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Governments act in an increasingly multilateral and international environ-
ment. However, making this cooperation work still depends heavily upon 
the capacities of national administrations. In many cases, their basic pro-
files have been shaped by long traditions, while others have undergone a 
process of transformation. In the context of the European Union, it is vital 
for member states to realize that European policies work effectively only 
when public administration is able to meet all new challenges. As an aid to 
understanding how we act, we decided to offer to the international public 
administration community an up-to-date edition of articles presenting and 
analysing the German system, including recent challenges and reforms. 
We have chosen the context of the European Public Administration 
Network (EUPAN), a forum for EU intergovernmental cooperation 
which includes member states and the European Commission, for launch-
ing the open access version of the book. The fora and this book consider 
the basis and standards for an effective and efficient public administration 
that is citizen-oriented and fosters trust in public institutions. This can 
support European initiatives for improving the implementation of public 
programmes and cooperation in the first place between the EU and its 
member states.
In the international community of public administration scholars and 
practitioners, there is a growing need for knowledge and information, 
analyses, reviews and evaluations of present-day Germany’s administrative 
system and recent reforms. German researchers and practitioners are often 
asked for a publication to meet this need, especially in the arena of the 
International Institute of Administrative Sciences (IIAS) and its regional 
Foreword
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institution, the European Group of Public Administration (EGPA), as well 
as in the world-wide public administration projects of the Deutsche 
Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) GmbH. The pres-
ent volume is intended to respond to research and teaching needs and to 
provide information on the actual practices and reforms.
No English-language publication about the German administrative sys-
tems has been on the market since 2001, when the German Section of the 
IIAS successfully met the demand for such a publication nearly 20 years 
after the first, published in 1983. However, as these two works were pro-
duced before and after German unification, much of their content is now 
outdated and in need of major revision.1 I am grateful to all the authors 
represented in this volume, who are leading academics and practitioners in 
the field and who cooperated with great enthusiasm to bring forth the 
new edition within a short period of time. They all take full responsibility 
for the content they have contributed.
The German Section of the International Institute of Administrative 
Sciences is deeply grateful to Professor Sabine Kuhlmann (Potsdam), 
Professor Isabella Proeller (Potsdam), State Secretary Dieter Schimanke 
(ret., Magdeburg/Hamburg) and Professor Jan Ziekow (Speyer) for 
developing the idea for this publication and realizing it together with a 
group of high-level experts in the German public administration.
State Secretary, 
Federal Ministry of the Interior, 
Building and Community  
President, German Section of the IIAS
 Hans-Georg Engelke
1. See König, K., von Oertzen, H.J., Wagener, F. (eds.) (1983). Public 
Administration in the Federal Republic of Germany. Deventer: Kluwer. 




We would like to thank the German Section of the International Institute 
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launching this book project and for their support throughout the process 
of writing. We very much enjoyed working with the twenty-seven contrib-
uting authors and would like to express our appreciation to all of them for 
their dedication and enthusiasm in bringing this volume together. The fact 
that we were able to finish this project in less than two years is a testament 
to their commitment and discipline.
Our gratitude also goes to the German Corporation for International 
Cooperation (Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit—
GIZ) for their generous support in the publishing of this book. GIZ is a 
state-owned service provider in the field of international cooperation for 
sustainable development in all continents. It is specialized, inter alia, in 
public sector reforms, administrative transformation and civil society par-
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sponsoring the publication project (Open Access version), some of the 
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The twenty-two chapters of the book, though each taking a specific 
perspective topic-wise, are based on a common understanding of the main 
characteristics, attributes and approaches as well as the most relevant 
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CHAPTER 1
German Public Administration: Background 
and Key Issues
Sabine Kuhlmann, Isabella Proeller, Dieter Schimanke, 
and Jan Ziekow
1  IntroductIon: Background and approach 
of the puBlIcatIon
In the international community of Public Administration (PA) of scholars 
and practitioners, there is a growing need to acquire knowledge and infor-
mation, analysis, reviews and evaluations about Germany’s administrative 
system and its recent reforms. The German system of public 
administration, which is embedded in the Rechtsstaat culture and deeply 
S. Kuhlmann • I. Proeller 
University of Potsdam, Potsdam, Germany
e-mail: skuhlman@uni-potsdam.de; proeller@uni-potsdam.de 
D. Schimanke (*) 




German Research Institute for Public Administration, Speyer, Germany
e-mail: ziekow@foev-speyer.de
2
rooted in the legalist tradition, is not simply regarded as a reference model 
for developing and transition countries. The basic features of the German 
administrative system have also inspired reform debates and modernisa-
tion efforts in OECD countries (Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development). Due to its federal structure and the pronouncedly 
decentralised institutional setting, German public administration is 
regarded as a prime example of multilevel governance and strong local 
self-government. Furthermore, over the past decades, the traditional pro-
file of the German administrative system has significantly been reshaped 
and remoulded through reforms, processes of modernisation and the 
transformation process in East Germany that began with unification. 
Wide-ranging approaches to reform from territorial amalgamations, priva-
tisation and re-municipalisation, citizen participation, performance and 
human resource management, to better regulation and digital govern-
ment, have been pursued at various levels of government and have had 
varying effects. Within this context, we observe an increasing interest in 
the academic and practitioner’s community to acquire more comprehen-
sive and systematic knowledge about Germany’s administrative system, its 
institutional structures, functional responsibilities, civil service features, 
multilevel governance and most recent reforms. From a comparative pub-
lic administration perspective, there is a need for more in-depth institu-
tional knowledge concerning the various administrative systems in order 
to capture the peculiarities of different models, compare their strengths 
and weaknesses, and learn from each other while striving for improvement 
in public administration worldwide.
Against this background, it is a cause for concern and criticism that 
there has been no English language publication about German adminis-
trative systems on the market for about 20 years, when the German Section 
of the International Institute of Administrative Sciences (IIAS) published 
the last volume. A number of new topics, for example digital and open 
government, better regulation, co-production, participatory administra-
tion, have since come on the agenda and thus merit analytical attention. 
This book is about filling this knowledge gap. After two decades, it is time 
to present a topical, comprehensive yet differentiated analysis of Germany’s 
public administration and its reforms that explicitly targets an interna-
tional audience of PA practitioners, policy advisors, academics and stu-
dents. The contributions in this book provide an overview of the key 
elements of German public administration at the federal, state (Länder) 
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and local levels of government and of the current reform processes of the 
public sector. They focus, inter alia, on the following areas:
• key institutional features of public administration;
• changing relationships between public administration, society and 
the private sector;
• administrative reforms at different levels of the federal system; and
• new challenges and modernisation approaches, such as digitalisation, 
open government and better regulation.
The four topics are addressed in this book. Part I outlines the basic 
features, institutions and legal framework of German public administra-
tion at different levels of government and within its multilevel setting. In 
Part II, the relationship between politics and administration, administra-
tive procedures, controlling and accountability mechanisms as well as key 
resources of administrative action (staff, finances) is analysed. The subse-
quent chapters focus on the various fields of administrative reform and 
modernisation, starting in Part III with reforms intended to reshape the 
macro-institutional setting of public administration. This includes a his-
torical review of the administrative transformation after unification as well 
as more recent approaches to reform, such as the redrawing of territorial 
boundaries and jurisdictions, functional and structural reforms, the re-
definition of the relationship between the public and the private sector 
through privatisation, and the opening up of public administration vis-à- 
vis citizens and society. Finally, in Part IV, the focus is on changes in the 
distribution of responsibilities and resources within administrative organ-
isations, the re-engineering of administrative processes, digital innovations 
and e-administration, the internal reorganisation of decision-making rules 
designed to enhance management capacities, efficiency in service delivery 
and the quality of policymaking.
2  part I: german puBlIc admInIstratIon 
In the multIlevel system
Owing to its legalistic tradition, German public administration is very 
much rule-driven. Karl-Peter Sommermann refers to the concept of 
Rechtsstaat. German public administration is rooted in this tradition, 
which aims at the protection of human dignity and individual freedom by 
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providing, alongside the principle of legality, the rules, principles and insti-
tutions that ensure the prevention of arbitrary state action and the protec-
tion of individual rights. A dynamic interpretation of the Basic Law (the 
German Constitution) of 1949 by the Federal Constitutional Court has 
constantly specified and extended the normative scope of fundamental 
rights, which are directly binding upon the legislative, executive and judi-
cial powers. The constitutional principle of the welfare state has not only 
enhanced the dynamic evolution of the law, but also led to the creation of 
largely equivalent levels of infrastructure and services in the different ter-
ritories of the federal state. The continually readjusted cooperation 
between the federal level and the Länder level and among the Länder 
themselves has strengthened the interoperability and coherence of their 
administrations, and competitive elements have fostered innovation.
The German federal architecture is shaped by a peculiar mix of strong 
decentralisation and a high degree of autonomy at lower levels of govern-
ment, combined with an administrative culture of uniformity, solidarity 
and coordination. Nathalie Behnke and Sabine Kropp recapitulate the 
notion of this system as ‘administrative federalism’ to emphasise the prom-
inent role of executives and administrations in policymaking and policy 
implementation. The dominant principle of administrative federalism is 
the territorial principle as opposed to the functional principle, that is gov-
ernments and administrations at each level are responsible for all the tasks 
at this level with the exemption of special regulations for sectoral organisa-
tions. The federal level relies on the states (Länder) for executing its tasks. 
For their part, the Länder executives have rights of co-decision in federal 
legislation via the Bundesrat (Federal Council). While formal jurisdictions 
are strongly decentralised, a dense web of interlocking powers as well as 
processes and institutions of coordination induce territorial governments 
to closely cooperate with each other when implementing (compulsory) 
joint tasks and coordinating autonomous responsibilities voluntarily. To 
date, German-style administrative federalism has been successful in curb-
ing conflict caused by dissent among political parties and in implementing 
policies efficiently. However, trends like the upward shift of tasks from the 
Länder to the federal level and increasing party system fragmentation chal-
lenge its continued success and consequently require adaptation.
The three-tier system of German public administration is increasingly 
being brought in line with the overarching level of the European Union 
(EU) and in a special form of vertical arrangement. As Hans Hofmann 
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calls it, the EU is a union of states sui generis (unique). The Member States 
remain independent states and, in principle, retain their sovereignty. 
However, the EU’s influence on national public administrations is con-
stantly growing due to the increasing number of regulations (laws, bylaws, 
guidelines) and other EU programmes that require implementation in the 
Member States. The expanding influence of the EU is not limited to those 
areas where the Member States have transferred the authority to make 
laws to the EU, but is also spreading to those areas where the Member 
States have retained such authority. At the same time, however, there is no 
systematic codification of the law on administrative procedures at European 
level and no system of legal remedy for Union citizens equivalent to those 
at national level.
Germany’s federal administration is significantly small in size (around 
ten per cent of all public employees). This special feature of the country’s 
administrative system—as described by Julia Fleischer—is based on the 
division of responsibilities. The central (federal) level develops and adopts 
most of the public programmes and laws, and the state level (together 
with the local level) implements them. The administration at the federal 
level comprises the ministries, some subordinated agencies for special 
issues (e.g. the application of drugs, information security and the registra-
tion of refugees) and selected operational tasks in single administrative 
sectors (e.g. foreign affairs, the armed forces, the federal police and the 
supreme courts). The capacities to prepare and monitor laws are well 
developed. Moreover, the approaches to innovation and the instruments 
and tools of internal communication and coordination are exemplary 
compared to other countries.
According to the Basic Law, the states are, in principle, responsible for 
public administration, regardless of whether state or federal law is being 
enforced. The Federation has no authority to enforce state laws. When 
federal states carry out federal laws, they may do so in their own right or 
on federal commission. In both cases, the Federation has rights of supervi-
sion. Hans-Heinrich von Knobloch clearly makes these principles explicit 
on the relevant case of the portfolio of the Ministry of Interior. The Basic 
Law has set a narrow framework for the federal administration. The obli-
gations and options of the federal administration are defined in full. 
However, superior federal authorities responsible for the entire federal ter-
ritory may be established by law and passed with the consent of the 
Bundesrat for matters on which the Federation has the power to legislate.
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The institutions of the social security system are the main providers of 
services of the welfare state and cover a large share of the public budgets 
(about 45 per cent of expenditures). On the one hand, the system enjoys 
a certain degree of autonomy and is therefore called ‘indirect state admin-
istration’, as explained by Dieter Schimanke. On the other hand, the steer-
ing by federal legislation is quite extensive. However, in implementing this 
legislation, the institutions are only subject to limited state supervision, 
which is restricted to legal supervision (Rechtsaufsicht). Moreover, the 
social security institutions can appeal to the ‘social courts’ against the 
orders of the supervising state administration.
In Germany’s federal system, the administrations of the 16 federal 
states (Länder) have central responsibility for the enforcement of both 
federal and state law. Ludger Schrapper observes that notwithstanding the 
heterogeneity in terms of their size, administrative tradition and culture, 
there is relative uniformity in their administrative structures (with the 
exception of the three city-states). Everywhere, the municipalities, which 
are part of the state executive under state law, play a significant and, above 
all, independent role as bodies of public administration. Still, there are 
some differences which are due to whether the administrations of the 
Länder have a two-tier or a three-tier structure. Within these varying 
structures, administration seems to be relatively homogeneous, not least 
because of the very similar staffing structures, career patterns and admin-
istrative cultures. Structural reforms of very different scope have been a 
long-term phenomenon since the 1990s.
The local level, also called the communal level (municipalities, cities 
and counties), plays a strong administrative and political role in the 
German system. Kay Ruge and Klaus Ritgen demonstrate the weight of 
the communal level in the figures for personnel and budgets. The right 
to local self-government is guaranteed in the Basic Law and has a long 
history. Moreover, the communal administration—and especially the 
county level—serves a second function. It is, in principle, the opera-
tional level responsible for implementing the programmes and laws of 
the federal and state levels. The local authorities mainly differentiate 
themselves from the federal and regional authorities by the mandates of 
their elected representative bodies (city council, county council and 
municipal council). The head of a local administration (mayor or county 
commissioner) is usually directly elected by the citizens. Finally, the 
principle of German local self- government and administration is a good 
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example for practising the cornerstones of the European Charter of 
Local Self-Government.
3  part II: polItIcs, procedures and resources
The relationship between politics and administration is the key to under-
stand the conditions and interactions between administrations. In their 
chapter, Werner Jann and Sylvia Veit examine the relationships between 
politicians and administrators in Germany, both in institutional and legal 
terms as well as at all three levels of German executive federalism, that is 
the federal, state and local level. Using the concept of politicisation, they 
start with the distinction between politicians and civil servants and the 
viability of such distinction in practice. The central indicators are party 
membership and turnover rates after elections. Jann and Veit examine dif-
ferent dimensions of politicisation both in federal ministries and in the 
federal states, focusing on typical career patterns as well as the key features 
of the political-administrative relations at the local level. As a result, the 
authors identify a high degree of functional politicisation of top positions 
in public administration.
The dimension of public administration as a ‘working state’ was intro-
duced into German administrative science as far back as the nineteenth 
century (von Stein 1870, p. 7). Taking a process-oriented approach, Jan 
Ziekow examines public administration as the interconnection of informa-
tion, communications, interactions and decisions. As regards German 
administration, he assumes a distinction between processes and proce-
dures, whereby one feature of these procedures vis-à-vis persons outside 
the administration is a high degree of juridification by administrative pro-
cedure law. He classifies and analyses the administrative processes accord-
ing to different criteria and empirical and legal categories. Among other 
things, Ziekow deals with service delivery processes, communication, 
transparency and information, administrative procedure law, management 
processes, knowledge management, inter-organisational cooperation and 
administrative oversight.
In order to hold public administration accountable, a differentiated set 
of instruments is required. Veith Mehde emphasises—from a legal point of 
view—that the concept of accountability is an element of democratic legit-
imacy. He describes two very different mechanisms. First, the control 
exercised over the administrative jurisdiction and second, the control exer-
cised by the courts of audit. He particularly emphasises the fact that it is 
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not the role of the administrative courts and courts of audit to hold 
administration accountable. Rather, their role is to provide other actors—
the parliaments, the public, the media, etc.—the opportunity to hold the 
respective administration accountable. As part of their role in exercising 
administrative jurisdiction, Mehde describes the structure of administrative 
courts in Germany, the types of their decisions and the depth and extent 
of their control. He also describes the organisation and scope of review of 
the courts of audit as well as the effects of their control.
The professionalisation of public service staff is one of the most impor-
tant aspects of efficient administration. The employment structure and 
training of these employees is generally characteristic of a national admin-
istrative system. Accordingly, Christoph Reichard and Eckhard Schröter 
open their chapter on civil service and public employment with the ques-
tion, ‘What kind of an animal is the German civil service?’ Their contribu-
tion sheds light on the size and structure of public employment in Germany 
prior to presenting the two different types of employment status in the 
public service, ‘civil servants’ on the one hand and ‘public employees’ on 
the other. Following an overview of the legal framework and policies relat-
ing to the civil service, subsequent sections deal with recruitment and 
qualifications, compensation schemes and benefits as well as major 
reform trends.
‘Money makes the world go round’—this also applies to public admin-
istration. Revenues and expenditures are central to public administration 
processes. In the chapter on public finance, Gisela Färber deals with the 
principles of budgeting and the budget cycle as well as the generation and 
distribution of tax revenues in Germany. In the latter context, she 
addresses, inter alia, the constitutional regulations on the distribution of 
financial resources and the structure of public expenditure and revenue—
providing a general structural analysis as well as a breakdown of tax reve-
nues from a federal perspective. Färber goes on to discuss the considerable 
importance in the German federal financial system of the vertical and hori-
zontal fiscal equalisation between the various administrative units. The 
chapter closes with an account of public indebtedness and budget deficits 
in Germany at different government levels.
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4  part III: redrawIng structures, BoundarIes 
and servIce delIvery
In order to understand more recent developments and modernisation 
efforts in the German administrative system, it is important to consider 
earlier developments, especially after reunification, which sharply distin-
guish the German case from other European countries. Against this back-
drop, the chapter by Hellmut Wollmann reviews the transformation of 
public administration in East Germany following unification. He focuses 
on the process and result of the administrative transformation process in 
East Germany as one of the most comprehensive institutional shifts of the 
last century. He provides an overview of the peculiarities of the East 
German mode of transformation (as opposed to other transition coun-
tries) and of the ‘transfer of institutions’ from West to East. In trying to 
answer the question ‘what shapes institutions’, he analyses the drivers and 
triggers of the process as well as the impacts and outcomes of the transfor-
mation process achieved so far. Wollmann also reviews some remaining 
problems, legacies and new challenges facing the unified German 
administration.
Due to the highly decentralised federal structure and the allocation of 
administrative tasks primarily to sub-national units, reforms in the multi-
level system have always played a key role in Germany. Sabine Kuhlmann 
and Jörg Bogumil analyse recent territorial, functional and structural 
reforms in the German Länder, which represent three of the most crucial 
reform trajectories at the sub-national level to date. The chapter sheds 
light on the variety of reform approaches pursued by the different Länder 
and also highlights some of the factors that account for these differences. 
Kuhlmann and Bogumil also address the transfer of state functions to local 
governments, the restructuring of Länder administrations (e.g. the abol-
ishment of the meso level of Länder administrations and of single-purpose 
state agencies), and the redrawing of territorial boundaries at county and 
municipal levels. In the final section, they give a brief review of the recently 
failed (territorial) reforms in Eastern Germany.
Administrative reforms not only refer to vertical rescaling of competen-
cies and tasks between levels of government but also to horizontal reor-
ganisations vis-à-vis the private sector on the one hand, and in relation to 
citizens and society on the other. The chapter by Benjamin Friedländer, 
Manfred Röber and Christina Schaefer begins with the observation that in 
recent decades, the provision of public services in Germany has 
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increasingly been transferred to bodies outside the core administration, 
which has changed the institutional landscape significantly. The authors 
examine four dominant institutional trends, namely corporatisation, out-
sourcing, privatisation and re-municipalisation. They also discuss some of 
the advantages and disadvantages of public vs. private service provision.
As regards the changing relationship between public administration 
and citizens/society, two major reform approaches merit attention. First, 
the co-production of services and the involvement of multiple actors, both 
in the delivery of services and in decision-making. The trend towards a 
more participatory administration and co-production with citizens is ana-
lysed by Stephan Grohs who specifically focuses on the shift from ‘tradi-
tional’ modes of service delivery and decision-making to co-producing 
features and participatory elements. He also addresses some of the result-
ing key problems and pitfalls, such as accountability, transparency and 
legitimacy.
5  part Iv: modernIsIng processes and enhancIng 
management capacItIes
The fourth part of this book provides an analysis of the reform and mod-
ernisation efforts of German public administration, most of which target 
various internal administrative management capacities. As elsewhere, digi-
talisation is a ubiquitous and omnipresent organisational challenge for 
public administrations in Germany. In the chapter on digital transforma-
tion, Ines Mergel analyses how Germany is managing the transformation of 
its service delivery structures. She describes how the digital transformation 
of the public sector is embedded in a large-scale reform to digitalise the 
service delivery of 575 public services by 2022. Mergel also describes the 
legal basis of digital transformation with its centralised and decentralised 
organisational embeddedness of administrative responsibilities, and illus-
trates recent developments with selected cases of implementation.
Second, there has been a significant trend towards ‘open government’, 
which Jan Porth, Friederike Bickmann, Patrick Schweizer and Zarina Feller 
see as a trend towards greater openness in political and administrative 
actions. They provide a brief overview of the conceptual understanding of 
open government, the potential advantages and disadvantages as well as 
recent developments at the federal level of government in Germany. Three 
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selected sub-fields of open government, namely open government data, 
open innovation and open budget, are presented in more detail.
The role of public administration is not only limited to service delivery 
but also extends into the legislative process and its involvement in drawing 
up and drafting new regulations. Sylvia Veit and Sabine Kuhlmann explore 
and describe how ‘Better Regulation’ has become an influential and estab-
lished mechanism at the federal level and—in some cases—also at the 
Länder level in Germany. The authors introduce the basic features of the 
legislative process at the federal level in Germany, address different aspects 
of Better Regulation and outline the role of the National Regulatory 
Control Council (Nationaler Normenkontrollrat–NKR) as a ‘watchdog’ 
for compliance costs, red tape and regulatory impacts.
Public administration—not only in Germany—requires a sufficient 
number of qualified and motivated staff to produce services and imple-
ment policies efficiently, effectively, professionally and reliably. Hence, 
managing the workforce is one of the most crucial functions in public 
administration. The chapter by Isabella Proeller and John Siegel first exam-
ines the practices and developments in (core) human resource manage-
ment (functions). They then turn to a discussion on the importance of 
leadership, performance-related pay, public service motivation and diver-
sity management. The authors conclude by highlighting some of the 
major paradoxes of German public human resource management (HRM) 
in light of current challenges, such as demographic change, digital trans-
formation and capabilities for organisational development.
In the final chapter, Isabella Proeller and John Siegel analyse two very 
prominent public management reform trajectories in German public 
administration over the past three decades since unification. In the 1990s, 
the New Steering Model emerged as a German variant of the New Public 
Management (NPM). Since the mid-2000s, local governments in Germany 
have been subjected to a mandatory reform of their budgeting and 
accounting system known as the New Municipal Financial Management 
reforms. These reforms have led to substantial changes, but have really 
only scratched the surface in terms of changing control mechanisms and 
the organisational culture.
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6  InternatIonal context and lessons to learn
Each of the chapters highlights and explains selected key features of the 
German administrative system or relevant approaches to reform, then pro-
vides descriptive information about these issues before moving on to 
problem-oriented analyses of the subject area. At the same time, these 
analyses are linked to key debates and theories in public administration 
and policy and are accessible and comprehensible to an international read-
ership not familiar with the German case. Finally, each chapter draws some 
lessons and conclusions to be considered by international readers when it 
comes to concept transfer, good practice learning and institutional transla-
tions into different national contexts.
The book is designed to serve as a basic reference book for students, 
academics and practitioners interested in better understanding and con-
textualising German public administration. It elaborates on the particu-
larities in order to make these understandable to an international 
readership. To this end, the authors embed their analyses in the interna-
tional context and refer to formal as well as informal mechanisms and 
standard operating procedures at work, showing how they differ from 
other national systems and administrative settings elsewhere. ‘Comparing 
is human’ (Raadschelders 2011, p. 831ff.) because it helps to understand 
one’s own (national) administrative system by comparing it with others 
and recognising its particularities, advantages and disadvantages, strengths 
and weaknesses (Kuhlmann and Wollmann 2019, p. 2). The aim is thus to 
stimulate the interest and curiosity of academics and practitioners in the 
variety of administrative systems beyond national borders and from a 
trans-European and global perspective.
Furthermore, to encourage international comparisons, each chapter in 
this book concludes with a ‘lessons learned’ section. These lessons point 
out important features and mechanisms that manifest themselves in the 
German setting and should be considered when referring to the German 
model in the international debate. For academics, lessons learned might 
point to the importance/non-importance of certain independent or con-
textual variables. For practitioners, lessons learned might point to caveats 
in concept transfer. For both communities, the different chapters may be 
helpful for a more thorough and informed comparison of the German case.
 S. KUHLMANN ET AL.
13
references
Kuhlmann, S., & Wollmann, H. (2019). Introduction to Comparative Public 
Administration. Administrative Systems and Reforms in Europe (2nd ed.). 
Cheltenham/Northampton: Edward Elgar.
Raadschelders, J. C. N. (2011). Commentary—Between ‘Thick Description’ and 
Large-N Studies. The Fragmentation of Comparative Research. Public 
Administration Review, 71(6), 831–833.
von Stein, L. (1870 [2010]). Handbuch der Verwaltungslehre und des 
Verwaltungsrechts, Stuttgart: Cotta (reprint U.  Schliesky (Ed.)). 
Tübingen: Mohr.
Open Access  This chapter is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons 
Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/
by/4.0/), which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction 
in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original 
author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons licence and 
indicate if changes were made.
The images or other third party material in this chapter are included in the 
chapter’s Creative Commons licence, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to 
the material. If material is not included in the chapter’s Creative Commons licence 
and your intended use is not permitted by statutory regulation or exceeds the 
permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from the copy-
right holder.
1 GERMAN PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION: BACKGROUND AND KEY ISSUES 
PART I
German Public Administration in the 
Multilevel System
17© The Author(s) 2021
S. Kuhlmann et al. (eds.), Public Administration in Germany, 
Governance and Public Management, 
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-53697-8_2
CHAPTER 2




Among the characteristics of German public administration that are most 
likely to catch the eye of a foreign observer include the following two 
phenomena: first, the high density of statutory law (law adopted by the 
parliament) regulating the organisation, the procedure and the substantive 
criteria for the activities of public administration; and second, the almost 
ubiquitous presence of arguments inferred from constitutional law in the 
legislative process, court rulings and even administrative decisions. The 
practice to constantly emphasise the interconnection of constitutional and 
ordinary law can also be seen in legal education, where professors of public 
law teach administrative law against the background of constitutional law. 
Unlike in the Romance-speaking countries, most German law faculties do 
not clearly separate the chairs of constitutional law from those of adminis-
trative law, but combine them under the denomination of ‘public law’, 
notwithstanding the fact that the holders of the chairs will often specialise 
more or less in one of the fields.
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The legalistic orientation of German public administration has not con-
stituted an obstacle to modernisation processes based on managerialist or 
new governance approaches, but has limited their scope, in particular by 
pointing out the necessity of constitutional safeguards. This chapter 
undertakes to elaborate on the guiding constitutional concepts and 
requirements, which determine the development of German public admin-
istration and its capacity to adapt to a changing environment.
2  Key concepts of publIc law 
and publIc admInIstratIon
German public administration has been profoundly shaped by two con-
cepts: by the liberal idea of a Rechtsstaat that originated in pre-democratic 
times and aims at an effective protection of individual freedom, and by the 
idea of a strictly normative constitution that is binding upon all public 
powers—the legislator as well as the executive power and the judiciary.
2.1  The Principle of the Law-Governed State (Rechtsstaat)
In international and European terminology, the term Rechtsstaat has for 
some time now generally been translated into English as ‘rule of law’. This 
terminological choice and the subsequent exchange of ideas have fostered 
a conceptual convergence of both principles, even in the national sphere 
(see Sommermann 2018: 107ff.). Despite their origins in far different 
contexts and the attachment of the rule of law to the concept of parlia-
mentary sovereignty, they are inspired by similar insights and by the objec-
tive to protect individual freedom through reliable laws and prevention of 
arbitrary state action. The most prominent German author of the first half 
of the nineteenth century who pushed forward the idea of the Rechtsstaat 
was the liberal Robert von Mohl (1799–1875). His approach even resem-
bles the modern concept of a ‘social’ Rechtsstaat, when he emphasises the 
obligation of the state to promote the free development of citizens by 
organising ‘the living together of the people in such a manner that each 
member of it will be supported and fostered, to the highest degree possi-
ble, in its free and comprehensive exercise and use of its strengths’ (von 
Mohl 1844: 8). In the further discussion, scholars put more emphasis on 
the formal requirements of the Rechtsstaat, gradually supplementing the 
core principles of legality and separation of powers (including judicial 
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control by independent courts) by the principles of equal treatment, 
accountability of those who act on the basis of public powers, legal cer-
tainty and proportionality. The Rechtsstaat, like the rule of law, relies upon 
procedural rationality and fairness, although the criteria are not always 
the same.
2.2  The Constitutional State (Verfassungsstaat)
The modern constitutional state takes up essential elements of the idea of 
the Rechtsstaat. It is characterised by the strict normativity of a constitu-
tion, which includes guarantees and enforcement measures for individual 
freedom, even against parliamentary acts. In the Basic Law, conceived as a 
counter-concept to overcome the totalitarianism of the Nazi period and, 
since 1990, the constitution of the reunified Germany, Article 1 (3) already 
reflects the will of its drafters to establish a strictly normative constitution. 
It reads: ‘The following fundamental rights shall bind the legislature, the 
executive and the judiciary as directly applicable law.’ Furthermore, con-
sidering the guarantee of judicial protection in Article 19 (4) and the pow-
ers attributed to the Federal Constitutional Court in Article 93, the 
normative, in no part merely programmatic, character of the Basic Law 
becomes evident. The normative and formative powers of the Basic Law 
turned out to be so strong that as early as 1959, the then president of the 
Federal (Supreme) Administrative Court, Fritz Werner, coined the 
phrase—nowadays often quoted, not only in Germany—that ‘administra-
tive law is constitutional law put into concrete terms’ (Werner 1959: 527). 
This is particularly true for the general principles derived from Article 20 
(3) (see Sect. 3.1) and for the normative effect of the fundamental rights 
(see Sect. 3.3).
2.3  The Integration of the Rechtsstaat 
and the Verfassungsstaat in the European Union
The German legal system, as any other legal system of the European 
Union (EU) Member States, is subject to the influence of supranational 
law. European Union law has not only been triggering legal reforms and 
the reinterpretation of ordinary law, but also constitutional amendments 
(cf. Chap. 4). In general, conflicts between European law and domestic 
constitutional law have largely been avoided by constitutional opening 
clauses, first, by the general empowerment clause of Article 24 (1) ‘to 
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transfer sovereign powers to international organisations’, and later since 
the constitutional reform of December 1992, by a special clause for 
European integration (Article 23). However, this empowerment finds its 
limits in other constitutional provisions. The Federal Constitutional Court 
had already stated with regard to the general clause of Article 24 (1) that 
it does not authorise the constitutional bodies to give up the constitu-
tional identity of the Federal Republic of Germany through the transfer of 
powers that will jeopardise the constituent structures of the Basic Law 
(BVerfGE 73, 339, 375–376). This applies, in particular, to the constitu-
tional elements declared as unchangeable in Article 79 (3) (the so-called 
eternity clause), that is, ‘the division of the Federation into Länder, their 
participation in principle in the legislative process, or the principles laid 
down in Articles 1 and 20’—Article 1 enshrines the inviolability of human 
dignity and the direct applicability of fundamental rights; Article 20, basic 
constitutional principles such as democracy, separation of powers and the 
rule of law. The ‘European Clause’ of Article 23, inserted in the Basic Law 
in 1992, took up the case law of the Federal Constitutional Court. 
Germany’s participation in the development of European integration is 
admissible as long as the Union ‘is committed to democratic, social and 
federal principles, to the rule of law (principles of a Rechtsstaat) and to the 
principle of subsidiarity and [..] guarantees a level of protection of basic 
rights essentially comparable to that afforded by this Basic Law’, and does 
not infringe upon the constitutional elements secured by the ‘eternity 
clause’.1 Since the European Union considers itself to be a Rechtsunion, 
that is, a union governed by the rule of law/Rechtsstaat (Article 2 of the 
Treaty on European Union), there are favourable conditions for a harmo-
nious interaction between the national and the European level in this 
respect. Despite the fact that ‘different national traditions underpin the 
“rule of law” in the EU’ (Nicolaidis and Kleinfeld 2012: 27ff.), the sub-
principles of the Rechtsstaat mentioned above are, in essence, equally rec-
ognised by the European Court of Justice.
This is not always the case regarding the democratic principle. As will 
be shown (see Sect. 5), the requirement for democratic legitimacy of all 
state action, laid down in Article 20 (2), bears the potential to generate 
conflicts with secondary EU law containing organisational prescriptions 
for the national public administrations.
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2.4  Lessons Learned
German history has shown the importance of always maintaining aware-
ness that formal principles, such as the separation of powers, legality, legal 
security, proportionality and judicial protection by independent courts, 
are not ends in themselves, but serve the common goal of preventing arbi-
trary state action and preserving individual rights. When the Nazis came 
to power, some lawyers tried to reinterpret the Rechtsstaat, criticising the 
mere formal understanding of the notion. They proposed substituting it 
for a concept focussing on ‘national-socialist justice’, which would allow 
sacrificing ‘mere formal principles’ for the sake of this substantive goal. 
Such perversion of the Rechtsstaat is only conceivable against the back-
ground of a former reduction of the Rechtsstaat to formal principles. The 
original idea that led to the establishment of the formal principles men-
tioned had not been kept alive (cf. Sommermann 1997: 150ff.). Hence, it 
is indispensable to understand that the fundamental objective of the 
Rechtsstaat is the protection of human dignity and individual freedom, 
and to centre any discussion on the further development of the concept 
around this objective. Equally, a mere reference to an unspecified ‘justice’ 
(Rechtsstaat as state of justice, Gerechtigkeitsstaat) bears the risk of open-
ing up the concept to barely controllable contents.
3  the constItutIonal frame 
of publIc admInIstratIon
Notwithstanding the fact that the Basic Law provides only few concrete 
rules for public administration, numerous organisational, procedural and 
substantive requirements have been derived from its general principles, its 
federal architecture and the duty to protect fundamental rights.
3.1  Constitutional Principles
The concept of the Rechtsstaat had early on been linked to principles such 
as proportionality (choice of the less severe appropriate means to attain a 
legitimate aim that must not be outweighed by the detrimental effects) 
and legal certainty (prohibition, inter alia, of retroactive regulations or of 
the revocation of lawful administrative decisions). The administrative 
courts applied these criteria as general principles, implied in the essence of 
administrative law as such. With the entering into force of the Basic Law, 
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these principles became, alongside others, part of the positive constitu-
tional law. The Federal Constitutional Court and the legal doctrine con-
sidered the principle of the Rechtsstaat, which is expressly mentioned in 
Article 28 (1) of the Basic Law (with regard to the Länder constitutions), 
to be primarily enshrined in Article 20 (3) (BVerfGE 35, 41, 47; 117, 
163, 185), which provides that the ‘legislature shall be bound by the con-
stitutional order, the executive and the judiciary by law and justice’. From 
the subjection of the executive power to the law (principle of legality), the 
jurisprudence furthermore derived, besides the supremacy of the law 
(Vorrang des Gesetzes), the necessity to base administrative action directly 
or indirectly on a parliamentary act (Vorbehalt des Gesetzes). In this sense, 
Article 80 (1) of the Basic Law determines that the issue of statutory 
instruments (Rechtsverordnungen) requires an explicit parliamentary act of 
delegation. Consequently, in the German parliamentary system of govern-
ment, there are no independent statutory orders, as is the case, for exam-
ple, in the semi-presidential system of France. Furthermore, in the light of 
the democratic principle, the Federal Constitutional Court has concluded 
that all ‘essential provisions’, especially those related to fundamental 
rights, have to be regulated by the parliament itself and therefore cannot 
be delegated to the executive power (BVerfGE 49, 89, 126; 139, 148, 
174–175). Apart from democratic considerations, this solution ensures 
that important questions are deliberated in a multistage parliamentary 
process where the pros and cons are discussed more intensely and more 
transparently than in a monocratic executive organ. Irrespective of the 
eminent role played by the parliament, the Federal Constitutional Court 
recognises a core area of self-responsibility of the executive power, which 
includes a ‘confidential sphere for initiatives, deliberations and actions’, in 
particular in the governmental process of decision-making (BVerfGE 137, 
185, 234–235).
The requirement to assign state tasks to the functionally most adequate 
bodies is attributed to the principle of separation of powers (Article 20 
(2)), which, in turn, is considered to be inherent in a Rechtsstaat (BVerfGE 
68, 1, 86; excerpts in English in Kommers 2012: 139ff.). Further recog-
nised subprinciples of the constitutional principle of the Rechtsstaat are a 
clear attribution of responsibilities, certainty of the law (definiteness, pub-
licity, reliability and consistency of the law as well as protection of legiti-
mate expectations) and proportionality (Heun 2011: 41ff.; Morlok and 
Michael 2019: 142ff.; Robbers 2019: 49–50; Sommermann 2018: 128ff.). 
Other more detailed requirements of the Rechtsstaat concerning 
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administrative action are the objectivity and impartiality in the exercise of 
public functions, the duty of administrative authorities to hear the indi-
vidual before imposing a burden and to give reason for the decision. The 
federal law and the laws of the sixteen Länder on administrative procedure 
further specify these requirements. The duty to give reason is most impor-
tant for an effective defence against unlawful acts and has to be seen in the 
light of the requirement of an effective judicial protection of the rights of 
individuals. Being part and parcel of the concept of the Rechtsstaat, the 
guarantee of an effective judicial protection against the violation of indi-
vidual rights by a public authority is explicitly laid down in Article 19 (4) 
of the Basic Law.
The principle of objectivity and impartiality in the exercise of public func-
tions finds an institutional safeguard in the guarantee of a professional civil 
service (Berufsbeamtentum). Article 33 (4) and (5) of the Basic Law stipu-
lates that the exercise of sovereign authority as a rule should be entrusted to 
members of the civil service who stand in a relationship of service and loyalty 
defined by public law, with due regard to the traditional principles of the 
professional civil service (cf. Chap. 13). The status of this category of civil 
servants is characterised, inter alia, by employment as lifetime officials, dif-
ferent career tracks (according to qualifications), recruitment and promo-
tion according to the merit principle and loyalty towards the constitution 
and towards the public employer, the prohibition of strikes and the duty of 
public employers to grant remuneration and retirement benefits that corre-
spond to the public function exercised by the respective official. Influenced 
by new concepts in leadership and human resource management, the main-
tenance of the constitutional guarantee of Article 33 has repeatedly been 
discussed, but no constitutional reform that would abolish the traditional 
principles of the Berufsbeamtentum has taken place so far.
As far as principles of state policy are concerned, the German constitu-
tion enshrines two basic aspirational principles (Staatszielbestimmungen): 
first, the principle of the social state (Article 20 (1)), and second, the prin-
ciple of environmental protection, also with regard to the responsibility 
towards future generations (Article 20a). These principles, although they 
do not convey individual rights, are not merely programmatic proclama-
tions, but have binding character for the legislator, the executive and the 
judiciary. The legislator must pursue and consider these objectives when 
making laws, even though the jurisprudence of the Federal Constitutional 
Court has allowed for a wide margin of discretion and has limited its con-
trol to evident violations of the constitutional objectives. However, these 
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principles attain considerable importance when combined with fundamen-
tal rights. For the public administration and the courts, the principles of 
the social state (Sozialstaat) and the ecological state (Umweltstaat) consti-
tute binding criteria for the interpretation of the law or for the exercise of 
discretionary powers. The social state, interpreted in the light of the 
freedom- protecting principle of the Rechtsstaat, can rather be qualified as 
an ‘enabling state’ that creates and improves the social conditions for a 
free development of the members of the society than a predominantly 
transfer-oriented ‘welfare state’ (Sommermann 2018: 54ff.; Morlok and 
Michael 2019: 187). The Federal Constitutional Court has derived from 
the principle of the social state in conjunction with the inviolability and 
protection of human dignity (Article 1 (1)), a fundamental right to the 
guarantee of a subsistence minimum, comprising not only a physical but 
also a sociocultural dimension (BVerfGE 125, 177, 221ff.).
3.2  The Multilevel Administration of German Federalism
The federal structure of German public administration entails three main 
territorial levels of public administration: the federal level, the Länder level 
and the local level (cf. Chaps. 3, 5, and 8). The local administration forms 
part of the Länder administration but enjoys a constitutional right to regu-
late through bylaws (Satzungen), within the limits of the law, all local affairs 
(Article 28 (2)). Because of their partial legal autonomy, local administra-
tion and other self-administrating public bodies created by law are char-
acterised as ‘indirect state administration’ (mittelbare Staatsverwaltung). 
It should be noted that local authorities partly act as state authorities 
(Länder authorities) of first instance. In this sense, the areas of their own 
responsibility (eigener Wirkungskreis) have to be distinguished from those 
of delegated responsibility (übertragener Wirkungskreis; cf. Chap. 9).
While the Basic Law assigns the majority of legislative competences to 
the Federation, the overwhelming majority of administrative competences 
remains with the Länder, where the local authorities deliver most of the 
administrative tasks (Heun 2011: 62). The principle of execution of fed-
eral laws by the Länder forms part of what is called Exekutivföderalismus 
(executive federalism), characterised by an intertwining of the federal and 
the Länder level (cf. see Chap. 8; for the conceptualisation of the execu-
tive federalism in Germany, cf. Dann 2004: 123ff.).
According to Article 87 (3), the federal legislator can establish federal 
agencies for matters on which the Federation has legislative power and 
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thus create bodies of federal administration. The most important federal 
agency is the Bundesnetzagentur (Federal Network Agency), created in 
the wake of the privatisation of essential public services in the 1990s and 
whose regulatory and monitoring tasks lie in the field of telecommunica-
tions, postal services, energy and railways. The original administrative 
competences of the Federation relate to the foreign service, financial 
administration and federal waterways and shipping. Based on Article 87, a 
federal border police had been created, which was later transformed into a 
federal police responsible for border control and security of railways and 
airports. By and large, the main competence for police matters remains 
with the Länder.
As far as the regulations of the European Union are concerned, their 
execution conforms to the distribution of administrative competences 
applicable to national legislation. Likewise, the transposition of Union 
directives has to be carried out by that legislator or those legislators (fed-
eral parliament or Länder parliaments) who would be competent in 
national affairs. According to the principle of federal loyalty, which the 
Federal Constitutional Court has inferred from the federal principle 
(Article 20 (1); cf., e.g., the judgements BVerfGE 1, 299, 315, and 133, 
241, 262), the Länder are obliged vis-à-vis the Federation to take within 
their sphere of competence responsibility for the implementation of Union 
law. This is indispensable to prevent Germany breaching obligations under 
Union law. The same applies to the implementation of international law. 
In order to prevent unforeseeable obligations for the Länder, the Basic 
Law provides for their participation through the Bundesrat in matters 
concerning the European Union. Participation can even amount to repre-
sentation of Germany at Union level by a representative of the Länder 
when ‘legislative powers exclusive to the Länder concerning matters of 
school education, culture or broadcasting are primarily affected’ (Article 
23 (6)).
3.3  The Impact of Fundamental Rights 
on Public Administration
It goes without saying that fundamental rights put limits on the legislative 
power of the parliament and the rule-making power of public administra-
tion. Likewise, they constitute important criteria for the interpretation of 
the laws and for the exercise of discretionary powers by the administrative 
authorities. However, the normative scope of the fundamental rights goes 
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far beyond their classical liberal function as defensive rights against intru-
sions of the public power. According to the German Federal Constitutional 
Court, the fundamental rights establish
an objective order of values, and this order strongly reinforces the effect of 
power of fundamental rights. This value system, which centres upon dignity 
of the human personality developing freely within the social community, 
must be looked upon as a fundamental constitutional decision affecting all 
spheres of law. It serves as a yardstick for measuring and assessing all actions 
in the areas of legislation, public administration, and adjudication. (BVerfGE 
7, 198, 205—leading case)
Subsequently, the Court has inferred duties to protect from the objec-
tive dimension of the fundamental rights. The protection must also be 
ensured by an appropriate administrative organisation and procedural set-
ting (BVerfGE 65, 1, 51; 84, 34, 45–46). The legal doctrine has strength-
ened this approach by conceptualising administrative organisation and 
procedure as important steering mechanisms in the realisation of substan-
tive legal rules and principles (Schmidt-Aßmann 2004: 19ff., 244–245; 
Schuppert 2012: 1073ff.). The jurisprudence to consider fundamental 
rights as procedural guarantees equally applies to court procedures. In this 
sense, the Federal Constitutional Court emphasises the duty of the courts 
‘to make really effective the normative value of the fundamental rights in 
the respective procedure’ (BVerfGE 49, 252, 257).
3.4  Lessons Learned
A constitution can only comply with its task to create a reliable framework 
for the relations between citizens and the state and for the interaction 
between state organs if it possesses a strong legal normativity. ‘Normative 
constitutions’ (Löwenstein 1957: 147ff.; Grimm 2012: 105ff.) generally 
are provided with suitable mechanisms of implementation and enforce-
ment. In Germany, the Federal Constitutional Court has particularly 
enhanced the effectivity of fundamental rights.
In modern societies, the complexity of law is increasing, not least by the 
necessity to regulate the provision of infrastructure and social services, and 
to care for the prevention of risks associated with, for instance, new struc-
tures of economic power, the evolution of modern technologies, environ-
mental pollution and climate change. The new dimensions given to 
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fundamental rights by the jurisprudence of the German Federal 
Constitutional Court have to be seen against this background. The pro-
motion of obligations stemming from the principle of the social state 
backs the derivation of protective duties and procedural guarantees for the 
state, even from classical liberty rights. The cooperative structures and 
mechanisms of the federal system, as they have developed over the years, 
not only contribute to a largely equivalent level of protection and services 
in the whole German territory, but also reduce dysfunctional conflicts 
between the federal actors and ensure interoperability and coherence 
between their administrations. It goes without saying that the optimisa-
tion of the cooperation remains a constant task.
4  the role of JudIcIal revIew
In its efforts to strengthen individual rights, in particular the fundamental 
rights against state authorities, the drafters provided for the previously 
mentioned guarantee of an effective judicial protection against the viola-
tion of individual rights and for a constitutional control of the legislator. 
Shortly after the entering into force of the Basic Law in 1951, the func-
tions of the Federal Constitutional Court were supplemented by the com-
petence to adjudicate on individual constitutional complaints.
4.1  The Right to an Effective Judicial Remedy
Under the auspices of the guarantee of judicial protection against the pub-
lic power in Article 19 (4), the administrative jurisdiction soon developed 
into a bulwark of citizens against unlawful intrusions or inactivity of 
administrative authorities (cf. Chap. 12). From the beginning, the Code 
of Administrative Court Procedure of 1960 took into account that the 
protective interests of individuals are not limited to the annulment of ille-
gal administrative decisions. They equally comprise claims aiming at the 
issue of an administrative decision or another performance that has been 
refused or omitted as well as the declaration of the existence or non-exis-
tence of a legal relationship. Hence, the Code provides rules for rescissory 
actions as well as provisions on actions for performance and on declaratory 
actions. The same is true for the corresponding specialised codes of the 
social jurisdiction and the financial jurisdiction. In the codes of all the 
three branches of administrative jurisdiction, the provisions on the main 
procedures are accompanied by rules of interim relief that comprise, on 
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the one hand, automatic suspensory effect of rescissory actions or court 
orders of suspension and the empowerment of the court to issue tempo-
rary injunctions on the other. This system meets the requirements which 
the Federal Constitutional Court has inferred from the guarantee of 
Article 19 (4), in particular that the protection must be complete (without 
loopholes) and effective (cf. BVerfGE 35, 263, 274; 115, 81, 92).
Individuals often make use of the protection afforded by the adminis-
trative courts. In the general administrative jurisdiction alone (i.e. not 
including the social and the fiscal jurisdiction), there were about 200,000 
new lawsuits and around 80,000 requests lodged for interim relief in 
2018.2 Currently, there are still numerous claims of migrants for recogni-
tion as refugees which are pending.
4.2  The Powers of the Constitutional Jurisdiction
The constitutional jurisdiction of the Federation and the Länder partici-
pates in the protection of individuals against unlawful behaviour on the 
part of the public administration, especially by adjudicating on constitu-
tional complaints. Since the Federal Constitutional Court has derived a 
general liberty right from Article 2 (1), which is applicable if none of the 
special liberty rights is relevant (BVerfGE 6, 32, 36ff.—leading case), all 
illegal acts that impose a burden have to be seen as affecting a fundamental 
right. However, before presenting a constitutional complaint, the plaintiff 
has to exhaust the ordinary remedies before the courts. If the action is 
dismissed by the last instance, the constitutional complaint that asserts the 
violation of a fundamental right is generally directed not only against the 
administrative decision, but also against the last-instance judgement that 
confirms the administrative act. The constitutional complaint, just as an 
abstract or a concrete review of statutes, can lead to the annulment of a 
law if the violation of the fundamental right originates in it. Out of the 
almost 6000 new cases received by the Federal Constitutional Court in 
2018, more than 95 percent were constitutional complaints.
4.3  The Jurisdictionalisation of Administrative 
and Constitutional Law
If the Federal Constitutional Court finds that a law is unconstitutional, it 
does not always declare it null and void. It has developed a technique 
according to which it limits itself to the mere declaration of 
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unconstitutionality in case an annulment would cause disproportionate 
damage. However, in these cases, the court will generally combine the 
declaration of unconstitutionality with a time limit within which the legis-
lator has to remedy the situation. In special cases, the court even states 
that specific transitional rules have to be applied until the new legislation 
is adopted, thus acting as a praeceptor legislatoris, that is, substitute legisla-
tor (Sommermann 2018: 98). Furthermore, the jurisprudence of the 
court has considerably contributed to strengthening judicial control over 
the exercise of discretionary powers and planning procedures. Therefore, 
new approaches to regain a broader margin of appreciation for public 
administration by restricting complete control of the legal application 
have been discussed (cf. Schmidt-Aßmann 2004: 217ff.), especially by the 
doctrine of specific empowerments of public administration by the 
legislator.
With regard to the active role the Federal Constitutional Court plays in 
the German legal culture, some authors warned that the state of parlia-
mentary legislation would be transformed into a state of constitutional 
jurisdiction (verfassungsgerichtlicher Jurisdiktionsstaat; see in particular 
Böckenförde 1990: 25). However, it cannot be denied that the predomi-
nant role given to the fundamental rights by the constitutional jurisdiction 
has sensitised public administration for constitutional principles and has 
ensured over past decades a high degree of protection of the rights of the 
citizens, who hold the Federal Constitutional Court in high esteem.3
4.4  Lessons Learned
In a modern state, which takes responsibility for infrastructure, public ser-
vices and social benefits, effective judicial control requires more than pro-
cedures that are limited to the annulment of illegal administrative decisions. 
After the Second World War, the drafters of the Basic Law and subse-
quently the German legislator felt strongly committed to establishing an 
all-encompassing judicial protection of citizens against unlawful behaviour 
on the part of the state. Consequently, a system was soon created that 
provided not only rescissory actions, but also, taking up earlier first 
approaches, remedies against the inactivity of public administration. In 
order to allow for timely help, interim relief remedies completed the pro-
tective system. In harmony with the main procedures, the administrative 
courts are empowered to grant interim relief in all conceivable situations 
where judicial control is needed to protect individual rights. In most 
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Member States of the European Union, this resynchronisation between 
the development of the administrative law (which had already expanded 
into the fields of planning procedures and service delivery much earlier) 
has taken place only since the 1990s. In the German case, it was the trau-
matic experience of a dictatorship which gave rise to the early modernisa-
tion of the judicial system. The same is true for the remedy of constitutional 
complaints that considerably strengthened the position of individuals and 
gave rise to a specification of the constitutional right to effective judicial 
protection.
5  constItutIonal reform 
and constItutIonal change
The constitutionalisation of the legal order on the one hand, and its 
Europeanisation on the other, entails the necessity to constantly adapt the 
constitution to the changing social and economic situations and suprana-
tional context. To date, the Basic Law has been modified sixty-four times, 
producing a constitutional text more than twice as long as it was in 1949 
and, from the aspect of a formal legislative process, in many cases not 
exemplary for a constitution that should focus on essential points. Most 
modifications concern the organisational part and the financial constitu-
tion. Fundamental rights have undergone only a few modifications to their 
wording, the most important changes stemming from their dynamic inter-
pretation by the Federal Constitutional Court. Thus, the Court has 
derived from the right to freely develop one’s personality (Article 2 (1)) in 
conjunction with the protection of human dignity (Article 1 (1)), first a 
general right to privacy, later (1983) an implicit right to self-determina-
tion over personal data (BVerfGE 65, 1, 41ff.) and then (2008) a right to 
the confidentiality and integrity of information technology systems 
(BVerfGE 120, 274, 302ff.). Furthermore, the reinterpretation of consti-
tutional rules or principles in the light of European Union law constitute 
an important factor of constitutional change, that is, a change without a 
constitutional reform pursuant to Article 79, which would require a two-
thirds majority in both chambers, the Bundestag and the Bundesrat. As far 
as the principles laid down in Articles 1 and 20 of the Basic Law are con-
cerned, constitutional reforms are not admissible. This has already gener-
ated a conflict between obligations arising out of Union law to establish 
independent agencies, on the one hand, and the principle of democratic 
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legitimation enshrined in Article 20 (1), on the other hand, given that the 
principle of democratic legitimation and responsibility is deemed to 
require supervision by the competent minister in order to maintain parlia-
mentary accountability. A solution can only be found in a reinterpretation 
of Article 20, which means that the understanding of the requirement of 
an uninterrupted chain of democratic legitimation has to be modified. 
This appears to be justifiable to the extent that the legislator defines the 
rules governing the decisions of the agency in a clear and sufficiently pre-
cise manner and alternative forms of parliamentary control are established.
6  conclusIon
German public administration has long been influenced by a legalist 
approach inherent to, and shaped by, the concept of the Rechtsstaat. 
Under the Basic Law of 1949 and the jurisprudence of the Federal 
Constitutional Court, this approach even became a constitution-centric 
juridification of public tasks (Frankenberg 2014: 143). Fundamental 
rights not only are safeguards for individual freedom, but also convey, in 
the light of the principle of the social state, directives for positive state 
action. Given the dense normativity of the constitutional obligations 
inferred from the Basic Law, the law of the European Union poses a major 
challenge for the adaptability and flexibility of the German legal system.
German federalism is modelled in a way that the infrastructure and the 
social services are roughly equivalent in the sixteen Länder. The intense 
self-coordination among the Länder themselves and between the Länder 
and the Federation strengthens this tendency towards a unitary federal 
state (unitarischer Bundesstaat; Hesse 1962: 13–14). Not least at admin-
istrative level, the cooperation between the members of the Federation 
constitutes an important prerequisite for coping effectively with tasks like 
internal security, environmental protection, strategies for digitalisation 
and, as recent developments have shown, migration, climate policy and 
the fight against pandemic diseases. The latest constitutional reforms have 
further developed the cooperative federalism to the extent that the 
Federation can participate in structural tasks at the local level through co-
financing educational infrastructure and public housing. The price the 
Länder had to pay was the admission of special controls concerning the 
use of the funds. The maintenance of a living federalism requires a con-
stant balancing and reconciliation of centripetal and centrifugal forces.
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The German federal state has frequently been analysed through the lens of 
‘administrative federalism’ (see, e.g., Hueglin and Fenna 2015: 54). This 
denotation builds on two basic dimensions. On the one hand, it empha-
sises that governments and administrations at all territorial levels are pow-
erful actors in policymaking and implementation processes. On the other 
hand, compared to other federations, the German model implies that leg-
islation predominantly takes place at the federal level, while the Länder 
(the relevant political sub-federal units) implement federal laws in their 
own right, through their own administration and at their own cost 
(Kuhlmann and Wollmann 2019: 93). This specific federal architecture is 
inherited (as elaborated in Sect. 2) and entails a specific distribution of 
responsibilities and functions (as elaborated in Sect. 3; see also the chapter 
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by Schrapper). Accordingly, the strength of the Länder is not rooted in 
exclusive jurisdictions and self-rule, but based on their extensive rights to 
co-decide on federal bills and their prerogative to implement federal laws.
Consequentially, Länder administrations are embedded in a dense net-
work of vertical and horizontal relations. Two (types of) organisational 
bodies are particularly relevant for securing coordination both horizon-
tally among the Länder and vertically between the entire Länder and the 
federal level: the Bundesrat and the various ministerial councils, among 
which the prime ministerial council (Ministerpräsidentenkonferenz) is the 
most prominent, as will be elaborated in Sect. 4.
In other federal states providing a more dual federal architecture, such 
as the United States or Switzerland, horizontal intergovernmental coun-
cils primarily fulfil the function of protecting sub-federal policymaking or 
policy implementation from federal encroachment. Second chambers, 
where they exist and have some meaningful role in legislation, rarely rep-
resent sub-federal interests. By contrast, in Germany, both (types of) bod-
ies represent effective arenas for multilateral coordination, thereby 
providing various venues for debating and deciding potentially conten-
tious issues. They also serve as arenas where conflicts can be averted at an 
early stage of the political process. This consensual culture of decision- 
making in multilevel structures was illustratively described as entangled or 
interlocking politics (a more or less clumsy translation of Politikverflechtung 
as coined by Fritz W. Scharpf). While critics claim that this cooperative, 
multilateral decision-making style might lead at best to incremental 
change, or even to outright decision deadlock, it turned out that these 
bodies have contributed to a surprisingly high effectiveness of German 
federalism and a concomitantly low level of litigation between the units of 
government.
2  HIstorIcal roots of German 
admInIstratIve federalIsm
The peculiar German model of administrative federalism is deeply rooted 
in German history. Although the German Basic Law was drafted from 
scratch after the breakdown of the totalitarian regime and the end of the 
Second World War in 1945, constitutional key institutions were conspicu-
ously taken from federal experiences in the German past and adapted to 
the requirements of the newly established federal democratic institutional 
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setting. Especially the period from 1867 to 1871 is perceived as a ‘critical 
juncture’ in German administrative federalism (Weichlein 2012: 112).
Three basic features have decisively shaped administrative federalism: 
first, most notably, the executive character of the Bundesrat; second, the 
principle of administrative connectivity (Verwaltungskonnexität); and 
third, the vertical division of powers that runs along functions but not 
along policies, a principle which entails coordination and cooperation 
between various governments and bureaucracies across all policy fields. 
Consequently, bureaucrats are strong players in these intergovernmental 
settings, because they make coordinative and cooperative activities work 
(Behnke 2019).
The German empire’s constitution adopted in 1871 (Reichsverfassung) 
fostered the administrative character of German federalism. In the nine-
teenth century, former independent territorial units pooled their sover-
eignty in order to unite and establish the German nation-state. Most 
importantly, the Bundesrat was designed as an assembly of Länder repre-
sentatives, holding legislative as well as executive powers (Frotscher and 
Pieroth 2018: 209–212). And the Bundesrat, representing Länder gov-
ernments, partially assumed functions of the federal government, which 
was still weak at that time and had to resort to Länder contributions and 
their administrative resources. Furthermore, as an embodiment of the 
authoritarian state, the Bundesrat enabled the former federal chancellor, 
Otto von Bismarck, to circumvent parliamentary accountability (Weichlein 
2012: 113). Hence, federalism served as a ‘fence’, protecting the govern-
ments and their bureaucracies against parliamentarisation and the upcom-
ing emancipation of the working class. The Bundesrat was designed to 
secure the prerogative of the emperor over the Reichstag; for the time 
being, it also helped regional sovereigns to contain the state parliaments’ 
growing demands for participation.
Since the nineteenth century, the federal government has not been 
responsible for implementing its own laws, even though residual federal 
administrative responsibilities do meanwhile exist (Mußgnug 1984: 189). 
As a rule, the Länder executives implemented (and still implement) federal 
laws and bear the cost involved (Verwaltungskonnexität). On the other 
hand, since the Länder take over administrative responsibility for federal 
matters, they must also be involved in federal legislation, which was (and 
still is) executed with the requirement that all federal bills pass the 
Bundesrat. The concomitant functional division of labour necessitated 
intergovernmental coordination and fostered entanglement among the 
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federal units. The developing welfare state and expanding infrastructure 
(railway construction, trade etc.) pressured governments to find unitary 
solutions, thereby strengthening cooperation between executive actors 
across territorial levels. Finally, a legalistic administrative culture devel-
oped during the nineteenth century, underpinning since then the German 
federal culture.
The constitution of the Weimar Republic (1918–1933) did not sub-
stantially alter this basic architecture. After the breakdown of the Nazi 
regime, which had abrogated federalism in 1934, the allies advocated fed-
eralisation and decentralisation as a means of containing any potential mis-
use of governmental power. During the early post-war period (1945–1949), 
the heads of Länder governments (the minister presidents) were leading 
figures in framing the constitutional debate. Concomitantly, before the 
Federal Republic was founded in 1949, the ministerial bureaucracies of 
the Länder had already begun to apply horizontal cooperation in various 
policy fields. After controversial debates in the parliamentary council 
(Parlamentarischer Rat) on drafting the Basic Law in 1948–1949, its rep-
resentatives ultimately rejected the US-style senate model, which would 
have stipulated the popular election of senators. Preferring the involve-
ment of Länder governments in federal legislation to the principles of 
immediate legitimation and self-rule, the fathers and mothers of the Basic 
Law returned to the Bundesrat model. In contrast to the 1871 constitu-
tion, parliamentary majorities now hold the post-war Länder governments 
accountable; administrations are agents of fully democratised govern-
ments. Nevertheless, the administrative character of German federalism is 
still anchored in the Bundesrat and its committee structure, composed of 
Länder bureaucrats rather than elected politicians, and is reflected in a 
dense web of inter-administrative bodies.
3  dIstrIbutIon of responsIbIlItIes
In West Germany after the end of the Second World War (1949) and East 
Germany after reunification (1990) (see the chapter by Wollmann), power 
was organised in a highly decentralised fashion, granting the Länder and 
their municipalities with a large number of jurisdictions. Power is divided 
in the ‘vertical’ dimension between two levels of government—the federal 
level and the sixteen Länder. The local authorities are formally lower 
administrative units of the Länder, but Article 28 of the Basic Law accords 
them extended rights of autonomy, in particular a functional omnipotence 
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within the territorial boundaries of their jurisdiction (see the chapter by 
Bogumil/Kuhlmann). Intermediate layers exist ‘in between’ the local and 
the Länder level. Higher communal associations (höhere 
Kommunalverbände) bundle local authorities’ administrative capacities for 
a larger territory. District organisations (Regierungspräsidien) are all- 
purpose sub-units of the Land ministry of the interior exercising direction, 
control and oversight over the execution of Länder tasks in the respective 
territory. In addition, there are functionally specialised Länder offices, for 
example, environmental offices, health offices and statistical offices, to 
name but a few.
Division of labour between the federal level and the Länder is organised 
mainly along a functional logic, yet overlapping with a policy-specific 
logic. Functionally, the federal level holds the majority of legislative pow-
ers, while the Länder and local authorities fulfil the overwhelming part of 
executive functions. Policy-wise, a few exceptions exist. For example, the 
Länder have retained legislative competences for culture, education and 
police and some minor competences. They also have considerable organ-
isational autonomy and decide how they implement policies. This even 
extends to the regulation of local charters, local fiscal equalisation systems 
and local responsibility for certain tasks. The division of legislative powers 
is elaborated mainly in Articles 72 and 74 of the Basic Law. The federal 
level, on the other hand, relies predominantly on Länder administrations 
to fulfil its tasks. In the case of a few tasks, which are deemed to be of 
exclusive federal nature, the federal government staffs its own offices at 
the local level across the territory. These include, for example, the military 
services, the customs and duty administration, and the intelligence ser-
vices, as well as the Federal Unemployment Agency and the Federal Office 
of Migration and Refugees (see Article 87 of the Basic Law).
If the activities of the Länder administrations relate to federal laws, the 
administrations act on behalf of the federal government. If they execute 
their own laws, they act autonomously. This distinction is laid down in 
Articles 83–85 of the Basic Law and has implications for the intensity with 
which the federal government may structure administrative processes and 
organisations in all Länder alike, thereby securing uniform standards of 
public service delivery. The Länder, for their part, can delegate their tasks 
to the local authorities, where basically the same principle applies: the local 
authorities, as administrative units that have direct contact with citizens as 
addressees of norms or as requesting services, act on their own behalf if 
they perform tasks that fall within the concept of local autonomy. If they 
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take on tasks that have been transferred to them by the Länder, they must 
respect the regulations given by the Länder and are subject to legal and 
functional oversight (Fachaufsicht) (see Fig. 3.1).
As a rule, the formal power distribution assigns clearly delineated juris-
dictions to each level of government or to single territorial units, thereby 
establishing political accountability and responsibility for the effective and 
efficient fulfilment of tasks. However, joint provision of tasks across levels 
of government severely hampers these principles. Nevertheless, with the 
constitutional reform of 1969, administrative coordination has intensified. 
The reform defined a considerable number of policy issues such as regional 
and economic development and the construction of university buildings as 
joint tasks to be planned, implemented and financed jointly by the federal 
government and the Länder (Articles 91a and 91b of the Basic Law). This 
instrument of joint tasks has been extended to other policy areas, such as 
labour administration, digitalisation (see the chapter by Mergel) and com-
parison of education levels (Articles 91c–91e of the Basic Law). Beyond 
these constitutionally prescribed joint tasks, voluntary horizontal and ver-
tical cooperation is a pervasive feature of administrative practice in 
Germany’s federal system, as will be discussed further in the next section. 
The motives for cooperation include, for example, striving for best prac-
tices, economies of scale and uniform implementation. In instances of ver-
tical or horizontal cooperation between the Länder and the federal level, 
self-regulatory bodies are often established and jointly staffed by all units 
legislative powers



















Fig. 3.1 Functional division of labour in the federal hierarchy
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involved in order to monitor the negotiation process and to govern imple-
mentation (e.g. the stability council or the IT planning council).
Financial management largely follows the principle of administrative 
connectivity, meaning that the unit responsible for executing a task or pro-
viding a service is obliged to finance it. The rationale behind this principle 
is to ensure a responsible spending behaviour. As is shown in Fig. 3.1, 
local authorities shoulder responsibility for the largest share of executive 
tasks. As they have the smallest allocation of financial resources, the higher 
levels of government transfer funds by means of tax sharing, fiscal equalisa-
tion payments or grant systems to the local level (see the chapter by 
Färber). Naturally, federal, Länder and local governments have diverging 
opinions about the amount of fiscal transfers necessary to fulfil tasks appro-
priately. Over the past decades, two trends have become apparent. First, 
taxes are increasingly being levied collectively. They are distributed in 
complex nested processes in order to empower each political and adminis-
trative unit to finance its own tasks. Second, with increasing amounts 
being spent by local authorities on welfare state payments, the federal gov-
ernment is willing to adopt larger shares of these payments by transferring 
money directly to the Länder level (e.g. according to Article 104a of the 
Basic Law). Nonetheless, in spite of this fundamentally cooperative atti-
tude, the level of payments to be made gives rise to much litigation, in 
particular between local authorities and the Länder.
To sum up, the vertical division of power is marked by a predominantly 
functional allocation of powers, whereas units with territorial jurisdictions 
and units with functional jurisdictions overlap across the German territory. 
Control and oversight are exercised mainly by the Länder over their local 
authorities, whereas the relationship between the Länder and the federal 
level is essentially non-hierarchical but marked by mutual rights of co- 
decision- making, which are exercised in various negotiation arenas (such 
as joint task committees). This multi-layered and strongly decentralised 
administration is consistent with Germany’s federal tradition and bol-
stered by a logic of subsidiarity and autonomy. It is balanced, however, by 
a deeply engrained administrative culture of cooperation and coordina-
tion. This specific manifestation of administrative federalism creates—in 
comparison to other federal architectures—a unique mix of decentralised 
decision-making, while securing policy homogeneity and a low level of 
litigation.
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4  coordInatIon and cooperatIon: makInG 
admInIstratIve federalIsm Work
The allocation of powers to territorial units provides the formal structure 
for policymaking. Yet, the everyday work of administrations requires con-
stant processes of communication, information and coordination between 
governments and bureaucracies. These processes of intergovernmental 
relations are what makes federalism work in everyday politics. 
Intergovernmental communication and negotiations are institutionalised 
mainly in two arenas: in Bundesrat sessions and in regular meetings of 
ministerial conferences. Additionally, a multitude of informal meetings, 
working groups or task forces emerge and disappear on single issues. 
Undoubtedly, the most prominent institution providing an institution-
alised framework for intergovernmental relations is the Bundesrat. 
According to Article 50 of the Basic Law, ‘(t)he Länder shall participate 
through the Bundesrat in the legislation and administration of the 
Federation and in matters concerning the European Union’. This pre-
scription implies a dual function: while the Bundesrat is a second chamber 
and, as such, involved in federal legislation, due to its composition and 
working mode, it also serves as a crucial arena for intergovernmental activ-
ities (Hegele 2017). The Bundesrat co-decides on every federal bill. 
Around 38–60 percent of all bills in post-war history have been consent 
bills requiring an absolute majority of votes in the Länder assembly. Bills 
typically require consent if they affect finance and tax issues. Most impor-
tantly, however, bills stipulating that the Länder administrations execute 
federal laws in their own right trigger the consent rule. The federalism 
reform of 2006 relaxed some of these requirements and the percentage of 
consent bills has since decreased from an average of 55 percent per legisla-
tive period to an average of 39 percent (Stecker 2016: 614).
The Bundesrat meets roughly every four weeks and in each plenary ses-
sion votes on about fifty federal bills. In order to shoulder this enormous 
workload, it is organised in working committees, which are at the top of 
the administrative coordination pyramid (Hoffmann and Wisser 2012: 
601) and are bolstered by numerous more or less formalised administra-
tive bodies and a dense network of informal administrative ties. Most com-
mittees are composed of higher-ranking civil servants (Ständige 
Sitzungsvertreter) from the respective Länder ministries, but in some com-
mittees (i.e. finance), the minister himself or herself takes part. In other 
‘political committees’ (i.e. defence or foreign relations), the minister 
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presidents themselves are involved, since these exclusive federal jurisdic-
tions are naturally not mirrored in the Länder cabinets (Sturm and Müller 
2013: 147 f.). The discourse in the committees is considerably shaped by 
the administrative and legal expertise of their members. As participants 
must often decide on dozens of issues during one meeting, generalists 
rather than policy specialists participate (Hoffmann and Wisser 2012: 
607). Before the meetings, however, the highly specialised civil servants 
employed in the respective divisions of the Länder ministries are required 
to prepare the issues within a short time period (usually six weeks; see 
Article 76 (2) of the Basic Law).
In intergovernmental negotiations, territorial, party-based and issue- 
specific interests interact (Toubeau and Massetti 2013). For example, if 
distributive programmes, fiscal or tax issues are on the agenda, territorial 
interests usually prevail over party positions. Notwithstanding, decision- 
making in the Bundesrat plenary sessions depends on political constella-
tions. As the coalition landscape at the Länder level—and thus the political 
composition of the Bundesrat—has become increasingly ‘multi-coloured’ 
since reunification, majorities nowadays are more often incongruent or 
even cross-cutting between the Bundestag and the Bundesrat. As part of 
the Länder governments, coalition parties need to agree on a common 
voting behaviour because each Land government must cast its votes en 
bloc (Article 51 (3) of the Basic Law). Accordingly, Länder coalitions stip-
ulate in their coalition treaties that the government abstain from voting in 
the Bundesrat should the parties in government be unable to come to an 
agreement. This kind of two-level bargaining, which takes place simulta-
neously within the federal and Länder governments and across the federal 
units, is, in theory, prone to blockade. Under these conditions, one may 
find it surprising that the Bundesrat has so far voted against a remarkably 
small fraction of bills; the arbitration committee has only been invoked on 
rare occasions. From 1994 to 2017, the number of disapproved bills and 
arbitration committee meetings decreased significantly (from 2.5 percent 
and 14 percent to 0.1 percent and 0.5 percent, respectively, according to 
the official statistics on the Bundesrat website).
Certainly, party ideology is a relevant factor in shaping Bundesrat nego-
tiations. Compromise and coalition building occur along party lines and 
across territorial interests, since Bundesrat members from the different 
Länder meet in political pre-negotiation circles—so-called A-rounds 
(Social Democrats), B-rounds (Christian Democrats) and G-rounds (the 
Greens). Yet, the final vote is shaped by various competing factors. First, 
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even if majorities diverge between the Bundestag and the Bundesrat, a 
conflict of interest between the federal and Länder governments is man-
aged by the practice that, already at the drafting stage of a bill, the federal 
legislator usually considers the preferences of Länder governments and 
adapts drafts according to the given majority situation (Burkhart and 
Manow 2006). Second, party organisations have been decentralised in 
recent years to a degree that has allowed Länder parties to place strong 
emphasis on territorial interests (Detterbeck 2012: 131ff.), which may 
cross-cut traditional party lines and open up new options for majority 
building. Third, civil servants who are involved in everyday legislative 
work share a similar professional understanding of their job and can mod-
erate party ideological conflicts within bureaucratic networks. Recent 
research reveals a moderate party politicisation in the Bundesrat commit-
tees which prepare Bundesrat votes (Souris 2018). They share a strong 
identity as neutral experts in their respective policy fields. At the same 
time, expertise and party logics are not mutually exclusive; civil servants 
usually anticipate the will of their political leadership (Mayntz and Scharpf 
1975). Depending on the political salience of the issue at stake, civil ser-
vants can ‘domesticate’ party politicisation, and often ministers and the 
cabinet follow their bureaucrats’ expert advice (on civil servant politicisa-
tion; see also the chapter by Jann/Veit). Thus, depending on the polarisa-
tion of an issue, the administrative model of federalism can be quite 
effective in containing party conflict in federal coordination (Hoffmann 
and Wisser 2012).
The second set of relevant intergovernmental arenas besides the 
Bundesrat are so-called ministerial conferences, eighteen sectoral inter-
governmental councils composed of ministerial bureaucrats from the 
Länder governments, who are sometimes joined by their counterparts 
from the federal level (Hegele and Behnke 2017). In addition to the sec-
toral conferences, the minister presidents’ conference is the most promi-
nent coordination arena of the Länder governments. Historically, the 
earliest ministerial conferences were founded in Germany after the Second 
World War, with the most recent (integration) being added in 2007. While 
administrative negotiations in the realm of Bundesrat sessions serve to 
provide input from administrative practice to legislative proposals, the 
meetings and autonomous working groups in and around ministerial con-
ferences serve primarily to coordinate Länder interests during other stages 
of the policy cycle. They can be used to put issues on the political agenda, 
to influence pre-legislative negotiations or to coordinate policy 
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implementation. Broadly, these meetings serve as a platform to exchange 
information, form coordinated positions, exert pressure and influence at 
the federal level, or to harmonise implementation practices. If issues on a 
ministerial conference’s agenda are simultaneously being debated in a leg-
islative bill in the Bundesrat, then typically the conference drops the issue 
to avoid a parallel discussion. Nevertheless, the decision as to which venue 
to choose if an issue is to be promoted politically—in a ministerial confer-
ence or in the Bundesrat—is also subject to strategic considerations. In 
that sense, the two arenas complement each other as fora of intergovern-
mental relations.
In the conferences, and even more so in the working groups, the logic 
of bureaucratic decision-making predominates over the logic of political 
decision-making. This is even more pronounced than in the Bundesrat 
and its committees, although it is in part the same persons who attend 
both fora. Indeed, the bureaucrats negotiating in ministerial conferences 
are well aware of the fact that they represent their home department pre-
sided by a minister who is, at the same time, member of a coalition party 
in government. They strive to act as ‘honest brokers’ for their ministers’ 
political aims within the limits of factual expertise and consensus orienta-
tion. However, German civil servants essentially define their role as experts 
responsible for a policy field and, in accordance with the Weberian legalis-
tic tradition, as advocates securing the rule-bound implementation of law 
(Hustedt and Salomonsen 2018). Surveys gathering data on the role defi-
nitions of political bureaucrats in the higher ministerial ranks suggest that 
the bureaucrats perceive themselves as representatives of the state but 
reject the role of party delegates (Mayntz and Derlien 1989; Schwanke 
and Ebinger 2006: 243). Due to continued coordination, vertical admin-
istrative ‘brotherhoods’ are sustained along policy areas, cutting across the 
levels of government and even stretching to the EU level.
While federal-Länder relations are well institutionalised and partly con-
stitutionally guaranteed, the local authorities have a harder standing in the 
multilevel game. Without formal involvement in federal legislation and 
being dependent on the decisions of Länder governments, they must rely 
on lobbying, negotiation and informal representation in federal and 
Länder institutions. As a result, communities have formed associations of 
interest representation, some dating back more than a hundred years such 
as the Deutsche Städtetag (German Cities Association), the Städte- und 
Gemeindebund (Federation of Cities and Municipalities) and the 
Landkreistag (Counties’ Association). Endowed by their members with 
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financial resources and the power to speak in their name, these associations 
have intensely lobbied federal legislative processes. They have acquired an 
undisputed position as experts in hearings and an informal chair in federal- 
Länder negotiations. To name just one example, it was due to the persis-
tent intervention on the part of the Counties Association that new 
provisions were added to Articles 84 and 85 of the Basic Law in the 2006 
constitutional reform protecting local authorities from an uncontrolled 
increase in tasks and concomitant financial burdens.
To sum up, multiple formal and informal, more or less institutionalised, 
and in part constitutionally guaranteed committees, councils and regular 
meetings are the backbone of intergovernmental relations. While federal 
and Länder levels are constitutionally on a fairly equal footing with the 
guaranteed participation of the Länder in federal legislation by means of 
the Bundesrat, the local authorities are in a more precarious situation and 
need to rely on lobbying to secure their influence on multilevel decision- 
making. In all these institutions and processes, bureaucrats from all levels 
of government play a crucial role in providing and exchanging informa-
tion, defending positions, communicating and negotiating policies. 
Thereby, political ideology and conflict are mediated to a large extent. 
While they definitely shape position-taking by intergovernmental actors, 
they rarely develop disruptive power. As a rule, multilevel decision-making 
proceeds far more smoothly than the complicated formal network of 
entangled powers, institutions and processes would suggest.
5  trends and cHallenGes
In recent decades, the steadily increasing Europeanisation of the German 
institutional setting has further bolstered administrative federalism, since 
bureaucratic networks, which are organised along policy fields, connect 
EU, federal and Länder (including local) actors and institutions. In fact, 
the German model of federalism has proved rather successful in coping 
with the challenge of creating institutional complementarity across the 
various territorial levels. It matches the European institutional setting, as 
it reflects its explicit executive character. In the intertwined European and 
German multilevel systems, executives of the lower territorial units partici-
pate in legislation at the respective higher level, thereby joining executive 
and legislative functions. This construction clearly empowers administra-
tive actors. In Brussels, national (and sub-federal, if exclusive jurisdictions 
of the Länder are affected) bureaucrats are involved in all stages of 
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policymaking. Similar to the Bundesrat model, the national governments 
and their civil servants negotiate rules and orders in numerous suprana-
tional and intergovernmental bodies, which are attached to the European 
Commission, the council of ministers and other EU institutions.
By applying the expertise of sub-federal ministerial bureaucracies in 
federal legislation during the early stages of policymaking, administrative 
federalism has actively contributed to professionalising law-making since 
1949. Nonetheless, the German model is under pressure for change and 
has been the subject of critical debate. First, applying the principal-agent 
theory, it could be argued that German federalism is prone to agency 
problems. In this regard, ministers as ‘principals’ are not expected to 
closely scrutinise their bureaucrats. However, this theory is the subject of 
controversy; Bogumil et al. suggest that ministers are not always able to 
enforce their political will, since a growing share of (political) bureaucrats 
are more inclined to prioritise expertise at the cost of the (politically 
accountable) minister’s political preferences (Bogumil et  al. 2012: 
166–168). Second, it is beyond question that the administrative (execu-
tive) character of cooperative federalism, which also stretches to the EU 
level, weakens parliaments as the primary principals, mainly at the Länder 
level (Kropp 2015), because parliaments face difficulties in scrutinising 
their governments and administrations and untying package deals in the 
multilevel intergovernmental game. Administrative federalism has 
undoubtedly secured legal expertise and may improve the quality of legis-
lation, but, as a flipside, it diminishes transparency and complicates 
accountability. Even though the Bundestag and some resource-strong 
Länder parliaments participate throughout the executive-driven multilevel 
processes and have thus managed to enlarge their information and scru-
tiny rights vis-à-vis their governments in EU affairs (Kropp 2013), this 
does not counterbalance the deficiencies of input legitimacy.
Third, administrative capacity and financial power are not evenly dis-
tributed among the German Länder. Not surprisingly, some of the smaller 
Länder and city-states face difficulties in drafting their own policy solu-
tions or in implementing laws, even when exclusive jurisdictions, exit 
options and deviation rights are constitutionally provided. As a result, 
German federalism is not fully able to exploit its potential to launch com-
petition for best policy solutions and thus fails to serve one of its genuine 
purposes. Due to weak administrative capacity (which adds to a remark-
ably unitary federal culture), policymakers do not often tailor regulations 
and laws to regional needs. Moreover, in intergovernmental bodies, the 
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stronger Länder usually dominate the scenery. Overall, the power imbal-
ance among the Länder devitalises federalism, a trend that has been 
enforced by personnel cutbacks across all levels of public administration.
Finally, federal administrative networks are basically able to generate 
innovative policy solutions transcending the status quo. Although moder-
ate party politicisation is inherent in intergovernmental bodies, which 
make decisions with broad majorities or even unanimously, blockades 
rarely emerge from federal negotiations. In the past, even large-scale 
reforms were adopted, since party positions converged and moved away 
from the status quo. The German federal system with its strong institu-
tionalised vetoes, however, will come under pressure if party polarisation 
further increases. Today, three-party Länder coalitions are often required 
to achieve a parliamentary majority. As a result, tensions between cabinet 
members have increased. This may also affect intergovernmental networks 
because civil servants are obliged to show loyalty to their respective minis-
ter, even if, as experts themselves, they have conflicting views. Under these 
conditions, consensus building and decision-making in the intergovern-
mental arenas will become increasingly burdensome.
6  conclusIon and lessons learned
As the above considerations have shown, German federalism cannot prop-
erly be understood without appreciating the specific division of functions 
between the federal and Länder levels, which gives powerful authority to 
Länder executives and administrations in policymaking (by means of the 
Bundesrat negotiations) and in implementation (by means of the Länder 
prerogative). This characteristic and the formation of the Bundesrat as 
second chamber staffed by members of Länder governments are historic 
and deeply ingrained in the German federal tradition. The tight institu-
tional entanglement between executives and administrations at both levels 
of government requires powerful coordination mechanisms. In everyday 
policymaking, coordination is achieved across multiple arenas, including 
committees and working groups of intergovernmental coordination and 
cooperation in which bureaucrats especially play an important role in cur-
tailing conflicts of interest and harmonising policy implementation. The 
strong administrative influence has proven to be rather efficient. 
Implementation runs smoothly, and, while regional variation is being 
accommodated to some degree by the highly decentralised territorial 
organisation, living conditions are relatively homogenous across the 
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German territory (compared to other federal states). However, despite the 
constitutional requirements to achieve ‘equal living conditions’ and mul-
tiple redistributive programmes, regional disparities have not been elimi-
nated. In an era of policy challenges such as terror prevention, refugee 
integration, energy transition and digitalisation, the overly complex insti-
tutional and procedural architecture of German administrative federalism 
is constantly being criticised for hindering the development of efficient 
solutions. According to federal decision-makers, the trend towards even 
stronger centralisation and unitarisation of policymaking seems to be 
inherent in new tasks cross-cutting the existing distribution of 
responsibilities.
In terms of legislation, executive influence on policymaking would, in 
theory, be prone to causing deadlocks; in practice, however, political con-
flict is moderated by coordination routines in the intergovernmental are-
nas. Party affiliation serves to structure coordination procedures, for 
example, in the A-, B- and G-rounds of pre-plenary coordination in 
Bundesrat and ministerial conference meetings, but it rarely causes out-
right blockade. Administrative federalism is criticised for its democratic 
deficit because parliaments, particularly at the Länder level, are basically 
disadvantaged in multilevel games. However, to the extent that recent or 
ongoing trends such as increasing territorial disparities and the fractionali-
sation of the political landscape undermine efficient policymaking and 
implementation, it becomes questionable whether the model of adminis-
trative federalism will be robust enough to live up to its promise.
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The European Union (EU) is not a (federal) state, but rather a union of 
states sui generis created by means of international treaties and having its 
own legal system. Within the EU, the Member States remain independent 
states and, in principle, retain their sovereignty. The Member States have 
defined the EU’s competences and areas of activity in various treaties such 
as the Treaty on European Union (TEU) and the Treaty on the Functioning 
of the European Union (TFEU), also known as the Treaty of Lisbon. 
These treaties are called primary law. According to the principle of confer-
ral anchored in these treaties (Article 5 (1) and (2) TEU), the Union may 
legislate and adopt legally binding acts through its law-making organs 
only when primary law has conferred on it the competence to do so 
(Article 2 (1) TFEU). These legal acts constitute secondary law and are 
adopted above all in the form of regulations, directives and decisions 
(Article 288 TFEU). The national law of each Member State remains in 
force alongside.
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Primary law governs not only the division of competences between the 
EU and its Member States, but also the organs of the EU and their proce-
dures, in particular the procedure for adopting legislation. Primary law 
can therefore be understood as the constitutional law of the EU. However, 
since its founding as a purely economic partnership of convenience, the 
EU has developed into a comprehensive union with state-like structures 
and is characterised by an increasing transfer of sovereign powers from the 
Member States to the Union.
2  the eu’s strIvIng to extend Its JurIsdIctIon
The division of competences between the EU and its Member States 
sketched out here is not static, nor is the co-existence of national and 
Union law entirely free of conflict. This relationship has evolved over time 
through primary law, often in connection with the admission of new EU 
Member States, but should also be regarded as an ongoing internal strug-
gle over power and influence between the EU and Member States.
Therefore, it would be wrong to describe the division of competences 
as unquestioned or unchallenged. On the contrary, the Union is con-
stantly striving to become an area of freedom, security and justice, which 
entails extensive harmonisation of the law. In the EU’s multilevel system, 
harmonisation is brought about by the process known as ‘Europeanisation’ 
of the Member States’ national legal systems. In this way, over the years, 
one field of national law after another has been taken into the EU’s legal 
system with the aim of harmonisation (cf. Nemec 2016; Sturm 2017).
This is a comprehensive process encompassing not only individual fields 
of law, such as law on competition, consumer protection and the environ-
ment, but the entire legal system as well: civil law, public and administra-
tive law, criminal law. The Europeanisation of the national legal systems 
also encompasses all dimensions of the law—law-making, administration 
and court rulings are all affected.
3  the PrIncIPle of MeMber state resPonsIbIlIty 
for adMInIsterIng and enforcIng eu law
Although the EU now has extensive power to legislate, it is in principle 
not responsible for enforcing secondary law (Vincze 2017). For this rea-
son, it does not have its own administrative apparatus comparable to those 
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of the Member States. According to the division of competences set out in 
primary law, the Member States are responsible for implementing the law 
(Article 4 (3) TEU).
Enforcement and application of the law has been conferred on the 
Union (as a rule, the European Commission) as executive in only a few 
areas, such as oversight of state aid. This is known as the direct implemen-
tation of Union law. Then there are other selected areas in which the EU’s 
own agencies take action as legal entities of the Union under public law.
As a result, administration within the EU takes three different forms:
• implementation of national law by the public administrations of the 
Member States,
• implementation of EU secondary law by the public administrations 
of the Member States (indirect implementation of Union law) and
• implementation of EU secondary law by organs or agencies of the 
EU (direct implementation of Union law or EU self-administration) 
in exceptional cases.
4  to avoId dIscrePancIes, MeMber states 
IMPleMent eu law to a greater degree than Is 
actually requIred
The fundamental division of administrative competences means that every 
Member State enforces Union law with its own administrative organisation 
and its own law on administrative procedures (see the chapter 11). The 
EU is not allowed in principle to intervene in the internal administration 
of the Member States. However, if the Member States’ public administra-
tions carry out the same EU law using different organisational units and 
under different law on administrative procedures, the problem of different 
standards arises.
This is why the Court of Justice of the European Union set a limit on 
the principle of administrative autonomy for the Member States. The 
administrative autonomy of the Member States ‘must be reconciled with 
the need to apply Community law uniformly so as to avoid unequal treat-
ment of producers and traders’ (European Court of Justice, judgement of 
21 September 1983, verb. Rs. 205–215/82, Slg 1983, 2633, Tz. 
17—Deutsche Milchkontor GmbH).
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In order to avoid disparities and conflicts in interpretation, national 
implementation must always obey two principles: the principle of effec-
tiveness (effet utile) and the prohibition of discrimination. According to 
the principle of effectiveness, the application of national procedural law 
must not interfere with the scope or effectiveness of EU law. In particular, 
the modalities provided for in national law on administrative procedures 
must not make it impossible in practice for EU law to take effect.
As a result, national law which is applicable in principle is modified 
when it is necessary to ensure the uniform application of EU law in accor-
dance with the principle of effectiveness.
The second principle is the prohibition of discrimination, which is also 
known as the principle of equivalence. This principle means that the pro-
cedural rules of national law must be no less favourable when implement-
ing EU law than when ruling on similar but purely domestic legal disputes. 
The national authorities must proceed with exactly the same degree of 
care when someone claims a right based on EU law as in similar cases in 
which they apply national law to a right guaranteed by national law alone. 
This also means that the authorities must refrain from any differences in 
treatment which cannot be justified objectively.
In general, EU law now exerts much greater influence in the Member 
States than can be directly derived from the provisions of primary and 
secondary law. This is partly due to pressure, not directly from EU or 
national law, but from administrative logic. If the Member States strictly 
conformed to the limited scope of EU law when implementing it, doing 
so would result in two different legal regimes in many areas. One regime 
would continue to be oriented on the existing national laws, as far as the 
EU has no legislative competence for the matter, while the second legal 
regime would be oriented on EU law and would be limited to its scope of 
application. Having two different legal regimes at the same time would 
necessarily create much more work for the administration and would be 
difficult to explain to the public. In order to avoid these difficulties, there 
is a strong tendency when implementing EU law to make national law 
conform to it, sometimes well beyond the actual scope of EU law. One 
example is the implementation of the EU Services Directive (see the 
chapter 11).
For the EU, this tendency represents a simple way to expand its own 
influence and is further reinforced by the trend towards greater network-
ing among Member States’ public administrations in the European 
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association of public administrations, and by administrative acts having a 
transnational effect.
5  eu court rulIngs
According to Article 19 (1) TEU, the Court of Justice of the European 
Union makes sure that both the Member States and the EU organs them-
selves uniformly comply with EU law. As a result of the Member States 
transferring sovereign powers to the EU, the courts of the Member States 
are not allowed to rule on the lawfulness of legal acts or administrative 
actions of the EU. Because the Court of Justice regards both written law 
(primary and secondary legal acts) and unwritten legal principles (often of 
its own creation) as EU law, in its rulings, it claims very extensive compe-
tences which are not entirely based directly on the Treaties. In this con-
text, the Court argues that the uniform application of Union law is a 
fundamental principle of the EU, thereby attempting to legitimise a 
‘Europeanisation’ of the Member States’ legal systems. This position can 
lead to conflicts over competence, especially with the constitutional courts 
of the Member States.
6  legal reMedy ProvIded by the natIonal 
adMInIstratIve courts
In Germany, judicial remedy against measures taken by the public admin-
istration is provided in accordance with the individual’s right vis-à-vis the 
public authorities (subjektives öffentliches Recht). For this reason, only 
those persons are entitled to recourse to the courts who can claim that the 
measure taken by the public authorities has violated their individual rights 
(see the chapter by Mehde). The legal principle the public authorities are 
alleged to have violated must therefore at least serve to protect the indi-
vidual (Schutznormtheorie). However, in Germany, unlike other countries, 
administrative procedures have the nature of a service and usually do not 
bestow direct individual rights. Simple procedural breaches therefore do 
not automatically lead to annulment of the decision and can only be chal-
lenged together with the substance of the decision. The German system of 
legal remedy thus does not provide for popular action (actio popularis) or 
collective action against the public administration. However, when there 
are grounds for recourse to the administrative courts, the court’s review is 
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much more thorough than in many other Member States, because the 
principle of ex officio investigation applies: the court itself must investigate 
the facts of the case (see the chapter 12). The court thus examines not 
only the arguments and the evidence provided by the parties themselves; 
it also conducts its own thorough investigation of the facts of the case and 
the lawfulness of the administrative measure. This very thorough legal 
remedy often results in extremely arduous and time-consuming legal pro-
ceedings, especially in legal challenges to complex, large-scale projects.
In the field of environmental protection, EU law in particular has 
expanded recourse to the courts in cases in which the claimant is not 
directly affected by the alleged violation of rights. A limited right of asso-
ciations to bring collective action was introduced to implement EU law 
and intergovernmental agreements (the Aarhus Convention). With this 
right, recognised environmental protection organisations (associations) 
can bring legal actions against violations of environmental law that do not 
violate their own individual rights (see the chapter 12). Such collective 
actions are extremely important in practical terms for the implementation 
of EU law. Because the EU does not have an administrative apparatus 
comparable to those of the Member States, it can monitor the Member 
States’ application of the law in individual cases only to a limited degree. 
Along with the recourse of individual Union citizens and companies to the 
Court of Justice and the Member States’ extensive reporting obligations 
vis-à-vis the European Commission, the right of associations to bring col-
lective action is an effective instrument for indirect oversight of the 
Member States’ authorities. Because of the principle of ex officio investi-
gation and the thoroughness of the review in German administrative court 
proceedings, such collective actions contribute to the much- lamented 
length of major proceedings in Germany.
7  lessons learned
The division of labour between the EU and its Member States actually 
provides for Union law to be enforced solely by the Member States 
through their public administrations and in accordance with their admin-
istrative law. It has become clear that this principle is not (or no longer) 
applied consistently. The EU’s own agencies enforce Union law in some 
areas, and Union law is constantly being added to, not only providing for 
substantive regulation, but also increasingly determining the administra-
tive practices of the Member States. This also has an indirect effect on 
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national administrative procedures outside the immediate scope of Union 
law, thus reinforcing the latter’s impact on public administration in the 
Member States. At the same time, however, consistent law on administra-
tive procedures is lacking at EU level (see the chapter 11). Although the 
EU has no general competence to legislate enforcement of such law by the 
Member States, codification for the area of the EU’s own administration 
would send a strong signal.
The Member States are called on to take a serious and, where necessary, 
critical look at how Union law is increasingly permeating their national 
law. Germany has a great interest in supporting to guide future develop-
ments and in making a contribution to these developments. Community 
and national administrative law have a steadily growing influence on each 
other. Increasing convergence between the two in future could offer an 
opportunity to address the codification of European law on administrative 
procedures.
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The federal administration in Germany is embedded in the system of exec-
utive federalism in its functions and main tasks (see the chapter by Behnke/
Kropp) and its structures and procedures follow a Weberian ideal–type 
bureaucracy. It is strongly shaped by constitutional and codified rules, 
which guide the structures, competencies and interactions between the 
different actors. The key features of the German federal ministerial admin-
istration are its major focus on policy formulation and its hierarchical 
organisational structure, whereby duties and responsibilities are assigned 
to federal ministries and their officials as key actors. Policy formulation 
follows intra-ministerial and inter-ministerial coordination processes 
designed to express and arbitrate bureaucratic expertise while acknowl-
edging the political context (see the chapter by Veit/Jann). Against this 
backdrop, the aim of this chapter is to present the formal framework of 
federal bureaucracy in Germany, its key organisational features, the pat-
terns and dynamics of policy formulation and coordination as well as dis-
cuss previous and current attempts for reform.
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2  the Formal Framework 
For the Federal admInIstratIon
The German Basic Law (Grundgesetz) acts as the ‘legal backbone’ for the 
key principles structuring the federal government and gives the federal 
government and its administration wide-ranging responsibilities in policy 
formulation, whereas the state and local levels mostly engage in policy 
implementation (Article 65 of the Basic Law; see the chapters by Ruge/
Ritgen and Schrapper). A single Article of the Basic Law outlines the three 
key principles structuring the ‘constitutional framework of executive 
action’ (Mayntz 1980: 142):
The Federal Chancellor determines and is responsible for the general policy 
guidelines. Within these limits federal ministers conduct the affairs of their 
respective portfolios independently and on their own responsibility. The 
Federal Government decides as a collegial body on important matters, par-
ticularly concerning differences of opinion between federal ministers. 
(Article 65 of the Basic Law)
Although these three principles distributing the executive power 
between the leadership of the chancellor (Kanzlerprinzip), the cabinet 
(Kabinettsprinzip) and the departmental ministers (Ressortprinzip) are 
perceived to be in permanent imbalance, in practice the third is the most 
recognised and protected. In addition, two rulebooks further specify the 
work of the cabinet and the federal administration. For the cabinet, the 
‘Rules of Procedure of the Federal Government’ (Geschäftsordnung der 
Bundesregierung—GOBReg; see GMBl 22.10.2002)  are issued by the 
cabinet and approved by the Federal President in 1951 (Article 65 of 
the Basic Law), and for the federal ministries, the ‘Joint Rules of 
Procedure of the Federal Ministries’ (Gemeinsame Geschäftsordnung der 
Bundesministerien—GGO; see BMI 2011) are formulated in consultation 
with all other federal ministries, approved by the cabinet and issued by the 
Ministry of the Interior since 1958.
The constitutional principle of leadership by the chancellor is expressed 
in several chancellorial privileges that contribute to the German ‘chancel-
lor democracy’ (Hennis 1964). They include the chancellor’s right to rec-
ommend the appointment and dismissal of federal ministers to the Federal 
President (Article 64 of the Basic Law). Although the chancellor may also 
engage in portfolio allocation and therefore determine the number, remit 
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and size of federal ministries, in practice these processes are strongly 
shaped by coalition governance and the chancellor has limited influence 
over the political dynamics of portfolio allocation and ministerial (de-)
selection, especially for those cabinet positions held by her/his own party. 
However, chancellors do have the prerogative to issue organisational 
decrees in order to organise the federal government (Organisationserlass 
der Bundeskanzlerin, Article 65 (1) of the Basic Law; Lehnguth and 
Vogelgesang 1988). These decrees are often issued after general elections 
and express the compromise of coalition parties in reallocating portfolios 
and the corresponding transfer of policy jurisdictions across federal minis-
tries and agencies (see Table 5.1).
Since 1951, German chancellors have issued a total of 45 organisational 
decrees. The number of decrees issued per legislative period has fluctuated 
between zero and five, with the highest number after German reunifica-
tion in 1991. The number of decrees issued by chancellors has slightly 
increased over time, particularly during the 1990s and early 2000s. That 
said, since the late 2000s, the chancellor has only issued one organisational 
decree per legislative period. In addition, the chancellor is responsible for 
formulating general policy guidelines, which are, inter alia, expressed in 
government declarations before parliament. In practice, these declarations 
are often prepared jointly by the chancellery and the affected federal min-
istries, and either summarise departmental policy initiatives or declare and 
explain changes to previous departmental policies. In practice, the chan-
cellor’s prerogative to draw up general policy guidelines is often used 
rather as an ‘authority reserve’ (Holtmann 2008) than a provision of pol-
icy goals that cabinet ministers and federal ministries are supposed to fol-
low. Instead, coalition government, party competition, the relevance of 
the parliamentary parties and the departmental and cabinet principle limit 
this prerogative. One exception to this overall pattern is foreign and EU 
policy, where the principle of the chancellor providing general policy 
guidelines is more regularly applied (Niclauß 1988). However, even with 
German chancellors becoming increasingly engaged at the international 
and supranational level, these policies are still most often prepared between 
the chancellery and affected ministries, most notably the Foreign Office.
The constitutional principle of leadership by the cabinet refers to the col-
lective responsibility for government decisions and is further codified in 
the GOBReg. German cabinet decisions are not prepared and predeter-
mined in cabinet committees, albeit a few of these committees do exist. 
Instead, the cabinet’s agenda is mostly discussed in advance between 
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cabinet members, and the cabinet acts rather as a certification body. 
Hence, informal party bodies oftentimes  manage the cabinet’s agenda, 
especially the ‘coalition committee’, comprising the senior figures from 
the coalescing parties in government. Controversial issues are solved by 
Table 5.1 Chancellor’s organisational decree of 14 March 2018
In accordance with Section 9 of the Rules of Procedure of the Federal Government, I 
order with immediate effect:
I.
The Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation, Construction and 
Nuclear Safety receives the denomination Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature 
Conservation and Nuclear Safety.
II.
The Federal Ministry of the Interior shall be given the denomination Federal Ministry of
of the Interior, for Construction and Community.
III.
The Federal Ministry of the Interior, for Construction and Community receives
1. from the portfolio of the Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation 
and Nuclear Safety the responsibilities for construction, construction industry and federal 
buildings, for urban development, housing, rural infrastructure and public building law, 
for the urban development matters of the spatial planning and demographic change;
2. from the portfolio of the Federal Ministry of Transport and Digital Infrastructure the 
responsibilities for spatial planning, the federal spatial planning plan, flood protection, 
European spatial development policy, territorial cohesion and demographic change.
The transfers of competences include their related European and international issues as 
well as general and strategic issues.
IV.
The Federal Chancellery shall receive from the portfolio of the Federal Ministry of the 
Interior, for Construction and Community the responsibilities for the IT management of 
the federation, for the IT Council secretariat, and for the joint IT of the federation.
V.
Number I. of the Federal Chancellor’s Organizational Decree of 3 May 1989 (BGBl. I 
p. 901) is worded as follows:
The Federal Intelligence Service is subordinated to the head of the Federal Chancellery. 
Its representative is a state secretary or a head of department in the Federal Chancellery.
VI.
The details of the transition shall be agreed between the federal government members 
involved and notified to the head of the Federal Chancellery. The transfer of 
responsibilities under III.1. corresponds regarding its resources to the agreement of 22 
May 2014 between the Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation, 
Construction and Nuclear Safety and the Federal Ministry of Transport and Digital 
Infrastructure for the implementation of the Organisational Decrees of the Federal 
Chancellor of 17 December 2013.
Source: Federal Law Gazette (BGBl.) 2018, Part I, No. 10, p. 374
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the cabinet, although the chancellor may chair a meeting of affected min-
isters prior to cabinet meetings (Section 17 GOBReg). Hence, the first 
arbiter for conflicts between cabinet ministers is the cabinet, with the 
chancellor playing a pivotal role in achieving a compromise. In practice, 
such conflicts are often solved by either re-defining the subject and thereby 
changing the number of affected ministries or by scheduling a coalition 
meeting, if ministers from different parties are involved. Formally the cabi-
net decides by majority—unless the chancellor rejects the majority deci-
sion with reference to the chancellor principle. By convention, German 
cabinet ministers rarely criticise their cabinet colleagues’ proposals if their 
own jurisdiction is not affected. More generally, the cabinet mostly ratifies 
decisions already made via inter-ministerial coordination, or compromises 
moderated by the head of chancellery, and by various bodies of coalition 
governance.
The constitutional principle of leadership by departmental ministers 
addresses the individual ministerial responsibility of cabinet ministers for 
their ministry—which they conduct ‘independently’ and ‘on their own 
responsibility’ (Article 65 of the Basic Law). In general, the GOBReg 
assigns further competencies to cabinet members. The Minister of Finance 
enjoys a ‘qualified veto’ that ‘can only be overruled by a simple majority in 
the cabinet supported by the Chancellor’ (Section 26 (1) GOBReg). 
Similarly, the Minister of the Interior and the Minister of Justice may veto 
cabinet decisions if existing legal or constitutional regulations are violated 
(Section 26 (2) GOBReg). Furthermore, the GGO allocates responsibili-
ties across ministries and thus shapes the exercise of ministerial responsibil-
ity for departmental ministers. The Ministry of the Interior and the 
Ministry of Justice must be involved in examining all legal norms for com-
patibility with the Basic Law and in all other cases where doubts arise as to 
the application of the Basic Law (Sections 45 (1) and 46 GGO). 
Furthermore, the Ministry of Justice participates in preparing the draft 
legislation (Section 46 GGO). The Ministry of Finance must give its con-
sent in the case of provisions on taxes and other duties, or if the income or 
expenditure of the federation, the Länder or local governments is affected 
(Section 51; Annex 6.4 GGO). In addition, many other ministries must be 
consulted nowadays regarding specific issues affecting its portfolio, rang-
ing from gender mainstreaming to regulatory impact assessment (Annex 
6.9 GGO).
German cabinet ministers have no individual responsibility to parlia-
ment. Given that cabinet reshuffles are rare events, they are widely 
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regarded to acquire a departmental perspective in office. At the same time, 
they enjoy a high level of managerial autonomy and are responsible for 
policies within their own jurisdiction. However, departmental ministers 
only rarely undertake policy initiatives personally, and these initiatives are 
often limited to policies stipulated in the coalition agreement or confined 
to crises or highly sensitive and publicly debated issues, responses to critics 
of the ministry or issues suggested by the parliamentary party, the cabinet 
or influential political personalities (Mayntz and Scharpf 1975: 91). If a 
policy initiative is launched by the political top level, it receives utmost 
attention by line officials. The vast majority of the government’s policies, 
however, is initiated and prepared by ministry officials. Following the 
notion of the departmental principle, they seek to implement and follow 
their ministry’s policy agenda.
3  organIsatIon oF the Federal admInIstratIon: 
mInIstrIes and agencIes
More generally, the German federal administration is strongly shaped by 
the so-called Rechtsstaat tradition (Ziller 2008), which emphasises the 
rule of law and puts legal and formal conditions at the heart of the struc-
ture and organisation of government (see the chapter by Sommermann). 
Accordingly, formal processes, rules and directives apply and provide con-
siderable stability to the administrative apparatus (e.g. König 1991). 
Moreover, bureaucratic decisions are to be taken in an objective, equita-
ble, impartial and legal-rational manner (Ziller 2008; see the chapters by 
Ziekow and Mehde). It follows that the federal administration is organised 
in a quasi-judicial fashion and enjoys at the same time strong continuity, 
which increases the predictability of bureaucratic behaviour in coordina-
tion processes.
As a consequence of the state structure and the corresponding distribu-
tion of competencies in executive federalism, the size of the federal admin-
istration is relatively small, yet it is a highly specialised and fragmented 
central government organisation. The current federal government com-
prises 14 federal ministries and the chancellor’s office (see Table 5.2). The 
number of federal ministries is comparatively stable, ranging from 19 in 
the 1960s to 13  in the early 2000s. The internal organisation of these 
federal ministries and its subordinated agencies is often portrayed to 
resemble a Weberian ideal–type bureaucracy, characterised by a 
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hierarchical set-up that promotes specialisation and the clear allocation 
and development of sectoral expertise, while simultaneously contributing 
to fragmentation and its unintended consequences for coordination.
According to the chancellor principle, the chancellor’s office (or Federal 
Chancellery) acts as the main coordination body within the federal admin-
istration. Yet, it is less powerful than other government headquarters 
because of the strong departmental principle and the notion of ministerial 
responsibility (Fleischer 2011; see Fig. 5.1). The head of the chancellery 
acts as key coordinator of the federal government, formally he/she also 
sets the agenda for cabinet meetings and is often involved in arbitrating 
inter-ministerial conflicts if they reach the cabinet level (see below). 
However, the chancellery seldom intervenes in the cabinet agenda based 
on its own policy interests. Instead, cabinet governance and senior party 
members in government act as crucial agenda-setters for the cabinet.
In accordance with the role of the chancellery as key coordinator and 
arbiter of potential inter-ministerial conflicts, the chancellery is composed 
of seven directorates, which incorporate a range of units that ‘mirror’ the 
various federal ministries (Spiegelreferate; see Fleischer et  al. 2018). 
However, only four directorates truly mirror the rest of the federal admin-
istration, while the other three directorates are engaged in EU policy, digi-
talisation and innovation, and in supervising the intelligence services (as 
one of the few original tasks of the chancellery and servicing the federal 
commissioners for the intelligence services located at the chancellery). 
Table 5.2 Federal ministries as of November 2019
Federal Ministry of Finance
Federal Ministry of the Interior, for Building and Community
Federal Foreign Office
Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy
Federal Ministry of Justice and Consumer Protection
Federal Ministry for Labour and Social Affairs
Federal Ministry of Defence
Federal Ministry for Food and Agriculture
Federal Ministry for Family Affairs, Senior Citizens, Women and Youth
Federal Ministry for Health
Federal Ministry for Transport and Digital Infrastructure
Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety
Federal Ministry for Education and Research
Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development
Source: Federal Cabinet 2018





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The key task of these mirror units is to proactively engage with the mirror-
ing ministry on its policy proposals prior to cabinet meetings. This includes 
regular communication and comment, but cannot include a hierarchical 
request for distinct substantial or other elements of these policy proposals. 
To facilitate these interactions, officials working in these mirror units are 
often on secondment from the very ministry that the unit is mirroring. 
These positions are regarded as springboards for faster promotions in the 
parent ministry.
The federal ministries follow the Weberian ideal–type bureaucratic 
organisation and are headed by a minister, that is, a political executive who 
is usually a senior party member. The German ministers are rarely outsid-
ers to the political arena and thus only a few lack a party affiliation and are 
from the private sector. The federal ministries follow a strong division of 
labour and a strong hierarchical line organisation.
As a multi-layered branching hierarchy, they are made up of several lay-
ers of formal levels with their own types of units, namely the level of direc-
torates directly subordinated to the political leadership, the sub-directorates 
and the divisions, which can be regarded as the ‘backbone’ of the federal 
administration and the core units of policymaking. Besides, each federal 
ministry incorporates a specific directorate responsible for its internal 
administration, including human resources, budgeting, legal affairs and so 
on (coined ‘Z Directorate’). Despite the widespread notion of the German 
federal administration following Weberian ideals, several rather unortho-
dox types of units can be identified inside the federal ministries as well. 
These include working groups, staff units tasked with particular responsi-
bilities as well as e.g. federal commissioners and their support units (see 
Fleischer et al. 2018). More importantly, every German federal ministry 
hosts a leadership staff unit (Leitungsbereich) that is directly subordinated 
to the minister and engages in various functions and tasks, including pol-
icy advice, communication and press relations, and liaison with parliament 
and the cabinet (see Hustedt 2013). These leadership staff units have 
grown over the past decades and are mostly occupied by ministry officials 
rotating into these positions from the line organisation.
The minister is politically supported by one (or more) ‘parliamentary 
state secretaries’ who is not part of the internal hierarchical structure, but 
is a member of parliament and thus often represents the minister in parlia-
ment and elsewhere. In contrast, the administrative top officials are called 
‘administrative state secretaries’ and often recruited through internal pro-
motions. Together with their directly subordinated heads of directorates, 
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they represent the class of ‘political civil servants’, which are the formalised 
group of political appointees acting as a ‘transmission belt’  (Hesse and 
Ellwein 2012) that transmits political signals to the line bureaucrats and 
bureaucratic expertise to the political executives. A federal law enumerates 
the ranks in the federal administration allowing for such political recruit-
ments and includes the heads of several federal agencies (Section 30 (1) 
Beamtenstatusgesetz).
Germany has a long tradition of federal agencies dating back to Prussian 
times when these organisations were created as the predecessors of the first 
government authority that later developed into the ministries. Currently, 
roughly 90 federal agencies exist, employing more than 90 percent of the 
federal bureaucratic  workforce (Bach 2010). Federal agencies differ in 
their mandates and tasks: only very few are regulatory agencies with a 
strong regulatory authority, such as the Federal Competition Authority, 
the Federal Financial Supervisory Authority and the Federal Network 
Agency. Given that the federal administration implements very little pol-
icy, federal agencies are not usually involved in service delivery. Instead, 
they often provide policy advice and expertise or may perform administra-
tive tasks and support functions (see the chapter by von Knobloch). 
However, the federal agencies often enjoy considerable autonomy vis-à-vis 
their supervising ministry, and, in contrast to other countries, the German 
federal administration has not set up a specific procedure for monitoring 
agencies or binding them to particular objectives (in the sense of a con-
tract and contract management; see BMI 2008).
4  PractIces oF coordInatIon and utIlIsatIon 
oF exPertIse
Despite the various constitutional and codified rules on the organisation 
of the federal government and administration that follow the German 
Rechtsstaat tradition and its demands for rule-bound behaviour (see the 
chapter by Sommermann), the German administrative practice at federal 
level is also strongly oriented towards cooperative administration (Benz 
1994) and well prepared and accustomed to negotiating and bargaining, 
which is very visible at all levels of the inter-ministerial coordination pro-
cess. At the same time, the federal administration seeks to include exper-
tise from external actors in the inter-ministerial coordination process and 
has, therefore, established various means to organise this knowledge 
production.
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4.1  Levels and Patterns of Inter-ministerial Coordination
The inter-ministerial coordination in the German federal administration 
can be distinguished into four ideal-typed dimensions that involve differ-
ent actors and take place in different arenas. Firstly, in accordance with the 
departmental principle, line ministries prepare primary and secondary leg-
islation, which is strongly shaped by the provisions of the Joint Rules of 
Procedure and mostly driven by ministry officials. Secondly, the executive 
coordination process unfolds within a distinct political context with strong 
dynamics of party competition. Hence, the  leadership staff units within 
the federal ministries provide a genuine additional coordination loop. 
Thirdly, and in a similar vein, political appointees perform a crucial role in 
moderating and arbitrating bureaucratic expertise with political requests; 
they also prepare cabinet meetings and thus act as crucial gatekeepers for 
policy proposals to be dealt with in the cabinet. Lastly, the cabinet level 
itself provides various arenas that are either open to all members or exclu-
sive to some cabinet members.
At the outset, the GGO stipulates the formal requirements for inter- 
ministerial policymaking by prescribing ‘ministry drafts’ 
(Referentenentwürfe) as key products (Section 45 (4) GGO). Accordingly, 
one ministry sponsors each initiative (Federführung) and ensures that all 
the other ministries concerned with the issue are consulted via co- signature 
(Mitzeichnung; Section 15 GGO). In practice, the ministry with the 
broadest jurisdiction on the issue usually serves as lead ministry; in cases of 
conflict over leadership, the cabinet decides. Moreover, the rules prescribe 
the formal inclusion of external stakeholders and organised interests as 
well as the German Länder and municipalities. The majority of policy pro-
posals is prepared by ministry officials following these rules of taking the 
lead or co-signing a policy proposal initiated by another ministry. It is the 
prerogative of the lead ministry’s unit to decide which external actors to 
involve and how—yet following the aforementioned rules of always engag-
ing with the Länder, municipalities and organised interests.
The typical pattern of inter-ministerial coordination by ministry officials 
can be described as ‘negative coordination’ (Mayntz and Scharpf 1975), 
whereby policy drafts presented by the lead ministry’s responsible unit to 
the units in the other ministries as co-signatories are primarily evaluated 
for their potential (negative) impact on these co-signing units’ remit and 
areas of responsibility. Negative coordination prevails as the most com-
mon coordination pattern because it serves both a need for keeping trans-
action costs at a reasonable level for all units involved and an opportunity 
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for co-signing units to express concerns and request changes if the policy 
draft violates their turf or contradicts their own existing and future poli-
cies. By contrast, ‘positive coordination’ refers to multilateral policymak-
ing that involves all units potentially affected at the earliest stage possible 
and allows for discussion and deliberation on alternative actions. However, 
such processes are rather difficult to set up and conduct, as they require 
comparatively more resources and levels of trust between the partici-
pants—and they are not necessarily prone to result in solutions that can be 
presented to political superiors and the cabinet.
Moreover, the number of ministerial drafts that federal ministries navi-
gate through the inter-ministerial coordination process differ considerably 
(see BT 2019). Of the 547 bills issued to parliament by the federal gov-
ernment during the past legislative period (2013–2017), the Ministry of 
Justice and Consumer Protection issued the highest share (18.1 percent), 
followed by the Ministry of Finance (17.6 percent) and the Ministry of the 
Interior (13.3 percent). The smallest number of bills (namely three) was 
issued by the Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(Deutscher Bundestag 2019). It follows that some ministries are more 
often involved in inter-ministerial coordination than others, not only as 
lead ministries (as the numbers above illustrate) but also as co-signing 
ministries. In addition, the timing of cabinet proposals has become more 
crucial over time. Given the German federal and electoral system, the fed-
eral elections are synchronised neither with elections at the state (and 
local) level nor with the elections to the European Parliament. Under cur-
rent governing conditions with a coalition government in office that 
negotiated its legislative programme only after initial coalition talks 
between different parties failed, political contestations spill down to arenas 
at the lower levels of inter-ministerial coordination.
The level of political appointees performs a crucial transmission function 
between the bureaucratic expertise embedded in the line hierarchy of min-
istries, on the one hand, and the political demands and objectives of politi-
cal executives, on the other. Accordingly, political appointees are the key 
gatekeepers for policy proposals prepared by ministry officials and also act 
as negotiators and as ‘final resort’ in inter-ministerial conflicts before the 
political level; that is, before ministers under the moderation of the head 
of chancellery get involved themselves. The key arena for political appoin-
tees to clear inter-ministerial conflicts that could not be resolved by depart-
mental officials is their preparatory cabinet meeting under the chairmanship 
of the head of the chancellery, which is held a day before cabinet meetings. 
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The meetings are restricted to one administrative state secretary per min-
istry, although many federal ministries have two or three of these top offi-
cials. At the same time, the cabinet agenda can be rather wide-ranging, 
and it can happen that the representative of the ministry is not the top 
official heading the branch of the ministry that has been involved in pre-
paring the policy proposal.
Those arenas at the cabinet level open to all cabinet members include 
cabinet committees as well as the cabinet meeting itself. Cabinet commit-
tees do not play a strong role in the German federal administration (com-
pared to other European countries). They allow, however, for bringing 
together a set of federal ministries with responsibilities in a distinct policy 
issue and for evaluating policy proposals in a more comprehensive manner. 
Moreover, they are often supported by the distinct group of political 
appointees (administrative state secretaries and directors-general) that pre-
pares and transmits the cabinet committee’s work to the line hierarchy of 
affected ministries. A few cabinet committees have gained attention, 
including the current cabinet committee on digitalisation as well as the 
cabinet committee for climate protection. Hence, cabinet committees may 
also signal and communicate the cabinet’s prioritisation of distinct issues 
or express the necessity to deal with broader cross-cutting issues in a more 
comprehensive manner. Moreover, the cabinet meeting itself may serve as 
a coordination arena.
Besides, the inter-ministerial coordination at the cabinet level also 
unfolds in arenas that are exclusive and only allow participation of a dis-
tinct group of cabinet members. In addition to the aforementioned arbi-
trations necessary to reach policy compromises, which are moderated by 
the head of chancellery and, thus, only invite those departmental ministers 
involved in the conflict, other arenas have been established, especially over 
the past legislative periods with grand coalitions between the Conservatives 
(Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and Christian Social Union (CSU)) 
and the Social Democrats (SPD) in office. For each of the three parties, a 
genuine arena has been established exclusively for their ministers in office 
in order to prepare policy coordination among those ministries led by the 
party. These arenas for party-driven coordination are also present in other 
areas of the German executive federalism system, most notably to prepare 
Bundesrat meetings involving Länder governments and administrations 
(see the chapter by Behnke/Kropp). For the federal government and 
administration, however, they are rather novel, as they separate all three 
parties in the cabinet rather than offering a combined arena for at least 
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those ministers from the CDU/CSU acting in parliament as a joint parlia-
mentary group (Fraktionsgemeinschaft). Each of the three arenas is sup-
ported by an administrative state secretary who serves as a gatekeeper and 
involves subordinated ministry officials for monitoring and drafting pol-
icy ideas.
4.2  External Expertise in Inter-ministerial Coordination
Next to the highly specialised and well-equipped bureaucratic workforce 
inside the federal ministries and federal agencies, the federal ministries also 
generate and incorporate external expertise into their inter-ministerial 
coordination activities in various ways. Firstly, ministries establish and 
maintain permanent advisory bodies and councils. These advisory bodies 
may take different forms (see Fleischer 2015). Over the past decades, sev-
eral cabinets have been particularly active in creating novel advisory bod-
ies, especially the first Brandt cabinet in the late 1960s, but also the 
aftermath of the German reunification witnessed an increase in such advi-
sory arrangements. A closer sectoral examination shows that a dispropor-
tionately large number of advisory bodies was set up in the areas of the 
interior, environment, health, food and consumer protection, while sig-
nificantly fewer advisory bodies were established in the areas of economic 
cooperation, post and telecommunications, and justice (ibid.). The most 
prominent permanent advisory bodies include the German Council of 
Economic Experts (Sachverständigenrat zur Begutachtung der gesam-
twirtschaftlichen Entwicklung) and the German Advisory Council on the 
Environment (Sachverständigenrat für Umweltfragen), which advise the 
corresponding ministry, generate data and produce reports on a regu-
lar basis.
The cabinet or individual ministers will occasionally establish ad hoc or 
temporary expert commissions to provide policy advice, often on major pol-
icy reforms or complex and cross-cutting issues that benefit from the gen-
eration and inclusion of external knowledge and advice. However, a crucial 
function of both permanent and temporary commissions is also the cre-
ation of legitimacy for distinct policy compromises or the utilisation of 
these bodies as a magnet for blame. The current coalition agreement has 
announced almost 20 new temporary commissions to address various pol-
icy issues and topics  in its coalition agreement. In rare instances, these 
expert commissions are set up as an executive inquiry into policy scandals 
(see Fleischer 2016). Yet, the impact of these experts in permanent and 
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temporary arrangements is often unclear. Nevertheless, even though many 
of these bodies produce reports that may lack an immediate impact, they 
are often incorporated into political debates within the government and 
between government and parliament, or are made available to the gen-
eral public.
Lastly, the German federal administration had already introduced tools 
of evidence-based policymaking in the 1970s. Since 2000, a regulatory 
impact assessment (Gesetzesfolgenabschätzung, GFA) has been required for 
every draft bill presented to parliament (via revision of the GGO; see the 
chapter by Kuhlmann/Veit). The GFA process assesses the intended and 
unintended effects of policy drafts and potential policy and instrumental 
alternatives. In 2009, the GFA was extended by incorporating the sustain-
ability impact assessment into the GGO, thus stipulating the evaluation of 
potential environmental, economic and social consequences of all policy 
drafts submitted to parliament. As part of this sustainability impact assess-
ment, all policy proposals must be assessed for their long-term conse-
quences for Germany’s National Sustainable Development Strategy and 
the UN Sustainable Development Goals.
5  the german Federal admInIstratIon 
as a reluctant Yet mostlY unconcerned reFormer
The formal responsibilities for reforming the federal administration are 
scattered across the federal ministries. Despite some central tasks allocated 
to the Ministry of the Interior, especially in regulating the civil service, 
each ministry has its own directorate responsible for its internal adminis-
tration—and thus also for its potential internal reforms. In other words, 
federal ministers are expected to exercise responsibility for their own min-
istry by managing its human resources, internal organisation and budget 
as well as its analogue and digital resources largely autonomously. 
Consequently, government-wide reforms are not put forward by a single 
key actor or by the chancellery. More importantly, given the federal state 
structure and corresponding assignments of tasks and functions, the fed-
eral administration is not as involved in service delivery as its counterparts 
in other countries and thus does not benefit directly or as much from 
potential reforms of its inner structures and procedures as other adminis-
trations. Nevertheless, two dynamics can be identified as recent reform 
trends at the federal level: on the one hand, the current scheme of regula-
tory impact assessment and sustainability impact assessment, which is 
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wide-ranging and well-equipped, also in comparison with other countries 
(see above), and, on the other hand, the digital transformation of society 
and administration, which is also putting pressure on the federal adminis-
tration to introduce reform measures.
More generally, the recently advanced debate on the digitalisation of 
federal bureaucracy has indicated some reluctance to change existing 
structures and procedures (see the chapter by Mergel). A team explicitly 
coined ‘the agile team’ (Tech4Germany) that was originally set up as a 
temporary unit has very recently been extended and affiliated to the head 
of chancellery. Its task is to support and identify suitable digitalisation 
initiatives across the federal administration. Similarly, the federal ministries 
are now involved in so-called digitalisation labs bringing together federal, 
state and municipal actors as well as external actors and end-users in order 
to increase the acceptance of jointly developed solutions for the digitalisa-
tion of distinct public services, which the federal government committed 
itself to, namely to offer these services by the end of 2022 (Online Access 
Act 2017). In addition, other rather unorthodox organisational arrange-
ments can be observed, mostly on a temporary basis. These include teams 
and working groups on digitalisation and digital topics; for example, the 
Ministry for Labour Affairs has an internal ‘think tank’ (Denkfabrik) 
experimenting with novel ways to organise its bureaucratic work. They 
also include policy labs for piloting novel ideas in the realm of digital 
transformation, for example, in the Ministry of Transport and Digital 
Infrastructure to discuss the future of mobility. Besides these more struc-
tural innovations, some procedural innovations can also be observed, for 
example, the piloting of artificial intelligence (AI)-supported crises predic-
tion simulations in the Foreign Office and the Ministry of Defence, or the 
numerous online platforms to invite and incorporate external actors more 
strongly into policy design. Yet, as mentioned above, these initiatives are 
rather piecemeal and rely heavily on the support of the ministry’s political 
leadership as well as the initiative of line officials to foster innovative ways 
for executive decision-making and coordination. At the same time, the 
German federal government is not as advanced as other European govern-
ments in utilising and providing open data.
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6  lessons learned
The German federal administration is governed by various formal frame-
works that result in a firm and hierarchical organisational structure sup-
porting the principles of leadership by the chancellor and the cabinet, but 
especially the principle of leadership by individual cabinet ministers. This 
crucial departmental principle also strongly influences the practices of 
coordination and puts the key policy work inside the highly specialised 
federal ministries. These ministries rely not only on their highly skilled 
workforce but also on delegated agencies and their generation of expertise 
and information as well as external expertise. Following the distribution of 
competencies and the resulting lack of pressure for reform (as the federal 
level does not deliver very many services directly to the citizens), the fed-
eral administration has widely maintained its organisational and proce-
dural patterns of federal policymaking over time. The more recent digital 
transformation, however, increases the need for adaptation in the rather 
fragmented patterns of policymaking in and by the federal 
administration.
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CHAPTER 6
The Federal Administration of Interior Affairs
Hans-Heinrich von Knobloch
1  IntroductIon: Federal admInIstratIon/
state admInIstratIon
As enshrined in the Basic Law, federalism is based on the principle that all 
the powers not specifically assigned to the Federation as central state are 
reserved to the Länder. According to Article 30 of the Basic Law, the 
exercise of state powers and the discharge of state functions is a matter for 
the German states (Länder) unless otherwise provided for or permitted by 
the Basic Law. The same applies to public administration. According to 
Article 83 of the Basic Law, the Länder execute federal laws in their own 
right unless the Basic Law otherwise provides or permits. The Basic Law 
contains special provisions on the content and limits of the federal admin-
istration (Articles 83 to 91).
If the Länder carry out federal laws in their own right, as is usually the 
case, there are three ways in which the Federal Government may exert 
influence: firstly, by issuing general administrative rules with the consent 
of the Bundesrat; secondly, by exercising oversight to ensure that the 
Länder execute federal laws in accordance with the law (Article 84); and 
thirdly, the Federal Government may take the necessary steps to compel 
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the Länder to carry out their duties (Article 37). Such steps would be 
taken only as a last resort and require the consent of the Bundesrat. This 
instrument has never been used since the Basic Law entered into force and 
is only a theoretical option in the state practice of relations between the 
Federation and the Länder.
If the Länder execute federal laws as a delegated matter, such laws 
require the consent of the Bundesrat, that is, the chamber representing the 
Länder, which must also consent to general administrative regulations of 
the Federation. The Federation has a comprehensive right to issue instruc-
tions, which is related to the lawfulness and expediency of the execution 
(Article 85 of the Basic Law).
In the exercise of oversight and the administration by delegated author-
ity, the authority to act lies with the Länder (external action and account-
ability); that is, they are accountable in court and out of court for executive 
actions.
2  exceptIon: Federal admInIstratIon
Further, the Basic Law contains provisions on the execution of federal laws 
by the Federation itself (federal administration [bundeseigene Verwaltung] 
in accordance with Articles 86 and 87). A distinction is drawn here 
between obligatory and optional federal administration. According to 
Article 87 (1), first sentence of the Basic Law, obligatory federal adminis-
tration comprises the foreign service, the federal financial administration, 
the administration of federal waterways and shipping as well as the federal 
defence administration according to Article 87b of the Basic Law. 
According to Article 87 (1), second sentence of the Basic Law, the federal 
administration may comprise the Federal Police, the Federal Criminal 
Police Office and the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution. 
A federal law is required to establish each of these authorities.
In addition, according to Article 87 (3), first sentence of the Basic Law, 
autonomous superior federal authorities and new federal corporations and 
institutions under public law may be established by a federal law for mat-
ters for which the Federation has the power to legislate. A federal law is 
required for these central authorities active throughout the federal terri-
tory because they perform tasks which are, in principle, the responsibility 
of the Länder. Federal authorities at intermediate and lower levels may be 
established with the consent of the Bundesrat and an absolute majority of 
the Bundestag in cases of urgent need.
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Taken together, these provisions express the central message for 
Germany’s administrative federalism: the framework for the federal admin-
istration is more narrowly defined than that of the Länder. As the state 
authority with a concentration on legislation (including the Federal 
Government’s right to introduce legislation), the Federation is supposed 
to be able to claim key areas of administration only under certain condi-
tions. The prohibition on mixed and joint administration between the 
Federation and the Länder is an additional instrument to contain federal 
administrative activity. Nor is the evolution of legal form a way to inter-
vene in the powers of the Länder. The Federation is prohibited from 
departing from the form of public law in order to assume responsibilities 
of the Länder, for example, through foundations by means of private law. 
This applies in particular to the totality of services (see Wolff 2018).
3  structure oF the Federal admInIstratIon
The internal structure of the federal administration follows the same prin-
ciples found in the administrations of the Länder. As in the Länder (see 
Chap. 8 and Kloepfer 2011 and Kloepfer and Greve 2018), a distinction 
is drawn between direct federal administration by federal authorities with-
out legal personality and indirect federal administration by independent 
legal entities having legal personality, namely corporations, institutions or 
foundations under public law.
The direct federal administration, that is, that which is bound by 
instructions, is divided into three levels: central, intermediate and lower. 
Examples are as follows:
• The central level includes the federal ministries as supreme federal 
authorities, the superior federal authorities immediately subordinate 
to them and responsible for the entire federal territory, and the fed-
eral institutions without legal personality.
• The intermediate level includes the regional finance offices and the 
waterways and shipping directorates.
• The lower level includes the main customs offices, the Bundeswehr 
careers centre and the waterway and shipping offices.
Within this structure, a comprehensive right to issue legal and expert 
instructions applies. Its functioning in compliance with the rule of law 
depends on the integrity and expertise of the public service (in particular 
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the civil service) and its adherence to law and justice (Article 20 (3) of the 
Basic Law). At the top of the instruction-giving hierarchy is the federal 
minister as head of the supreme federal authority; he or she also belongs 
to the government sphere and holds office by virtue of the federal chancel-
lor’s authority to organise. As the federal chancellor is elected by the 
Bundestag, this chain of authority ensures the necessary democratic legiti-
mation of every administrative act at the federal level.
The activity of all authorities is subject to the law on their area of 
responsibility and the obligations of constitutional law, in particular 
regarding fundamental rights, and to the general and specific federal law 
on administrative procedures (see the chapter by Ziekow). This activity is 
subject to comprehensive supervision by the Federal Administrative Court 
and the Federal Constitutional Court (see Chap. 12). The Federation 
alone has the authority to carry out federal administrative tasks (responsi-
bility and external representation).
In terms of organisation, the reason for establishing superior federal 
authorities is the need for an effective structure for carrying out non- 
ministerial, subject-related tasks. Delegating additional authority to the 
administration is intended to enable the ministerial level to devote itself to 
its policy-related tasks. This often happens as the result of an increased 
workload, which the ministry is not able to handle or new developments, 
in particular concerning administrative processes, such as the shift to digi-
tal technologies and the security of data and information. Decisions on 
overall policy remain the responsibility of the relevant ministry.
4  the BmI and Its executIve agencIes
The Federal Ministry of the Interior, Building and Community (BMI) is 
the ministry responsible for the classic interior affairs of the Federation 
(see Fröhlich et al. 1997). The principle of ministerial autonomy notwith-
standing, the supreme federal authorities are guided by the general inter-
nal administration at the federal level, which is based at the BMI. Although 
its areas of responsibility have changed numerous times since it was estab-
lished 70 years ago, the federal ministry has always kept BMI in its German 
abbreviation. Within the Federal Government, the BMI is the ministry 
responsible for issues related to the Constitution (together with the 
Ministry of Justice), organisation, public service law and security. Police 
matters and public security, including protection of the Constitution, 
migration and emergency management as well as the public service are key 
 H.-H. VON KNOBLOCH
85
tasks. The BMI’s executive agencies reflect the ministry’s broad range of 
tasks and make up its administrative substructure (Table 6.1):
The BMI has the most executive agencies of any federal ministry (20). 
The Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy (BMWi) has six 
executive agencies, including the Federal Cartel Office; the Federal 
Ministry of Health (BMG) has five, including the Federal Institute for 
Drugs and Medical Devices; and the Federal Ministry for the Environment, 
Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety (BMU) has four, including the 
Federal Environment Agency.
Including the Federal Police, which employs roughly 46,300 staff (the 
state police forces employ approximately 270,000), the BMI is responsible 
for around 60,000 federal civil servants and other federal staff. Only about 
1100 of them work within the federal ministry itself.
Table 6.1 Executive agencies of the Ministry of the Interior, Building and 
Community
  • Federal Equalisation of Burdens Office (BAA)
  • Federal Office for Central Services and Unresolved Property Issues (BADV)
  • Federal Office for Migration and Refugees (BAMF)
  • Federal Office of Civil Protection and Disaster Response (BBK)
  • Federal Office for Building and Regional Planning (BBR)
  • Federal Agency for Public Safety Digital Radio (BDBOS)
  • Procurement Office of the Federal Ministry of the Interior (BeschA)
  • Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (BfV)
  • Federal Institute for Population Research (BIB)
  • Federal Institute of Sport Science (BISp)
  • Federal Criminal Police Office (BKA)
  • Federal Agency for Cartography and Geodesy (BKG)
  • Federal Agency for Civic Education (BpB)
  • Federal Police (BPoL)
  • Federal Office for Information Security (BSI)
  • Federal Office of Administration (BVA)
  • Federal Statistical Office (Destatis)
  • Federal University of Administrative Sciences (HS Bund)
  • Federal Agency for Technical Relief (THW)
  • Central Office for Information Technology in the Security Sector (ZITiS)
See the website of the BMI: https://www.bmi.bund.de/EN/ministry/ministry-node.html
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5  supervIsIon
Expert supervision is usually performed at the order of the minister by the 
organisational unit responsible for the matter in question (Fachreferat); 
administrative supervision is performed by the relevant divisions of the 
directorate-general responsible for central tasks (see Pieper 2006). Daily 
practice is characterised by close and trusting interaction between minis-
tries and their executive agencies. The division requests reports on specific 
matters as needed and, as a rule, responds by issuing instructions, either in 
agreement with the action proposed by the superior federal authority or 
rejecting the proposed action and suggesting an alternative. It is also stan-
dard for the executive agency to report to the ministry on its own initiative 
and ask for instructions. If there are very many similar cases, for example, 
with regard to nationality law (responsibility of the Federal Office of 
Administration), a single standard procedure is often agreed below the 
level of administrative regulations. After new legislation enters into force, 
the ministry usually consults the relevant executive agency concerning the 
practical application. Ministries regularly schedule meetings with all their 
executive agencies on matters of mutual concern (budget, staffing, organ-
isation, supervisory practice). These meetings are usually led by the minis-
ter or an administrative state secretary depending on the priority of tasks 
carried out by the executive agency.
Supervision of the ministry’s remit (so-called subordinated sector) is 
generally considered a key task of the relevant ministry. This is based on 
the principle of relieving supreme federal authorities of the task of process-
ing individual cases and on the executive agencies’ need for guidelines 
whose policy orientation can only be formulated by the ministry. 
Supervisory tasks are therefore diverse, requiring knowledge of the subject 
and policy expertise as well as a culture of leadership. The supreme federal 
authorities conducting supervision need to provide their executive agen-
cies with understandable, clear and practicable instructions where needed, 
along with the specific description of the space for discretionary decisions 
wherever possible. In addition to respect for the hierarchy, an understand-
ing for the productivity of the executive agencies is also needed. Looking 
after their personnel and material resources and representing their con-
cerns to the parliament are priorities of supervision.
In some cases, the outlines of supervision have become less clear in 
recent years, partly due to the assertiveness and importance of the execu-
tive agencies and partly due to a misunderstanding of the requirement to 
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follow instructions, which is felt to interfere with the nature and content 
of the tasks to be carried out. However, it should be noted that there are, 
in principle, no areas in which instructions do not apply. Executive agen-
cies are not autonomous even if they are privatised or assigned the legal 
form of institutions. In every case, a minister will be politically accountable 
to the Bundestag for his actions or failure to act. The minister will be able 
to fulfil this responsibility only if he or she has the authority to give instruc-
tions, at least concerning the lawfulness of the activity. If functions belong-
ing to expert supervision are delegated to bodies such as management 
boards of institutions under public law, organisational responsibility 
remains with the supreme federal authority. Nor can target agreements 
concluded between the ministries and individual executive agencies take 
the place of the ministries’ right to issue instructions in a specific case (see 
also Chap. 22). Therefore, they do not reinforce the instrument of classic 
supervision and are allowed by law only within a narrowly defined 
framework.
6  excursus: ‘mInIster-Free Zones’
Within the hierarchical structure of government administration, the prin-
ciple of being bound by instructions (Weisungsgebundenheit) applies in all 
but a few exceptional cases. So-called minister-free zones always require a 
legal basis and important objective reasons (see Schmidt-Bleibtreu et al. 
2017). These reasons might be a greater need for neutrality in performing 
duties or for independent decision- makers having special expertise. For 
example, a minister has, at most, limited possibilities to provide technical 
supervision and instructions when it comes to decisions made by the audit 
offices and audit committees. Within the remit of the BMI, the compila-
tion of statistics by the Federal Statistical Office is largely governed by 
community law, which takes precedence over national law. Community 
law requires the independence of the European Union’s statistical office 
Eurostat, of the EU Member States’ statistical offices and their directors, 
and gives this independence priority over the principle of democratic 
legitimation.
Distinct from ‘minister-free zones’ is the complete independence of 
supervision in the case of institutions which, according to the Constitution 
or Union law, are not part of the administrative hierarchy. For example, 
the Basic Law guarantees the independence of the Bundesbank (Federal 
Central Bank) and the Bundesrechnungshof (Federal Court of Audit). The 
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European Court of Justice ruled that the federal and state data protection 
officers in Germany, as in the other EU member states, must become inde-
pendent bodies and no longer fall within the remit of a ministry (see 
below). The administrations of the German Bundestag, the Bundesrat and 
the Federal Constitutional Court are also independent of supervision in a 
broader sense. However, they too are subject to oversight by indepen-
dent courts.
7  central servIce provIder: Federal oFFIce 
oF admInIstratIon
The Federal Office of Administration (BVA) is a superior federal authority 
within the remit of the BMI that provides services for all the federal min-
istries. The law establishing the BVA dates from 1959 and is based on 
Article 87 (3), first sentence of the Basic Law. The BVA performs special 
tasks of the federal administration with which it has been entrusted by law 
or based on a law (e.g. matters related to nationality, resettlement, emigra-
tion, German schools abroad and civil servants). It also performs tasks 
assigned to it by other federal ministries in agreement with the BMI. In 
these cases, the relevant federal ministries perform expert supervision, 
while the BMI remains responsible for administrative supervision and 
organisation. Thanks to its diverse tasks, for years the BVA has viewed 
itself as the engine of digital transformation in the federal administration 
(see Ritgen 2019).
8  From superIor Federal authorIty to supreme 
Federal authorIty: Federal commIssIoner For data 
protectIon and Freedom oF InFormatIon
Outside the remit of the BMI, the Federal Commissioner for Data 
Protection and Freedom of Information (BfDI) monitors federal bodies’ 
compliance with data protection law. Following its creation in 1978, the 
federal commissioner’s office was located within the BMI until a decision 
of the European Court of Justice in 2016 called for its independence. 
Since then, the BfDI answers only to the Bundestag and is no longer under 
the supervision of the Federal Government. In this regard, the BfDI’s 
status is very similar to that of the Bundesrechnungshof (see Chap. 12), and 
it has the task of monitoring and advising the government and parliament. 
The BfDI must be consulted on proposed legislation relevant to data 
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protection, but he or she has no right of veto even if he or she identifies 
violations of data protection law. But the entry into force of the EU’s 
General Data Protection Regulation has strengthened the BfDI’s position. 
In practical terms, the BfDI and the data protection commissioners of the 
Länder act as the defenders of citizens’ fundamental right to privacy. The 
European Court of Justice also regards compliance with the General Data 
Protection Regulation in all the EU Member States as an important task 
(see Thomé 2018).
9  lessons learned
For the federal administration to be effective, it must also be lean. Good 
relations between supreme and superior federal authorities must be main-
tained with the help of supervision based on trust and the rule of law. This 
also applies to functions carried out by bodies under private law, in which 
case legal supervision and the responsibility of organisation must remain 
entirely with the Federation. Target instruments do not make appropriate 
instruments of supervision.
Key future projects of the federal administration are the digital transfor-
mation of the administration, IT security and modernisation of the admin-
istrative registers (see Chap. 19). With regard to IT security, the Federal 
Office for Information Security (BSI) was established by law already in 
1991 and has steadily expanded since then.
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CHAPTER 7
The Peculiarities of the Social Security 
Systems (Indirect State Administration)
Dieter Schimanke
1  The Welfare STaTe, ITS ProgrammeS (laWS) 
and enTrenchmenT In admInISTraTIve federalISm
Germany is a welfare state. Over the years, it has been shaped by different 
directions and waves of development. The welfare system is a highly dif-
ferentiated social system in terms of benefits and therefore target groups, 
institutions and financing. The welfare state has constitutional status 
(Article 20 (1) of the Basic Law).
Social policy is characterised by three principles: the public welfare prin-
ciple, the compensation principle and the insurance principle. Social assis-
tance is the expression of the first principle that entails benefits in situations 
of personal need, where the individual is not able to care for his or her 
personal needs without assistance. These are financed through tax reve-
nue. The compensation principle is an expression of the solidarity of the 
public community as a whole. The benefits are also financed through tax 
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revenue. These include, for example, a benefit to the community with 
respect to the upbringing of children (child benefit—Kindergeld) or sacri-
fices for the community (e.g. victims of war, violent crimes and vaccination 
injuries). The third principle, the insurance principle, has the biggest influ-
ence over the German welfare state. It finds expression in the five branches 
of the social insurance system. These have their roots in the early labour 
movement and in the legislation introduced during the time of Chancellor 
Bismarck, namely health insurance (1883), occupational accident insur-
ance (1884) and pension insurance (1889). The structure of the organisa-
tion and administration as well as the financing were already contained in 
this legislation. Financing is effected through contributions to the social 
insurance, which are calculated based on the wages by applying a non- 
constant percentage over time (either with contributions from both the 
employee and employer or, in the case of occupational accident insurance, 
from the employer1). With regard to pension insurance, a considerable 
part of the financing comes from tax revenue or is subsidized by the fed-
eral budget (over the years this has increased to approximately €100 bil-
lion or 30% of pension insurance expenditure in 2019; one reason for 
financing from tax revenues is that services not related to employment but 
to social policy are included, for example pension benefits for child-rearing 
periods). In respect of unemployment insurance, the federal government 
provides liquidity assistance in the form of loans.
The Federal Republic of Germany, as established under the Basic Law 
of 1949, has continued to build on the historical bases of social policy of 
the later years of the nineteenth century and the early years of the twenti-
eth century (e.g. unemployment insurance was added in 1927). In recent 
decades, the state has further developed the substance of the social secu-
rity systems (e.g. by introducing far-reaching pension reforms, expanding 
the unemployment insurance system to an active labour market policy and 
introducing in 1995 long-term care insurance, the so-called fifth pillar of 
the social insurance system). The various areas of social policy and associ-
ated functions are allocated to the three levels of the German administra-
tive system (federal, state and local government level). Alongside there are 
also independent institutions dealing with social insurance covering the 
risks of illness, long-term care, old-age (pensions), unemployment and 
occupational accidents.
All three levels of the administrative system, therefore, have a responsi-
bility in relation to the welfare state and its various programmes (laws). 
The central level is dominant in the area of legislation, especially on 
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account of its role in the codification of social law in the form of Social 
Codes (Sozialgesetzbücher) and in the legal supervision of most of the 
social insurance institutions. To date, there are 12 Books of the Social 
Code (Sozialgesetzbuch—SGB) covering the aspects shown in Table 7.1.
Book X of the Social Code sets out the basic principles of the adminis-
trative procedures. It not only follows the principles of the Administrative 
Procedures Act (Verwaltungsverfahrensgesetz) (cf. Chap. 11), but also 
contains special rules applicable to the social administrations.
In addition, there is further federal legislation pertaining to benefits, 
inter alia, for the target groups of trainees, children, victims of war and 
other so-called sacrificial victims (Aufopferungen, e.g. people injured by 
compulsory vaccination), and recipients of housing benefits. The recently 
introduced basic income support is codified in two of the social codes 
mentioned above. The benefits for job seekers are contained in SGB II, 
and for pensioners and persons unable to work in SGB XII. Basic income 
support is, at the same time, however, a prime example of administrative 
federalism: the municipalities execute federal law in respect of pensioners 
as delegated matters (übertragene Angelegenheiten) and in respect of per-
sons with diminished earning capacity as mandated matters 
(Auftragsangelegenheiten) (with the result that the federal government 
has a direct right of control over the latter). In respect of job seekers, a 
form of mixed administration between the federal administration (Federal 
Employment Agency) and the municipalities has been created, which is 
Table 7.1 Contents of the 12 books of the Social Code
Book number Title and content
Book I Universal principles and fundamental principles
Book II Basic income support for job seekers
Book III Promotion of employment
Book IV Common regulations for the social insurance systems
Book V Statutory health insurance
Book VI Statutory pension insurance
Book VII Statutory occupational accident insurance
Book VIII Child and youth welfare
Book IX Rehabilitation and participation of disabled persons
Book X Administrative procedures and protection of social data
Book XI Social long-term care insurance
Book XII Social assistance and services
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problematic from a constitutional point of view. This situation has been 
‘healed’ by an amendment to the constitution (Article 91e of the Basic 
Law), but remains an exception in administrative federalism, which is 
shaped by the principle of having a clear assignment of responsibilities.
Within the administrative system of Germany, the implementation of 
social policy is broadly in accordance with the above-mentioned three 
principles in light of the following attributes: the public welfare principle 
has its main focus on local government; the compensation principle is a 
distinctive feature of the state administration; and the insurance principle 
is located mainly at the federal level.
2  areaS of SocIal BenefITS and TheIr allocaTIon 
WIThIn The admInISTraTIve SySTem of germany
The individual areas of social policy and their related expenses are outlined 
in the social budget (cf. BMAS 2019b). These relate to non-cash benefits 
(e.g. medicine, vehicle, guide dog) and cash benefits (e.g. child benefit) as 
well as personal support benefits (e.g. care at home).2
Personnel expenditure pertaining to social policy is spread across all 
public budgets based on the division of responsibilities. The charts per-
taining to activities in social administration show a total of 705,600 full- 
time equivalent (FTE) jobs (including social security providers). This 
represents 16.7% of all FTE in public administration. As can be gleaned 
from the summary table of the distribution between the three levels of 
federal administrative system and the social insurances (Table  7.2), the 
focus of executory social administration lies with the municipalities and 
counties (local administration) on the one hand and the social security 
institutions and agencies on the other.





Social insurance systems 326,740
Total 705,600
Source: Statistisches Bundesamt (2019) Finanzen und Steuern. Personal des öffentlichen Dienstes 2018. 
Fachserie 14, Reihe 6, p. 53
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The social security providers are independent public institutions and 
agencies alongside the administrations at the federal, state and local levels. 
They employ their own personnel, which is shown separately in the statis-
tics (Tables 7.2 and 7.3). The budgets are separate and are also different to 
the budgets of the three territorial authorities (Gebietskörperschaften). 
Consequently, the social security providers are also labelled ‘indirect public 
administration’ (mittelbare Staatsverwaltung) or ‘near governmental units’ 
(Parafisci). Their independence is evidenced by their special legal status 
(corporate body subject to public law (Körperschaft des öffentlichen Rechts), 
Section 29 (1) SGB IV). Corporate body means that they have members 
(the insured individuals and the employers) and legal capacity, which means 
that they can enforce their rights through the courts (e.g. against measures 
of government supervision) and can be sued themselves (e.g. by the insured 
in respect of benefits). The limits to state supervision and control (see part 
3 below) are also interconnected with this semi- autonomous status.
Compared to an expenditure budget of €634.5 billion (Table 7.4: total 
of sections 1 and 2), the number of contingent personnel in the social 
insurance systems amounting to 326,740 FTE, or 7.9% of all persons 
employed in the public service, is relatively small. This is because the dif-
ferent institutions of the social security systems mainly provide financial 
transfers as routine cases of mass administration. The share of the expen-
diture budgets of the social insurance systems in relation to the 
Table 7.3 Personnel of social security providers (‘indirect public administration’, 
‘near governmental units’, Parafisci)
Function FTE (full-time equivalent)
Health insurance 126,680
Occupational accident insurance 22,705
Pension insurance 53,445
Other organisations 7950 (with rounding 
differences)
Union of miners’ insurance and social insurance for the 
agricultural sector
14,740
Federal Employment Agency 101,225
Total 326,740
Note: The numbers are taken from this publication of the Federal Agency of Statistics. For the category 
‘Other organisations’ the following explanation is given: sums might not fit due to rounding differences 
caused by security reasons
Source: Statistisches Bundesamt (2019) Finanzen und Steuern. Personal des öffentlichen Dienstes 2018. 
Fachserie 14, Reihe 6, p. 74
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expenditure of all public budgets is rather high with 43.3% (see Chap. 14, 
Table 12.1: €648 billion out of €1429 billion).
If one takes the extent of the individual benefits and the budgets as a 
basis, the social insurances are dominant in the policy and administrative 
areas of social benefits. The expenditure of the social insurances amounts 
to approximately two-thirds of the entire social budget (cf. Table 7.4).
The social budget share of gross domestic product (GDP) is 29.4% (of 
which the social insurance systems, with a share of 17.7% of GDP, cover 
approximately two-thirds; cf. Sozialbudget 2018: 12). The social budget 
covers about 45% of the expenditure of all public budgets. The funding 
comprises of 34.5% social security contributions by the employers, 30.9% 














Systems of the Civil Service 
(2)
7.8%






Special systems for 
retirement provisions (4)
0.9%














The Social Budget according to areas of coverage in 2018:
Shares in the total expenditures including contributions by the State
(1) statutory and private 
(2) pensions, family allowances, financial assistance
(3) continued remuneration, supplementary benefits of the public service, and others
(4) pension insurance for the agricultural sector, pension funds of certain professions, private old-age insurance
(5) including other employment promotions
(6) promotion of vocational training and upgrading training assistance, housing benefit and compensation 
schemes
Fig. 7.1 The social budget according to the branches of social security (includ-
ing the five branches of the social security system: illness, occupational accident, 
personal care, unemployment, pension). Pension insurance: 30.3%, health insur-
ance: 25.3%, long-term care insurance: 4.0%, systems of civil service: 7.8%, 
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3  The SPecIal STaTuS of The SocIal SecurITy 
SySTemS and TheIr relaTIonShIP To The general 
admInISTraTIve SySTem
3.1  The Legal Bases of the Public Institutions in the Social 
Security Systems
The social security institutions and agencies have been established as inde-
pendent bodies alongside general public administration. They are granted 
by law the status of public corporate body with legal capacity and the right 
to self-administration (rechtsfähige öffentliche Körperschaft mit 
Selbstverwaltungscharakter) (Section 29 SGB IV). The regulatory frame-
work for organisation, finances, human resource management, decision- 
taking, etc. is based on federal laws, on the one hand, (mainly on SGB IV) 
and ordinances, which are passed by the committees of the social security 
institutions and agencies, on the other. The supervisory authority 
(Aufsichtsbehörde) has to either approve these ordinances (cf. Section 195 
SGB V) or raise objections if they are inconsistent with the applicable laws. 
The representative committee (governing board—Vertreterversammlung) 
is elected every six years by the members (i.e. usually the insured individu-
als and the employers). An exception is the unemployment insurance. In 
this regard, the Federal Ministry for Labour and Social Affairs appoints the 
members of the governing board pursuant to nominations from the 
employers’ associations and trade unions as well as from the federal gov-
ernment, states and municipalities. The representative committee 
Fig. 7.1 in- company retirement provisions: 2.7%, child benefit and family allow-
ance system: 4.5%, basic income support for job seekers: 4.4%, child and youth 
support: 4.5%, unemployment insurance: 2.6%, occupational accident insurance: 
1.3%, systems of the employers: 6.6%, special systems for retirement provisions: 
0.9%, parental allowance: 0.7%, social assistance: 3.9%, other systems: 0.6%. (1) 
Statutory and private, (2) pensions, family allowances, financial assistance, (3) con-
tinued remuneration, supplementary benefits of the public service and others, (4) 
pension insurance for the agricultural sector, pension funds of certain professions, 
private old-age insurance, (5) including other employment promotions, (6) pro-
motion of vocational training and upgrading training assistance, housing benefit 
and compensation schemes. (Source: Sozialbudget 2018 (BMAS 2019b): 6)
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(governing board) elects the executive board. The executive board does 
not need to be confirmed by a public authority (with the exception that 
the executive board of the Federal Employment Agency (Verwaltungsrat) 
is appointed by the federal government, based on the recommendation of 
the governing board).
The bodies of the social security systems draw up yearly budgets. In this 
regard, the budget principles are similar to those set out in the federal 
budget code (budget code; see Chap. 14) and in the social code (Section 
67ff. SGB IV). The supervisory authority may request the budget and can 
object to it if it is in contravention of legal requirements. The unemploy-
ment insurance and the miners’ pension insurance budgets require the 
approval of the responsible federal ministry since the federal government 
is liable as guarantor. In respect of the general pension insurance at the 
federal level, the liquidity assistance provided by the federal government 
only leads to an obligation to advise on the budget. An approval by the 
federal government is not required.
The way elections are structured, the creation of programmes (by way 
of ordinances) and the restrictive rules in respect of the budgets differ 
greatly from the scope of autonomy characteristic of local self-government 
with direct elections by the citizens and broad areas of autonomous 
decision- making (see Chap. 9). This is because almost all the benefits pro-
vided by the social insurances are regulated by federal laws and manifest as 
legal rights of the insured (Section 38 SGB I)—with only very limited 
discretion on the part of self-government (cf. Reit 2015). The institutions 
are formed by representatives elected by employers and insured individu-
als. In this regard, this form of self-government can also be characterised 
as a special type of self-government with autonomous legitimation and 
restricted scope for decision-making (cf. Schimanke 2001). Their origin 
lies in the pre-democratic time of the Bismarck era and aimed at promot-
ing social stability by involving employees and employers directly in the 
internal decision-making structures. The social security systems are now 
incorporated into the fundamental principles and the constitutional frame-
work of the Basic Law (Article 74 (1), number 12; Article 87 [2]).
3.2  Oversight of the Social Security Systems
The social security institutions and agencies are independent bodies yet 
part of public administration (‘indirect public administration’, ‘near gov-
ernmental units’). They are bound by the laws and are required to 
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implement them. The federal and state governments have to ensure that 
the social security systems implement legislation and work within the legal 
framework. Government oversight extends to ensuring that legislation 
and other laws are observed (Section 87 (1) SGB IV and Section 393 (1) 
SGB III) and, thus, is limited to legal supervision (cf. Chap. 6). However, 
in exceptional cases related to the so-called delegated tasks (übertragene 
Aufgaben), the oversight extends beyond examining the legality of mea-
sures to expert supervision (Fachaufsicht), which means that in these cases 
administrative expediency can also be evaluated. Examples in this regard 
are prevention tasks for occupational accident insurance or the family ben-
efits offices (Familienkassen) of the Federal Employment Agency (execu-
tion of the Law on Child Benefits).
The structure and responsibilities of the supervisory authorities reflect 
the features of administrative federalism (cf. Section 90 SGB IV). As a 
rule, the states have supervisory authority over the social security systems, 
which is limited to the area of one state (up to 3 states when they agree on 
supervision, cf. Article 87 (2), sentence 2 of the Basic Law). This mainly 
applies to regional health insurers, occupational accident insurers and the 
regional authorities of pension insurance. Usually, the state ministries of 
social affairs carry out the supervision; some states have tasked their own 
government agencies with this. In the vast majority of cases, the oversight 
function is vested in the Federal Government and is carried out either by 
the ministry responsible (usually the Federal Ministry for Labour and 
Social Affairs) or its subordinate, the Federal Office for Social Security. 
The supervisory authorities meet regularly to exchange experiences 
(Section 90 paragraph 4 SGB IV). This practical approach has brought 
about the expansion of administrative federalism to very intensive 
networks.
The legal supervision by government agencies is the expression of a 
legitimate interest of the state and its responsibility to ensure that institu-
tions and social security benefits comply with legal requirements (cf. 
Beschorner 2015; Kahl 2013: 514). In this regard, the independent status 
as a corporate body subject to public law with right to self-government 
(Körperschaft des öffentlichen Rechts mit Selbstverwaltung) has to be taken 
into account. It follows that legal supervision, when choosing supervisory 
means, has to be mindful of the leeway afforded by legislation (especially 
in form of the so-called scope for appreciation (unbestimmter Rechtsbegriff) 
and discretion (see Chap. 12); internal organisation and budgets). The 
principle of the least invasive interference applies—as codified in Section 
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89 SGB IV—ultimately an expression of the rule of law principle (Ausdruck 
des Rechtsstaatsprinzips) (see Chap. 2). The Federal Social Court upholds 
that a decision, which is justifiable, should not be objected to. Oversight 
can be pre-emptive or repressive. Consultation applies in the first place. 
Once a violation of law becomes evident, an objection will be raised with 
the requirement to remedy such violation within a certain period of time. 
It is only then that an administrative decision obligating compliance 
(Verpflichtungsbescheid) is issued against the social security system in ques-
tion. This administrative decision constitutes an exercise of discretion by 
the oversight authority. The latter can uphold the decision (e.g. declare 
invalid an election or budget) as soon as it becomes legally binding. Since 
the social security systems are corporate bodies with legal capacity, they 
can take legal action before the social courts against the administrative 
decisions of the legal supervision.
4  leSSonS learned
It may be advisable to develop a policy field with broader scope in the 
structured (federative) administrative system that is independent or semi- 
autonomous of the constitutional point of view and thus unburdens the 
state and the general administration. General public administration will be 
unburdened by operational functions. The social security institutions and 
agencies have a vested right to decide for themselves on ordinances, per-
sonnel and budgets (so-called functional self-government). The state, via 
legal supervision, has the task and opportunity to monitor compliance with 
legal requirements. The system of semi-independent authorities responsi-
ble for social security benefits does not insignificantly contribute to the fact 
that the institutions of the public sector are accepted and legitimised.
noTeS
1. Employers have the significant advantage that occupational accident insur-
ances (mainly named ‘Berufsgenossenschaft’/employers mutual insurance 
association) assume the liability of the employers in cases of occupational 
accidents. Moreover, for several decades now the occupational accident 
insurances also cover the claims of voluntary services.
2. A detailed survey is published by the Federal Ministry of Labour and Social 
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1  AdministrAtions of the Länder (federAl stAtes) 
in the system of GermAn federAlism
The German federal constitution or Basic Law (Grundgesetz) shapes the 
relationship between state and federal government in the exercise of state 
functions in the sense of a rule-exception relationship. Article 30 of the 
Basic Law reads: ‘The exercise of state powers and the fulfilment of state 
responsibilities is a matter for the Länder, unless this Grundgesetz does not 
provide or permit otherwise’. Historically, this rule-exception relationship 
is based on the fact that the Länder legally created the federal power in 
1949, not the other way around. In apparent contrast to this, the Basic 
Law, especially in the area of law enforcement (execution of the law), con-
stitutes a strong interdependence of the federal levels. According to Article 
83 of the Basic Law, federal laws are, in principle, not executed by the 
federal administration but by the state administrations. As a rule, 
L. Schrapper (*) 
Ministry of School and Education of the Land North Rhine-Westphalia, 
Düsseldorf, Germany
e-mail: ludger.schrapper@msb.nrw.de
Rule in everyday life is administration. (Max Weber)
106
execution is carried out by the Länder ‘on their own behalf’, that is, in 
principle, free from tight controls and regulating administrative supervi-
sion by the federal government. However, the level of control needs to be 
distinguished. In the execution of federal laws according to Article 84 of 
the Basic Law, the federal government—with a few exceptions—is only 
entitled to ensure laws executed by the Länder are in accordance with the 
law. Where the execution is ‘by order’ of the federal government accord-
ing to Article 85 of the Basic Law, the federal government is only entitled 
to ensure the appropriateness of execution per Article 85 (4) and—with 
certain restrictions—issue individual instructions. As an exception to the 
provisions of Articles 83, 86 and 87 of the Basic Law, the federal adminis-
tration assigns enforcement powers to the Federation and thus it has the 
power to establish its own law enforcement agencies, notably the foreign 
service and authorities for the waterways and shipping, border police and 
intelligence service. The main agencies at the federal level are the Federal 
Employment Agency and the social insurance institutions.
The enforcement of the federal laws thus described is carried out at the 
Länder level by administrative bodies (direct state administration) and, 
above all, by the municipal administrations. It is estimated that around 80 
percent of all public tasks are carried out at the municipal level (Grunow 
2003). From the federal point of view, however, the direct administrations 
of the Länder and the municipalities are a unit. This is also made clear in 
Article 84 (1), seventh sentence of the Basic Law: ‘By federal law tasks 
may not be transferred to municipalities and municipal associations’.
Taking the special form of German federalism, the strong position of 
the Länder executive is justified in relation to both the federal administra-
tion and the internal relationship with the local legislature. In contrast to 
the so-called senate model with more political representation by the fed-
eral states, such as in the United States or Switzerland, according to the 
Basic Law, the Bundesrat (Federal Council) is the representative body of 
the Länder governments. Thus, participation in federal legislation becomes 
a task of their executive, depending solely on their decision-making. The 
classification of this system, known as ‘executive federalism’ (Münch 
2002) or ‘administrative federalism’ (Grunow 2003), is correct (cf. also 
Kuhlmann and Wollmann 2019), although the political dimension of par-
ticipation in the Bundesrat against the background of the different (party) 
political majorities and, thus, political-ideological orientations of the 
Länder governments plays a major role.
Another important field of Länder cooperation induced by federalism 
is the permanent structure of so-called minister conferences, the oldest of 
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which, the Kultusminister Konferenz (the Standing Conference of the 
Ministers of Education and Cultural Affairs), was established in 1948. The 
heads of the different ministries hold their coordination meetings twice a 
year, and the chair changes annually. Below the top level, a substructure of 
permanent working parties prepares the issues together with a close net-
work of Länder officials.
A comparison of the staffing levels of federal and Länder administrations 
reflects the above-described central role of Länder administrations and 
their municipalities in law enforcement in the federal system. Around 
656,000 federal civil servants work in the public sector (excluding military 
personnel) compared to more than 3.4 million employees (as of 2017) in 
both Länder and local government. On the other hand, at the federal 
level, the proportion of employees in the areas of political management 
and central administration is disproportionately high at 21,000. In addi-
tion, 15.7 percent (3300 employees) of the functions are top functions in 
the so-called grade B (salary range from €95,000 to €180,000). At the 
level of the Länder administrations, this compares with only about 60,000 
employees in these areas, including top jobs of 7.1 percent (4300 exclud-
ing municipalities). By far the largest proportion of employees in the 
Länder civil service is in education (schools and universities) with around 
1,168,800 staff (56 percent), followed by 234,000 officers (11 percent) in 
the 16 Länder police forces (compared to 40,600 federal police).
2  BAsic conditions 
for the AdministrAtive orGAnisAtion
In attempting to depict a comparison of the administrations of the German 
Länder, the following conclusion can be drawn: the considerable hetero-
geneity of the baseline conditions, such as size of the area, the number of 
inhabitants, the economic or the topographical structure—despite all the 
differences in terminology and details—is the opposite of a relative homo-
geneity of administrative structures. This was—and still is—based on the 
influencing power of the Prussian administrative traditions, which live on 
in particular through the nationwide, almost standardised, training of civil 
servants and comparable career patterns. Nevertheless, it cannot be denied 
that a Land like North Rhine-Westphalia with a population of 17.9 mil-
lion needs, at least partially, different administrative structures to 
Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania with only 1.6  million inhabitants or 
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Saarland with 0.99 million. Therefore, almost all of the large territorial 
states of the Federal Republic have a three-tier system compared with the 
states of Brandenburg, Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania, Schleswig- 
Holstein and Saarland, whose administrative structure is organised in two 
tiers. Niedersachsen (Lower Saxony) is a special case, having abolished its 
regional middle level, contrary to a long tradition, in 2005. Significant 
deviations in the administrative structure also result from the distinction 
between the German so-called territorial states and city-states, which—for 
Hamburg and Bremen—can only be explained by a long-standing tradi-
tion rooted in the Middle Ages. In the case of Berlin, its special status after 
the end of the Second World War as a territory under the responsibility of 
all four occupying powers has not changed. In the city-states, state and 
municipal affairs are carried out by a single administration. In Berlin and 
Hamburg, due to the size of the cities, with the so-called district adminis-
trations in Berlin and the urban district office (Ortsamt) in Bremen, there 
is an additional inner-city administrative level. The city of Bremerhaven is 
also part of the city-state of Bremen. In addition, in city-states, public 
authorities are set up as independent bodies of public administration, 
which can be described as indirect Länder administration.
3  BAsic structures of the AdministrAtions 
of the Länder
The State Organisation Acts of the Länder (Landesorganisationsgesetze—
LOG) classify their subjects as legal persons (legal entities). Like natural 
persons, they have a fundamental legal capacity in the sense of a broad 
legal capacity to act in all areas of law. In the field of public law, there are 
three basic types: corporation (Körperschaft), institution (Anstalt) and 
foundation (Stiftung). The federal and Länder governments are catego-
rised as territorial communities (Gebietskörperschaft), that is, associations 
of all people residing in a demarcated area. Legal persons act through their 
bodies (Organe), which are legally constituted units with defined powers. 
At the top level of the state organisation, these are for the Länder the par-
liament, the Länder government as the head of the executive branch and 
the bodies of the judiciary. Within the executive branch, the authority 
(Behörde) is the standard type of body.
The Länder can have their executive tasks performed by their own 
bodies (authorities). One speaks then of direct Land administration. 
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However, they can also transfer certain tasks to independent legal entities, 
most of which are municipalities. These bodies of the indirect Land 
administration set up their own budgets and have their own staff.
3.1  Direct Land Administration
Where the Länder directly execute law and carry out other executive tasks, 
they act through the authorities and other forms of organisation of the 
direct state administration. The regulation of the administrative structure 
is usually reserved for the legislator (cf. Article 77, fourth sentence, Land 
constitution of North Rhine-Westphalia). The establishment of individual 
organisational units (e.g. authorities) is again a matter of self-organisation 
of the executive.
3.1.1  Upper Administrative Level
Beyond the question of whether the direct administration of the Länder is 
structured in two or three tiers (see below), the highest executive level, as 
in the federal administration, is formed by different ministries, such as the 
Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Education and Research. 
Organisationally, they fall into the category of the highest Länder authori-
ties. The appointment of ministers and, thus, the determination of the 
number of ministries as well as the technical competencies are the respon-
sibility of the minister president of the respective Land, who, as head of 
government, has been given this power. Instead of a federal chancellery, 
he has a so-called state chancellery (in some Länder a ministry of state), 
which handles the administrative coordination of the other ministries. In 
the city-states, the heads of state have the title of ‘mayor’ following the 
urban tradition, and the Land governments are referred to as the ‘senate’. 
In work and function, there are far-reaching parallels between the ministe-
rial administrations of the federation and those of the Länder. Central 
tasks include the drafting of legislation and the political-technical control 
(supervision) of the subordinate administration. The organisational struc-
ture is based predominantly on a so-called line organisation and, accord-
ing to the German administration tradition, with few personnel in staff 
functions. In the direction of their ministries, the ministers are supported 
as political representatives by one—rarely several—state secretary with 
civil servant status (permanent secretaries). They are so-called political 
officials and—as an exception to the civil service guarantee of permanent 
employment status—can be relieved of their duties at any time and put 
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into temporary retirement if compliance with the political principles of the 
respective Land government is no longer guaranteed. The basic organisa-
tional units of the state ministries—again parallel to the federal administra-
tion—are the units, which are bundled into departments and, in larger 
state administrations such as North Rhine-Westphalia, additionally subdi-
vided into sub-departments (groups). Unlike the federal government, the 
department heads are generally not political officials in the legal sense just 
described.
With regard to the size relation of ministries as the uppermost 
administrative level to the respective overall administration, the ministerial 
administration of the Länder is rather disproportionate in comparison to 
the Federation. An indicator may be the number of top officials in grades 
B2–B11. The functions from the first management level (head of unit) up 
to the head of department are assigned these grades throughout. Here, 
there are approximately 3300 top civil servants in the federal service with 
an approximate total of 328,000 employees (excluding military personnel) 
compared with only around 4300 top officials in the Länder services with 
a total of approximately 2,378,000 non-municipal employees. This is due, 
on the one hand, to the lack of ‘big’ ministries, such as defence and for-
eign affairs, in the area of the Länder. Above all, however, the much stron-
ger orientation of the administrations of the Länder towards actual 
administration is evident here. This is particularly noticeable in the area of 
school education. For example, in North Rhine-Westphalia, the ratio of 
supervisory ministerial administration to the total body of staff in the area 
of school education is 1:500.
In addition to the ministries as the highest state authorities, under the 
state organisation acts, each Land has a higher state authority (Obere 
Landesbehörde). These bodies are directly subordinate to the ministries 
and do not assume any political leadership tasks, but instead sector-specific 
tasks that require special expertise. They belong to the upper level of the 
administrative structure because their territorial jurisdiction covers the 
entire state territory. As a rule—at least in three-tiered state administra-
tions—they do not have their own administrative base, but in certain cases 
have supervisory powers over the middle- or lower-level authorities. A 
typical upper state authority is the state criminal police office with coordi-
nation functions as regards combatting crime and special forensic exper-
tise. The same applies to the state environmental agencies with special 
advisory skills and laboratory capacities. Also worthy of mention are the 
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personnel and pension offices which manage the salaries and pensions of 
active and former state employees.
The so-called Landesbetriebe (state enterprises) have a similar function 
to the upper Land authorities. As an organisational type, they are a conse-
quence of the theories of New Public Management (NPM) and have had 
an impact on the administrative organisation since the beginning of the 
2000s. They are responsible for providing the administration with market-
able services. With regard to their product range they are therefore com-
peting with private enterprises, but in some cases are nevertheless entitled 
to establish for other public authorities of the state administration an obli-
gation to ‘buy’ their services. The obligation to draw up a business plan, 
and also to account according to commercial law, is designed to create 
cost transparency. In state-owned enterprises, for example, the Länder are 
responsible for organising the administration of their real estate or for all 
tasks relating to road construction and maintenance. More recently, the 
necessary IT services have been provided by state-owned enterprises.
Finally, as administrative organisations with Land-wide competence, 
the Einrichtungen (institutions) should be mentioned. In contrast to state 
authorities, they perform public tasks in the internal relationship of the 
administration. These may be tasks in the field of staff training as provided 
by the administrative colleges of the Länder. Typical state institutions also 
include public archives or institutes charged with development of school- 
specific programmes or with scientific-technical specialised tasks.
3.1.2  Regional Meso Level
Below the level of the ministerial administration, it is possible to 
differentiate between two structural models according to whether there is 
a regionally located central authority between the state level and the 
municipal level. With the exception of the state of Lower Saxony, all large 
and populous German states have a meso-level administrative district. It 
coordinates the various actors at the local level in their district and, 
moreover, directly performs those administrative tasks which require a 
certain concentration of technical or legal expertise. The traditional rule 
type of a regional mid- authority is the administrative district authority, 
which is also called the Bezirksregierung (regional government) or 
Regierungspräsidium (Regional Commissioner’s Office). It draws on the 
Prussian administrative tradition of the early nineteenth century and is 
characterised by a bundling—and thus coordination—of numerous 
administrative tasks in one authority. In terms of supervision, a ‘general 
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representation of the state government’ is established for the various 
regions of the Land (cf. Article 8 (1) of the State Organisation Act 
(Landesorganisationsgesetz—LOG) of North Rhine-Westphalia, NRW). 
The bundling authority avoids the establishment of special administrations 
ranging from the highest department (ministry) down to the local level, 
which bring with them the dangers of a technical-mental ‘pillarisation’, a 
hampered reconciliation of interests by deficient communication structures 
and a lack of regional networking (Schrapper 1994; Bogumil and Ebinger 
2008). Because of the bundling effects described above, the organisational 
model is also described as the concentrated three-stage principle (Bogumil 
2007; Reiners 2010). Despite their mature organisational development, 
the administrative district authorities have been the subject of structural 
reforms like almost no other area of state administration (cf. Chap. 16).
The structuring in administrative districts with the Bezirksregierung as 
administrative body can be found in North Rhine-Westphalia, Bavaria, 
Baden-Württemberg and Hesse. The population in these districts varies 
from over 1 million in the more rural areas of Bavaria (Upper Palatinate, 
Upper Franconia and Lower Bavaria) to 5.3 million in the conurbation 
Rhine/Ruhr in North Rhine-Westphalia (Düsseldorf and Cologne). The 
tasks are defined by the categories of ‘order’ (e.g. traffic and air supervi-
sion, disaster control, building supervision and food supervision), ‘allow-
ance’ (e.g. support programmes for economic policy, urban planning, 
culture and sport), ‘approval’ (environmental and occupational safety, 
goods and passenger transport) and ‘regional planning’ (Bogumil 2007). 
In addition, the administrative district authorities are usually responsible 
for the legal and financial supervision of local authorities. Worth mention-
ing is the subsidiary competence of the district governments for all state 
administration tasks that are not explicitly assigned to other authorities (cf. 
Section 8 (3) LOG NRW). In view of new short-term enforcement tasks 
emerging (e.g. in the field of genetic engineering), this subsidiary role has 
repeatedly proven its necessity.
In addition to the traditional concept of the concentrated three-stage 
principle described above, hybrids of the model of the regional bundling 
authority can be found in the states of Rhineland-Palatinate and in the 
three (East) German (‘new’) Länder of Saxony, Saxony-Anhalt and 
Thuringia. In 2000, Rhineland-Palatinate bundled together its three 
intermediate authorities (the administrative districts of Koblenz, Neustadt 
and Trier) not only regionally, but also functionally. This was done due to 
their small size, which is slightly below average in comparison with the 
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Federation (e.g. the Trier district has 500,000 inhabitants). The authori-
ties were reorganised and replaced by the Supervision and Services 
Directorate and two Structural and Approval Directorates. In fact, the 
directorates act in part as bundling authorities because they are anchored 
in the structure of the state administration, that is, only sectorally. After 
German unification in 1990, the (East) German Land of Thuringia 
decided directly for a state-wide concentrated intermediate level with a 
so-called State Administration Office as ‘functional equivalent’ (Bogumil 
and Ebinger 2008), whereas Saxony and Saxony-Anhalt have since gone 
through dissolving their earlier established administrative districts (cf. 
Chap. 16).
The Länder of Brandenburg, Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania, 
Saarland and Schleswig-Holstein completely dispense with a middle level 
of the state administration. At least in terms of number of inhabitants, 
they belong to the smallest territorial states. The typical functions of a 
regional administrative level are not required against the background of a 
municipal area structure with a clearly below average number of rural and 
urban districts (districts and independent cities). This is particularly evi-
dent in the state of Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania, which has taken 
several reform steps to divide its territory into only six large so-called 
Kreise (counties) and two county-free cities (Rostock and Schwerin). The 
representation of municipal administration in the area is expected to reach 
its limits here. In contrast to this, despite its considerable size, the state of 
Brandenburg also has a two-tier administrative structure with as many as 
14 counties and 4 county-free cities. Here, the need for a coordinating 
intermediate or regional administrative level cannot be completely 
ruled out.
3.1.3  Lower State Authorities
The fulfilment of public tasks by the administration at the local or regional- 
local level takes place within a dual administrative structure. A distinction 
needs to be made between state-owned ‘lower’ authorities, which are sub-
ordinate to the service and technical supervision of a state intermediate 
authority, or, more rarely, to an upper or even to the highest state author-
ity. The vast majority of public duties, on the other hand, are performed 
by the municipal authorities as indirect state administration (see above). 
This is due to their constitutional special status described above, according 
to which—from a federal law perspective—they are part of the state admin-
istration, but also have a right guaranteed by the federal constitution to 
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self-govern their own affairs, that is, those of the local community. In this 
area, the municipal authorities are only subject to legal supervision of the 
Land. As a third category of public tasks, in addition to the original state 
tasks (e.g. police or financial administration) and ‘own affairs’, those tasks 
are to be mentioned where the Länder reserve a broader supervisory right, 
which includes the expediency of task fulfilment.
In this case, a distinction is made between the different municipal 
traditions of the Länder according to whether these ‘transferred’ tasks 
(dualistic model), insofar as legally dogmatic, are comparable to the 
so-called Order Management laid down in Article 85 of the Basic Law or 
whether a monistic model is used, according to which municipal authorities 
basically only perform municipal tasks, which in certain cases, especially in 
the area of security, are legally defined as so-called ‘compulsory tasks to be 
performed according to instructions’ and thus subject to greater control.
The difference described above will result in direct consequences for 
the organisation of the authorities. In the dualistic model with the legal 
concept of the so-called delegated Wirkungskreis (realm of influence), the 
tasks performed by certain local authorities (Landräte—county adminis-
trators, and Oberbürgermeister—lord mayors) retain their state character; 
they remain Land tasks. As a result, the bodies of the counties and city 
districts act as ‘lower land administrative authorities’ (cf. Section 8 (1) 
LOG Brandenburg: ‘General lower Land authorities are the county 
administrators and lord mayors’). Here they are subject to unrestricted 
specialist supervision by the upper and intermediate Land authorities and 
not only to legal supervision, as in their ‘own affairs’. In addition, there 
are some requirements of the Land for the authorities.
The concept of the delegated realm of influence can be found mainly in 
the southern and eastern German states, whereas for north-western 
Germany, especially North Rhine-Westphalia, the monistic task concept is 
relevant. This, in turn, requires an organisational differentiation according 
to whether public tasks can be performed as municipal mandatory tasks 
(according to instructions) or whether they are originally federal tasks that 
require comprehensive control powers of intermediate or upper Land 
authorities (usually in the field of internal security and disaster control). In 
these cases, the superior authorities can access the administrative head of a 
county (Landrat—county administrator) or, in some cases that of a 
county-free city (Oberbürgermeister—lord mayor), who is then fully sub-
ject to the authority of the higher authorities, in this sense ‘borrowed 
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administration’. Legally, the district administrator (or the lord mayor) acts 
as the ‘lower state administrative authority’.
The state-owned lower authorities are part of the direct state 
administration. In the majority of Länder these are typically the tax offices; 
in Länder with delegated realm of influence, these are the police service 
agencies or the school inspectorate. The tasks performed have a clear, 
definable territorial reference and therefore justify the establishment of 
locally based units.
3.2  Indirect Land Government
As a matter of principle, according to their own degree of state autonomy, 
the Länder decide to what extent they delegate the execution of public 
tasks to independent agencies. However, there is a significant exception 
here. In the case of local or municipal authorities (counties and cities), 
Article 28 (2) of the Basic Law as federal constitution already guarantees 
their right to ‘regulate all matters of the local community on their own 
responsibility within the limits prescribed by the law’. However, the quali-
fication of a public task as a ‘local matter’ is neither selectively changeable 
nor unchangeable for Länder legislation over time because the local refer-
ences of a matter can change with its social, economic or technical frame-
work (Federal Constitutional Court 2014). But the legislator has to 
observe a vital core area of self-government and even a ‘priority of jurisdic-
tion’ of the local authorities (cf. Ruge, Chap. 5).
Other important representatives of the indirect state administration are 
the universities, which employ 22 percent of the Länder personnel. This 
applies regardless of their affiliation to a territorial state or city-state. Their 
status, unlike that of a local authority, is not constitutionally anchored. 
The provisions of freedom of scholarship under Article 5 (3) of the Basic 
Law define this as such. Also worth mentioning are the self-governing 
institutions of professional bodies such as the chambers of industry and 
commerce as well as the chambers of crafts and chambers of the ‘liberal 
professions’, such as lawyers, auditors, doctors and so on. In addition to 
the management of their own affairs, individual state tasks for execution 
are also delegated to them.
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4  Personnel structure 
And AdministrAtive culture
As mentioned at the outset, the central role of the Länder in executing law 
in the federal system is reflected in the size of their administrative staff. As 
already stated, a distinction must be made between the bodies of direct 
and indirect state administration, in particular local authorities (counties 
and cities).
Of the already mentioned more than 3.4  million employees (as of 
2017) in these areas, 2,387,000 employees and thus 50.1 percent of the 
total civil service in Germany (4,179,000, including social security and 
military personnel) account for the direct state administration. This mainly 
reflects the responsibility of the Länder for school and university educa-
tion. Consequently, there are approximately 1,170,000 employees work-
ing in these areas, that is, 28 percent of the total civil service in Germany. 
Another consequence of this responsibility is the significantly dispropor-
tionate share of women in the administrations of the Länder compared 
with the federal administration, namely 57 percent compared to the fed-
eral administration with 29 percent. This, in turn, results in a noticeably 
higher proportion of part-time employees of around 32 percent (of which 
45 percent are female), compared to 11 percent in the federal 
administration.
Differences in the range of tasks carried out by the federal administration 
and the administrations of the Länder are also reflected in the remuneration 
structure, which, in turn, allows conclusions to be drawn about the 
qualifications of the staff and the hierarchy of functions. As already 
mentioned in this context, there is a disproportionate share of top func-
tions in the federal area in relation to the total number of employees 
(excluding military personnel) of 10.1 percent compared with 0.18 per-
cent in the administrations of the Länder. By contrast, the percentage of 
staff in the middle segment of the Länder (civil service grades A11–A13 
and salary levels EG11–EG13 for non-civil servants) is clearly dispropor-
tionate—40 percent of the total number of employees compared to 15.6 
percent in the federal administration (including military personnel and 
social insurance). The main reason for this, as already mentioned, is the 
importance of the education sector for the Länder; the vast majority of 
teachers are assigned grades A12 and A13. In addition, the employees in 
these categories of general administration form the functional group of 
the administrative work and thus the backbone of a management that 
 L. SCHRAPPER
117
tends to be oriented towards enforcement rather than management and 
control.
With regard to age of staff, there is a relative over-proportional ageing 
of the civil service compared to the private sector (Schrapper 2013). When 
comparing the administrations of federal and Länder governments, there 
are no significant differences. The proportion of the age group ‘60 plus’ 
(the statutory pension age will be raised in intermediate steps to 67 years 
by 2031) is 8.8 percent of the total staff in the federal administration and 
11.5 percent in the state administrations. For staff below the age of 30 
(Federation 24.4 percent; Länder 13 percent), the difference is explained 
by the high proportion of regular soldiers serving for a fixed period with 
ratings, identifiable by the relatively low remuneration levels. In the area 
of this functional level, 9.2 percent of the employees work in the federal 
government and only 0.2 percent in the Länder.
In addition to the professional self-image, the personnel structure of 
the administrations gives rise to the distinct character of the administrative 
culture prevailing there. In a differentiated administration such as the 
Land administration, however, subdivided subcultures obviously exist, for 
example, in the areas of school, police, justice and general services. To 
identify a definable ‘culture of state administration’ is virtually impossible. 
Drawing a comparison between the Länder administrations and with the 
federal government, there are hardly any significant differences to be 
found in the various sectors. The professional self-conception of the gen-
eral administration in federal and Länder governments in the upper- 
intermediate service is characterised by a high proportion of civil servants 
with similar educational backgrounds from specific administrative colleges 
(Wiegand-Hoffmeister 2011). Accordingly, career changes between 
administrations are in legal and practical terms not a problem. In spite of 
the distribution of more legislative competences in the field of remunera-
tion to the Länder by the constitutional reform in 2006, this is still helped 
by a (still) fairly uniform remuneration structure nationwide. However, 
the tendency here is clearly towards increasing spreading, which could 
prove to be an obstacle to mobility in the future and could, therefore, also 
be the cause of increasing partitioning (Battis 2009). Salaries already differ 
by up to 10 percent in the various salary levels between the federal govern-
ment and the Länder, and also between the Länder themselves, where 
there is a north-south divide.
For the group of university-trained civil servants (higher service) in the 
general administration, a factual monopoly of jurists is still a characteristic 
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feature of the German administrative culture and tradition (Bull 2018; 
Hebeler 2008). Whether this results in consequences for the habitus of 
the administration or even its willingness to reform is a controversial sub-
ject of administrative research (Hammerschmidt et  al. 2010; Kroll 
et al. 2012).
5  lessons leArned
5.1  Structural Reforms: More than a Political Playground?
The history of administrative reforms in the administrations of the Länder 
is, above all, a history of administrative structural reforms (for the process 
of ‘communalisation’ cf. Kuhlmann and Wollmann 2019). From a critical 
perspective, this is primarily due to the fact that the intervention in struc-
tures serves politically plausible expectations (cost reduction and de- 
bureaucratisation or ‘slim state’) and avoids more conflict-laden 
mission-critical decisions (Grotz et al. 2017). For example, the abolition 
of public authorities—reduced by 66 percent in the period from 1992 to 
2014—did not lead to a proportional reduction in staff numbers. An addi-
tional factor is that interference in the structure and staffing levels in the 
central policy fields of education and homeland security with their large 
bodies of personnel would not be conveyable in political terms.
The main object of interventions in the structure were the administrative 
district authorities as central or regional bundling authorities. Again, one 
could assume a superior motive. Thus, the structure of the highest level of 
administration of the ministries follows immediately obvious political 
premises and, of course, changes in the cycle of electoral periods and the 
resulting change of government; the interventions are shallow and involve 
less structures than responsibilities. Regional bundling authorities are 
sufficiently complex entities with purely administrative functions. In the 
large and populous West German Länder, the district governments are 
firmly anchored as the regional authority of the meso level; only Lower 




5.2  Prepared for the Future? Digitalisation 
as a Major Challenge
In comparison to the more endogenous reform drivers described above, 
such as the situation of public budgets, the current and future dominant 
driver for reforms in the process of organisation, and possibly also for the 
organisational structure of the state administration, is digitalisation. 
Systemically anchored obstacles such as the ‘friction losses of federalism’ 
(Martini 2017) or a traditional, overly complex administrative culture 
designed for decentralised and clearly defined responsibilities as well as 
administrative secrecy (Hagen and Lühr 2019) are considered as causes of 
incompatibilities. In this difficult reform environment, the federal govern-
ment has already laid down the foundations for further development with 
the passing of the eGovernment Act (EGovG) in 2013 and the Online 
Access Act (OZG) in 2017, which in part required an amendment to 
Article 91c (5) of the Basic Law due to the cross-level portal network. The 
federal, state and local authorities are committed to making all their 
administrative services available via a nationwide access platform by the 
end of 2022. As a result, not only will business processes have to be 
IT-capable, but the professionalism as well as the attitude of employees 
and executives will have to be further developed (Winners 2019).
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Germany has a long tradition in  local self-government. The modern 
approach goes back to the beginning of the nineteenth century at the time 
of significant reform in the different states, especially in Prussia (reforms 
developed and implemented by Stein). The principles of local self- 
government have been strengthened over the past two centuries in the 
different states with ups and downs. The federal and state constitutions of 
1948 and 1949 follow these principles and guarantee strong local self- 
government. In fact, the cornerstone of the institution of local self- 
government in Germany is mirrored in the European Charter of Local 
Self-Government of October 1985.1 Germany was among one of the first 
states to sign this charter because its principles reflect and underline the 
existing system of local self-government in Germany. Therefore, the 
approaches and practices in the different German states offer a broad basis 
for studying the functioning of a well-established local self-government 
and its relationship to state authorities. Moreover, local self-government is 
K. Ruge • K. Ritgen (*) 
German County Association, Berlin, Germany
e-mail: Kay.Ruge@landkreistag.de; klaus.ritgen@landkreistag.de
124
not uniform across all the 16 states. This opens up the opportunity for 
comparative research and argumentation on ‘best practice’.
In 2017, there were 11,455 local authorities in Germany, including 
107 county-free cities, 294 counties and 11,054 municipalities belonging 
to a county. These municipalities, cities and counties are responsible for a 
variety of original tasks as well as for the performance of large parts of 
federal and Land laws. Local authorities are usually entrusted by the 
Länder with the performance of federal or Land laws. There are two mod-
els to be distinguished here: either the states (Länder) transfer tasks to the 
local authorities so that after the transfer they are, as it were, their own 
municipal tasks, or the local authorities perform them as external tasks and 
thus act on behalf of the state. The result of both models leads to a largely 
decentralised administration in Germany. There are, however, federal 
administrative authorities as well as numerous regional administrative 
authorities of the states (see Chaps. 6 and 8). The majority of civil service 
staff, which includes teachers, professors and police officers, are employed 
in the state administrative authorities.
The administrations of the local authorities are embedded in the 
politico- administrative system of Germany and cover significant functions. 
Two central indicators that underline the weight of the local authorities 
are the number of personnel and the finances. The local authorities account 
for 30 per cent of public service personnel (Table 9.1).
This high number of personnel reflects the functions of local authorities 
to deliver most of the public services in direct contact with the citizens 
(the number of personnel in the states is only higher due to large numbers 
of public servants working in the three areas of education, that is schools 
and universities, police and courts). The first and most important point of 
Table 9.1 Civil service staff
Sector FTE2 %
Federation 474,100 11.3
Federal states 2,105,200 50.4
Local authorities 1,271,300 30.4
Social security 328,500 7.9
Total 4,179,100 100
Source: German Federal Statistical Office (2019) 
Finances and taxes. Civil service staff 2018. Special 
series 14, Series 6, p. 25
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contact for citizens and companies regarding most administrative matters 
is either the town hall of their town or municipality, or the county admin-
istration of their county. These services are often organised in centres of 
administrative services called Bürgerämter (one-stop shops).
Insofar as the weight of the local authorities in public finances is con-
cerned, the central budgets of the local authorities cover roughly one- 
third of public expenditure (excluding social security). However, the 
expenditure is not only assessed in the central budgets of the local authori-
ties, but also in special budgets established for the different local goods 
(local public transportation, water provision and sewage, waste collection, 
institutions of culture, etc.; see Chap. 14). In addition, the local authori-
ties implement a major share of the public investments (often co-financed 
by the states or out of the federal programmes). (cf. Deutscher Landkreistag 
2019; Deutscher Städtetag 2017; Zimmermann and Döring 2019). 
Table 9.2 summarises the main items of revenue and expenditure of the 
communes (excluding the three city-states).
The following provides an overview of the very different structures of 
cities, counties and municipalities (Sect. 2). The special position of munic-
ipalities in the German administrative system would remain incomprehen-
sible without looking at the constitutional entrenchment of the local 
self-government rules, which also result in guidelines for local territorial 
reforms (Sect. 3). Section 4 proceeds with a description of the main fea-
tures of the rules governing the organisational aspects of local authori-
ties—the local constitutional law. A brief description of the role of local 
government associations in Sect. 5 concludes this chapter.
2  cItIes, countIes and MunIcIpalItIes
The distinction between counties and municipalities is fundamental for 
understanding the structure of local self-government bodies in Germany 
(Kuhlmann and Wollmann 2019: 92ff.).
2.1  The Various Bodies of Local Self-Government
A distinction is laid down in Article 28 of the Basic Law. Article 28 (2), 
first sentence of the Basic Law grants municipalities the right to take 
responsibility for all matters of the local community. The Basic Law thus 
ties in with historically developed forms of settlement to which it grants a 
special status of the ‘right to self-government’, a special constitutional 
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position, also vis-à-vis the Länder and the Federation (Engels 2014: 
227ff.).
In addition to the municipalities there are the associations thereof 
(Article 28 (2), second sentence of the Basic Law), which essentially refers 
to the counties. The counties are not a creation of the Basic Law either, 
but rather entities whose origins can be found in the early history of 
German administration. They have a dual nature. On the one hand, a 
county is an association of municipalities, which are therefore also referred 
Table 9.2 Finances of the communes from 2017 to 2022
Revenue/Expenditure 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022
Billion euro
Revenue 243.80 253.94 264.6 274.8 283.5 290.6
Taxes 95.90 101.21 103.4 107.7 111.8 115.7
Including:
  Property taxes 12.50 12.69 12.8 13.0 13.1 13.2
  Trade tax revenues 40.06 42.21 42.2 44.7 46.4 47.7
  Share of income tax 36.30 37.92 39.2 40.7 42.8 45.0
  Share of VAT 5.51 6.79 7.5 7.7 7.9 8.0
For information only:
  Gross trade tax revenue 48.17 50.72 49.9 50.1 52.0 53.5
Fees 19.41 19.96 20.5 20.9 21.1 21.3
Current allocations from state/
federal government
88.43 91.42 97.1 100.0 104.3 107.4
Investment allocations from state/
federal government
7.42 8.44 10.6 13.,0 13.0 12.5
Other revenue 32.63 32.91 32. 95 33.2 33.4 33.7
Expenditure 234.07 245.26 259.0 270.7 281.3 291.2
Personnel 59.13 62.12 65.3 67.9 70.3 72.4
Material expenses 49.53 51.14 53.1 54.8 56.4 57.8
Social benefits 58.77 59.07 61.7 64.2 66.4 68.7
Interest 2.71 2.47 2.5 2.5 2.6 2.6
Investments in real assets
Including: 24.42 27.60 31.7 34.9 37.3 39.5
  Construction measures 18.22 20.82 23.9 26.5 28.6 30.4
  Acquisition of property, plant and 
equipment
6.20 6.78 7.7 8.4 8.7 9.0
Other expenses 39.52 42.85 44.8 46.4 48.4 50.2
Financial balance 9.73 8.68 5.6 4.1 2.2 −0.6
Source: Local Government Associations, Deutscher Landkreistag, October 2019: 499. The figures for the 
years from 2019 to 2022 are based on surveys, statistics and projections
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to as ‘municipalities belonging to a county’. On the other hand, coun-
ties—like the municipalities—are also considered local authorities with the 
constitutional right of self-government.
This general dualism is important for the allocation of municipal tasks 
(for more on common tasks, see Sect. 2.3 below). Obviously, the counties 
are predestined to perform tasks, which by their nature have a supra-local 
reference that goes beyond the boundaries of the municipalities belonging 
to them. This applies, for example, to ensuring local public transportation 
in rural areas. Due to their size and administrative power, counties are also 
more efficient than municipalities.
The general dualism at the local level is suspended when it comes to the 
structure of county-free cities. County-free cities are considered munici-
palities that do not belong to an overarching municipal association. The 
local level in county-free cities is, therefore, not of a dual nature but (in 
principle) of a singular one.
2.2  Population and Size of County-Free Cities, Counties 
and Municipalities Belonging to a County
While counties have a comparatively higher degree of homogeneity 
regarding population (and size of their territory), the population of 
(county-free) cities and municipalities (belonging to a county) differ vastly.
The largest county-free city is Munich with approximately 1.5 million 
inhabitants, followed by Cologne with around 1.1 million inhabitants and 
Frankfurt/Main with roughly 740,000 inhabitants.3 At the lower end of 
the scale are the county-free cities of Zweibrücken (34,500), Suhl (35,600) 
and Pirmasens (40,400). The most populated county is the county of 
Recklinghausen with 620,000 inhabitants, while the least populated is the 
county of Lüchow-Dannenberg with just under 49,000 inhabitants. In 
this respect, however, these are exceptions. The vast majority of the 294 
counties in Germany have between 150,000 and 250,000 inhabitants and 
cover an area from 1100 km2 to 1500 km2. On a national average, 37 
municipalities belong to a county. By contrast, the situation is completely 
heterogeneous among municipalities belonging to a county. There are, for 
example, some municipalities with less than 100 inhabitants, while others 
have 100,000 inhabitants.
In some states, attempts have been made to address this disparity by 
merging the small and very small communes into more powerful munici-
palities. Especially in Hesse, North Rhine-Westphalia and Saarland, 
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regional reforms in the 1970s led to the creation of larger, more powerful 
municipalities (see Chap. 16). In Hesse, for example, the number of 
municipalities decreased from a total of 2691 in 1960 to only 416 in 1978. 
In particular, the number of municipalities with less than 5000 inhabitants 
decreased from 2589 to 141. A similar pattern can be seen in North 
Rhine-Westphalia, where the number of municipalities dropped from 
2277 in 1968 to 396 after the implementation of the reform in 1978. In 
Saarland, which had 345 municipalities before the reform, only 50 existed 
afterwards.
In the new states of Saxony and Saxony-Anhalt, too, there was a signifi-
cant reduction in the number of municipalities at the municipal level after 
German reunification. However, unlike in Hesse, North Rhine-Westphalia 
and Saarland, the model of the united municipalities was not consistently 
applied in these states. Here, and also in particular in Baden-Württemberg, 
Bavaria, Brandenburg, Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania, Lower Saxony, 
Rhineland-Palatinate, Schleswig-Holstein and Thuringia, together with a 
few united municipalities, a considerably high number of small and very 
small municipalities continue to exist, which have been combined into 
municipal associations acting below the county level to compensate for 
their lack of capacity. These associations, described as administrative part-
nerships (Verwaltungsgemeinschaften), municipal associations (Ämter), or 
‘double-decker’ municipalities (Verbandsgemeinde), are essentially distin-
guished by the fact that they perform most of the administrative tasks of 
their member municipalities in a quasi-managing capacity and are thus 
able to provide the necessary administrative structures. The member 
municipalities of such associations also have their own mayor and a munic-
ipal representative body (municipal council). Consequently, self- governing 
local politics also takes place in these often very small communes.
2.3  Common Tasks of County-Free Cities, Counties 
and Municipalities Belonging to a County
As mentioned in the introduction, there are two groups of tasks that are 
performed by the local authorities. In addition to their original tasks, there 
are the tasks that have been assigned to them by the state (Federation, 
Länder). The heterogeneity of the municipalities just described presents a 
challenge for a legislator who wants to transfer tasks to the local authori-
ties. It is necessary to ensure that only tasks are entrusted to those local 
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authorities where the performance required for enforcement can be 
expected.
Where the municipalities perform the tasks of the states, the situation is 
very heterogeneous when compared to the rest of the country (cf. Lange 
2019). In the following, an overview of the tasks typically performed 
either by the counties or the municipalities belonging to a county is given. 
The tasks of the county-free cities result from an overview of both bundles 
of tasks.
2.3.1  The Common Tasks at the County Level Are Primarily
• financial support for job seekers according to Social Code Book 
(SGB) II, including integration/re-integration in the labour market. 
This task is either performed by local job centres or joint institutions 
together with the Federal Employment Agency (see Chap. 7);
• authority for secondary schools or vocational schools, adult educa-
tion centres;
• fire and disaster protection as responsible body over the lower disas-
ter control authorities. The counties each have their own laws on 
disaster control in an emergency. Although the municipalities are 
responsible for equipment, facilities and maintenance of the fire 
departments, the counties set up control centres through which fire 
departments and emergency services are alerted;
• public health and veterinary inspection;
• county hospitals;
• organisation of the emergency and ambulance services in the 
rural area;
• public child and youth welfare (SGB VIII);
• ‘classic’ social welfare (e.g. financial support for those of retirement 
age receiving too little pension, or for those who are unable to earn 
their living (completely) on their own due to illness (SGB XII);
• waste disposal, including maintenance of landfills and waste consult-
ing; environment protection and nature conservation;
• guarantee of public transportation in rural areas and maintenance of 
county roads;
• integration of refugees and other migrants (besides communes, 
social welfare organisations and others);
• economic development (e.g. guaranteeing an extensive broadband 
supply; own companies for development of commercial zones); and
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• miscellaneous administrative tasks, such as motor vehicle registra-
tion, weapons law enforcement, issue of building permits, and other 
matters of regulatory state law (‘transferred tasks’).
2.3.2  The Municipalities Belonging to a County Are Responsible 
for the Following
• authorities of schools and adult education centres where a county is 
not responsible;
• nurseries (can also be provided by welfare organisations or private 
companies);
• kindergartens, nursery schools, after-school clubs;
• fire departments and brigades;
• cultural institutions such as libraries and museums, and other public 
facilities, namely sports facilities and parks, swimming pools, city 
halls and communication centres;
• funeral services and cemeteries;
• maintenance of public road network (municipal roads);
• planning sovereignty grants municipalities the power to organise and 
shape their territory by creating land-use and development plans, 
whereas the counties issue building permits;
• the municipalities also perform state administrative tasks, for exam-
ple ID and civil status registration; these services are typically pro-
vided in special centres of administrative services (one-stop shops).
2.4  State Authority and Local Supervision
The question of whether local authorities perform original or delegated 
tasks plays a role, particularly in the state powers of instruction and state 
supervision of the local authorities (Knemeyer 2007).
The state has no authority to issue directives on the original tasks of the 
local authorities. Its control is limited to legal supervision only. Therefore, 
the state can only monitor and check that the local authority is complying 
with the law in the performance of its tasks (Rechtsaufsicht—legal supervi-
sion; see von Knobloch and Schimanke).
The state can make it compulsory for local authorities to perform an 
original task (‘compulsory tasks’). In this case, the local authority can only 
decide on the method used for performing the task, but not on whether it 
should fulfil the task since it is obligated to do so. A legal supervision 
remains.
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With regard to the tasks delegated, a distinction should be made. If the 
transferred tasks become the local authorities’ own tasks (‘monistic sys-
tem’), the state can not only oblige the local authorities to perform the 
tasks, but also grant itself a right to issue instructions regarding the method 
of task fulfilment (‘duty to fulfil according to instructions’). In those states 
where tasks do not lose their state character even after they have been 
transferred to the local authorities (‘dual system’), that is external tasks for 
local authorities (‘matters of mandate’), this right to issue instructions 
already follows from the remaining public character of the task.
3  local self-GovernMent and Its 
constItutIonal foundatIons
The role of local authorities in the German administrative system is largely 
shaped by the fact that they enjoy a special status, which is the guaranteed 
right to local self-government provided by the constitution. Furthermore, 
the constitution requires that representative bodies (municipal, city or 
county council) are directly elected by the people in the local authorities. 
This special form of the right to self-government of the local authorities 
has a long tradition in Germany and is closely linked to the principle of 
subsidiarity (Norton 1994: 237ff.; Hendler 1984), which the Basic Law 
was able to take up in 1949. The involvement or participation of munici-
pal or county citizens primarily takes place through elections, but increas-
ingly also through plebiscitary instruments ( Chap. 18). This not only 
serves to legitimise the administration, but also aims particularly at the 
quality of the decisions to be taken. The point is to create effective rights 
of participation for those affected and to involve external expertise, or 
rather to activate those involved in their own affairs, thus literally meaning 
‘self ’-administration (Decisions of the Federal Constitutional Court: 
BVerfGE 79, 127; BVerfGE, 138, 1, 18).
3.1  The Constitutional Guarantee of Local 
Self-Government Right
The federal constitution guarantees local self-government in Article 28 (2) 
of the Basic Law. Furthermore, the constitutions of the states guarantee 
the right to self-administration. As they largely correspond to the Basic 
Law in this respect, they are not specifically mentioned in the following.
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3.1.1  Article 28 (2) of the Basic Law as Institutional Guarantee 
of the Local Self-Government of the Municipalities 
and Associations of Municipalities (Counties)4
When ‘associations of municipalities’ are mentioned in the Basic Law, they 
primarily refer to the counties. On the one hand, according to Article 28 
(2) of the Basic Law, municipalities and the associations thereof are subject 
to the legal regulations of the federal and regional governments. The right 
of self-government exists within the limits of the laws. Therefore, for 
example, tasks can be assigned to the local authorities by law, or the ter-
ritorial borders of municipalities and associations of municipalities can be 
changed (see Chap. 16). On the other hand, legislators must respect the 
self-government right of the municipalities and the associations thereof in 
all these actions. In addition, municipalities and the municipal associations 
can sue for violations of their rights by a federal or state legislator before 
the state constitutional courts or the Federal Constitutional Court.
In detail, the constitutional guarantee for municipalities and associa-
tions of municipalities results in the following legal positions (Dreier 
2015: 719ff.).
a) Population and territorial surface
First, according to Article 28 (2) of the Basic Law, municipalities and 
associations of municipalities in Germany must be guaranteed the right to 
self-administration. The federal states, therefore, have no authority to 
eliminate municipalities and the associations thereof on their territory and 
replace them with other random administrative bodies. However, this 
does not mean that every municipality or association of municipalities has 
a guarantee of existence. Instead, state legislators may legally dissolve indi-
vidual municipalities or association of municipalities or merge them 
with others.
b) Tasks
The Basic Law empowers the municipalities to take care of all matters 
of the local community. This is their sphere of competence. As far as a local 
community matters are concerned, the municipalities may act without any 
further legal mandate. Local matters are those tasks which concern the 
living conditions and the coexistence of local people or have a specific 
reference to it.
There is no such regulation for the counties in the Basic Law. However, 
according to a general clause, some state constitutions as well as county 
codes of the Länder transfer the right to perform all supra-local public 
tasks to the counties.
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c) Autonomy
Article 28 (2) of the Basic Law guarantees the municipalities and the 
associations thereof the right to regulate their affairs ‘on their own respon-
sibility’ within the boundaries of the legal framework. This principle of 
autonomy forms the core of the right to self-government. In this context, 
autonomy means freedom from state regulation regarding the methods, 
that is regarding if, when and how tasks are to be performed (BVerfGE 
119, 331, 362); comprehensive state control is thus excluded (BVerfGE 
138, 1, 17). This autonomy refers first and foremost to the original tasks 
of the local authorities and, thus, to the affairs for which they are already 
responsible.
d) Right to cooperate
The principle of autonomy includes the power of local authorities to 
decide for themselves whether a certain task can be performed autono-
mously or together with other administrative bodies (the so-called right to 
cooperation,  BVerfGE 138, 1, 17ff.). This right of intermunicipal coop-
eration is further developed by the federal states in their own laws 
(Oebbecke 2007). Intermunicipal cooperation can take place institution-
ally, for example through an administration association jointly supported 
by several local authorities (especially in the legal form of a Zweckverband), 
or it can be regulated by contract.
3.1.2  Principles of Financial Autonomy (Article 28 (2), Third 
Sentence of the Basic Law)
Article 28 (2), third sentence of the Basic Law is also a part of the consti-
tutional recognition of the municipal self-government guarantee that 
applies equally to both the municipalities and associations of municipali-
ties. It determines that principles of financial autonomy are included in the 
self-government guarantee. This rule, which was only integrated into the 
Basic Law in 1994, stipulates that an entitlement to minimum funding is 
part of the municipal self-government guarantee. This complies with the 
jurisdiction of the constitutional courts in some states and the Federal 
Administrative Court (Henneke 2018: 1142ff.). The Federal Constitutional 
Court has repeatedly emphasised that under Article 28 (2), third sentence 
of the Basic Law ‘the state’ is bound to provide the municipalities with the 
funds necessary to fulfil their tasks. The term ‘state’ stands primarily for 
the federal states (BVerfGE 138,1, 19). There is no scope in this chapter 
to further elaborate on the financing details of the local authorities (see 
Werner 2006; Schweisfurth and Wallmann 2019).
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4  fundaMentals of local constItutIonal law
4.1  Introduction
In every state there are municipal and county codes which primarily con-
tain regulations on the organisational rights of municipalities and counties 
(‘local constitutional law’). These municipal and county codes, which in 
some federal states have also been incorporated into a single law, are sup-
plemented by laws that regulate the local right to vote (‘local electoral 
law’), the right to levy local taxes (‘local taxation law’) and the coopera-
tion between local authorities.
4.1.1  Elections and Forms of Direct Democracy at the Local Level
a) Elections
The voting right is granted to German citizens who have reached the 
age of 18. However, the voting age in some states is 16, depending on the 
local electoral law. Article 28 (1), third sentence of the Basic Law extends 
the voting right to citizens of other Member States of the European 
Union, while third-country nationals are not entitled to vote at local level. 
These guidelines apply equally to the right to stand as a candidate (‘eligi-
bility of candidates’). But in this respect, the right to vote in the local 
government elections of the states occasionally requires a voting age of 18 
(instead of 16), or a longer residency in the local authority (six months 
instead of three), than for the exercise of the voting right. Members of the 
local representative bodies are directly elected by the citizen (city, munici-
pal or county councillor) as well as mayors and, in most states, county 
commissioners too. In addition, the municipal law also foresees the estab-
lishment of various advisory boards, particularly advisory boards for for-
eigners and integration. However, the advisory boards have no rights of 
decision, though in many cases they have rights of proposal or rights of 
consultation.
The duration of the electoral period for the local representative bodies 
is now five years in almost every state, with the exception of Bavaria, which 
is six years. In addition, some differences exist in the rules that determine 
the design of each respective electoral system, especially as Article 28 (1), 
second sentence of the Basic Law allows for considerable flexibility. For 
this reason, the right to vote in local government elections differs substan-
tially from federal and state electoral law.
b) Local consultations and other direct democratic instruments
 K. RUGE AND K. RITGEN
135
In addition to the right to vote, there is also the right of consultation 
(Neumann 2007). Through ‘referendums’ citizens have the opportunity 
to take binding decisions in place of the local representative bodies. In 
fact, since the 1990s, the respective regulations have been incorporated 
into all the municipal charters at both municipal and county level. 
Obviously, due to their complex procedures, such instruments cannot 
replace the continuing resolution of the local representative body, but 
only supplement it on a case-by-case basis. Hence, under Article 28 (2), 
second sentence of the Basic Law, the local level has a clear precedence 
over representative democracy.
The procedure for direct democratic decision-making at the local level 
is two-tiered. At the first tier, a so-called citizens’ initiative takes place. If 
it is declared admissible and receives the necessary support from the citi-
zens, the local representative body must then decide if it wants to allow 
the initiative. If the application is rejected, a referendum follows. The 
objective and contextual applicability of direct democracy at the local level 
is limited; certain matters cannot be made subject of citizens’ initiatives 
and referendums. The list of matters for which such instruments are not 
allowed varies from state to state. Referendums typically exclude personnel 
matters and the internal organisation of the local administration. The bud-
get statutes are also regularly excluded.
4.2  The Local Bodies
As local authorities, the municipalities are only capable of acting through 
their bodies. The core of local constitutional law is based on the regula-
tions defining the bodies of a local authority, how they are created, the 
relationship between them, and what specific tasks they must perform. 
Despite a harmonisation of local constitutional systems, there are still dif-
ferences between the states in these matters. Most states have now at least 
reduced the number of their local bodies to two. Thus, the local represen-
tative body only has to face one executive body. This dualism has been 
implemented in the states of Bavaria (at municipal level), Baden- 
Württemberg, Hesse, Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania, Rhineland- 
Palatinate, Saarland (at municipal level), Saxony, Saxony-Anhalt, Thuringia 
and Schleswig-Holstein. In most of these states, the executive body is 
organised monocratically and is represented by a mayor or a commissioner 
of the county. It is only in Hesse where its implementation is still in the 
hands of a college, namely the municipal board (Section 65ff. of the 
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Municipal Code of Hesse, HGO) or the county committee (Section 36ff. 
of the County Code of Hesse, HKO), which consists of the respective 
mayor or commissioner of a county and the deputies.
By contrast, the local authorities in the states of Brandenburg, Lower 
Saxony and North Rhine-Westphalia have three bodies. In Bavaria and 
Saarland (only) the counties have a third body. In these states, besides the 
representative body and the mayor or commissioner of the county, there is 
another body to which a certain number of deputies or members of the 
representative body belong, in addition to the respective chief administra-
tive officer.
The following description is limited to the role of the local representa-
tive bodies and the respective chief administrative officer.
4.2.1  The Local Representative Bodies
The main body of every local authority is the local representative body, 
that is the municipal and city council as well as the county council (Ehlers 
2007). The council is the central leading body of the local authority 
(BVerfGE 47, 253, 275). Article 28 (1), second sentence of the Basic Law, 
stipulates the representation of the people in the municipalities and coun-
ties. This body takes precedence over all others at the local level.
a) Internal organisation
The size of the local representative bodies varies in the federal states 
and depends on the number of inhabitants.
There is also a diverse range of regulations determining whether the 
respective chief administrative officer belongs to the representative body 
and which function he holds. According to the local public law in a num-
ber of states, the respective chief administrative officer (mayor or commis-
sioner of a county) is by virtue of office a member and chairman of the 
local representative body. In other states, however, the chief administrative 
officer is part of the representative body, but not its chairman. Lastly, there 
are states where the chief administrative officer is not a member of any 
representative body.
Political groups are usually formed in the municipal and county coun-
cils as in the case of parliaments (Suerbaum 2007). Similarities to parlia-
mentary law exist insofar as, according to the local law of all states, the 
formation of committees is stipulated. With regard to committees, a dis-
tinction should be made between mandatory and optional. In some states, 
it is foreseen that committees not only consult but also make decisions on 
behalf of the representative body.
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b) Competences
The formation of a representative body at municipal and county level is 
stipulated by constitutional law as mandatory (Article 28 (1), second sen-
tence of the Basic Law). Consequently, the most important management 
and control tasks for each local authority must be reserved for the repre-
sentative bodies.
Beyond the area of the constitutionally mandatory statutory tasks, the 
state legislators are free to decide on which body they wish to assign the 
tasks and the range of tasks, which entails a wide variety of regulations. In 
principle, however, the representative bodies are responsible for all matters 
unless they are explicitly assigned to another local body, particularly to the 
chief administrative officer or the above-mentioned ‘third’ body (munici-
pal board or county committee).
4.2.2  The Chief Administrative Officer
All local authorities in Germany have a chief administrative officer. In the 
counties, the officer is called the commissioner of the county (Landrat). 
In the municipalities, the chief administrative officer is referred to as the 
mayor (Bürgermeister) in the cities, and, in accordance with the relevant 
state law, in larger municipalities he/she is referred to as the lord mayor 
(Oberbürgermeister). Except for smaller municipalities, the chief adminis-
trative officials are employed full-time and are salaried.
a) Direct election of the chief administrative officials
Mayors employed full-time are directly elected by the people. It is only 
in the case of voluntary mayors of smaller municipalities that an election 
by the representative body is foreseen according to the local constitutional 
law of some states (e.g. in Brandenburg). The commissioners of the coun-
ties are also directly elected in the majority of states, but not all.
b) Responsibilities
As already indicated, the local government codes of the states also 
exhibit considerable variations in the assignment of responsibilities to the 
bodies. The basic premise is that chief administrative officials are respon-
sible if no competence of the representative body exists. The chief admin-
istrative officials are usually responsible for executing the council’s 
decisions and for managing all the ongoing administrative matters. They 
are also responsible for the external representation of the local authority.
c) The commissioner of the county as lower state administrative authority
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One feature deserves special mention regarding the commissioner of 
the county. In some federal states, the commissioner of a county is not 
only the chief administrative officer, he also acts as the lowest tier of the 
regional authority (Meyer 2007: 702).
5  the local GovernMent assocIatIons
The interests of local authorities in the federal state and at European level 
are represented by the three local government associations at the federal 
level: the German Association of Cities (Deutscher Städtetag—DST) as the 
leading representative of the county-free cities; the German County 
Association (Deutscher Landkreistag—DLT) as representative of the 294 
counties; and the German Association of Towns and Municipalities 
(Deutscher Städte- und Gemeindebund—DStGB) as representative of all 
municipalities belonging to a county. There are also corresponding 
regional associations at state level. In addition to their respective head-
quarters, the three local government associations at federal level each 
maintains a European office in Brussels.
Unlike many state constitutions, the Basic Law does not provide for any 
participation or consultation rights of local government associations. As 
regards draft legislation by the federal government, the procedure on par-
ticipation and consultation is set out in the Joint Rules of Procedure of the 
Federal Ministries (GGO).5 According to Section 41 GGO, the opinions 
of local government associations at federal level are to be obtained before 
drafting a legislative proposal that affects the concerns of local authorities. 
The impacts on the budgets of the local authorities must be listed sepa-
rately in accordance with Section 44 (3) GGO. In compliance with Section 
47 (1) GGO, the ministry responsible forwards the draft legislation pre-
pared on this basis to the local government associations as early as possible 
if local issues are involved.
In the Rules of Procedure of the German Federal Parliament, Sections 
66 (2), 69 (5) and 70 (4) contain provisions on the participation of the 
local government associations.6 Essentially, in any matter of crucial interest 
that affects the municipalities and associations of municipalities, the local 
government associations at federal level should be given the opportunity 
to issue a statement before decision-making. Substantial interests are 
adopted if the relevant legislation is fully or partially implemented by the 
municipalities (or associations of municipalities), their public finances are 
directly affected or their administrative organisation is influenced.
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6  lessons learned
Germany observes the principles laid down in the European Charter of 
Local Self-Government. Moreover, the municipalities and especially the 
counties are the main operational level for implementing the state laws. 
This weight at the communal level is underlined by the number of person-
nel and size of the communal budget: the communal level covers around 
one-third of the public service personnel and public budgets (excluding 
social security). Based on their traditional roots of the early nineteenth 
century, the modern communal administration and local self-government 
contribute significantly to the quality of public service delivery and to 
legitimation acceptance of public administration in general. The decen-
tralised system with a wide range of responsibilities and decision-making 
authority has provided the basis that facilitates initiatives and approaches 
to modernising public administration and reforms in various fields.
notes
1. Council of Europe. European Treaties Series No. 122. Strasbourg October 
15, 1985. https://www.coe.int/en/web/conventions/full-list/-/conven-
tions/rms/090000168007a088.
2. FTE = full-time equivalent.
3. The two largest cities in Germany are Berlin with roughly 3.6 million inhab-
itants and Hamburg with around 1.8 million inhabitants. However, these 
two cities and Bremen are, at the same time, state-constituted federal states 
(‘city-states’, see Sect. 2.4).
4. The fundamental text of Article 28 (2) of  the Basic Law: ‘Municipalities 
must be guaranteed the right to regulate all local affairs on their own respon-
sibility, within the limits prescribed by the laws. Within the limits of their 
functions designated by a law, associations of municipalities shall also have 
the  right of  self-government in  accordance with  the  laws. The guarantee 
of  self-government shall extend to  the bases of financial autonomy; these 
bases shall include the  right of municipalities to a  source of  tax revenues 
based upon economic ability and the right to establish the rates at which 
these sources shall be taxed’.
5. GGO in German: https://www.bmi.bund.de/SharedDocs/downloads/
DE/veroeffentlichungen/themen/ministerium/ggo.pdf;jsessionid=59D
E D 0 A 8 0 8 A A B 5 4 F E 2 E 6 A 2 2 2 E F 2 5 B 7 4 B . 2 _ c i d 3 6 4 ? _ _
blob=publicationFile&v=2.
6. Rules of Procedure (German Federal Parliament) in English: https://www.
btg-bestellservice.de/pdf/80060000.pdf.
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The relationship between ‘politics’ and ‘administration’ in both practical 
and theoretical terms is one of the most controversial and, at the same 
time, often not well understood features of modern states. Especially the 
close institutional links between politics and administration in Germany, 
which have a long history, are internationally not well known.
In public administration literature, two ideal types of political- 
administrative relations are distinguished. On the one hand, there is the 
assumption of a basic ‘dichotomy’ between politics and administration, 
going back to the ground-breaking work of Woodrow Wilson (1887) and 
Max Weber ([2019] 1922) in the late nineteenth century and early twen-
tieth century. They described politics and administration as two different 
spheres of public life, both governed by their own rationalities: while 
politics is concerned with power, legitimacy and the formulation of 
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policies, administration stands for professionalism, legality and the imple-
mentation of policies. Although Wilson and Weber saw the bureaucracy as 
an ‘instrument’ of political power, both had severe doubts that profes-
sional bureaucracies could be controlled by amateur politicians. In this 
context, Weber stressed the dependency of politicians on bureaucrats 
because of two types of knowledge: Fachwissen (which is a bureaucrat’s 
superior professional expertise) and Dienstwissen (which is their proce-
dural and institutional knowledge of the functioning of public administra-
tion). From this perspective, administrations become powerful for their 
own sake, eventually creating the ‘iron cage’ of modern bureaucracies. 
This understanding has been taken up by modern economic principal–
agency theories. Here, too, the principals—the politicians—have great 
problems controlling what their agents—the bureaucracies—are doing, so 
the relationship becomes one of permanent distrust and power and 
blame games.
On the other hand, there is a less theoretical, more empirical 
understanding of the relationship, which argues that there is and can be no 
clear distinction between politics and administration, fundamentally 
questioning the ‘instrumentalist’ concept. This argument has been at the 
core of social science-oriented public administration and policy studies, 
first in the United States, but also after the Second World War in Western 
Europe (for Germany, e.g. Mayntz and Scharpf 1975). A seminal 
international study of ministerial bureaucracies—the Comparative Elite 
Study (CES) (Aberbach et al. (1981)—showed that in all Western countries 
the image of the ‘classical bureaucrat’ as an apolitical instrument in the 
hands of his masters does not reflect the real relationship between politics 
and administrations and that most modern civil servants in the ministerial 
bureaucracy see themselves as ‘political administrators’ instead. They 
acknowledge, and most of them generally appreciate, the political aspects 
of their profession. Public administration scholars call this phenomenon 
‘functional politicisation’ (Mayntz and Derlien 1989).
In practical and normative terms, the first ideal type—the 
‘instrumentalist’ concept with its emphasis on a neutral and apolitical civil 
service—resembles the so-called Westminster model known from the 
(former) Commonwealth or the Scandinavian countries (where principal–
agent problems play an important role in political and theoretical 
discussions). Simple, and many would argue naïve, models of New Public 
Management (NPM) tried to establish this concept as a baseline for public 
sector reforms in the 1980s and 1990s, arguing that politics should only 
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be concerned with the ‘what’ of public policies, while the ‘how’ should be 
left to administration.
The second ideal type, which assumes that there is no clear and simple 
distinction between politics and administration, is usually represented by 
the US system with its large number of political appointees (Lewis 2012), 
but also, in a much less open way, by many South and East-European 
countries (Meyer Sahling 2008). In these countries, governments may 
often pay lip service to the neutral and apolitical civil servant, while replac-
ing large numbers of them after elections or for other political reasons.
Germany falls somewhere between these two ideal types. The traditional 
view holds that the civil service is above politics and in the old Hegelian-
inspired state theories, which were prominent and dominant at least until 
the first half of the twentieth century, only the civil service could guarantee 
the common good, if necessary, even against politicians, interest groups 
and parties merely representing special interests. This ideology of the 
apolitical, neutral civil servant only interested in the common good was 
brutally discredited in the Nazi period (1933–1945). Already in the late 
Weimar republic, many top civil servants were decisively anti- democratic, 
supported right-wing parties and ideas, and later played an important role 
in the rise and crimes of the National Socialist German Worker’s Party 
(NSDAP) (Jann 2003). Many indeed joined the NSDAP after Germany 
became a one-party state in 1933.1 In 1930, a famous liberal constitutional 
lawyer, Gustav Radbruch, had already characterised the apolitical civil 
servant as the ‘living lie of the authoritarian state’ (Lebenslüge des 
Obrigkeitsstaates). But even before these devastating experiences, a simple 
distinction between politics and administration has never been a defining 
feature of the German political and administrative system. The German 
system had early on developed some quite unique institutional features to 
create linkages between the two spheres, for example the concepts of the 
‘political civil servant’ (politischer Beamter) at the ministerial level and the 
‘elected civil servant’ (Wahlbeamter) at the local level.
Our aim in this chapter is to look at the relationships between politicians 
and administrators in Germany in institutional and legal terms, but 
especially also in its empirical manifestations at the federal, state and local 
level. We start with a simple, actor-oriented distinction between politicians 
and civil servants. The first are elected for a limited period of time (and 
may be removed if they lose support), while the second are appointed, 
usually for a (lifelong) career. Politicians are dependent on political sup-
port, while civil servants are not, at least in theory. But how true are these 
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distinctions in practice? In order to discuss these questions, we use the 
concept of politicisation as an analytical lens. Two core dimensions of 
politicisation are distinguished. The first dimension is functional politicisa-
tion (whether and how both politicians and bureaucrats are engaged in 
different kinds of policymaking tasks). The second dimension is party 
politicisation (whether and how does party political attachment play a role 
for administrative careers). Empirically, we will look at party membership 
(the most straightforward measure of party politicisation) and turnover 
rates after elections as well as the relevance of ‘political craft’ for adminis-
trative careers.
The following sections are structured as follows. We start with a 
description of political-administrative relations at federal level, thereby 
focussing on both dimensions of politicisation and on typical career 
patterns in federal ministries. Subsequently, a similar overview is given for 
the Länder level. Afterwards, the main characteristics of political-
administrative relations at local level are examined. The chapter ends with 
concluding remarks and lessons for transfer.
2  PolItIcs and admInIstratIon 
In Federal mInIstrIes
In the German federal system, the Länder and their local governments are 
responsible for the implementation of most laws, while the federal level 
dominates the law-making process and policymaking (see chapters 
Fleischer; Schrapper; Kuhlmann/Veit). This deep involvement of federal 
ministerial officials in policymaking is reflected in a special legal construct, 
the so-called political civil servant (politische Beamte). According to 
Section 54 of the Federal Civil Service Act (Bundesbeamtengesetz), civil 
servants in the two highest ranks in the federal ministerial hierarchy—
administrative state secretaries (beamtete Staatssekretäre, who are the offi-
cial administrative heads of ministries) and directors-general 
(Ministerialdirektoren, who are the heads of directorates)—are political 
civil servants. They traditionally have a background in the career civil ser-
vice, but serve at the request of their ministers and can be sent into retire-
ment at any time and without any given reason, while they keep their 
earned pension rights and can be recalled at any time. The basic idea is that 
ministers should be able to choose their most important officials and advi-
sors from civil servants they trust and if this trust—for whatever reason—
no longer holds, replace them.
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The institution of ‘political civil servant’ and the ‘political retirement’ 
tradition in Germany date back to the middle of the nineteenth century. 
During this period, the ‘lifetime principle’ for civil servants was intro-
duced in Prussia. This meant that civil servants could no longer be dis-
missed unless they committed a civil offence. This raised the question of 
how to constrain the power of civil servants and especially how to secure a 
distinct degree of harmony between the monarch and top civil servants. 
Therefore, in 1849 in Prussia (when quite a few civil servants had shown 
sympathies with the failed 1848 revolution), a new ordinance was intro-
duced that, for the first time, enumerated the leading positions within 
state administration. It stated that civil servants in these positions could be 
temporarily retired by the king at any time. In the following decades, the 
position of a ‘political civil servant’ was introduced in many German 
Länder and from 1871 onwards at national level.
Administrative state secretaries are not to be confused with parliamentary 
state secretaries who are elected members of the Bundestag and support 
the minister in maintaining good relations between the ministry and the 
parliament. When the institution of parliamentary state secretaries was first 
introduced in 1967, the minister was given a great deal of leeway over 
which tasks to delegate to the parliamentary state secretary. The influence 
parliamentary state secretaries exert on the internal affairs of the ministry 
is considered not very strong compared to that of the administrative state 
secretary.
Besides the federal chancellor, there are currently 15 federal ministers 
and 35 parliamentary state secretaries, so all in all 50 executive politicians 
in the federal government, and about 125 political civil servants (25 
administrative state secretaries and about 100 directors-general, all in all 
far less than one per cent of all higher civil servants at the federal level). All 
other civil servants in federal ministries, that is heads of sub-directorates, 
heads of divisions (Referatsleiter) and all lower ranks are career civil ser-
vants in tenure positions. This does not mean, however, that they do not 
fulfil politicised functions or have no party affiliation.
Germany was one of the country cases explored in the CES study by 
Aberbach et al. (1981). This study revealed that senior officials in federal 
ministries—not only political civil servants but also civil servants in lower 
ranks—are, even more so than in other Western democracies, deeply 
involved in the process of policymaking. They not only develop draft laws 
and draft policies but also play a prominent role in intra-governmental 
coordination as well as negotiation and coordination with other levels of 
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government and external actors, such as interest groups (see also Mayntz 
and Scharpf 1975). A replication of CES in the second half of the 1980s 
(Mayntz and Derlien 1989) as well as more recent studies (Ebinger et al. 
2018; Ebinger et al. 2019) confirm these findings and underline that most 
senior officials in federal ministries not only appreciate the political side of 
their job but also anticipate political considerations when fulfilling their 
tasks. Thus, the main focus of the federal level on policymaking is reflected 
in a high degree of functional politicisation among civil servants in federal 
ministries. Functional politicisation is higher in ministries than in federal 
agencies, and higher for top positions than for lower hierarchical ranks 
(Ebinger et al. 2018).
The concept of functional politicisation is closely related to the concept 
of ‘political craft’, which was developed by Klaus Goetz (1997) based on 
empirical work on the federal ministerial bureaucracy in Germany. He 
defines political craft as ‘the ability to assess the likely political implications 
and ramifications of policy proposals; to consider a specific issue within the 
broader context of the government’s programme; to anticipate and, where 
necessary, influence or even manipulate the reactions of other actors in the 
policymaking process (…); and to design processes that maximise the 
chances for the realisation of ministers’ substantive objectives. To do all 
this, senior officials need to be able to draw on personal networks of infor-
mation and communication that extend beyond their own ministry (…)’ 
(Goetz 1997: 754). Thus, political craft means not only having the ability 
to act in a functional politicised manner, but also having the willingness 
and ability to play an active part in the political process by drawing on 
political networks.
Empirical studies examining the career background of political civil 
servants in federal ministries have repeatedly shown that many of them 
gain professional experience in civil service positions close to politics, such 
as personal assistant to a minister or head of the ministers’ office, in the 
federal chancellery or as party staff in parliament while being on leave from 
their position in the ministry (Schröter 2004; Veit and Scholz 2016) ear-
lier in their career. All these positions are not only suitable for acquiring 
‘political craft’ during a career in the civil service, they can also reflect a 
civil servant’s political attachment. Thus, it does not come as a surprise 
that many higher-ranking civil servants in Germany are party members.
One important and defining feature of the German system is that all 
civil servants, from the lowest to the highest level, can be members of 
political parties, and very often are. Allowing party membership (even for 
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soldiers) is one of the many lessons the ‘founding fathers’ of the Federal 
Republic drew from the experiences of the downfall of the Weimar 
Republic and the rise and success of Nazi Germany. As a result, Germans 
prefer their civil servants to declare their political standing and not hide 
behind a false veil of political disinterest. This does not mean that all civil 
servants are members of a political party, but that being a member is a 
legitimate and respectable expression of one’s political views (Jann and 
Veit 2015). In practice, the political activities of civil servants are far less 
restrained than in many other countries. Highly visible activities for left or 
right-wing radical parties are, however, forbidden.
Promotion to the top positions in federal ministries depends both on 
professional competence and on party political attachment and loyalty 
(Bach and Veit 2018). Political civil servants are mostly, but not necessar-
ily, members of the same political party as the minister (Fleischer 2016) 
and most of them are replaced after a change in government (Ebinger 
et  al. 2018). The share of party members and civil servants with clear 
party-political loyalties among top civil servants is high, even among ‘non- 
political’ heads of sub-directorates and divisions (Bach and Veit 2018; 
Ebinger et al. 2018). All this points to the relevance of political patronage 
and there can be no doubt that party membership is relevant for top 
administrative careers in the German civil service. But while top civil ser-
vants may depend on political support for their careers, this relationship 
cuts both ways. Ministers are just as much, or perhaps even more, depen-
dent on the support, the loyalty and especially the professionalism and 
expertise of top civil servants.
Despite the particular relevance of ‘political craft’, the careers of 
executive politicians and ‘political civil servants’ in federal ministries have 
traditionally been clearly separated: top civil servants do not usually come 
from a career in parliament or as a minister and ministers do not usually 
come from the top civil service (Derlien 2003), even though there have 
recently been some well-known exceptions. Civil service careers in federal 
ministries—similar to other parts of public administration in Germany—
are characterised by a low inter-sectoral and intra-sectoral mobility, that is 
in most cases, ministerial civil servants spend their whole career within the 
jurisdiction of one ministry—the only exception being the secondments to 
the chancellery or the federal parliament mentioned earlier. Despite the 
high degree of continuity in civil service careers in federal ministries, some 
changes have been observed over the decades. First, the typical ‘pure civil 
service career’ where an individual enters the civil service directly after 
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graduation and remains there until retirement is no longer the norm. The 
latest figures show that less than one-fifth of the administrative state secre-
taries belong to this group. All others have work experience outside public 
administration, often in academia, in the judiciary, or in some kind of 
political function (Veit and Scholz 2016). Among the directors-general, 
‘pure civil service careers’ are more common, but here mixed careers have 
also been growing in importance in recent years. Second, the former 
‘monopoly of jurists’ in the federal senior civil service has converted into a 
mere dominance: over the years, the proportion of jurists among senior 
civil servants has gradually declined. While in 1954 more than three- 
quarters of the administrative top positions in Bonn were held by jurists, 
this decreased to about 50 per cent in the 2000s (Veit and Scholz 2016).
In sum, political-administrative relations in federal ministries in 
Germany are characterised by close collaboration in policymaking and a 
high degree of functional and party politicisation of top bureaucrats on 
the one hand, and clearly differentiated career patterns of politicians and 
bureaucrats on the other. However, the growing importance of ministerial 
officials having professional experience in the political sector indicate some 
changes. Surprisingly, these changes are more rapid at the Länder level as 
will be shown in the next section.
3  PolItIcs and admInIstratIon In Länder mInIstrIes
More than half of all public employees in Germany work in one of the 16 
Länder, but only a very small number of them in ministries. Länder min-
istries resemble federal ministries in many respects (similar institutional 
framework, similar structure, etc.) but differ with regard to their task port-
folio as the law-making competency of the Länder is restricted to a limited 
number of policy fields, most importantly education and police (see chap-
ter Schrapper). The involvement of Länder ministerial officials in policy-
making varies considerably across ministries and implementation and 
oversight responsibilities are usually more important than policymaking.
The number of ‘political civil servants’ in the Länder is therefore smaller 
than at federal level. The number of Länder ministries (besides the state 
chancellery) varies between 7 and 12. Each Land ministry is headed by a 
minister. In most Länder, there are no parliamentary state secretaries. In 
all Länder except Bavaria, the highest-ranking civil servant in each minis-
try (the administrative state secretary) is a ‘political civil servant’ who—
like his counterpart at federal level—can be sent into temporary retirement 
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on the minister’s behalf. Heads of directorates in Länder ministries and all 
lower-ranking officials are career officials in tenure positions, even though 
heads of the police force (Polizeipräsident) and regional administrations 
(Regierungspräsident) are also often political civil servants. All in all, the 
number of political civil servants does not exceed 20, even in the larg-
est Länder.
As at federal level, administrative state secretaries in Länder ministries 
are usually recruited from the civil service: out of all the administrative 
state secretaries appointed between 2000 and 2018, 85 per cent had at 
least one year’s work experience in the civil service and roughly half of 
them had more than ten years of civil service experience at the time of 
their appointment.2 However, mixed careers, that is careers in different 
sectors, especially between administration and politics (members of parlia-
ment becoming permanent secretaries, civil servants becoming ministers), 
are more common than at the federal level. Similar to the federal level, 
there is a high proportion of jurists and women are under-represented in 
top administrative and political positions in the German Länder. The 
under-representation of women in administrative offices is, however, 
much more pronounced as discussions on issues relating to representative-
ness are less intense when it comes to public administration.
Thirty years after the demise of the German Democratic Republic and 
reunification in 1990, considerable differences still remain between East 
and West Germany. After German unification, the implementation of 
democratic political institutions and, in particular, the establishment of a 
functioning public administration after the West German model, was sup-
ported by a wide-ranging recruitment of West German civil servants to 
leadership positions in the East German Länder (and local) administra-
tions (see chapter Wollmann). Our data analysis reveals that in the East 
German Länder of Brandenburg, Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania, 
Saxony-Anhalt, Saxony and Thuringia, the proportion of administrative 
state secretaries who were born in East Germany is still rather low, ranging 
from under 20 per cent (Saxony) to more than 30 per cent (e.g. 
Brandenburg). Thus, most administrative state secretaries still come from 
the western part of Germany. This differs greatly from the Länder minis-
ters, where the proportion of East Germans is much higher.
With regard to politicisation in Länder ministries, five empirical findings 
are particularly striking. First, the proportion of party members is high 
(similar to the federal level). Second, administrative state secretaries have 
very often acquired professional experience in the world of politics (be it 
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as an elected politician, party professional or civil servant with experience 
in offices close to politics, such as personal assistant to a minister) at earlier 
stages in their careers. More than two-thirds of all administrative state 
secretaries have this kind of experience. On the other hand, many ministers 
(about one-third) have professional experience in the public sector. This 
indicates that political and administrative careers in the German Länder 
are not as strictly separated as at federal level. Third, and again different 
from the federal level, almost every fifth political civil servant (18 per cent) 
was a full-time professional politician (member of parliament) before 
being appointed as a political civil servant. This, again, reflects the higher 
hybridisation of administrative and political careers at Länder level. 
Fourth, political experience at local level (as elected mayor or council) is 
widespread but decreasing over time. Whereas at the beginning of the 
2000s, 38 per cent of the administrative state secretaries in the German 
Länder had such a background, this percentage decreased to less than 25 
per cent between 2015 and 2018. Fifth, the importance of having relevant 
experience as a party professional or in civil service offices close to politics 
has increased considerably over time. This resembles developments at the 
federal level and presumably reflects the increasing importance of ‘political 
craft’ for administrative top positions at both levels of government.
4  PolItIcs and admInIstratIon at the local level
At the local level, there are two competing understandings about the 
relationship between politics and administration. Traditionally, local 
government in Germany is not legally defined as politics, but ever since 
the famous Stein-Hardenberg reforms at the beginning of the nineteenth 
century, as local self-administration (lokale Selbstverwaltung). Taking this 
view, local government is essentially apolitical. Politics does not and should 
not play an important role (‘there are no conservative street lights or 
social-democratic public conveniences’) and the elected councils at local 
level, by legal definition, are not local parliaments but part of the adminis-
tration. The same holds true for elected mayors, heads of counties 
(Landräte) and other local politicians. Mayors and heads of counties as 
‘elected civil servants’ (Wahlbeamte) are both part and head of the local 
administration.
Local government is in the German constitutional tradition and 
doctrine part of the Länder administration (Kuhlmann and Wollmann 
2019: 92ff.) and due to the autonomy of the Länder in determining their 
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organisational structure, there is a large and sometimes confusing 
organisational variance between them. This overall variance has been 
somewhat reduced since the 1990s in all of the Länder when the direct 
election of mayors (and in most of them county heads too) became the 
norm. Even though they are ‘elected civil servants’, as directly elected 
politicians they have a strong direct legitimacy, actually much stronger 
than other executive politicians in Germany. They are elected for a term of 
five to ten years,3 but they can be removed by different forms of recall, 
usually through a combination of direct democratic and representative 
procedures. As Kuhlmann and Wollmann (2019: 95) point out, ‘it is 
worth noting that the local executive is acting as a politically accountable 
local politician rather than as ‘agent of the state’, even in the conduct of 
delegated business’, that is in those areas where they act as direct 
representatives of state and federal government and can be instructed by 
higher levels.
Those who hold the second view have therefore argued for quite some 
time that local self-administration is in reality highly politicised, that party 
politics plays an ever more important role, both for elected mayors and 
especially for councils at all levels, which for all practical concerns act just 
like local parliaments. This goes along with the normative argument that 
local government should align itself to competitive party democracy in 
order to ensure transparency and control of hitherto opaque administra-
tive decision- making and to enable political participation. Again, the basic 
assumption is that there is no apolitical administration.
At the local level, the empirical reality is more complex, but it shows 
many interconnections and networks between politics and administration, 
probably even more so than at the state or federal level. The new reality 
has been described as self-government instead of self-administration (for 
more details see Bogumil and Holtkamp 2013).
While there is a wide consensus that local administrations in Germany 
have become much more politicised in recent years, there are, at the same 
time, a number of important distinctions between the different forms of 
politicisation, which have to do with, among others, size, institutional set-
tings and the traditions of local government in different parts of Germany. 
In larger municipalities, especially in the more industrialised parts of 
Germany (like North Rhine-Westphalia) party politicisation of councils 
and of mayoral elections have become the norm. Careers in politics are 
made, first of all, through political parties, councils are organised between 
opposition and governing factions, and many decisions are made along 
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party lines. In more rural, smaller municipalities, especially in the southern 
part of Germany (like Baden-Württemberg), local careers are usually much 
less determined by parties; there are more members of councils, mayors 
and heads of counties who do not belong to a party, and decision-making 
at local level is more consensual. If you compare all the German Länder, 
more are on the consensus side, especially in East Germany. All in all, the 
relevance of political parties thus may decrease, while executive leadership 
(by elected civil servants) and consensual decision-making are gaining 
ground. At the same time, elements of direct democracy and citizen par-
ticipation at the local level have been strengthened in all German Länder 
and, moreover, are much more widely used (even in the form of more 
recalls of mayors) than before.
Furthermore, there is a second, quite often overlooked, element that 
creates a close relationship between elections, political parties, councils 
and administrations, which is the institution of the so-called Beigeordnete 
(adjunct mayors or adjunct head of counties). Here, too, these vary con-
fusingly from Land to Land but, in general, these positions are obligatory 
in all larger municipalities and counties. Beigeordnete are elected by the 
local council for a fixed term of up to eight years and are the responsible 
heads of larger sections of local administrations like ministers in state and 
federal governments (one of them is usually the Kämmerer, the chief 
financial officer in local government). They are usually full-time employees 
(unless they work in small municipalities) and, like mayors and heads of 
counties, ‘elected civil servants’. An interesting feature is that they are not 
elected on the lines of ‘government and opposition’ but mostly by propor-
tional representation. Thus, all major parties and other groups in  local 
councils are represented in proportion to their strength in the political 
leadership of local administrations. In some Länder, this proportional 
electoral system is even mandated in the legal rules for local government 
(i.e. in Baden-Württemberg and Saxony), but even if not required, it is 
widely used nearly everywhere.
When looking at these close interactions between politics and 
administration in Germany, it is not surprising that the simple New Public 
Management mantra of a clear division between politics and administra-
tion never really caught on in German local governments. It was not only 
the legal definition that local councils are part of local administrations 
which prevented this simple division of labour, but also the traditional 
understanding of all elected local ‘politicians’ that they are, of course, 
responsible for all elements of local administration, especially for the 
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implementation of policies, not only for ‘strategic goals and objectives’, 
and that, at the same time, administrators obviously fulfil political func-
tions. Therefore, in all empirical evaluations of NPM reforms in Germany, 
the ‘clear division of politics and administration’ is the element which, by 
far, is implemented the least (Kuhlmann et al. 2008: 855).
5  lessons learned
A clear distinction or even dichotomy between politics and administration 
has never been and is not a defining characteristic of the German political- 
administrative system. Instead, at the federal, state and local level we 
observe many close interrelations and interactions between elected politi-
cians and appointed civil servants. Civil servants in Germany are used to 
and generally appreciate the functional politicisation of their jobs, that is 
their close involvement in all stages of the policy process, from policy for-
mation, goal definition, negotiation within and outside government, and 
the interaction with citizens and interest groups in the implementation of 
policies. Obtaining ‘political craft’ has therefore become an important 
part of the learning and job experience of top civil servants. At the same 
time, political parties play an important role in German public administra-
tions because all civil servants have the right to join a political party and 
many of them actually practice this right. For many civil servants—but 
certainly not for all—their political affiliation is well known within their 
administration. This political orientation does not impede their role as 
civil servants, indeed their loyalty to serve all democratically elected lead-
ers is taken for granted and civil servants are expected to exercise some 
restraint when engaging in their political activities.
While at the federal level the careers of politicians and civil servants are 
still quite separate, that is very few top administrators become politicians 
and even fewer politicians end up as civil servants, this is gradually chang-
ing at the Länder level. Here we observe a growing number of ‘hybrid’ 
careers, that is people originally working outside the civil service, for 
example for political parties or in parliament, are appointed to higher civil 
servant positions and may even end up later in their careers as ministers. 
At the local level, there is historically an even closer relationship between 
politics and administration. By legal definition, even local councils are part 
of the administration, but the close interaction is especially guaranteed by 
‘elected civil servants’ (Wahlbeamte), that is mayors and adjunct mayors, 
who belong both to the sphere of politics and administration.
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Both at the federal and Länder level, the institution of ‘political civil 
servants’ plays an important role. While Prussian public administration 
has been the empirical inspiration for the Weberian ideal-type of merit 
bureaucracy, the political importance of top civil servants has, neverthe-
less, been acknowledged since the middle of the nineteenth century. 
When the position of civil servants was strengthened by the introduction 
of lifelong tenure, the understanding grew that trust between rulers and 
their top administrators is necessary for government and that rulers, 
therefore, should be able to choose their top civil servants and, if neces-
sary, retire them. Thus, the institution of the ‘political civil servant’ was 
invented.
For German ministers at federal and Länder level, this means that 
they are free to choose the top officials in the ministry they lead and can 
send them into retirement at any time if, for any reason, they no longer 
enjoy their unlimited trust. Political civil servants, therefore, act as link-
ages between the professional bureaucracy and the political leadership, 
helping to create mutual understanding and trust as well as helping to 
soften misunderstandings and suspicion between both spheres. The 
typical blame games between politicians and civil servants, or even ‘a 
government of strangers’, are therefore rather unusual in Germany. The 
relationship between politics and administration and between elected 
politicians and appointed civil servants is also in Germany never without 
its tensions and conflicts, but all in all the politicised civil service, both 
in functional and political terms, seems to have led to fewer conflicts, 
misunderstandings and blame games than in other democratic coun-
tries. Top civil servants in Germany need both professional expertise 
and political craft, they do not pretend to be apolitical and neutral, and 
the German public usually knows where their top officials come from 
and what they stand for.
The German institutions and experiences cannot be easily transferred to 
other political systems. The institutional setting in Germany depends not 
only on a highly regulated legal system but even more so on a large num-
ber of informal rules, which define appropriate behaviour and have been 
developed and adapted over a long time. Nevertheless, the main idea is 
relevant for other countries and cultures: a neutral and apolitical civil ser-
vice should not be taken as given and the political role of civil servants 
should be accepted, made transparent and not be hidden behind unrealis-
tic assumptions and false pretentions.
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notes
1. By 1934, two-thirds of all top civil servants in German ministries were 
members of the NSDAP; the share increased to more than 90 per cent in 
1939 and later, own data.
2. All numbers presented in this section stem from an analysis of all 
administrative state secretary appointments in the German Länder (except 
Bavaria) between 2000 and 2018 (N = 1119) that was conducted with a 
research grant by the Thyssen Foundation as part of the research project 
‘Government Constellations and the Politicisation of Bureaucracy’. Data 
collection is based on biographical data derived from different public sources 
such as ministry and personal websites, media coverage and parliamentary 
documents.
3. Term of office differs across the Länder.
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The title of this chapter, which distinguishes between administrative pro-
cedures and processes, already indicates that the view of the procedural 
‘working’ side of the administration is of central importance for the respec-
tive administrative cultural understanding. The German understanding of 
administration is strongly determined by organisation. In this sense, the 
administration is an organisation subdivided hierarchically and structured 
by the normative assignment of functions and responsibilities into units of 
expertise, the ‘organisational structure’, the framework for the interac-
tions and actions of the administration. Because of this organisational ref-
erence, the entirety of the procedures and processes of the administration 
is called the ‘process organisation’. This differs from an understanding 
that summarises the processes of the administration as ‘business processes’ 
and is more process-oriented. However, in the course of New Public 
Management a much stronger process orientation of the German admin-
istrations has taken place (cf. Lenk 2012).
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While the term procedure has functional connotations and includes 
aspects such as ensuring transparency, accountability and participation, 
provision of legitimacy, and ensuring rights and the correctness of the 
result (Ponce 2005: 552–553), process refers to the totality of administra-
tive workflows for preparing and delivering a service.
2  classIfIcatIon of Processes
The literature on the processes of public administration makes a distinc-
tion between different forms of process, based predominantly on the pro-
cess map known from process management with the three stages of core, 
management and support processes (cf. Bundesministerium des Innern 
Bundesverwaltungsamt 2018: 4.2; KGSt 2011: 16):
• The core processes of companies are the value-added processes 
directly related to the customer’s wishes that ‘give the company its 
face’. In public administration, this means the service provision pro-
cesses directly serving the realisation of the unit’s strategic goals, 
usually delivering services to persons outside the organisation.
• Support processes are usually intra-organisational processes that pro-
vide the resources or services needed to perform the core processes.
• Management processes—also referred to as leadership or control 
processes—are processes that are not directly related to actual service 
provision, but serve to formulate the strategic goals of the organisa-
tion and set and enforce standards for performance and a framework 
for the other types of process.
Not completely identical to the above categorisation is the classification 
of processes in relation to the boundaries of the respective administrative 
organisation:
• Processes that are exclusively within the respective administrative 
organisation, for example those that take place in a ministry, are 
intra-organisational. These are support and management processes.
• Inter-organisational processes are processes between two or more 
administrative organisational units. These can be structured at the 
same level in the form of cooperation and support, or hierarchically. 
As a rule, these are support and management processes, but 
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 inter- organisational core processes in cooperative service provision 
are also possible.
• Extra-organisational processes are performed by an organisational 
unit of the administration to persons or companies outside the 
administration. These are, almost without exception, core processes 
to the clients of the administration. The procedures in which these 
extra-organisational core processes run are usually summarised under 
the term administrative procedures (see Sect. 1 above).
The presentation of the administrative procedures and processes in this 
chapter follows the above distinction according to the organisational ref-
erence point. Since the German administration is to be classified as a legal-
istic type of administrative culture, the process of administration in 
Germany is largely regulated by laws and subordinate acts.
3  extra-organIsatIonal Procedures
Extra-organisational procedures relate to the administration’s ‘external’ 
actions, that is those oriented towards citizens and businesses. These 
actions are to be classified as core processes, as these interventions towards 
citizens and companies are usually among the core tasks of the respective 
administrative unit. The conduct of extra-organisational procedures is 
strongly determined by the interaction with the point of reference of the 
process, that is the citizen or company. Therefore, for a comprehensive 
understanding of the extra-organisational procedures in addition to the 
actual processes of ‘outward’ service delivery (see Sect. 3.1 below), the 
communication between the administration and the recipients of the ser-
vices (see Sect. 3.2 below) is also of importance. The prerequisite for suc-
cessful communication is information. Therefore, transparency and 
information are conditions of success for the provision of services by the 
administration (see Sect. 3.3 below).
3.1  Service Delivery Processes
The discussion about the introduction of New Public Management to the 
German administration has led to a shift towards a broader understanding 
of the notion of administrative performance, brought about by product 
orientation as part of New Public Management. This has established an 
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understanding that defines ‘service’ as the administration’s output created 
to accomplish each task.
Accordingly, the circle of what is regarded as a ‘service’ of the adminis-
tration is large. The spectrum includes financial support and consultations, 
but also rules and prohibitions, their enforced execution and much more. 
All services at all levels of the German administration are recorded in a 
central service catalogue (LeiKa).
The understanding of services as output generated by the administra-
tion and the great heterogeneity of services have focussed attention on the 
need for a differentiated view of this process of output generation. In 
order to reduce the complexity associated with it for the individual admin-
istrations and enable role-model learning, the project of a National Process 
Library was initially pursued. As an online tool, the aim of this National 
Process Library was to successively compile and retrieve as many process 
models as possible at all administrative levels and according to certain 
order patterns. Since no agreement could be reached on the financing 
modes, the further development of the National Process Library was dis-
continued in 2015. Notwithstanding, process libraries are still operated by 
individual federal states and—for the municipal administrations—by the 
Local Governments’ Joint Agency for Administrative Management (KGSt).
An awareness that providing high quality administrative services and 
customer satisfaction requires the ability of administrations to develop and 
establish business processes tailored to their needs has evolved. This has 
not been ignored but, on the contrary, has been supported by the stan-
dardisation and modularisation of processes. This makes it possible, at 
least for comparable services or process elements, to reduce complexity 
and make use of proven standard process elements. The digitalisation of 
the administration makes it possible to call up standard descriptions and 
modules with regard to the respective service and modify them to mea-
sure. In order to enable administrations either to fully model business 
processes or to modify standardised elements for the individual service, 
business process management with the goal of optimising business pro-
cesses has been established at all administrative levels. In addition, business 
process management is understood as a means of procedurally implement-
ing the digitalisation of administration.
At the level of the federal administration, this increased ‘thinking and 
acting in processes’ has been triggered by a project for joint and integrated 
process optimisation. The Federal Ministry of the Interior (BMI) has initi-
ated the formation of a process management network consisting of 
 J. ZIEKOW
167
process experts from various federal administrations who discuss problems 
of process management and successful solutions. Among other things, this 
network has developed a guide to strategic process management for senior 
managers in public administration (Netzwerk Prozessmanagement 2018). 
Corresponding process management instructions are available in various 
federal states. For the municipal level, the KGSt had already presented 
guidance on process management in 2011 (KGSt 2011).
In addition to establishing and consistently implementing business pro-
cess management, recent efforts with regard to public service delivery pro-
cesses have focussed on increasing efficiency in the interests of citizens and 
businesses and on the digital architecture of business processes. The 
requirements of the European Union Services Directive on ‘single con-
tact’ have reinforced a trend towards the introduction of front office/back 
office structures. This trend already existed at the local level in the form of 
local ‘one-stop shops’ for administrative services that were designed to 
facilitate access for citizens. The function of a local one-stop shop for 
administrative services is to bundle communication with citizens when 
using municipal services, such as the renewal of ID cards and the applica-
tion for social benefits. The fact that only one point of contact for all citi-
zens’ matters, which is close to their residences and which will promptly 
take care of their requests, makes the administration more citizen- oriented. 
In the course of the digitalisation of the administration, electronic service 
portals have supplemented the local one-stop shops for administrative ser-
vices, through which many processes between the citizens and the munici-
pal administration can be handled web-based.
For the digitalisation of the processes, see Sect. 3.2 below.
3.2  Communication
Efforts in Germany to make communication between the administrations 
and their customers more citizen-friendly and faster by digitalisation ini-
tially focussed on asynchronous communication. In this respect, the goal 
has been to improve the low communication security of a simple email 
through the establishment of so-called trust services. A central measure 
has been the establishment of De-Mail services, which may only be offered 
by accredited companies. However, the use of De-Mail services has 
remained low in practice. EU-wide safety standards are set by European 
Regulation (EU) No. 910/2014 on electronic identification and trust ser-
vices for electronic transactions in the internal market.
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A fundamental new approach has been taken with the 2017 Online 
Access Act (OZG). It stipulates that all administrative services must be 
offered via electronic administrative portals. However, this does not have 
to be done exclusively. In addition, the administrations can continue to 
provide their services in other forms of communication using the multi-
channel concept. To facilitate communication for the users, the portals of 
the individual administrations remain in place but are linked to form an 
integrated portal network. All administrative services accessible in the por-
tal network are identified uniformly via an individual user account. An 
electronic mailbox is connected to the user account for secure communi-
cation between the authority and the user (cf. Martini and Wiesner 2018; 
for the digitalisation of public administration cf. Chap. 19, Appendix).
3.3  Transparency and Information
Both within and outside a specific administrative procedure, public author-
ities are obliged to provide information to citizens. This aims to ensure 
both the general transparency of the administration and the citizens’ con-
fidence in it as well as the protection of the subjective rights of those 
involved in an administrative procedure.
Within a specific administrative procedure, which should end with a 
decision by the authority:
• There is the right of the affected party to a hearing by the authority. 
This right serves to ensure a fair procedure. The person concerned 
must be given the opportunity to speak before a decision concerning 
his or her rights is taken, so as to be able to influence the proceeding 
and its outcome (Section 28 of the Administrative Procedures 
Act—APA).
• The parties have the right of access to files. This serves to ensure the 
realisation of the legal hearing and observance of the ‘equality of 
arms principle’ by the participants (Section 29 APA).
• In certain proceedings, an applicant may determine the status of the 
application processed by the authority via the Internet at any time.
Even outside concrete administrative procedures, various information 
is provided by the authorities to improve transparency and the informa-
tion situation (cf. Müller et al. 2019):
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• Under the Freedom of Information Act (IFG), every citizen has a 
subjective right of access to official information from any authority. 
In certain cases, this right does not exist if it is necessary for the pro-
tection of particular public interests, the protection of the regulatory 
decision-making process, the protection of personal data or the pro-
tection of business or trade secrets. The right of access to informa-
tion can be enforced in court.
• In addition to the right of access to information, there are more 
recent transparency regulations in the federal states (Länder) of 
Hamburg and the Rhineland-Palatinate. In these states, public 
authorities are required to make certain information that is relevant 
to the public accessible to everyone via a transparency platform on 
the Internet.
In addition, there is the nationwide metadata portal GovData where 
the open data provided by federal, state and local governments can be 
accessed. Various federal states and municipalities also operate their own 
open data portals.
3.4  Law
The administrative processes that transcend the intra-organisational and 
inter-organisational area and address citizens or businesses are almost 
completely regulated. The reason lies directly in the German understand-
ing of the constitutional state.
3.4.1  Functions of Administrative Procedure Law
Because the state is more powerful than all other actors, mere private law 
is not an effective means of protecting the freedom of the citizen against 
the state. This requires a special law for the containment of state power in 
the form of public law. In Germany, special importance is assigned to gen-
eral administrative procedure law. Located between the Basic Law and 
sector-specific special administrative law, the Administrative Procedures 
Act (APA) functions as a transmission belt, which forwards the standards 
of constitutional law to daily administrative practice. The APA represents 
the stabilising backbone of administrative law as a whole. It systematises 
the central legal institutions, so that regardless of which specific adminis-
trative law applies in a given individual case, the same basic patterns are 
accessed. This establishes transparency and predictability.
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In the German federal system, the individual federal states and the fed-
eral government respectively regulate the administrative procedures with 
an individual administrative procedures act for their own administrations. 
Except for minor deviations, however, these laws contain the same proce-
dural rules.
3.4.2  Structures and Principles of Administrative Procedure Law
In accordance with its aim to contain the power of the state, the APA 
applies only to sovereign acts of the state, that is acts in which the state 
relies on public law. If the state acts as a private citizen under private law, 
the APA is not applicable. Even when the state does act under public law, 
the APA only applies if the action intended by the administration takes the 
form of an administrative act or a public law contract vis-à-vis the citizen. 
These are the two most important forms of action by the administration, 
which are connected with special impacts. The principle of freedom of 
form should enable the administration to carry out administrative proce-
dures in a simple, expedient and expeditious manner in the interests of 
citizens and businesses. Only specific decisions are governed by specific 
procedural rules.
Despite the principle of freedom of the administrative procedure, the 
APA contains various provisions that the administration must adhere to in 
order to respect the requirement of a fair trial and protect the interests of 
the parties (cf. Rowe and Winterhoff 2001). These provisions are mainly:
• The investigative or ex officio investigation principle. On the one 
hand, this central procedural principle results from the rule of law, in 
particular the principle of the legality of the administration because 
it is about clarifying the facts in the public interest. On the other 
hand, what is behind the principle of ex officio investigation is the 
legal protection of those involved, in particular the citizen. For this 
reason, Section 24 APA expressly states that the authority must also 
take into account all circumstances that are favourable to the 
participants.
• The duty of support and care of the authority to the participants of 
the proceedings. The civil servant should not only be a servant of the 
state but also act as a helper for the citizen to create ‘equality of arms’ 
for the parties and prevent the realisation of rights from failure due 
to ignorance, inexperience or awkwardness in dealing with authorities.
• The right to be heard by the authorities (cf. Sect. 3.3 above).
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• The right of access to the files (cf. Sect. 3.3 above).
• The legal bounds of discretion of the authorities. At its discretion, 
the administration may only decide if a law has allowed this for the 
specific decision in question. Even if this is the case, the discretion of 
the authority is not unlimited, but may only be exercised within the 
framework laid down in the APA.
• The confidence protection principle. This principle protects the per-
son concerned by ensuring that unilateral revocations of decisions 
already taken by the authorities are not revoked without taking 
account of the person’s trust (legitimate expectation) in the exis-
tence of the decision.
3.4.3  Reform Discussions and Recent Developments
More recent discussions and developments with regard to administrative 
procedure law can be grouped together into three blocks: firstly, changes 
directly related to the APA; secondly, procedural regulations in the field of 
digitalisation; and thirdly, considerations at the level of the European Union.
Discussions concerning the amendment of the APA have related, 
among other things, to the participation of citizens and the acceleration of 
approval procedures:
• The result of the discussion to strengthen citizen participation was 
the inclusion of a provision in Section 25 (3) APA, according to 
which the public is to be involved in major industrial and transport 
projects before the permit application is submitted to the authority. 
This provision is significant because, according to earlier German 
understandings, the general public was not involved in an authorisa-
tion procedure, only those whose own rights were actually affected. 
The public also includes associations which represent the interests of 
environmental issues and are officially recognised for that purpose 
(Section 73 (4) APA, Section 2 of the Environmental Appeals 
Act [UmwRG]).
• For several decades now, Germany has been debating whether the 
granting of permits for the construction of economic or infrastruc-
ture projects takes too long, thus impairing economic development. 
The most recent law of this kind is the ‘Law on the Acceleration of 
Planning and Approval Procedures in the Transport Sector’, which 
came into force at the end of 2018.
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The second big block of recent developments is the discussion about 
the legal regulation of digital administrative procedures. In the legalistic 
German administrative culture, there is a high degree of consensus that at 
least the basic rules of digital administrative procedures should be regu-
lated by law. These regulations have been partly laid down in the APA, and 
partly in special procedural laws. In particular, basic rules were added to 
the APA relating to the conditions under which electronic communica-
tions can achieve legally binding effects in administrative proceedings 
(Section 3a APA), the duty to take account of important information from 
participants in automatic electronic procedures (Section 24 (1) APA), the 
legal equality of an automatically issued administrative act with a man- 
made administrative act (Section 35a APA) and the possibility of notifica-
tion of an administrative act via retrieval from an Internet portal (Section 
41 (2a) APA).
Added to this are the e-government laws, that is the acts to promote 
electronic government for electronic administration issues. These special 
procedural laws have been adopted for both the federal administration and 
the administrations of most Länder. Among other things, they include 
provisions on the electronic submission of documents in the administra-
tive procedure, electronic record keeping and access to files, and open data 
(on the Online Access Act (OZG) cf. Sect. 3.2. above).
A third major thread of discussion is the relationship between German 
administrative procedure law and the law of the European Union. A new 
impetus for the importance of the European idea for national administra-
tive procedure law has been provided by a Europe-wide research network, 
the Research Network on EU Administrative Law (ReNEUAL). After sev-
eral years of work, this network has developed the ‘ReNEUAL Model 
Rules on EU Administrative Procedure’ from an analysis of EU law and 
the administrative law of the Member States. The approach of the ReNMR 
corresponds to a great extent to the development of German administra-
tive procedure law. The principle of analysing the different legal subsys-
tems and, through comparative analysis, identifying congruent components 
and extracting the best elements in order to establish an optimal system at 
a higher level, one which subsequently establishes a set of propositions to 
guide the further development of the different legal subsystems, is deeply 
rooted in the tradition of German federalism. The model rules have initi-
ated reflection on the revision of German law in various regulatory areas 
of administrative procedure law.
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4  Intra-organIsatIonal Processes
Intra-organisational processes designate support and management pro-
cesses within the respective administrative unit. They serve to set the stra-
tegic goals and framework for the organisation and its task fulfilment as 
well as support the execution of the core processes.
4.1  Management and Support Processes
In the course of the discussion about gearing German administrations 
more strongly to the principles of New Public Management, the instru-
ments associated with management and support processes have now been 
further incorporated into the administration. This concerns, for example, 
the instrument of controlling, which has been implemented in municipal 
financial reporting at local authority level with the change from cash-based 
accounting budgetary management to a product-based budget. Since 
these questions are dealt with in more detail in the Chap. 16, this will not 
be discussed in detail here. The same applies to performance management, 
which is also the subject of the Chap. 16.
Quality management is understood as a comprehensive procedural 
approach, for which German public administrations rely on two basic 
models (Löffler 2018: 6–10):
• The series of standards ISO 9000 et  seq. of the International 
Organisation for Standardisation (ISO), implemented in Germany in 
the corresponding standards of the German Institute for 
Standardisation (DIN), with the core elements being customer ori-
entation, leadership, inclusion of persons, process-oriented approach, 
improvement, evidence-based decision-making and relationship 
management, formulates the requirement for an external certifica-
tion of quality management.
• The Common Assessment Framework (CAF), on the other hand, is 
a quality assessment instrument in the form of a self-assessment tool, 
agreed for the civil service of the EU Member States in 2000. It aims 
to develop and strengthen the administrations’ ability for self- 
assessment in a comprehensive internal communication process and 
to develop improvements.
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Quality management is now carried out in many German authorities, 
both at the level of the local governments and the administrations of the 
federal states as well as the federal government. The main challenge is to 
implement the improvement requirements identified by quality manage-
ment (Löffler 2018: 10).
It is, therefore, essential that change management should also be part 
of the quality management process right from the start and that the change 
process be developed out of the quality management implemented. 
However, change management also has significance beyond quality man-
agement. In view of the intense pressure for change to which the admin-
istrations are being subjected, not only through digitalisation but certainly 
also because of it, methods of change management are, at any rate, widely 
used in major change processes in German administrations (Die 
Bundesregierung, Change Management 2019). Recent approaches 
emphasise above all the necessary change in the thinking of administration 
employees.
The greater involvement of project-related thinking with the associated 
project management in German administrations is reflected by a situation- 
related relativisation of the line organisation structure with a fixed assign-
ment of tasks. This is especially the case for temporary tasks with a high 
degree of complexity. As a rule, the Joint Rules of Procedure of the Federal 
Ministries (GGO) provide for the establishment of project-related man-
agement by specially established project teams in such tasks (Section 10 
(2) GGO). In 2013, the federal government introduced the ‘Practical 
Guide to Project Management for Public Administration’.
4.2  Knowledge Management
The traditional knowledge management of the administration has con-
sisted mainly in archiving and file systems and the individual knowledge of 
the employees. For almost every German administration there are filing 
orders or similar administrative instructions that specify in which system 
the information available to the administrations must be stored in file form 
so that they can be retrieved as simply as possible.
Due to digitalisation, knowledge management has also undergone a 
major transformation. First, the knowledge available and the quantity of 
information and data to be processed by the administrations have grown 
exponentially. Second, the requirements related to the speed of access and 
retrieval of knowledge have increased significantly. Third, IT solutions 
 J. ZIEKOW
175
provide the ability to integrate and prepare large pools of knowledge tai-
lored to the needs of each administrative unit.
An empirical study compiled in 2013 showed considerable deficits in 
the knowledge management of the authorities at that time and room for 
improvement in the introduction of knowledge management systems 
(Materna GmbH and Hochschule Harz 2013: 65–67). Since then, a great 
deal of effort has been made to provide knowledge management solutions 
tailored to the needs of each agency, thereby anchoring knowledge man-
agement broadly in the administration. For example, the Federal 
Administration Office, a superior federal authority with service functions 
for the federal administration, offers an intranet solution (OfficeNet) for 
federal authorities with the option of agency-specific configuration. The 
authorities using OfficeNet work together in a specialist network and 
exchange their experiences and perspectives on possible further develop-
ments both in workshops and via an online platform. For municipal 
administrations, the KGSt has a knowledge management best practices 
database.
From 2020 onwards, the federal authorities are subject to the obliga-
tion under Section 6 of the E-Government Act (EGovG) to keep their files 
electronically. For the period ending 2019, a software solution was initially 
introduced in several federal agencies as part of a pilot project. In the sec-
ond phase of the project, the e-file solution provided by the Federal 
Information Technology Centre, the IT service provider of the federal 
government, will be introduced for all federal authorities deemed suitable 
for this purpose based on a capability maturity model.
4.3  Law
The processes within a single administrative unit are generally not gov-
erned by legislation in the strict sense (laws enacted by parliament or legal 
authorisation). The normative control of the internal administrative pro-
cedure is governed by administrative rules adopted by the executive itself.
In certain cases, however, rules related to questions on administrative 
internal processes are established through formal law. These questions 
concern important preconditions for proximity to the citizen and speed of 
administration. An example of this is the legal obligation to keep all files 
electronically (cf. Sect. 4.2 above).
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5  Inter-organIsatIonal Processes
Inter-organisational processes take place between different administrative 
organisational units, regardless of whether they are in a horizontal or verti-
cal (hierarchical) relationship. These processes serve to ensure and improve 
the effectiveness and efficiency of task performance and the lawfulness of 
administrative action. To this extent, processes between administrative 
units can be divided into three categories: communication and coopera-
tion, the support of one administrative unit by another outside coopera-
tive relations and the supervision of one administrative unit by another.
5.1  Inter-Organisational Communication and Cooperation
Communication and cooperation between different administrative units 
take place in daily work to meet many different kinds of requirements and 
in various forms. It is an essential element of an active authority culture 
that authorities inform one another and, if necessary, cooperate to fulfil 
their tasks more effectively and efficiently. In this respect, two groups of 
communication and cooperation can be distinguished:
• The communication or cooperation is related to the processes of 
service provision by at least one of the communicating or cooperat-
ing authorities. In this regard, we speak of performance-related 
cooperation.
• The cooperation is generally for mutual information between author-
ities. This communication also serves to improve service provision, 
but only indirectly. Examples are joint meetings or inter-ministerial 
informal permanent working groups, as set up in Germany both 
between the federal ministries for the coordination of government 
work at the working level and in committees on which the relevant 
ministries of all federal states are represented. These forms of coop-
eration are not directly related to the process.
As far as performance is concerned, a distinction can be made between 
communication and cooperation:
• Communication should be understood as the interaction between 




• Cooperation, by contrast, means that formal or informal arrange-
ments are established, independent of a concrete service delivery 
process, and that after their establishment they are then process own-
ers, or at least contribute to the process.
5.1.1  Performance-Related Communication
In the context of a concrete service provision process, authorities com-
municate to ensure that all the aspects that are important in that process 
are incorporated into it and taken into account in the provision of services. 
This is usually about technical aspects, for example where environmental 
authorities are involved in approval procedures for industrial plants, or 
about the impact of the outcome of proceedings on the activities of the 
administrative unit concerned. The latter, for example, is when the munic-
ipality has to be involved in the approval of construction projects by state 
authorities as this limits the ability of the municipality in terms of future 
development planning.
On the one hand, this communication can be informal. In this case, the 
competent authority asks another authority for information which the 
requesting authority does not have, for example information to assess the 
impact of certain environmental emissions. On the other hand, the com-
munication is formal if different authorities are required by law to be 
involved in the service delivery process. The significance of the part con-
tributions provided for by law may differ:
• Involvement is a contribution by an authority to a procedure for 
which another authority is responsible if the intention is to introduce 
a specific technical aspect into the procedure. The responsible 
authority is not bound by the view of the other authority.
• This is different to co-decision. Here, the partial contribution of the 
other authority is binding for the responsible authority.
5.1.2  Performance-Related Cooperation
For cooperation between different administrative units aimed at improv-
ing the fulfilment of the tasks of the participating units with regard to 
specific service provision processes, two basic cases can be distinguished:
• The cooperation provides internal services to the administrative 
units involved in the cooperation so that they can deliver their ser-
vices more effectively and efficiently.
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• The cooperation concerns not only internal support processes but 
also—directly—the service provision processes towards citizens and 
companies.
For the first case group, the provision of performance-related support 
through cooperation, the term shared service (centre) is generally used. 
Such shared services exist in Germany both horizontally and vertically 
(Schuppan 2018). In horizontal cooperation, administrative organisations 
cooperate at the same level with mostly identical tasks. Especially at 
municipal level, there are numerous examples in the back-office area. They 
concern, for example, the operation of a common building yard or joint 
legal department by several municipalities. By far the most important 
example, however, is shared services in the area of IT. Here a common IT 
service centre for several municipalities is set up. Vertical cooperation 
across multiple levels of administration is also found, especially in the IT 
sector, in the form of a common IT service centre of municipalities with 
one or more federal states. An example of such a cooperation is the infor-
mation service provider Dataport. Knowledge sharing, or cross- 
organisational knowledge management, has been discussed many times 
(cf. Schulz 2012), but is still in its infancy in terms of practical implemen-
tation in Germany. New impetus has come from the discussion under the 
heading of Data Driven Government (cf. Fadavian et al. 2019).
The cooperation processes directly affecting the provision of services to 
citizens and businesses are numerous, especially at municipal level. For 
this, the term ‘intercommunal cooperation’ is common. The legal forms 
of intercommunal cooperation are governed by laws on municipal coop-
eration. There are two basic forms:
• Several municipalities set up a new organisation with its own legal 
capacity. The organisation performs specific tasks for all municipali-
ties participating in it and performs the service delivery processes to 
citizens and businesses.
• Several municipalities sign an agreement mandating one of the par-
ticipating municipalities to perform a specific task for all the other 




5.2  Inter-Organisational Support
According to the German understanding of the functional definition of 
administration, it is assumed that every authority is able to fulfil its assigned 
tasks with its own personnel and material resources. If, however, difficul-
ties arise in individual cases, this should not lead to the task in question not 
being fulfilled. Due to the public interest in effectively fulfilling adminis-
trative tasks, in such a situation the authority must request another author-
ity to provide so-called administrative assistance instead. The authority 
requested to provide the assistance is obliged to do so. In this case the 
costs it incurs are reimbursed.
The obligation to give assistance has two limitations: firstly, assistance 
must be complementary and the actual task must be performed by the 
authority responsible for the task. Secondly, the assistance may only be 
provided on a case-by-case basis and not constantly. If an agency con-
stantly needs the help of other agencies to fulfil its tasks, its resources need 
to be improved.
5.3  Inter-Organisational Control
The responsibility of the government to the parliament under German 
constitutional law presupposes that the government can fulfil this respon-
sibility and have sufficient opportunities to control and influence the per-
formance of the tasks by the administration. This presupposes the right to 
give orders to the subordinate authorities and civil servants and control of 
the way in which the assigned tasks are performed. For this purpose, inter- 
organisational procedures for the control of the authorities by the super-
ordinate authority are established. (For control and accountability by 
administrative courts and courts of audit see Chap. 12.)
In this respect, a distinction must be made between administrative and 
technical supervision. Administrative supervision is usually understood as 
the supervision of the structure, internal order, use and distribution of 
personnel and other resources, as well as general management and person-
nel matters of the supervised body. Technical supervision refers to the 
legitimate and appropriate exercise of the technical tasks of the supervised 
body. The means of technical supervision typically includes the power of 
the technical supervisory authority to demand information, request sub-
mission of files, carry out examinations, issue instructions and, if these are 
11 ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES AND PROCESSES 
180
not obeyed, take control of the matter by asserting the right of action 
beyond defined competence.
A third form of supervision besides service and technical supervision is 
legal supervision. This is limited to reviewing the lawfulness of the deci-
sions of the subordinate authority and does not extend to whether the 
content of the decision is appropriate. A control restricted to legal supervi-
sion usually exists when the subordinate authority has the right of self- 
government. The most important example is the municipalities.
5.4  Law
Processes in the relationship of several administrative units to one another 
can only be governed by an administrative regulation if there is a joint 
upper authority or joint body that issues the regulation. An example of a 
decree by a joint higher authority is the instruction of a ministry to all 
lower authorities as to how they are to cooperate in certain cases, which 
deadlines have to be met between the authorities, etc. An example of pro-
cedural rules issued by a joint body of several authorities is the Joint Rules 
of Procedure of the Federal Ministries (GGO), which is adopted by the 
federal government as a collegiate body. Among other things, it regulates 
the cooperation and procedure of the federal ministries in the preparation 
of cabinet bills.
Inter-organisational procedural rules, adopted in the form of an act of 
parliament concern, for example:
• the regulation of performance-related communication between pub-
lic authorities (cf. Sect. 5.1.1 above);
• supervision of one authority over the other (cf. Sect. 5.2 above); and
• administrative assistance (cf. Sect. 5.3 above).
6  lessons learned
As for the question to what extent can the experiences of the German 
administration be regarded as a reference point for development in other 
countries, the first thing that applies is the same for all transfers of institu-
tions from the administrative culture of one state into another: the struc-
tures and administrative processes are embedded in complex environmental 
systems of a political, legal, social, economic and cultural nature. This 
usually excludes a transfer in the sense of a simple takeover. Rather, it 
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requires a careful examination of the conditions under which the experi-
ences and institutions of a foreign administrative culture can be made 
fruitful for one’s own structures and administrative processes.
Within this framework, three possible factors from the German experi-
ence, which go beyond the general principles of business process and pro-
cedure management and are essential for each administration, can be 
summarised as follows:
• A defining structural attribute of the highly diversified administrative 
landscape in Germany is its strong involvement in networks and 
cooperation with other authorities. The examples mentioned above 
are the creation of learning networks, the joint further development 
of knowledge management solutions, shared services, in particular in 
the form of strong intercommunal cooperation, and the obligation 
to provide mutual assistance to the authorities to fulfil their tasks. 
This serves to optimise the fulfilment of tasks through mutual learn-
ing processes and assistance and the enhancement of synergies.
• Also characteristic of the German understanding of administrative 
procedures is the legal regulation that puts citizens in a strong posi-
tion vis-à-vis the administration. The APA can certainly be described 
as an ‘export hit’. It is the more or less modified basis for the adop-
tion of administrative procedural law codifications in different coun-
tries. The reasons for APA’s success lie mainly in its systematic clarity 
and concentration on the key principles and legal institutions. The 
high degree of abstraction associated with it makes the provisions of 
administrative procedure law appear flexible and adaptable to differ-
ent legal systems.
• Especially for administrative systems that are as highly diversified as 
Germany’s, that is in countries where administration is highly decen-
tralised, the German solution, which preserves the autonomy of 
administrations and their IT systems and provides nevertheless all 
administrative services via electronic portals with a uniform user 
account regardless of which authority is competent, can be a helpful 
reference.
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In this chapter, two very different mechanisms are described. Both of 
them play a central role in the system, guaranteeing an adequate level of 
control of the administration in Germany (for a broad picture of both 
means of control see Kempny 2017). At all levels—the federal (Bund), the 
state (Länder) and the local level—the respective administration is a 
potential object of control by administrative courts and by audit offices. 
The administrative courts form—by and large—a joint system. As one of 
the characteristics of this joint system, cases are generally decided by courts 
established by the Länder, even when they invoke questions regulated by 
federal law, while the highest court of appeal in all matters regarding the 
application of federal law is a federal court. In contrast to this, there are no 
formal links between the different courts of audits in Germany. Rather, the 
federal level and each of the Länder have instituted them in their respec-
tive constitutions and have fulfilled their constitutional obligation to 
establish them as independent bodies. At the local level, similar 
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instruments are in place under the supervision of the respective Land that 
controls the financial propriety and efficiency of actions by the local gov-
ernments in their territory.
In both scientific and general public debate, control is regarded as ‘a 
necessary evil’ (Püttner 2001: 560). As will be shown, the mechanisms of 
control described in this chapter are well-established (for a typology see 
Püttner 2001: 561). The same could be said about the concept of account-
ability, which, from a legal point of view, is an element of the more com-
plex concept of democratic legitimacy. In this sense, it is not the role of 
administrative courts and courts of audit to hold the administration 
accountable. Rather, their efforts to control the administration give other 
actors—parliaments, the public, the media and so on—the possibility to 
hold the respective administration accountable.
2  AdmInIstrAtIve courts
The control of administrative actions by specialised courts has a long 
history in Germany (see von Oertzen and Hauschild 2001: 569–570; 
Ramsauer 2019: 24–25). The fact that administrative courts are not the 
‘ordinary’ courts does not imply any privileges on the part of the adminis-
tration. Part of the judicial system as set out by Article 95 of the Basic 
Law—the Grundgesetz (GG)—comprises ‘ordinary courts’ on the one 
hand, and specialised courts on the other. The latter are set up in the fields 
of administrative law, tax law, employment law and social security law. This 
set of different types of courts shows that their creation is a question of 
professional specialisation, not of institutional privileges.
The relevant rules regarding the system of control as exercised by the 
administrative courts can be found in the Grundgesetz—Basic Law,1 the 
Verwaltungsverfahrensgesetz—Administrative Procedure Act (APA),2 and 
the Verwaltungsgerichtsordnung—Code of Administrative Court 
Procedure (CACP).3
2.1  The Structure of Administrative Courts in Germany
As previously mentioned, the German judiciary is divided into five different 
branches. Three of these five branches are courts with a certain control 
function regarding some part of the administration. Apart from the 
administrative courts in the strict sense, there are the so-called finance 
courts for all matters regarding the application of tax law. A similar level of 
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specialisation can be observed with regard to the social courts in matters 
regarding social security, which include legal questions regarding pensions 
and public healthcare and other matters that involve a public insurance 
system or social benefits provided by public administration. In these cases, 
due to the explicit responsibility of these specialised entities—that is, spe-
cialised administrative courts—the administrative courts as such do not 
get involved. In contrast to this, claims of damages against the public 
administration have to be pursued in the ordinary courts just as in cases of 
civil litigation. Other laws give the administrative courts exclusive jurisdic-
tion to review certain administrative decisions. Probably the most promi-
nent cases involve matters regarding the individual employment of civil 
servants (while public employees have to pursue their claims in the so- 
called labour courts).
If neither of the two preceding constellations—exclusive jurisdiction of 
the administrative courts or of any other specialised court—is given, the 
so-called administrative court’s universal clause is applicable (see von 
Oertzen and Hauschild 2001: 570). According to Section 40 (1), first 
sentence of CACP: ‘Recourse to the administrative courts shall be avail-
able in all public-law disputes of a non-constitutional nature, insofar as the 
disputes are not explicitly allocated to another court by a federal statute.’ 
The Länder have the same power to allocate disputes to other courts in all 
matters of ‘(p)ublic-law disputes in the field of Land law’ (Section 40 (1), 
sentence 2 CACP). The application of the clause therefore requires a defi-
nition of the term ‘public-law dispute’ (see Singh 2001: 197ff.). In most 
cases, though, the interpretation is not a problem because in practice the 
application of the norm is quite well-established and normally does not 
give rise to any relevant legal problem.
There are three levels of administrative courts in Germany (Singh 2001: 
187ff.). Most cases have to be filed in the administrative courts 
(Verwaltungsgericht), which are courts of first instance with a regional 
configuration (see Mehde 2017: 119ff.). Appeal can be granted to or by 
the higher administrative court (Oberverwaltungsgericht or 
Verwaltungsgerichtshof), of which there can only be one in each Land 
(Section 2 CACP). The Länder Berlin and Brandenburg have established 
a joint Oberverwaltungsgericht so that there is a total of fifteen among the 
sixteen German Länder. Both the administrative courts and the higher 
administrative courts are established by the Länder. In contrast to the 
compulsory establishment of only one higher administrative court, the 
Länder are free to decide how many administrative courts they want to 
12 CONTROL AND ACCOUNTABILITY: ADMINISTRATIVE COURTS… 
188
have and how large their judicial districts should be. Especially the more 
populous states have a number of administrative courts—and therefore 
judicial districts—while smaller states (the city-states Berlin, Bremen and 
Hamburg as well as Saarland and Schleswig-Holstein) have established 
only one (Mehde 2017: 128; von Oertzen and Hauschild 2001: 572; 
Singh 2001: 187–188). These courts apply law enacted by the Länder or 
the local governments as well as federal law, so that the federal govern-
ment and its administrative bodies can be sued before the administrative 
court in the respective judicial district.
The Federal Administrative Court (Bundesverwaltungsgericht) is the 
highest court of appeal in the field of administrative law. While the admin-
istrative courts and the higher administrative courts apply law passed by 
the parliaments at the federal level or in the respective Land as well as by 
rule-making bodies at the local level, the jurisdiction of the Federal 
Administrative Court is restricted to questions of federal law. As a conse-
quence, the interpretation of the law of the Länder falls within the exclu-
sive jurisdiction of the administrative courts in the respective Land, with 
the court of last instance in these cases being the respective 
Oberverwaltungsgericht. It should be noted, though, that many questions 
of administrative law have to be seen in the context of the constitutional 
and European framework, which can provide an angle to assume a federal 
jurisdiction (see Mehde 2017: 136).
2.2  Empirical Facts
Cases that have to be decided by the administrative courts often mirror 
practical developments, namely special challenges the executive is faced 
with. Especially the number of cases pending with the courts of first 
instance can give an impression which topics are most controversial in the 
relationship between the various parts of the state and citizens. In the ten 
years between 2007 and 2016, pending before the administrative courts 
were—on average—between 100,000 and 150,000 cases (all figures 
regarding administrative courts are according to Statistisches Bundesamt 
2019b: 12–13). The year 2017 saw an increase to almost 190,000, fol-
lowed by a massive peak with more than 338,000 in 2018. An explanation 
for this increase can be found in the number of cases pending before the 
chambers with special jurisdiction for asylum cases. They saw a decrease 
from just over 67,000 in 2004 to just under 10,000 in 2010. From then 
on, the number increased, slowly at first and then very significantly towards 
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the end of the decade (2017: 104,060; 2018: 242,077). Here, of course, 
the effects of the so-called refugee crisis of late 2015 can be seen as in 
2016 and the following years, many of those who came to Germany 
received the decision regarding their right to stay in Germany from the 
Federal Office for Migration and Refugees. The figures for the chambers 
that have no jurisdiction for asylum cases have developed quite differently: 
these parts of the administrative courts of first instance have seen a con-
stant decrease in the number of cases pending, from 175,048 (2004) to 
86,275 (2013). The figures stayed at approximately the same level in the 
years following (2017: 85,113; 2018: 95,998). As the number of new 
cases also remains more or less stable (2014: 104,408; 2015: 94,206; 
2016: 89,755; 2017: 92,171; 2018: 90,253), the—relatively modest—
increase since 2017 probably cannot be explained by the number of new 
cases, but is far more likely a consequence of a massive shift of resources in 
the direction of the chambers dealing with asylum cases. That this was also 
regarded as a political challenge in need of decisive actions is proved by the 
fact that the number of positions for judges in the administrative courts of 
first instance saw a considerable increase from just under 1400 in 2013 to 
just over 1900 in 2018 (Bundesamt für Justiz 2019).
By and large, the social courts of first instance have an even higher 
number of cases to decide (the following figures are all according to 
Statistisches Bundesamt 2019a: 14–15). The figures for cases pending 
have remained stable at a very high level: from 355,379  in 2005 to 
445,559 in 2018, reaching a peak in 2012 (497,697). Of the cases con-
cluded in 2018, around a third dealt with questions regarding the second 
book of the social code (Statistisches Bundesamt 2019a: 28), which pro-
vides the legal basis for the rights of people searching for employment and 
which was the subject of major reforms in the first decade of the century. 
As a consequence of the high number of cases, it could well be said—at 
least quantitatively—that the social courts are the more relevant type of 
administrative courts. Nevertheless, the following remarks will focus on 
courts officially called ‘administrative courts’, as they can be regarded as 
the most important point of reference in the development of administra-
tive law and have, thereby, also contributed to the perception of the law in 
other areas, such as social security law.
12 CONTROL AND ACCOUNTABILITY: ADMINISTRATIVE COURTS… 
190
2.3  Types of Decisions
Three types of applications can be filed with the administrative courts (see 
von Oertzen and Hauschild 2001: 575; Singh 2001: 210ff.): first, motions 
to quash an administrative act; second, motions to force the administra-
tion to do something or refrain from doing something; and third, motions 
to declare that a certain legal relationship exists or does not exist or that 
an administrative act is void. Conceptually, the motion to quash an admin-
istrative act can be regarded as the basic structure. In this case, the admin-
istration made a formal decision that was issued and that is still in place. 
Following the motion, the court then decides the matter directly. Section 
113 (1), first sentence of CACP, determines: ‘Insofar as the administrative 
act is unlawful and the plaintiff ’s rights have been violated, the court shall 
rescind the administrative act and any ruling on an objection.’ When the 
judgement of the court enters into effect, the administrative act becomes 
invalid. In cases where the administrative act has ceased to have any effect 
before the judgement of the court could be delivered, the plaintiff can file 
a motion to declare the administrative act illegal and an infringement of 
his or her rights. A declaration of illegality is, in effect, also possible if the 
action of the administration does not qualify as a formal administrative 
act.4 This declaration can also be made with regard to the different types 
of executive legislation. While only the respective (federal or Länder) con-
stitutional court can rule statutes passed by parliament at the federal or 
Länder level to be unconstitutional—and thereby void—all administrative 
courts can regard ‘other legal provisions ranking below the statutes of a 
Land’ (see Section 47 (1), no. 2 CACP) or of the federation (the Bund) 
as illegal and therefore not applicable. If the administration refuses to 
grant an administrative act, the courts can order the administration to do 
so or, if the administration has scope for decision-making (see previous 
Sect. 2.2), force the administration to decide again, ‘taking the legal view 
of the court into consideration’ (Section 113 (5), sentence 2 CACP). If 
the matter the plaintiff applies for is not an administrative act, similar 
rules apply.
In all cases where the plaintiff—for whatever reason—does not have the 
time to wait for a judgement following the regular procedure, the court 
can grant interim injunctions (see von Oertzen and Hauschild 2001: 
581–582; Singh 2001: 237ff.). As a general rule, interim injunctions can-
not replace decisions taken in the ordinary procedures. Nevertheless, the 
protection of the plaintiff ’s rights is the priority that can be a justification 
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for taking decisions that are, in effect, final if this is the only possibility to 
protect the respective rights.
Altogether, this brief description shows that the various possible 
constellations are covered in a system that tries to make available effective 
legal remedies in all cases where infringements of rights can be avoided or 
amended, or at least to provide a retroactive control mechanism when the 
infringement of rights has already ended. The differences in the applica-
tions lead to equivalent procedural differences, but they are no reason to 
raise doubts about the universal protection of rights by the administra-
tive courts.
2.4  Depth of Control
The administrative courts use the same methodology as the administration 
to decide a particular case in its decision-making process. This also implies 
that the German system of judicial review, in principle, does not accept the 
notion that there should be scope for administrative actions not fully 
reviewable by the courts. That is to say, even very vague words in any 
given law—be it ‘public interest’, ‘proportionality’, ‘trust’ or similar terms 
open to interpretation—will be interpreted by the courts independently. 
Any difference between the interpretation found by the administration, on 
the one hand, and the finding by the court on the other, will lead to the 
conclusion that the original administrative decision violated the law 
(Ramsauer 2019: 33–34). This rule is backed by a constitutional right, 
enforceable in all courts, including the Federal Constitutional Court 
(Bundesverfassungsgericht). The respective norm, Article 19 (4), sentence 
1 of the Basic Law, reads as follows: ‘Should any person’s rights be vio-
lated by public authority, he may have recourse to the courts.’ This is 
understood by the Bundesverfassungsgericht and the various administrative 
courts as prescribing a full judicial review of undetermined legal norms in 
all cases where the claimant’s rights would be violated if the administrative 
actions were illegal. Consequently, the vast scope of the judicial review 
regarding the application of the law is not only a legal rule but also a 
basic right.
Two exceptions to the rule regarding the full control of the application 
of norms are accepted (see Ramsauer 2019: 30ff.). The courts distinguish 
between the provisions of the norm itself and the legal consequences, that 
is, the actions the administration can take because the norm is applicable 
in the respective case. The latter concerns situations where the 
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administration can act without authorisation in the law because its actions 
do not involve any interference with rights and are not regulated by any 
applicable norm. More often, the administration is granted discretion 
whenever the law explicitly says so. The norm indicates this fact by stating 
that certain actions ‘may’ or ‘can’ be taken.
2.4.1  Exception No. 1: Discretion
The legal concept of administrative discretion concerns the legal 
consequences whenever the conditions of an application of a certain norm 
are met. Section 40 of APA reads as follows: ‘Where an authority is 
empowered to act at its discretion, it shall do so in accordance with the 
purpose of such empowerment and shall respect the legal limits to such 
discretionary powers.’ The rule shows that discretion is regarded as an 
exception—and that this exception is granted by the law itself. It is not 
stated explicitly, but undoubtedly implies that the administrative courts 
have to accept that, only in this case, the administration has the final say 
on which decision should be taken in a specific context and that the 
administrative courts then have no authority to give the final decision in 
the case under consideration. This is confirmed by Section 114, first 
sentence of CACP, which reads as follows: ‘Insofar as the administrative 
authority is empowered to act in its discretion, the court shall also examine 
whether the administrative act or the refusal or omission of the 
administrative act is unlawful because the statutory limits of discretion 
have been overstepped or discretion has been used in a manner not 
corresponding to the purpose of the empowerment.’ This description 
shows the difference. In the case of ‘regular’ control, the courts provide 
the authoritative interpretation of a given norm, which is binding for the 
administration in the case under review. In the case of discretion, the role 
of the courts is restricted to the question of whether the administration 
made mistakes in the application of the norm. In other words, the norms 
mentioned demonstrate the shift from the question ‘What is the right 
interpretation of the law?’ to ‘Was the administration right in its application 
of the law?’
The exercise of discretionary powers does not imply an authorisation to 
‘free’ decision-making. The courts apply the above-mentioned Section 
114 (1) of CACP in a way that allows them to cover a broad spectrum of 
aspects relevant in all administrative decision-making. The starting point 
are four clearly defined types of ‘discretion mistakes’ that can be made by 
the administration (Singh 2001: 156ff.). The first two of these types—the 
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first dichotomy of possible mistakes—could be regarded as mere 
formalities: the courts ask if the deciding administration was aware of the 
scope of its discretionary power and if it saw the boundaries of the law 
established. The former aspects include cases in which the administration 
did not see at all that it had been granted discretionary power. Of course, 
this is a rather theoretical idea which—in times of highly professionalised 
administrations—does not play a noticeable role. In contrast to this, the 
precise definition of boundaries is very relevant in practice, as it includes 
the question of whether the respective decision was proportionate. 
Proportionality is probably the single most important topic in all matters 
involving administrative discretion. The concept gives the court broad 
power to determine whether the decision is necessary—that is, is there an 
equally effective alternative that would infringe rights to a lesser degree? 
More importantly, it also implies the question of whether there was an 
adequate balance between the aim of the decision and the impairment of 
the addressee’s rights. Considering that this requires a weighing of legal 
positions that tend to be virtually impossible to compare, it seems fair to 
say that there are no clear-cut rules that can guide this balancing act.
The second dichotomy of possible mistakes refers to the merits of the 
decision under consideration. The joint headline for this kind of mistake is 
‘wrongful exercise of discretion’. The starting point of this concept is the 
above-mentioned provision that ties the administrative decision to the 
purpose of the norm providing the administration with discretionary pow-
ers (Section 40 APA; Section 114 (1) CACP). In relation to this purpose, 
the court can establish which aspects of the case should be considered 
when taking the decision and vice versa. In other words, the courts scruti-
nise the reasons the administration gives for the respective decision. They 
will then decide if the arguments are legitimate in the application of the 
legal norm or if a certain aspect of the cases should have been considered 
or should have played a larger role in determining the decision. In both 
variances, the courts regard any mistake as a reason to declare the exercise 
of discretion as wrongful and, therefore, the respective decision as 
unlawful.
2.4.2  Exception No. 2: Scope for Appreciation
In the other case where courts do not control the interpretation of legal 
norms to its full extent—administrative scope for the application of the 
legal terms—the primary interpretative role of the administration is typi-
cally not stated explicitly in the respective law. It should also be noted that 
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in the German system, the courts generally have to investigate all relevant 
facts irrespective of the evidence provided by the parties (von Oertzen and 
Hauschild 2001: 576), so that the role of the courts is always a very rele-
vant one. Nevertheless, there is no doubt that, in certain instances, there 
are factual problems regarding a full-scale review of administrative actions 
(see Ramsauer 2019: 35ff.). A typical example in this respect is the appraisal 
civil servants receive after a certain period of time. The grade any given 
person has to receive for a given achievement is defined by legal norms. 
Obviously, from a merely practical point of view, it is impossible for an 
administrative court to reconstruct the personal behaviour and the achieve-
ments of the respective civil servant over such a long period of time, 
thereby finding the ‘right’ grade. Very similar problems arise with regard 
to exams (see Bundesverfassungsgericht 1991a, 1991b). Other constella-
tions in this regard concern specific decision-making processes. In all these 
cases, the restricted role of the courts could be described as an exercise in 
legal realism. The courts do realise that a tighter form of control would be 
nothing less than hubris.
As with discretion, the courts in these cases do not abstain from all 
forms of control but rather change the method they apply, asking if the 
administration made a mistake in taking the specific decision. The types of 
mistakes that lead to quashing the respective decision are very similar to 
the ones described with regard to administrative discretion. The 
Bundesverfassungsgericht points out that the control by the administrative 
court has to meet certain substantial standards. In particular, it rules that 
it is not within the scope of the decision-making by the administration to 
grade a position that is arguable or has foundation in the relevant scientific 
literature as being wrong (Bundesverfassungsgericht 1991a: 55; see also 
Bundesverfassungsgericht 1991b: 79).
2.5  Extent of Control
The description has shown that the different types of motions, in addition 
to the wide-ranging interpretation of the law, seem to lead to a near- 
complete control of the administrative action under review by the courts. 
Obviously, this is not the full picture. There are safeguards in place that 
prevent a complete dominance of administrative decision-making by the 
courts. The most important instrument in this respect is the restriction the 
German system provides for the question of locus standi (the Klagebefugnis) 
(see Singh 2001: 214ff.). Control of administrative actions by administrative 
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courts is an intended element of the German Rechtsstaat and therefore, of 
course, no accident. Nevertheless, it would be wrong to assume that the 
law established the courts as institutions of general control or even as a 
means to dominate executive decision-making. Rather, the protection of 
rights is the focus of judicial review, with the question of legality being one 
part of this. In fact, it could well be argued that the role of the administrative 
courts is not to control the administration, but rather to provide a remedy 
when rights are violated by the administration. The vast possibilities the 
courts have to exercise control in every case they have to decide is only 
acceptable because access to the court is clearly defined and restricted. The 
previously mentioned Article 19 (4), first sentence of the Basic Law, while 
guaranteeing access to the court in the case of violations of rights, has, in 
practice, been turned into a provision that reduces the court’s role to one 
of protector of these rights, thereby effectively barring them from all other 
forms of control.
Section 42 (2) of CACP plays the role of a kind of gatekeeper. It states, 
‘Unless otherwise provided by law, the action shall only be admissible if 
the plaintiff claims that his/her rights have been violated by the adminis-
trative act or its refusal or omission.’ This rule, directly applicable only to 
rescissory actions and enforcement actions (see Section 42 (2) CACP), is 
applied in all cases brought before the administrative courts. The courts 
will only decide on the merits of the case if a violation of the claimant’s 
rights seems plausible. The previously mentioned Section 113 (1), first 
sentence of CACP, stresses this point even further, stating that the court 
will rescind the administrative act only if two conditions are met: illegality 
of the act and violation of the plaintiff ’s rights. The same rule—court 
action only in the case of violations of the plaintiff ’s rights—applies with 
regard to enforcement actions as is clearly stated in Section 113 (5), first 
sentence of CACP. In some constellations, the question of whether a cer-
tain rule is not only ‘objective’ law but also grants a ‘subjective’ right 
might prove to be more problematic than the legality of the administrative 
action itself, and it might thereby determine the outcome of the case. This 
is particularly relevant in ‘triangular legal relationships’, that is, whenever 
a third party tries to get an administrative act rescinded that was addressed 
to someone else, such as in the case of someone trying to invalidate his or 
her neighbour’s building permission.
These restrictions give rise to a number of questions relating to the 
obligations stemming from EU law (see, e.g., Mehde 2010: 400  f.; 
Ramsauer 2019: 29; Siegel 2012: 456). Unlike the approach described 
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under Section 42 (2) of CACP, the European legislature seems to regard 
the courts in the EU member states much more as instruments to safe-
guard the implementation of European law (Schlacke 2014: 11; see also 
Mehde 2010: 401). At the very least, it can be said that the European 
Court of Justice (ECJ) tends to rule much more generously when the 
question arises as to whether the plaintiff has a legal right with the conse-
quence of locus standi (Steinbeiß-Winkelmann 2010: 1233, 1234). The 
German legislature as well as the courts have tended to widen the rules on 
locus standi in the respective areas of the law without challenging the con-
cept as such. To the above-mentioned rules a general reservation, ‘unless 
EU law requires otherwise’, must be added.
It should also be noted that as another development introduced by 
European as well as by international law, in a number of fields, the law now 
grants locus standi to certain, formally accredited associations (NGOs) 
that are engaged in the respective fields. This privilege is restricted to legal 
provisions for which there is typically no claimant under the traditional 
system, as the negative effects concern aspects of the environment, that is, 
no person or legal entity. The respective rights are not laid down in the 
CACP but in the special legislation. The most relevant of these can be 
found in environmental law, namely the Aarhus Convention and Directive 
2003/35/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council (see Siegel 
2012: 145–146). It should also be mentioned that there are certain areas 
in which the Länder can decide to allow associations to bring claims in 
restricted areas, such as matters concerning animal protection.
2.6  Remaining Aspects Concerning Judicial Control
It is one of the features of the German system that judgements tend to 
have greater effect than the law requires (see Mehde 2010: 382; Ramsauer 
2019: 42ff.). In most cases, the formal binding effect is restricted to the 
plaintiff and the defendant—normally the administration acting or failing 
to act—and possible third parties subpoenaed to the concrete proceed-
ings. In fact, though, the administration tends to apply the merits of the 
judgements in the same way as they would apply legal norms. The admin-
istration and the individuals acting on behalf of the administration can 
avoid criticism or at least deflect possible blame away from themselves 
when they are able to depict their decision as a necessary consequence of 
court rulings, even if these rulings are—in a strictly legal sense—not bind-
ing for them with regard to the case under consideration (Mehde 2010: 
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384). This can be described as a matter of precise interpretation of the law 
and as an element of the German Rechtsstaat or the legalistic tradition 
respectively. From a different point of view and equally arguable, the same 
phenomenon can be regarded as an overly cautious approach that under-
mines the primary role of the executive in the application of the law.
3  courts of AudIt
Unlike the courts of justice, the courts of audit can decide themselves if 
and when to look into a certain matter. In general, the scope of their con-
trol is restricted to questions of financial propriety and efficiency. In fed-
eral law, the legal base can be found in Article 114 (2), first and second 
sentences of the Basic Law: ‘The Federal Court of Audit, whose members 
shall enjoy judicial independence, shall audit the account and determine 
whether public finances have been properly and efficiently administered. It 
shall submit an annual report directly to the Bundestag and the Bundesrat 
as well as to the Federal Government.’ The provisions determine the basic 
organisational structure as well as the scope of review and the manner in 
which its work can gain effect. It should be noted that this is only a mini-
mal requirement. Article 114 (2), sentence 3, determines that further 
powers can be transferred to the court by federal law. In fact, the role of 
the federal court and its president has been extended and organisational 
features further developed in statutes, namely the Bundesrechnungshof 
Act (BA).5
In accordance with a long-standing tradition, the president of the 
federal court is also appointed to the position of ‘Federal Performance 
Commissioner’.6 In this position, he or she has a broad spectrum of pos-
sibilities to advise both the legislature and the executive and can also be 
asked to provide expert opinions.7 Nevertheless, the role does not feature 
as prominently in practice as its description or the possibilities implied by 
it might suggest.
In the Länder, the respective constitutions contain equivalent 
provisions. Therefore, there is a total of seventeen courts of audit in 
Germany, one at the federal level and one in each one of the sixteen 
Länder—all with ‘similar institutional design’ (Seyfried 2016: 494). At the 
local level, similar institutional arrangements have been established in the 
local government laws of the Länder.
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3.1  Organisational Features
As ‘(i)ndependence is one of the most important preconditions for the 
effectiveness of’ supreme audit institutions (Seyfried 2016: 494), the 
aspect of the organisational design that seems most relevant is the fact that 
the courts of audit are independent institutions bound only by the law 
that cannot be ordered to perform their functions in any specific way 
(Seyfried 2016: 494 f.; von Wedel 2001: 586 f.). As the above-mentioned 
constitutional requirement points out, the members enjoy the most inde-
pendent status possible in the public sector: judicial independence. 
Pursuant to Section 3 (1) of BA, the members of the Bundesrechnungshof 
are the president, the vice-president, the senior audit directors and audit 
directors. These members—but only three audit directors—serve on the 
Senate of the Bundesrechnungshof. Its independent character is further 
guaranteed by the fact that both the president and the vice-president are 
not appointed by the government of the day—as would be the case with 
‘ordinary’ high-ranking positions in the administration—but elected by 
the Bundestag and the Bundesrat, respectively, and appointed by the fed-
eral president (Section 3 (2), sentence 1, and Section 5 (2), sentences 1–3 
BA; for a description of the procedure in the federal states see Seyfried 
2016: 495ff.). The appointees chosen are elected for a term of twelve 
years, cannot be re-elected and have to retire after their time in office 
(Section 3 (2), sentence 2, and Section 5 (1), sentence 4 BA). According 
to Section 7 of BA, the duties are assigned to the different entities within 
the Bundesrechnungshof by the president, the vice-president and the Senate.
3.2  Scope of Review
In accordance with the provisions of Article 114 (2), sentence 1 of the 
Basic Law, the court of audit controls the respective administration, which 
includes all transactions of any financial relevance (von Wedel 2001: 587). 
There are different kinds of audits, with the courts being able to freely 
determine the different aspects (von Wedel 2001: 589). The measures 
applied are propriety, on the one hand, and efficiency, on the other. 
Propriety includes the question of whether budgetary means were spent in 
the way prescribed by the budget. This can be controlled quite effectively 
when the officials from the courts of audit establishing the facts have access 
to the invoices and other documents relating to particular spending pro-
cesses. The question of efficient expenditure gives rise to more complex 
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deliberations (see Engels 2015: 116ff.). Obviously, various definitions can 
be applied. There are basically two variables: the costs and the effects. Both 
have to be put in relation to each other (von Wedel 2001: 588). Efficiency 
requires an optimal relation between the two. It is part of the responsible 
assessment by the court of audit if this standard has been met in a particu-
lar case. It is part of the role of these institutions that their impact largely 
depends on the soundness of their assessments. This is probably the most 
effective instrument to ensure that the evaluations have a firm basis.
While the original role described in Article 114 (2) of the Basic Law is 
a retroactive one, the courts of audit have subsequently been given an 
advisory role that they can exercise before a final decision is made by the 
government or the parliament (von Wedel 2001: 591). It can also be 
described as a change in the ‘audit philosophy’ that the courts try to get 
involved in planning processes at an early stage (Engels 2015: 118).
3.3  Effects
The courts of audit have no executive powers and perform no judicial 
functions (von Wedel 2001: 593). The above-mentioned Article 114 of 
the Basic Law mentions the audit and the annual publication of findings as 
the only activity by the Bundesrechnungshof. In fact, courts of audit act by 
informing the relevant administrative entities as well as the respective par-
liaments and/or the relevant parliamentary committees. In particular, rel-
evant findings have to be published (see Kempny 2017: 241ff.). Before 
the publication, the findings are normally discussed with the respective 
administrations and, if relevant, existing supervisory bodies (von Wedel 
2001: 590). In reality, reports by the courts of audit only become part of 
the political debate when ‘wasteful’ spending is denounced—typically in 
the annual reports, less frequently when the courts of audit are commis-
sioned to file special reports. Over the course of a year, with budgets and 
bureaucracies as big as those of the German Länder and at the federal 
level, it is literally unthinkable that the courts of audit do not find some 
kind of spending that can be described as unnecessary or otherwise waste-
ful. From a point of acceptance of the system as a part of democratic legiti-
macy, this effect bears a certain ambivalence, as this kind of critique might 
not be regarded as a normal form of control that is part of a well- 
functioning system but, on the contrary, might be misunderstood as evi-
dence of systemic failure on the side of the administration and possibly of 
the government of the day.
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4  Lessons LeArned
The control mechanisms described in this chapter enable the public as well 
as the electorate to hold the executive accountable. Both types of control 
have almost nothing in common but, at the same time, and in many 
respects, complement one another. They are important parts of a system 
that, overall, leads to an acceptable level of control and which plays an 
important role in guaranteeing an adequate level of democratic legitimacy 
of the administration.
In the case of the courts, it should be noted that the essential idea 
behind the mechanism is not to control the executive in a general way. 
Their role is designed to help people as well as other entities that can bear 
subjective rights to enforce their rights effectively. In order to fulfil this 
task, courts have to control the legality of administrative actions. In addi-
tion, the law as well as the courts have developed a number of mecha-
nisms that give them the possibility to rule on cases even when there is 
no question of a present violation of rights involved, mainly because the 
administrative action has already occurred and cannot be revoked retro-
actively. Mainly as a consequence of the adaption of EU requirements, in 
some areas, the courts get involved at the request of organisations that 
do not invoke their own legal rights. Rather, their claims involve interests 
in the topic that do not fulfil the necessary requirements for the estab-
lishment of a legal right. Altogether, this leads to a mechanism which has 
effects far beyond the particular case. Administrative courts, in this sense, 
are the authoritative source of the interpretation of the law. In many 
instances, when an administrative court has ruled on a certain matter 
involving an interpretation of a certain legal rule, the administration will 
consider the relevant legal question as settled. Administrations often 
apply the essential findings of the courts as if they were the law itself even 
when they deal with cases on which the court’s decision has no 
direct effect.
In the case of courts of audit, the control is exercised in a clearly 
defined but certainly broad fashion without the need for initiation by 
external actors. Administrations have to fear that a control may be exer-
cised, which could lead to an embarrassing—published—claim of waste-
ful spending. This possibility should already have a restricting effect on 





1. All translations of this law in accordance with https://www.gesetze-im-
internet.de/englisch_gg/englisch_gg.html#p0108 (all websites quoted in 
this chapter were last visited on 10 January 2020).
2. All translations of this law in accordance with https://www.bmi.bund.de/
SharedDocs/downloads/EN/gesetztestexte/VwVfg_en.pdf?__blob=publi
cationFile&;v=1.
3. All translations of this law in accordance with http://www.gesetze-im-
internet.de/englisch_vwgo/englisch_vwgo.html#p0545.
4. The administrative act is defined in Section 35, first sentence of APA: ‘An 
administrative act shall be any order, decision or other sovereign measure 
taken by an authority to regulate an individual case in the sphere of public 
law and intended to have a direct, external legal effect.’
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CHAPTER 13
Civil Service and Public Employment
Christoph Reichard and Eckhard Schröter
1  IntroductIon
The term ‘civil service’ denotes more than the body of personnel in the 
employ of government. It also refers to a set of rules and institutional 
arrangements embedded in political and administrative traditions and cul-
tures. It is this wider concept of the German civil service and public 
employment system that we refer to in this chapter. Our chapter addresses 
the total public sector workforce regardless of the level of government 
(federal, state or local) or employment status (governed by public or pri-
vate law). In doing so, we are in part being untrue to the German usage 
of the term ‘civil service’ (Beamtentum), which is reserved for holders of a 
‘civil servant’ status (Beamte) governed by public law (see below for fur-
ther details). Rather, in the following we refer to paid public sector per-
sonnel generally, including civil servants and public employees at the 
federal, state and local levels. To be sure, the body of public personnel is 
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no monolith. It brings together a diverse group of professions and occu-
pations in a variety of sectoral policies and administrative tasks. For the 
sake of clarity and consistency, we confine ourselves in what follows, unless 
otherwise stated, to the administrative core of the civil service, which is 
trusted with non-technical tasks in the executive apparatus of government.
2  cIvIl ServIce SyStemS compared: What KInd 
of an anImal IS the German cIvIl ServIce?
When looking at foreign civil service systems from the outside, we tend to 
search for commonalities and differences that we can relate to systems that 
are more familiar (van der Meer et al. 2015). For a more systematic review, 
a number of dimensions suggest themselves against which national civil 
service systems can be compared. A first and simple question to answer is 
to what extent the civil service has evolved as a distinct set of employment 
regulations and as a body of personnel separate from the private labour 
market. In this respect, the prevailing notion of statehood plays a decisive 
role. State traditions that place a higher emphasis on the role of ‘the state’ 
vis-à-vis society and the economy, and in which public administration is 
trusted with a more comprehensive set of responsibilities to contribute to 
the development of society at large (often typified by the French or 
German variants of the continental European tradition)—as opposed to 
the Anglo-Saxon state tradition with a more instrumental role of the state 
(as function of the political, societal and economic forces)—tend to pro-
duce civil service systems, which carry a greater social prestige, are more 
distinct from private sector employment, and form a greater identity as 
‘servants of the state’. This argument is underpinned by legal and religious 
traditions in Europe, in which the Roman Catholic tradition of codified 
law is pitted against the case-based common law tradition. Finally, the 
sequence of historical developments seems to make an important differ-
ence in this respect. As a rule, the bureaucratisation and professionalisa-
tion of the civil service (and public administration as a whole) in German 
states preceded the advent of mass democracy. As a consequence, judicial 
control of the legality of administrative acts had been well in place long 
before (party-)political control of the executive apparatus was established. 
Pulling these threads together, we can conclude from this section that the 
German civil service—based on a strong public law and Rechtsstaat tradi-
tion—differs from many Anglo-Saxon public employment systems in that 
 C. REICHARD AND E. SCHRÖTER
207
it is a well- established body of personnel systematically governed distinct 
from private- sector employment.
The question of open and closed civil service systems is another litmus 
test for international comparison. When compared to public employment 
in the US (at one end of the spectrum), the German approach is classified 
as particularly closed. One of the underlying reasons for this classification 
lies in the dominant career-based system of the German civil service, which 
differs systematically from job-based or position-based approaches in 
other systems (primarily those of Anglo-Saxon or Scandinavian prove-
nience). It follows from the career system that entry into the civil service 
typically takes place in an early part of the work biography—with an expec-
tation that the individual completes his or her work life in the employ of 
government. For this reason, a high level of job security is coupled with 
disincentives to leave government service early. In addition, loyalty to the 
public employer is rewarded, for example, by extra pension benefits and, 
of course, opportunities to move up the career ladder. In line with this 
thinking, seniority is a significant factor for promotion and remuneration. 
In return for government’s loyalty, public employers impose specific duties 
on their employees (particularly on ‘civil servants’ as a distinguished status 
group), which requires them to show political moderation while in office 
and may even restrict—in the case of civil servants—their civil liberties 
(e.g. the right to go on strike). What is more, government employment 
and access to specific grades in the career ladder is, as a rule, dependent on 
certain levels of qualification and types of exams—qualifications and exams 
that are often (and sometimes exclusively) offered by government-run 
training institutions. Compare this system to the position-based system, 
the significant number of lateral entrants and rather frequent intersectoral 
changes, for example, in the US civil service (in-and-outers), and the rela-
tively closed nature of the German civil service system is easily discernible. 
In relation to its French neighbour, however, the German system of public 
employment shows strong elements of openness. The key reason for this 
change in perspective can be found in the decentralised structure of 
Germany’s politico-administrative system, which by definition provides 
more access points to public sector employment. Even at the same level of 
government, individual public organisations tend to pursue—though gov-
erned by the same set of regulations—their own recruitment, selection 
and hiring processes independent of one another. Due to the lack of a 
central personnel or civil service agency, public personnel policies tend to 
be—within the boundaries of the law—more decentralised and pluralist 
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than in France. This trend is further reinforced by the relative plurality of 
institutions of higher learning that provide talent pools for admission to 
the higher civil service.
3  hoW doeS the German cIvIl ServIce meaSure 
up? SIze and Structure of publIc employment
The size and structure of public employment not only mirrors the relevance 
and resources of the public sector in any given nation; it is also indicative 
of the relative power of levels of government, the significance of particular 
government functions as well as current and future challenges for human 
resource management in government organisations. Regarding our earlier 
discussion on statistical problems, the data presented below cover general 
government employment only and exclude, for example, employees of 
state-owned enterprises and other legally independent entities or 
organisations that provide public goods or services on a for-profit or not-
for-profit basis.
Compared to other industrialised countries, the size of the German 
public sector in terms of employment is relatively moderate. General gov-
ernment employment relative to total employment amounts to no more 
than 12 per cent, which ranges significantly below the Organisation of 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) average of 18.1 per 
cent. In fact, only a few nations fall below this level (notably Japan and 
South Korea), while Anglo-Saxon countries show employment levels 
closer to the OECD average and Nordic countries top the list with levels 
hovering around the 30 per cent mark (OECD 2019, 85). However, one 
should be quick to make mention of the fact that the vast majority of social 
services in Germany tend to be provided by welfare associations that oper-
ate—by definition—outside the public sector for statistical purposes. 
Interestingly, the relative size of the public sector—after years of contrac-
tion—has now reached the levels of the late 1960s and early 1970s, which 
ushered in a phase of massive increases in public employment (in Germany 
and much of the OECD world). In Germany, this development reached its 
peak shortly after German unification, when about 15 per cent of all 
employees were on the government’s payroll (1991). In absolute num-
bers, there were at that time some 6.7 million people in the employ of the 
public sector—a number that is now down to 4.8 million employees. 
Given the much higher levels of public employment in what used to be the 
German Democratic Republic, the integration of the public workforce in 
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the eastern German states resulted in a significant increase in public per-
sonnel numbers. However, public employment cut backs (in the whole of 
the country) began as early as the mid-1990s and were primarily driven by 
fiscal concerns, but also by reform measures such as contracting-out, pri-
vatisation and corporatisation.
For a more differentiated picture, Table 13.1 shows the distribution of 
the total public workforce across levels of government and between the 
two major employment categories (civil servants and public employees; 
see below for more details).
As for levels of government, the figures in Table 13.1 reflect the division 
of labour in Germany’s variant of federalism, which shifts administrative 
responsibilities per se to the states or Länder as well as to local government 
as major service providers. It flows from this that more than half of total 
government staff is employed by the Länder where the bulk of executive 
and personnel-intensive tasks are carried out. In particular, Länder 
governments employ teachers, police officers and members of law 
enforcement agencies and the judiciary. In comparison, the size of federal 
government in terms of employment figures is conspicuously small with 
less than eight per cent of the total (when military personnel are included, 
this percentage goes up slightly to roughly ten per cent).1
As for employment categories, civil servants only account for a little 
more than one-third (38.4 per cent) of the entire public workforce in 
Germany, while nearly two-thirds qualify as ‘public employees’ (for the 
specifics of these status differences see below). However, the relative 
(numerical) strength of these status groups varies significantly across levels 
Table 13.1 Public employment (excluding soldiers) in full-time employment 
(FTE) by government level and employment category (as of 30 June 2017; round-
ing differences possible)




Total FTEs Total 
%
Federal government 173,200 135,500 308,700 7.7
Länder government 1,169,900 935,100 2,105,000 52.4
Local government 172,000 1,099,300 1,271,300 31.7
Social insurance administration (incl. 
employment offices)
26,800 301,700 328,500 8.2
Total 1,541,900 2,471,600 4,013,500 100.0
Source: Destatis (2018, 86)
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of government. While the federal and Länder levels employ more civil 
servants than public employees (56.1 per cent and 55.6 per cent respec-
tively), the opposite holds true at the local level, where civil servants are a 
small minority representing only 13.5 per cent of the total local workforce.
In Table 13.2, we continue our analysis by breaking down personnel 
numbers according to their position in the administrative hierarchy. In 
doing so, we employ a well-established, but very broadly defined measure 
and refer to the legal classification of ‘career classes’ in the German civil 
service as well as their equivalents with regard to the grading of the jobs of 
public employees. As shown below, Germany’s public sector workforce is 
structured into different career classes, following the traditional civil ser-
vice system.
As the data reveal, the vast majority of civil servants are employed in the 
‘middle management’ and ‘senior management’ categories, while the 
lion’s share of public employees is grouped under the lower category of 
‘clerical services’. It should be noted that career structures have consider-
ably changed over time, particularly with regard to civil servants. Over the 
past thirty years, for example, the proportion of civil servants qualifying 
for senior management has more than doubled.
In addition to the data provided in Tables 13.1 and 13.2, we can distil 
from available statistics a number of important developments and poten-
tial challenges to which we will return in our concluding section. To begin 
with, the German public sector is no exception from the more general 
trend in many OECD countries that shows, in quantitative terms, an 
increasing ‘feminisation’ of public employment. In fact, no less than 57 
per cent of public sector staff are women (DBB 2019). However, this 
Table 13.2 Public employment (headcount) by career classes or equivalent 
grades for public employees, excluding soldiers and staff in training (as of 30 
June 2017)
Career class/grade Civil servants Public employees
Number % Number %
Senior management 596,500 38.1 378,400 14.1
Middle management 783,500 50.1 838,900 31.3
Clerical services 182,700 11.7 1,463,700 54.6
Total 1,562,700 100 2,681,000 100.0
Source: Authors’ own compilation based on Destatis (2018, 29, 57, 82)
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percentage also raises serious questions about gender-specific employment 
patterns since women are more likely to work in the ‘public employees’ 
category or in specific sectors of government employment (such as social 
services, healthcare or teaching) and tend to occupy positions in lower and 
middle management.
A related feature to female employment is the increase in part-time 
work in the German public sector. In fact, German public employers seem 
to offer attractive opportunities to work part-time as roughly one-third of 
the total workforce (32 per cent, the majority of whom are women) has 
made part-time arrangements. Again, this trend provides more of a mixed 
bag. On the one hand, part-time arrangements signal a greater openness 
and flexibility on the part of public employers to make the workplace more 
inclusive through rearranging work schedules to establish a better work- 
life balance or new work models. On the other hand, this trend may also 
reflect the government’s austerity measures and still shows a significant 
imbalance between men and women working part-time.
Finally, the data reveal the urgency of demographic challenges in the 
public sector. While Germany’s society as a whole is ageing, Germany’s 
public sector workforce is even more so: in 2017, no less than 27 per cent 
of the total staff employed by government authorities were aged fifty-five 
and over. This tidal wave of retirees raises complex questions about future 
talent pools, the attractiveness of the public sector as an employer and the 
management of an increasingly diverse government workforce.
4  hoW doeS the German cIvIl ServIce WorK? 
major characterIStIcS and featureS
4.1  The Weberian Bureaucrat as a ‘Leitmotif’: ‘Civil Servant’ 
and ‘Public Employee’ as Competing but Also Converging 
Status Models
Given its historical and cultural legacy, the process of bureaucratisation of 
the modern (European) nation state is the foundation on which the 
German professional civil service still rests.2 The reference to bureaucrati-
sation suggests that core elements of that newly institutionalised civil ser-
vice aspire to the ideal-typical characteristics of the Weberian bureaucratic 
staff organisation. In line with Weber’s ideas, the appointment of a civil 
servant is a unilateral administrative act—as opposed to a bilateral 
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contractual agreement. It also flows from this that employment conditions 
(including compensation and benefits) are exclusively governed by public 
law. This model of a government bureaucrat has served as a leitmotif for 
public employment in Germany to this day—despite the variations and 
changes to which we will turn below.
The institution of the ‘public employee’—introduced in 1920, marking 
the advent of an expanding public sector with extended welfare services—
deviates from the traditional role model. Designed as a private-law employ-
ment status, the labor conditions of public employees are the result of 
collective bargaining between government and labour representatives. In 
keeping with this principle, the social insurance regulations (i.e. health 
benefits and pension plans) for private-sector employment will generally 
apply—and so do the rules for industrial action, which, of course, safe-
guard the right to go on strike.
However, it is also fair to say that the status of ‘public employee’ 
emulates the traditional role model of a ‘civil servant’—notwithstanding 
its roots in private labour law. Most importantly, public employees also 
enjoy high levels of job security and—under certain conditions—even job 
tenure equivalent to that of a civil servant. Also, compensation schemes 
have significantly converged, extra benefits have been added and, in 
practice, a career system is also in place for public employees (who are, in 
principle, hired for a specific job)—provided they bring equivalent levels 
of formal education and job experience. While differences in the nature of 
these employment categories still exist, the role model of public 
employment—to all intents and purposes—is more unified than the duality 
of the German employment system suggests.
In administrative practice, the growing similarity between the status 
groups is also reflected in the relatively indiscriminate use of the different 
personnel categories when it comes to filling public sector positions. 
Constitutional law stipulates that ‘the exercise of sovereign authority on a 
regular basis’ shall be reserved for civil servants (Article 33 (4) of the Basic 
Law), which in particular applies, for example, to police officers, tax 
inspectors, law enforcement officers, court administrators and members of 
the prison service. In general government employment, however, the 
practice of assigning certain functions to civil servants or public employees 
varies significantly across the nation. Rather than applying a systematic 
yardstick for making these decisions, the allocation of civil servants or 
public employees to specific public sector posts primarily reflects historical 
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path-dependencies or political policy preferences at the relevant govern-
ment level.
Still, the formal bifurcation of the employment categories in public 
sector employment remains a constant bone of contention. For one, each 
employment status creates its own group of people (constituency)—which 
provides a base for organised interests—who fight to protect their privi-
leges or to even out any remaining differences. On top of that, there also 
appears to be a more fundamental, if not ideological, debate as to what 
status proves to be more efficient and/or legitimate. The real divide, how-
ever, is rather the distinction between employment inside and outside the 
public sector.
4.2  Steering and Coordination in the German Civil Service: 
Legal Frames, Collective Bargaining and Civil Service Politics
As for the steering and coordination of public sector employment, there 
are two major coordination and guidance mechanisms in public sector 
employment primarily at work: legal frames and collective bargaining 
agreements. One should be quick to add that both mechanisms are deeply 
entrenched in political and professional cultures. In addition, organised 
interests in the form of public sector unions play a significant role in the 
governance of the German civil service.
The remarkable stability and continuity of the German civil service is 
owed largely to the constitutionally enshrined ‘fundamental principles’, 
which govern the status of civil servants nationwide. This set of rules, 
upheld and interpreted by authoritative rulings of the Federal Constitutional 
Court, provides a powerful legal frame for any civil service policy in the 
country. In a similar vein, federal government serves as a rule-maker, not 
only for its own jurisdiction of federal civil servants, but also for civil ser-
vants of state or Länder government. However, this role has been drasti-
cally curtailed in the wake of the devolution of federal government 
prerogatives to the Länder as part of a constitutional reform package (the 
so-called Reform of Federalism I of 2006). As a result, the detailed rules 
governing the recruitment, employment conditions, benefits, pay scales 
and pension schemes of civil servants in the Länder have been decentral-
ised, while a broader nationwide frame of basic principles is still in place, 
allowing, among other things, for the transfer of civil servants across states 
as well as between federal and state governments, and vice versa.
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The system, however, is not only vertically decentralised but also 
horizontally fragmented. From an organisational point of view, Germany 
does not utilise a nationwide civil service commission or agency, which 
tends to centralise recruitment, selection or hiring processes with uni-
form standards. At the level of federal and state governments, the compe-
tencies for personnel affairs are widely dispersed with individual 
government departments being in charge of their own hiring decisions. 
The relevant ministries of the interior have primarily procedural compe-
tencies and coordinative functions, and oversee civil service training insti-
tutions in their jurisdictions. At the local government level, personnel 
functions tend to be more concentrated in single human resource man-
agement (HRM) departments, although various operative functions have 
been decentralised to line departments in the wake of the New Public 
Management (NPM) reforms of the 1990s (e.g. Demmke and Moilanen 
2010, 143).
In addition to legal frames, collective bargaining—designed for 
determining the rules of engagement for public employees—provides 
another major instrument of coordination and steering. Remarkable by 
any international standard, the level of collective bargaining is rather 
centralised and comprehensive. Negotiations are organised in a corporatist 
setting of interest mediation with peak organisations of public sector 
unions facing representatives of public sector employers. These talks are 
held in different rounds: one bargaining agreement covers all Länder 
governments and their employees, whereas another round of negotiations 
covers federal government as well as local government employees.
While public employees rely on the bargaining powers of strongly 
organised public sector unions (vested with the power of taking industrial 
action), civil servants are stripped of the right to go on strike and are 
dependent on legislative acts taken by federal parliament or state assem-
blies to determine their working conditions. What appears at first sight to 
be a disadvantageous situation for the ‘servants of the state’ may not be 
such a bad deal after all. To begin with, political conventions seem to 
soften the blow rather comfortably because federal and state governments 
and legislatures tend to follow suit (albeit with some delay or minor 
changes) once an agreement has been reached for public employees. What 
is more, civil servants as a collective status group tend to find many advo-
cates sympathetic to their cause in German legislatures. After all, roughly 
one-third of the members of the national parliament (Bundestag) and 
almost half of the delegates of state assemblies hold a civil service status.
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In addition, the interests of civil servants and public employees alike are 
represented at the organisational level by so-called personnel councils, 
which are an integral part of Germany’s system of co-determination that 
applies to both the private and public sectors of employment. As a result, 
each administrative entity has such a personnel council as part of its own 
governance structure. This council has specific rights and responsibilities 
whenever employees’ interests are at stake—a wide jurisdiction, which 
gives representatives of public personnel at the organisational level far- 
reaching co-decision rights in matters of organisational changes, recruit-
ment and promotion decisions or the allocation of performance-based 
payments to the workforce.
4.3  Recruitment and Qualification
Given its strong emphasis on professionalism and formal qualifications as 
entry requirements, education and training play a central role in civil ser-
vice regulations and policies. The German public sector is a large and 
multifaceted employer and major provider of numerous education and 
training programmes. Although government institutions recruit various 
categories of already well-educated and trained staff, for example in areas 
such as engineering, healthcare and teaching, the government is also very 
active in providing its own separate training programmes in a wide range 
of occupational fields for about 200,000 trainees. Apart from general 
administration, these specialised training programmes are offered, for 
example, to future police officers, tax inspectors, court administrators, 
social insurance officials and social workers.
Germany belongs to a group of countries that require comprehensive 
pre-service education and training as an essential qualification for future 
members of the public sector workforce. Accordingly, applicants for a civil 
service position usually have at first to pass an intensive educational pro-
gramme, either in the form of an apprenticeship or as a study programme 
at a public or government-specific university (Reichard and Schröter 2018).
Access points to the administrative career ladder are, in principle, 
organised according to distinct levels of education. In the ‘clerical class’ 
category, skilled (manual and non-manual) workers and service personnel 
who have successfully completed a two- or three-year apprenticeship on 
the job coupled with training in a vocational school (dual system) provide 
basic administrative or technical services. One level up, entry into the mid-
dle management range of the civil service, often referred to as the 
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‘backbone of the civil service’, requires a three-year bachelor’s degree. As 
a rule, this degree has to be completed at a university of applied sciences, 
which caters specifically to prospective civil servants and offers courses of 
study approved by the relevant interior ministry as an entry qualification. 
Senior management levels of government employment are filled by uni-
versity graduates (bringing with them a master’s degree or equivalent) 
recruited from the university system at large—most frequently from pro-
grammes in law, but also from the social and political sciences, public 
management and administration, and economics. In addition, successful 
candidates have to complete a two-year traineeship programme (or ‘prepa-
ratory service’) before they qualify for tenure as a civil servant.
4.4  Compensation Schemes and Benefits
Salaries of civil servants depend on the assigned post or rank (i.e. the pay 
grade in the respective career class).3 Compensation for the majority of civil 
servants is based on pay scale A, covering fifteen grades from A2 (simple 
manual tasks) to A16 (section head of a ministry). For more senior grades, 
there is a specific pay scale B with eleven grades. While the latter scale is not 
subdivided, each grade of scale A is split up into eight different steps. A 
civil servant gradually passes the different steps of a grade before he or she 
may be promoted to the next grade. Advancement to the next step is based 
on individual performance and seniority. Additionally, civil servants receive 
various kinds of allowances, for example family allowance. For the past 
twenty years, civil servants have had the opportunity to receive additional 
one-off bonus payments for outstanding performance. At the federal level, 
the number of performance-based bonuses are, however, generally limited 
to 15 per cent of that status group in an organisation. Also, these payments 
are not supposed to exceed seven per cent of the basic salary level.
The compensation of public employees is based on the collective 
agreements drawn up between the public employers and the trade unions 
and is determined by the actual task requirements. Actually, the pay scale 
for public employees largely follows the pay scale A for civil servants: it 
consists of fifteen grades (groups) and each grade is subdivided into six 
steps. Although, in theory, public employees are assigned to certain 
positions, in practice they enjoy similar promotion opportunities as civil 
servants. In addition to other kinds of allowances, public employees may 
also receive performance-based pay, although with currently usually only 
one per cent of salaries in a rather marginal form (Kuhlmann and Wollmann 
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2019). The practice of performance-based pay for public employees is 
quite diverse in the various government institutions (for more details see 
Chap. 21).
Civil servants in Germany are entitled to comparatively high pension 
levels. In fact, the replacement rate can be as high as 71.75 per cent, 
depending on the number of years served. These pension payments are 
largely financed out of the general budget (as opposed to special pension 
provisions or any kind of insurance system). Civil servants do not make 
any significant contributions themselves to their pension plans during 
their active period of service.4 Understandably, the current pension system 
for civil servants is causing growing fiscal concerns, particularly in view of 
the ‘tidal wave’ of prospective retirees in the years to come. How to cope 
with this huge fiscal challenge is part of a controversial and soul-searching 
debate in German politics. Public employees, in contrast, receive their 
retirement payments from the national statutory pension insurance sys-
tem. Additionally, they receive payments from a supplementary occupa-
tional pension scheme as agreed between government representatives and 
the unions. Like any other private sector employee, public employees 
make mandatory monthly contributions to public insurance funds (cover-
ing the risks of unemployment, sickness, long-term care as well as old 
age). According to the principle of parity, contributions to public insur-
ance funds in Germany are equally divided between employers and 
employees.
Civil servants also enjoy privileges with regard to their healthcare. In 
contrast to public employees, they opt out of the statutory public health 
insurance system and subscribe to a private health plan. In addition, they 
are entitled to government allowances to cover health-related expenses. As 
a rule, about half of these costs are covered by the government allowance, 
while the other half is taken care of by the insurance plan.
In the past—and particularly with regard to certain professions like 
engineering, computer science or information technology and manage-
ment—compensation in the German public sector was often perceived as 
being uncompetitive compared to the private sector. More recently, public 
sector pay, at least in some professions and career classes, appears to have 
become more attractive. Although the ‘service to the public’ may indeed 
be seen as advantageous by many applicants (compared to for-profit 
employers), and while the afore-mentioned social benefits and relative job 
security may also count for ‘going public’, the increasing competition for 
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young talent in a period of demographic change will still most probably be 
a major challenge for public employers.
4.5  The German Civil Service at the Interface Between Politics 
and Administration
Despite its legitimate claim to Weberian and bureaucratic heritage, the 
German civil service is at the same time an institution that operates in a 
highly politicised environment of an open society and a liberal mass 
democracy (see also Chap. 10). In fact, a lot of civil service rules and prac-
tices are—beyond the image of the law-clad nature of regulations—the 
result of political bargaining and negotiations. In addition, many civil ser-
vants and public employees take an active role in interest mediation and 
party politics.
The German administrative system does not treat civil servants (let 
alone public employees)—in stark contrast, for example, to the British 
case—as political eunuchs. Irrespective of their rank, they are free to be 
openly affiliated with political parties and stand for elections at any level of 
government without jeopardising their civil service privileges. (Once 
elected to legislative office, for example, they are entitled to take leave of 
absence, a period of time that will, nonetheless, count towards the promo-
tion clock.) Indeed, a significant percentage of civil servants, particularly 
in the higher ranks of the administrative hierarchy, carry party books5—a 
fact that prompted a British observer to nickname the then West German 
civil service a ‘party-book administration’ (Dyson 1977). While discus-
sions about party-political patronage of civil service posts flare up recur-
rently at the margins of the political discourse, it is widely recognised that 
this political affiliation signifies a healthy relationship between political 
parties and civil service members in a liberal democracy (for this discussion 
see also Schröter 2004).
5  hoW the German cIvIl ServIce haS chanGed or 
IS SuppoSed to chanGe: major challenGeS 
and reform trendS
The German civil service system has shown a remarkable degree of stability 
and continuity over a long period of time. In a country known for its 
drastic regime changes during the past century—all of which have had 
severe repercussions for European and world politics too—the established 
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orthodoxy of a civil service model based on the tenets of a Weberian pro-
fessional staff organisation stands out for its hyperstability. Rather than 
documenting and analysing processes of administrative change, it appears 
even more rewarding to discuss and explain the degree of continuity.
A major source of stability are the constitutionally enshrined traditional 
principles of the civil service. As a consequence, the bar for ‘game- 
changing’ innovative projects has been raised too high for most reform 
coalitions. Moreover, the decentralised and fragmented nature of the 
administrative system does not allow for one single, resourceful political 
actor. What is more, the current institutional arrangements serve the 
organised interests of their constituencies. Seen from this angle, it is not 
the persistent legal frames, but the balance of political power and interest 
representation that keep the current set of regulations in place. What also 
stabilises the existing system is the fact that public sector employment still 
carries an element of social prestige and the established principles of the 
civil service are generally respected by the public (rather than challenged 
by high levels of public disgruntlement and discontent). It is indicative 
that the most ambitious reform of civil service law during the early 
1970s—following a political sea change from a right-of-centre to a left-of- 
centre government led by Social Democrats—was eventually aborted. 
While the reform proposals aiming at a unified employee status and less 
opaque approaches to personnel management still provide a rich source 
for intellectual stimulation and academic analysis, they have failed misera-
bly in politics.
This is not to say, however, that change has never come to the established 
system of public sector employment. Rather, most developments in the 
civil service have been immanent to this existing paradigm of public 
bureaucracies. In other words, we have seen changes leading to ‘more or 
less of the same’, that is the bureaucratic fine-tuning of regulation and 
internal human resource management, the shift of competences between 
levels of governments, or the cutback or expansion of civil service posts, 
and the adjustments of pay scales and fringe benefits according to fiscal 
requirements. What we have not seen, however, is a massive approach of 
‘de-privileging’ the civil service (Hood 1995) as has been the case in many 
Anglo-Saxon countries. To the contrary, the most significant reform activ-
ity involving the German civil service (i.e. the process of administrative 
transformation in the wake of German unification) was driven by the 
desire to restore the traditional notion of the civil service. By way of con-
trast, reform elements borrowed from private management or market/
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efficiency-driven movements (such as the reform wave of the new public 
management) have made inroads only to a moderate degree.
A number of individual reform programmes merit specific mention 
because their consequences have significantly shaped current civil service 
practices. First, most fundamentally, the reform of education and training 
(at first pertaining only to civil servants, it also set standards for public 
employees) during the 1970s introduced a broader element of academisa-
tion to the level of middle management in the civil service. Today’s ‘uni-
versities of applied sciences’ date back to this reform measure, which also 
laid the foundation for later reform towards bachelor degree programmes 
for mid-level civil servants. Second, the massive quantitative changes to 
the public sector workforce since the mid-1990s cannot be underesti-
mated. They also stand out when compared to other countries. Drastic 
cutback measures hardly qualify as ‘reform’ in a pro-active and qualitative 
sense. However, the downsizing of the total number of public administra-
tors has been remarkable and has left its mark on the overall resources and 
structure of public employment. A third strand of reform, intimately 
linked to the size of the public sector, refers to the out-migration of public 
personnel to hived-off corporations. In fact, most of the managerial reform 
package has touched the civil service indirectly by way of formal privatisa-
tion (particularly at the federal level with regard to the national railroads 
or postal and telecommunications services, and a significant share of utility 
companies and service providers at the local government level). As a result, 
the rules governing the administrators who remained in public employ-
ment have largely stayed intact.
It is a matter of public debate whether this record of accomplishment 
sufficiently prepares the civil service as an institution to deal adequately 
with current and future challenges. As for demographic changes, the civil 
service will have to prove its attractiveness as an employer to new cohorts 
of talent. Not only are these talent pools drying up—just when they are 
needed most—but it is also quite likely that a young generation of poten-
tial applicants will bring new expectations of their desired work environ-
ment—an environment that may clash with the traditional practices of the 
civil service. Demographic (and cultural) changes, however, also question 
the extent to which the civil service mirrors the community it is supposed 
to serve. It flows from this that questions of inclusiveness and equitable 
representation of groups—in line with the aim of gender parity—are more 
likely to play a more prominent role in the future.
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6  leSSonS learned and concludInG thouGhtS
Moulded in traditional forms of Weberian bureaucratic staff organisations, 
the German civil service represents a classical continental European admin-
istrative system. It stands out from this category of employment systems, 
however, because it is relatively small in size and highly decentralised in 
terms of its structural layout. Its guiding principles have remained largely 
intact—despite the series of radical regime changes in German history—
over the course of more than a century. In particular, the established pub-
lic employment system has proven relatively impervious to external 
pressure from market/efficiency-driven reform measures in the wake of 
the new public management movement.
This legalist, merit-based career system of government employment 
comes with a series of advantages. Civil service members tend to be well 
trained for the functions they have to perform. In addition, training pro-
grammes and qualifications are also tailored to the specific needs of the 
public sector. Given the high level of strongly entrenched professional 
standards (underpinned by legal controls), the civil service system is geared 
to produce procedural fairness and low levels of corruption or cronyism 
and nepotism. However, the civil service also suffers from rigidity and 
inefficiencies that tend to stifle motivation and breed frustration among 
civil service members and clients of public services alike. In addition, its 
barriers to entry and exit work against intersectoral mobility and limit the 
access of public employers to sources of future knowledge and innova-
tive ideas.
Despite its bureaucratic heritage, the German civil service shows a 
remarkable measure of decentralisation and adaptability. It appears to be 
flexible enough to accommodate different choices by sub-national gov-
ernments or functional requirements by specific government agencies or 
local authorities. It has also proven adaptable to social and political 
changes. What is more, the institutional setting of the civil service as a 
whole is well embedded in the political environment and its system of 
organised interest representation. With this in mind, we seem to be on 
relatively safe ground in suggesting that the existing balance of political 
and organisational interests will keep the established employment system 
on a relatively stable path for future developments.
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noteS
1. In 2017, the Federal Armed Forces accounted for 165,200 FTEs, which 
brings the total public employment (including soldiers) to 4,179,200 FTEs.
2. In fact, this legacy dates back to 1794 in Prussia or 1804 in Bavaria, when 
those (and other) German states formed modern executive branches of 
government.
3. The following description focuses on the federal level; for more details see 
Federal Ministry of the Interior (2014, 82–101).
4. As a (mostly symbolic) nod to making contributions, a 1999 federal law 
stipulates that civil servants’ pay rises should be 0.2 percentage points below 
the pay rise for public employees. The savings are used to build up a pension 
fund to augment future pension payments from the annual budget (start-
ing 2032).
5. Between 1981 and 2005, the percentage of party members among the top 
three ranks in ministerial departments has ranged consistently between 50 
and 60 per cent.
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Public budgets are often called ‘government programmes in numbers’. 
They represent the financial side of government activities. They cover the 
salaries of civil servants, interest payments on public debt and a broad 
variety of transfer payments to enterprises and private households as well 
as among governments. On the revenue side, we find taxes and fees and 
received grants. A specific perspective comes up on the public sector, not 
as a homogeneous entity, but as a multilevel system with different levels of 
governments and a variety of financial transactions among them.
The chapter gives an overview of public finance in Germany. It provides 
information on the volume and structure of expenditure and revenue, the 
latter with special focus on the tax system, the system of multilevel tax 
distribution among the levels of government and finally on public debt. 
The chapter refers also to the legal framework for public budgeting and 
accounting standards, which differ to a certain degree among the levels of 
government or—in the case of local budgets—among the Länder (federal 
states).
G. Färber (*) 
German Research Institute for Public Administration, Speyer, Germany
e-mail: faerber@foev-speyer.de
226
2  regulatIon of PublIc budgets and budgetIng
In Germany, the Federation has established the law of principles of bud-
geting which sets out the requirements for the regulation of public bud-
gets for all levels of government. In addition, the federal budget code 
regulates all the details for federal ministries and agencies, as the budget 
codes of the Länder set out very similar detailed regulations for ministries, 
administrations and agencies.
2.1  Principles of Budgeting, Structures and Classifications
The law on budgetary principles was passed in 1969 in order to establish 
a framework for the common rules for federal, state and local budgets. 
This legislation aimed at establishing standardised legal procedures and 
structures as well as a common basis for the public sector financial statis-
tics. The law is based on traditional principles of budgeting, of which the 
most important are: principle of annuality, principle of coverage in total, 
principle of gross coverage, principle of unity, principle of totality, princi-
ple of balancing the budget, principle of exactness, principle of efficiency 
and economy, principle of public information and principle of budgetary 
trueness and clarity.
Budget acts are rather short and must include the total amount of esti-
mated revenue and expenditure as well as the maximum permissible bor-
rowing amount. They include as attachment the budgetary plan, which 
consists of surveys of the appropriations of all ministries and the adminis-
trations and agencies in their responsibility (overall plan), revenue and 
expenditure according to economic categories (grouping survey), revenue 
and spending purposes (the so-called functional plan), a budgetary profile 
combining institutional and economic categories, and finally a directory 
list of all personnel positions to be approved.
The Federation and the majority of the states present their budgets in 
the traditional ‘institutional structure’ and still apply the cash-based 
accounting system. Only Bremen, Hamburg and Hesse have changed to 
an accrual budgetary system. Local governments have all changed com-
pulsorily to accrual budgeting but follow a common institutional struc-
ture, although they are free to decide on their organisational structure and 
show a broad variety. The idea of programme budgets, which are not 
based on the institutional structure but on political goals and programmes, 
has not been successful; this information is shown, if included in the bud-
get, in addition to the traditional items.
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2.2  The Budget Cycle
A budget cycle, the period starting with the preparations leading to draft-
ing and coordinating the budget plan through to parliamentary approval, 
execution, the rendering of accounts, financial control and the discharge 
of the government by parliament, takes about three years.
The starting point is usually the tax estimation in November, which the 
representatives of all 17 ministries of finance, the Ministry of Economic 
Affairs, the Deutsche Bundesbank (Federal Central Bank) as well as aca-
demics and experts from the six big research institutes undertake twice a 
year. On this quantitative basis, the ministries of finance determine the 
baselines for the new budget which will come into force more than one 
year after the year being budgeted for. The financial framework includes 
total revenue expected, the amount of expenditure to be funded, stan-
dards for inflation rates and civil service salary increases. The ministries 
then ask their units to deliver their ‘financial needs’. The budget plan and 
other documents of the budget bill traditionally receive cabinet approval 
in the last meeting of the cabinet before the summer break. The budget 
bill is then submitted to the legislative bodies, the German Bundestag and 
the Bundesrat. From September, the German Bundestag adopts the bud-
get bill after three readings.
On 1 January, the implementation of the budget starts. The Ministry of 
Finance decrees details. Particularly in the event that revenue falls behind 
scheduled expectations, the Minister of Finance can order a spending 
freeze or other specific measures to reduce expenditure. The budgetary 
year closes by 31 December. The institutions can only carry forward 
remaining spending allowances into next year’s budget with a special exec-
utive permit of transfer. The Ministry of Finance renders the accounts by 
the end of February, which are then transferred to the Court of Audit. 
Usually in October, the Court of Audit delivers its annual report to parlia-
ment where the Audit Committee, a sub-committee of the Budget 
Committee at the federal level, examines the report. The report of the 
Audit Committee provides the information for granting discharge to the 
government.
2.3  Recent Budgetary Reforms
After timid experiences with Planning-Programming-Budgeting Systems 
in the 1970s, Germany continued with conservative budgeting and 
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financial management procedures until the early 1990s, when a recession 
after the boom created by German reunification restricted the tax revenue 
of all levels of government. Local governments were the first to reform 
their budgetary planning and financial management procedures, following 
the ideas of the Tilburg model of new public management (cf. Chap. 22). 
Federal and state governments do not apply performance budgets.
Gender budgeting is even less widespread in Germany than perfor-
mance budgeting. Here the budgetary impacts are planned and docu-
mented according to their effects on men and women (Färber, Christine). 
However, it is still difficult to get majorities for these types of budgets in 
Germany. A little more popular are the so-called citizens’ budgets, which 
involve the citizens themselves, that is the local voters, in the budgetary 
decision-making process. The participation of voters in budgetary issues 
mainly takes place in situations where a sharp fiscal consolidation needs to 
be implemented. The citizens then create ideas for expenditure cut-backs 
and increases of revenue. Neither measure is very popular, therefore the 
organised inclusion of ‘normal citizens’ in making these difficult political 
decisions promises a better acceptance. However, it is unclear whether 
local politicians favour participatory budgeting procedures not only in 
periods of fiscal stress, but also when tax revenue is growing.
3  basIc regulatIon for the ‘fIscal constItutIon’ 
In the basIc law
The Basic Law regulates the fundamental rules for public sector finances 
in its tenth chapter. In addition, the provisions of Article 28 (2) of the 
Basic Law guarantee the local governments financial autonomy and, to a 
certain degree, tax autonomy, by granting them the right of self- 
administration to manage all their own affairs.
The rules of the financial constitution are based on the specific ‘division 
of labour’ between the Federation and the Länder in the so-called admin-
istrative federalism. The Federation passes the legislation in the majority of 
policy fields while the states execute federal laws as their own responsibil-
ity. The Länder very often delegate the execution of federal and their own 
laws to their municipalities, each with a slightly differing degree of decen-
tralisation. Therefore, the Federation has the smallest administrative body, 




The budgets of all jurisdictions are independent of each other. All juris-
dictions set up their proper budgets and pass them to their parliaments 
and local councils for legislative approval. Only local governments need 
legal approval from their state administrations, which is a formal approval 
for all municipalities delivering balanced budgets.
Article 104a (1) of the Basic Law provides that the Federation and the 
states cover the costs for their respective public tasks. The obligation of 
cost covering follows the right of execution, not the right of legislation. 
This means that the upper level establishing new or additional regulations 
does not cover the costs of its administration. Only certain laws regulating 
specific social transfers contain the rule that transfer payments are shared 
on a 50:50 basis (e.g. housing subsidies) between the federal level and the 
states. The respective problems of cost covering by the decentralised levels 
result from European legislation. Since 2005, however, Article 104a (4) of 
the Basic Law has prescribed that federal laws, which foresee transfer pay-
ments, allowances in kind and other obligations in favour of third parties, 
and which are executed by the states as their own tasks, need the approval 
of the Bundesrat.
The Länder have, in principle, the same right to further decentralise the 
administration of federal laws and their own regulations to their counties 
and municipalities. For several years now, a so-called principle of connec-
tivity has been established in all state constitutions prescribing that in the 
case that the Länder decentralise additional administrative tasks to their 
communities, they must cover the costs. The respective detailed regula-
tions vary from state to state, particularly with regard to the procedures on 
how to measure the costs of administration and how the transfer payments 
are to be shaped (i.e. specific-purpose grants, general grants or inclusion 
in the local fiscal equalisation scheme). Municipalities have won several 
proceedings before state constitutional courts with regard to cost covering 
for decentralised tasks; many more are expected in the future. Recent 
reforms include the provisions under Article 104b–d of the Basic Law 
regulating vertical specific purpose grants for investment expenditure in 
order to stabilise economic development and foster economic growth as 
well as equivalent living conditions across Germany, other specified invest-
ment purposes for state and local governments and for affordable housing 
policies.
The tenth chapter of the Basic Law sets out the basic rules for tax 
assignment in the following articles: legislation in Article 105; revenue 
competences in Article 106; vertical and horizontal fiscal equalisation in 
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Article 107; and tax administration in Article 108. Additionally, Article 
109 regulates the limits of public debt and includes a specific rule to avoid 
budget emergencies in Article 109a. As the previously mentioned articles 
cover the Federation and the states, the articles following Article 110 only 
concern federal finance. Articles 110 to 113 set out the ground rules for 
federal budgeting, courts of audit (Article 114) and, more specifically, for 
federal public debt (Article 115).
4  PublIc exPendIture
The volume and structure of public expenditure provides a good insight 
into the different tasks of the levels of government. Public sector expendi-
ture and revenue include not only the three levels of government but also 
the social insurances (pensions, healthcare, long-term care, unemploy-
ment and occupational accidents), which underlie a specific governance of 
self-administration and for which the Federation only has the right and 
duty of legal control, but not supervisory control. However, they are 
responsible for the large budgets of transfer payments and cover about 
40 per cent of the total public sector budget. They dominate public expen-
diture in two areas: material expenses, which are mainly the expenditures 
on the healthcare insurance for medical services, medications and other 
materials; and the pension scheme for rehabilitation services and transfer 
payments to the private sector, including mainly payments for pensions 
from the general pension scheme and unemployment allowances from the 
unemployment insurance. The third biggest expenditure item of social 
insurances comprises transfer payments within the public sector, which 
mainly cover payments among the social insurances, such as the contribu-
tions for pensions, healthcare and long-term care insurances for pension-
ers and the unemployed, including contributions from both employers 
and employees, which, on the other side, are deducted from the payments 
transfers of pensioners and the unemployed. The expenditure on person-
nel is the lowest for all levels of government (Table 14.1).
The respective governments of the three levels show very specific struc-
tures of expenditure too. The federal budget is dominated by transfer pay-
ments to other public sector institutions and to the private sector. The first 
mainly cover transfer payments to the social insurances (to the general 
pension scheme and unemployment insurance, the latter for expenditure 
in favour of the long-term unemployed); to the states for general vertical 
grants in the context of intergovernmental fiscal equalisation (Federal 
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Supplementary Grants); for a broad range and growing number of specific 
purpose grants according to Article 104b–d of the Basic Law; and for the 
refugees administration of the Länder and their communities. Current 
transfer payments to the private sector include the federal share of social 
transfer payments for housing allowances, parents’ allowances, students’ 
Table 14.1 Public expenditure at government level and social insurances in 2018






Social ins Total govt
Personnel expenses 51,943 151,143 69,090 21,515 293,691
Material expenses 38,775 52,760 59,193 257,936 408,665
Interest payments 23,859 13,293 3009 81 40,242
Current transfer paymentsa 254,800 173,597 150,024 618,907 1,224,854
  To other public sector 
budgets
193,253 133,707 69,570 257,542 654,072
  To the private sector 61,547 39,890 80,454 361,365 570,782
Real investment expenditure 12,156 13,230 30,103 711 56,200
Capital transfer payments 29,002 26,730 2949 1 58,681
  To other public sector 
budgets
10,954 16,960 1655 11 29,579
  To the private sector 18,048 9770 1294 −10 29,102
./. payments from same level −28,869 −44,284 −59,094 −255,181 −679,246
Total expenditure 385,998 398,805 260,128 647,874 1,428,512
% of total expenditure
Personnel expenses 13.5 37.9 26.6 3.3 20.6
Material expenses 10.0 13.2 22.8 39.8 28.6
Interest payments 6.2 3.3 1.2 0.0 2.8
Current transfer paymentsa 66.0 43.5 57.7 95.5 85.7
  To other public sector 
budgets
50.1 33.5 26.7 39.8 45.8
  To the private sector 15.9 10.0 30.9 55.8 40.0
Real investment expenditure 3.1 3.3 11.6 0.1 3.9
Capital transfer payments 7.5 6.7 1.1 0.0 4.1
  To other public sector 
budgets
2.8 4.3 0.6 0.0 2.1
  To the private sector 4.7 2.4 0.5 0.0 2.0
./. payments from same level −7.5 −11.1 −22.7 −39.4 −47.5
Total expenditure 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: Federal Statistical Office (2018); author’s own calculations
Differences of the sums result from rounding
aSome figures include double counting; therefore, the total figures could be lower or higher than the fig-
ures reported/percentages shown
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allowances, minimum pensions for people of old age and unable to work. 
The Federation shows the lowest spending on personnel because it does 
not execute its own regulations. However, personnel expenditure has been 
increasing above average in recent years largely due to the Federation 
employing increasingly more staff in the federal police services and buying 
equipment for its ministries and federal agencies—and sometimes proba-
bly just spending federal tax revenue growth.
The states are the ‘big employers’ in the public sector. This is not only 
because of their responsibility for the execution of federal law—which they 
share with their municipalities—but also because of their own tasks in the 
field of education (schools and universities), police, courts of law and pris-
ons as well as tax administration, where they spend most on salaries and 
other salary-related costs, including pensions for civil servants. The second 
biggest budget item consists of current transfer payments within the pub-
lic sector. These mainly cover the local fiscal equalisation scheme through 
which the states share their tax revenue with their local communities (see 
below). Current transfer payments mostly represent the states’ share in the 
above-mentioned federal social transfer programmes.
Last but not least, local governments cover the smallest share in expen-
diture with ‘only’ €270 billion. The budgetary statistics, however, do not 
show the true volume of local expenditure because local communities, 
especially the larger ones, provide a huge variety of expensive local ser-
vices—local public transportation, water provision and sewage, garbage 
collection, and even local construction activities—via government-owned, 
‘formally privatised’ local enterprises. Public sector financial statistics do 
not include these expenditures and only account for transfer payments to 
them or profits paid by them. Therefore, the financial data of local govern-
ments presented underestimate the financial volume of local service pro-
duction, and the public sector revenue only includes the activities of the 
proper ‘administration’ and services ‘within the budgets’. Approximately 
€70 billion is for personnel expenditure, which has been steadily growing 
in recent years. This is particularly the result of increasing the number of 
kindergartens in line with federal regulations to guarantee early childhood 
care for all children from the age of three.
An even heavier burden is the increasing expenditure on social transfer 
payments—€800 billion in 2018—since local governments are still respon-
sible for all remaining areas of the guaranteed minimum income system, 
which covers a certain proportion of the accommodation costs for long-
term unemployed job-seekers, full support for people with disabilities who 
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are not privately covered as well as for poor people in long-term care insti-
tutions who cannot cover the costs themselves. The transfer payments 
within the public sector are mainly payments among local governments. 
Among them dominate the apportionments which counties in particular 
and other local government associations levy on their member municipali-
ties in order to cover their expenditure.
Finally, the specific role of local governments for real investment expen-
diture should be mentioned. The local communities are still the biggest 
investors in public infrastructure, although here other expenditure not 
shown in the documented investment expenditure is hidden in the 
accounts of the locally owned enterprises. However, the financial crisis 
in local budgets of the late 1990s and 2000s led to sharp cuts in invest-
ment expenditure. In particular, the poor communities in regions of 
strong economic structural change were not able to maintain their stock 
of public infrastructure.
5  PublIc sector revenue
Public sector revenue is more than taxes, although these dominate the 
receipts. Therefore, the next chapter outlines the various revenue streams 
and shows the differences among the levels of government before the 
German tax system is presented. Finally, the distribution of tax sources and 
tax revenue among the jurisdictions informs about the effective tax shar-
ing system in Germany.
5.1  Revenue in General
Taxes and compulsory contributions to social insurances amounted to 
€1.3 trillion in 2018. The revenue share was 60 per cent for taxes and 
40 per cent for contributions to social insurances. The second important 
revenue source of social insurances are transfer payments, of which 
€255 million are transfers paid by other social insurances for the above- 
mentioned contributions of pensioners and the unemployed. The remain-
ing €120 million come from the federal budget, mainly from the Ministry 
of Labour and Social Affairs (BMAS) in favour of the general pension 
fund. These latter transfer payments are designated to cover the costs not 
funded by earlier contributions, which are calculated in a general way. The 
only explicit contributions to the pension fund cover compensations for 
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child education, that is three years of average contributions for each child 
born after 1998 (Table 14.2).
The federal and state governments cover their expenditure from tax 
revenue amounting to €351 billion (88 per cent) and €299 billion (71 per 
cent), respectively. Local governments, however, generate only 38  per 
cent of their revenue from taxes. The latter, by contrast, receive 56 per 
cent of their income from current transfer payments from other public 
budgets, and 22 per cent from the state. The majority of these transfer 
payments represent vertical fiscal equalisation and, in the case of the 
Länder, some horizontal redistribution. These explicitly aim to cover the 
structural lack of own tax revenue of the lower levels of government and 
include horizontal distributional effects. Payments from the same level of 
local government do not include horizontal equalisation payments; they 
Table 14.2 Public revenue at government level and social insurances in 2018






Social ins Total govt
Tax revenue/social 
contributions
351,158 298,509 101,213 534,130 1,313,535
Current transfer revenuea 35,528 105,506 162,012 375,247 677,294
  From public budgets 28,898 93,641 152,316 372,815 64,767
  From private sector 6629 11,865 9696 2431 29,624
Other current revenue 31,241 37,507 47,439 4642 82,130
Sale of real assets 3175 1859 5266 147 10,447
Capital transfer revenue 3588 15,879 11,300 11 30,779
./. payments from same level −25,611 −38,074 −56,989 −255,170 −648,917
Total revenue 398,441 419,030 269,906 659,027 1,482,112
% of total revenue
Tax revenue 88.1 71.2 37.5 8.1 88.6
Current transfer revenuea 8.9 25.2 60.0 56.9 45.7
  From public budgets 7.3 22.3 56.4 56.6 4.4
  From private sector 1.7 2.8 3.6 0.4 2.0
Other current revenue 7.8 9.0 17.6 0.7 5.5
Sale of real assets 0.8 0.4 2.0 0.0 0.7
Capital transfer revenue 0.9 3.8 4.2 0.0 2.1
Total revenue 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: Federal Statistical Office (2018); author’s own calculations
Differences of the sums result from rounding




are mainly the apportionments in favour of county governments and other 
types of associations of local government. Capital transfer revenue partly 
follows the same goals, but is bound to cover investment expenditure and 
often requires a co-finance share from the recipient budgets (matched 
grants).
Other current revenue, which accounts for the third most important 
source of public revenue, is dominated by user fees and profits from 
government- owned enterprises. The amount of fees is bigger in local bud-
gets because local governments provide specific public goods for their citi-
zens and the local economy to which the exclusion principle can be applied 
and, therefore, the principle of equivalence. However, the fees covered in 
the financial statistics meanwhile only document the smaller share of local 
user fees because the ‘big fee budgets’ for water provision, sewage, waste 
collection, local public transportation, etc., have been privatised, although 
their fees remain as revenue regulated by (public) administrative law but 
never ‘touch’ a public budget.
5.2  Tax Revenue
Tax revenue, which in Germany has to follow the ‘ability to pay principle’, 
is almost completely under the legislation of the Federation. The 
Federation has the ‘exclusive legislative competence’ with respect to taxes, 
of which the revenue belongs to the federal budget. With respect to all 
others taxes, of which the revenue in part or in whole funds Land and local 
budgets, the Federation has the so-called concurrent legislative compe-
tence and requires the approval of the Bundesrat.
Seventy-three per cent of total tax revenue depends on two or three 
types of taxes, each levied in the form of several special forms of collection:
• the personal income tax consists of the wage tax on the income of 
employees, the assessed income tax on the profits of sole traders and 
partnerships as well as the self-employed, an interest income tax and 
a capital gains tax, which amounted to €299 billion in 2018 (38.5 per 
cent of total tax revenue);
• the corporate income tax for enterprises established as corporate 
entities (€33.4 billion or 4.3 per cent of total tax revenue); and
• the turnover tax in the form of a value-added tax for domestic sales 
(€175  billion, 22.6  per cent) and as a turnover tax on imports 
(€59 billion or 7.6 per cent of total tax revenue) (Fig. 14.1).
14 PUBLIC FINANCE 
236
The tax revenue is shared among the three levels of government. The 
Federation levies in addition a special surcharge tax of 5.5  per cent of 
income taxes intended to fund the costs of German unification.
Furthermore, the German tax system consists of a variety of excise taxes 
on tobacco, petrol, energy and electricity, coffee, spirits and beer (but not 
wine!), a motor vehicle tax and an insurance tax; the latter is 19 per cent 
on insurance premiums and ‘replaces’ the turnover tax because insurances 
are not subject to value-added tax. These taxes—except the beer tax—are 
revenues in the federal budget.
The states are entitled to receive the revenue from taxes on gifts and 
inheritances, land acquisition, gambling, lotteries and casinos, which are 
classed as taxes of smaller yield. The land acquisition tax is the only state 
tax for which the Länder have the right to decide autonomously on the tax 
rate. A wealth tax, which was levied until 1995 when the Federal 
Constitutional Court ruled the tax as unconstitutional, still exists but can-
not be charged.
Local governments receive the revenue from the local property tax and 
the local trade/business tax. Both taxes belong to the old so-called real 



































Fig. 14.1 The German tax system. Source: Federal Statistical Office, author’s 
own calculations and for the references: Statistisches Bundesamt (Federal Statistical 
Office): Fachserie 14.4 - 2018, Wiesbaden 2018
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on the gross added value of real assets (A for agricultural assets, B for all 
others) and the local trade tax on local business tax profits. The taxes on 
the amount of wages paid by an enterprise and the value of invested capital 
were abolished in 1979 and 1998. The tax bases and tax rates are estab-
lished by federal law; local governments, however, have the right to decide 
on a local multiplier. A recent property tax reform gives the states regula-
tory power to determine the tax base; the changes, however, will only 
become effective in 2026.
The smallest German taxes are the so-called local consumption and 
expenditure taxes. These are basically regulated by the states, but local 
governments decide whether they want to levy them and on the tax rates. 
Among the local consumption and expenditure taxes are the dog tax and 
the entertainment tax—in the past on cinema and other local event tickets, 
today on peep shows and gambling saloons—local beverage tax, and sec-
ond home tax. The local governments have, in principle, the right to 
invent local taxes as long as they are not levied on tax bases which are 
already taxed by the Federation and the states. In 1998, for example, the 
Federal Constitutional Court ruled a local package tax on single-use plates, 
cups and cans in Hesse to be unconstitutional for these reasons.1
The levels of government usually administer the taxes from which they 
receive the revenue. Exceptions arise regarding the vertically shared taxes. 
Here, the Federal Tax Office administers the capital gains tax and the VAT 
on imports, while the taxation offices of the states accept the tax declara-
tions of the taxpayers, receive the tax payments, organise tax audits in 
enterprises for the domestic (and meanwhile the European) turnover tax 
and the income taxes. Tax administration is administered ‘on behalf of the 
Federation’, which means that the Federation establishes special regula-
tions for personnel keys, administrative procedures and the application of 
the respective tax laws and decrees. On behalf of the Federation, the states 
also administer the social insurance tax and the solidarity surcharge tax.
5.3  Intergovernmental Financial Relations: Multilevel Tax 
Sharing Assignment
All ‘smaller’ taxes are revenues of the respective jurisdictions according to 
the territorial location of its source. This is, in general, the location of the 
transaction or the residence of the owner of the income or fortune. Some 
taxes need a specific definition, for example the tax liability on gifts and 
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inheritances is allocated to the residence of the donor or the heir, although 
many recipients live in another jurisdiction or abroad.
The three big taxes—personal, corporate income and turnover tax—
are, however, vertically shared taxes according to specific keys, as seen in 
Table 14.3.
While the distribution keys are fixed for the income taxes, the turnover 
tax is, in principle, flexible. According to Article 105 (2) of the Basic Law, 
in the case of diverging expenditure-revenue relations of the Federation 
on the one hand, and the states and their local governments on the other, 
the key must be changed by federal law, which requires the consent of the 
Bundesrat. The vertical shares of the turnover tax have been changed sev-
eral times in recent years, mostly in favour of the Länder (Färber 2015). 
In 1998, the increase in the turnover tax rate of 1 per cent was specifically 
transferred to the pension scheme. Since 1998, local governments have 
participated in the revenue with a share of 2.2 per cent. Smaller adjust-
ments have been made by lump-sum deductions or extra payments. From 
2020, the keys will change to simpler shares after the reform of the inter-
governmental financial relations. De facto, the turnover tax revenue will 
again slightly change in favour of the Länder—this was a condition for 
Table 14.3 Distribution of tax revenue between the federal, Länder and local 
governments
 Revenue in 
2018 (billion 
euros)
Tax Federation Länder Local 
governments
268.6 Wage and assessed 
income tax
42.5% 42.5% 15%
33.4 Corporate income 
tax, capital gains tax
50% 50%
6.9 Interest income tax 44% 44% 12%














€4.5 bn. from 
2021
1.996%
+€2.4 bn. from 
2020
a+€2.76 bn. in 2018; €3.4 bn. in 2019
b./. €6.5 bn. in favour of the Länder in 2018; €7.4 bn. in 2019
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their approving the reform. Table 14.4 presents the revenue before and 
after distribution among the levels of government, including the revenue 
of the EU, which is administered by the Member States and then trans-
ferred to Brussels.
Horizontally, tax revenue is assigned according to the territoriality prin-
ciple, which for the income taxes are the residence and the place of pro-
duction principles. The wage tax of taxpayers who live in a place other 
than their workplace is transferred to their place of residence. The income 
tax and the corporate income tax liability of enterprises with several pro-
duction sites is apportioned to the respective jurisdictions according to a 
key combining the added value and the number of employees.
From 2020 onwards, the state share of the turnover tax is distributed 
according to the number of inhabitants, including deductions and addi-
tional payments for those Länder whose revenue falls below the average 
per capita fiscal capacity.2 The local fiscal capacity is included in the for-
mula at 75 per cent. The remaining below average fiscal capacities after 
distribution of the state share of VAT revenue and local fiscal capacities of 
less than 80 per cent of the average is supplemented by specific funding 
from Federal Supplementary Grants (FSG) (Federal Ministry of 
Finance 2018).
The German multilevel tax sharing system finally contains the obliga-
tion of the states—according to Article 106 (6) of the Basic Law—to share 
their tax revenue from the above-mentioned joint taxes (including FSG) 
with their local communities. As the degree of decentralisation differs 
among the Länder and, therefore, also the financial needs of local govern-
ments, the percentage rates of state tax revenue vary from 12.75 per cent 
in Bavaria to 23 per cent in North Rhine-Westphalia. Most Länder also 
Table 14.4 Tax revenue of the different government levels and the EU before 
and after distribution in 2018 (billion euro)
Before distribution After distribution
Shared taxes 566.9 73.0%
Federal taxes 108.6 14.0% Federal tax revenue 322.4 41.5%
Land taxes 23.9 3.1% Land tax revenue 314.1 40.5%
Local taxes 71.8 9.2% Local tax revenue 111.4 14.3%
Customs (EU) 5.1 0.7% EU revenue 28.6 3.7%
Total 776.3 100.0% 776.4 100.0%
Source: Federal Statistical Office (2018); author’s own calculations
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share the revenue of their proper tax sources often using diverging transfer 
rates. The majority of this income is then assigned to 13 different local 
fiscal equalisation schemes, which include indicators for financial needs 
and fiscal capacity. All financial needs indicators are based on the number 
of local inhabitants and in most states are supplemented by other indica-
tors, such as the number of pupils or costs per pupil, social expenditure 
burdens, number of employees, length of streets. These local fiscal equali-
sation transfer payments explicitly aim to close the fiscal gap and provide a 
more equal financial balance among the municipalities and counties.
6  PublIc debt
Public debt was for many years an important source for funding public 
expenditure. A reform of the constitutional borrowing limits in 2009, 
however, changed the long tradition of an ever-increasing volume of debt. 
Since 2011, the ratio of public debt to GDP has been decreasing, since 
2013 the absolute amount too (see Fig. 14.2). The Federation holds the 
largest share of public debt; state and local government cover less than a 



















































Bund States local governments total as % of GDP
Fig. 14.2 Volume of loans and securities at the different levels of government 
1970–2018. Source: Federal Statistical Office, author’s own calculations and for 




privatised state and local government-owned enterprises is not included in 
the official statistics. However, a decline in the absolute level of public 
debt at all levels of government (on average) has not been experienced 
since the 1960s.
In addition to loans and securities, there are other types of public debt. 
The amounts are detailed in Table 14.5. While debt from other public 
sector institutions or levels of government, liabilities from deliveries of 
goods and services, and transactions similar to credits are of minor impor-
tance, and guarantees are only very rarely called, the cash credits of local 
governments have become a real political issue. Cash credits are short- 
term borrowings, usually used to cover a temporary budgetary deficit. In 
some states (Saarland, Rhineland-Palatinate, North Rhine-Westphalia, 
Hesse and Saxony-Anhalt) these deficits became ‘chronic’ during the 
2000s and many municipalities have not been able to reduce or erase 
them. In recent years, the respective state governments have established 
programmes to help solve the problems, but have not been able to make 
sufficient transfer payments to clear the debt over a shorter term due to 
the underlying continuing problems of high social expenditure and the 
fundamental underfunding of local budgets in these communities. As a 
result, the Federation is currently having discussions about offering a 
means of financial support to achieve a quicker solution.
After the regulations to limit the public debt of the Federation and the 
Länder to budgeted (i.e. planned) investment expenditure—a rule follow-
ing the principle of intertemporal equivalence—in 2009, the Federation 
and states decided on the requirement in future of an (almost) balanced 
budget. Since 2016, the Federation has only had permission to borrow up 
to 0.35 per cent of gross domestic product (GDP). As from 2020, the 
states are required to balance their budgets. Exceptions only arise for 
recessions and natural catastrophes (see Korioth 2016). Debt amassed in 
economically difficult periods and as a consequence of natural disasters is 
booked into a special account and must be redeemed over a shorter term.
In 2011, in response to the Euro debt crisis, particularly in the South 
European countries, a new debt regulation was introduced for the Member 
States of the European Union. The so-called fiscal pact followed the same 
concept as the German ‘debt brake’ and restrained public borrowing to 
0.5  per cent for ‘normal’ economic development. Germany ‘reserves’ 
0.15 per cent of GDP as fiscal space for local borrowing, which in the past 
was sufficient.


































































































































































































































































































































Against this background, the debt limits for local governments have 
remained unchanged. The local debt limits are covered by the state con-
stitutions and the local government laws of the 13 territorial states. Local 
budgets require the approval of their Länder, which is part of the supervi-
sion of local authorities; it stops at either special state administrations or 
the counties (in the past, the lowest level of state administration). In gen-
eral, local governments are allowed to finance investment expenditure by 
borrowing, but only if there are no other financial means (e.g. tax revenue, 
fees, charges and transfer payments). Since the introduction of accrual 
accounting and profit and loss budgets, the requirement is to have a bal-
anced budget. This means that local authorities have to cover interest and 
depreciation of investments from regular revenue. According to the 
requirements of accounting standards, the rule of balancing the profit and 
loss budget includes—theoretically—all other forms of open and hidden 
debt too (cash credits and hidden obligations of future payments).
The broad agreement on the new ‘debt brake’ across the majority of 
the political parties did not last for long, although good economic growth 
created additional revenue, some of which an increasing number of gov-
ernments used to redeem old debt. Taxes increased more than GDP 
growth because there was no majority in the Bundestag and in the 
Bundesrat to approve reducing tax revenue to the former ratio. The states, 
in particular, argued that they needed the revenue to shoulder the financial 
burden of increasing education and early childhood education at the local 
level. The Federation and Länder also increased the number of personnel 
in their police forces. The problem of below average investment expendi-
ture in public infrastructure, which emerged during the economically dif-
ficult years of the late 1990s and 2000s, remained unsolved. In contrast to 
this, the particularly poorer states and local communities achieved their 
budgetary consolidation but only by cutting back even more on invest-
ment expenditure.
As a result, a new discussion on the reliability of the so-called black zero 
policy has started. A part of the discussion deals with the question of 
whether governments should stabilise economic development by addi-
tional borrowing, even though the incoming tax revenue is still sufficient 
to cover all planned expenditure. More important are the questions on 
how to fund the necessary investment expenditure which—after cut backs 
in the past—require enormous financial efforts to meet both the consider-
able backlog demand for costs as well as accommodate the demand for 
public infrastructure modernisation. In the event that investment expen-
diture at all levels of government exceeds 0.5  per cent of GDP in 
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economically ‘normal’ times, a borrowing fund would not only be uncon-
stitutional, but would also violate European law. Therefore, might then 
the consequence be that bigger investment projects are shifted to times of 
recession? Why should governments intentionally violate the principle of 
intertemporal equivalence, the so-called golden rule of funding invest-
ments, and accept instead that they are (over)burdening generations of 
taxpayers? Despite all the successes of breaking the long-term continuous 
growth of public debt because of the actual constitutional and European 
debt limits, politicians should no longer ignore that the actual rule does 
not meet the requirements of sustainability. This will probably result in a 
new reform in the not-too-distant future.
7  local fInance
The local right of self-government includes financial affairs (Werner 2006). 
Municipalities, counties and other types of associations of local govern-
ments, therefore, need substantial autonomy with regard to deciding on 
their budgets, including local tax rates on their ‘own’ tax sources. The 
revenue from joint taxes, which the states are obliged to share with them 
according to Article 106 (7) of the Basic Law, should suffice to fund not 
only the expenditure for transferred tasks, but also a considerable amount 
of spending for the tasks of local self-government. Article 106 (6) of the 
Basic Law grants the right not only to the revenue from the local property 
and the local business tax, but also to decide on the local multiplier of 
these taxes. Local governments, therefore, have substantial autonomy on 
both sides of their budgets, although the scope of their financial decisions 
is restricted by the dominance of transferred tasks and the corresponding 
expenditure.
About 20 years ago, almost every territorial state introduced the so- 
called principle of connectivity into their state constitutions. The idea was 
that when transferring new tasks to local governments, the states would 
also include the necessary financial means for execution. However, reality 
shows that there is regional regulatory divergence with regard to 
(Schmidt 2016):
• the tasks specified by the principle; no Land has incorporated 
European and federal regulations into the compensation catalogue;
• the strictness of the application and duty of compensation; and
• the instruments and calculation methods of compensation.
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Meanwhile, there are doubts about whether the practised principle of 
connectivity has helped to protect local governments against additional 
financial burdens, or whether it has even created new distortions by estab-
lishing a broad range of new specific grants in addition to local fiscal equal-
isation and disturbances to the efficiency mechanism of the annual local 
budget decisions. The principle is actually rumoured to prevent an effi-
cient assignment of tasks between state and local governments as states 
avoid regulations in order not to create new obligations to make compen-
sation payments.
All local fiscal equalisation schemes have two main goals: to top up local 
revenue due to ‘chronically’ deficient vertical tax assignments and to close 
horizontal gaps of fiscal capacities regarding local needs. As the decentrali-
sation of tasks as well as local tax capacities differ from Land to Land (see 
Table 14.6), the volume of local fiscal equalisation needs to vary too.
Table 14.6 Per capita expenditure of state and local governments and aggre-














Baden-Württemberg 6495.3 4771.6 3595.8 55.4 1489.4
Bavaria 6953.9 4746.4 3285.4 47.2 1537.7
Hesse 7294.5 4841.2 3583.8 49.1 1602.0
Lower Saxony 5976.5 4121.9 3136.0 52.5 1181.0
North 
Rhine-Westphalia
6807.9 4374.3 3799.6 55.8 1406.5
Rhineland-Palatinate 5873.2 4362.0 2982.1 50.8 1183.0
Saarland 6016.4 4409.9 2564.6 42.6 1091.3
Schleswig-Holstein 7374.8 5574.6 3149.6 42.7 908.9
Brandenburg 6552.9 4988.6 3238.6 49.4 811.7
Mecklenburg- 
Vorpommern
6132.4 4728.6 3017.9 49.2 876.7
Saxony 6040.4 4485.2 3150.1 52.2 819.6
Saxony-Anhalt 6717.9 5126.1 3033.0 45.1 1169.8
Thuringia 5919.8 4674.2 2666.6 45.0 842.4
Territorial Ländera 6611.7 4615.0 3389.4 51.3 1318.8
Source: Federal Statistical Office (2018); author’s own calculations
aTerritorial states span a wider area and include a level of independent local governments while the three 
city-states Berlin, Hamburg and Bremen administer local tasks by dependent districts
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Most states—except Thuringia, Saxony-Anhalt and Hesse, which esti-
mate a minimum financial equipment for their communities—just apply a 
certain percentage to their tax revenue. The resulting sum is the basis for 
local fiscal equalisation. All states then start by using a rather large share of 
the fiscal equalisation sum for specific purpose grants, which amounted to 
42.7  per cent of total fiscal equalisation grants in 2013 (Deutscher 
Städtetag 2013) and should actually not be much lower (Table 14.7).
The remaining amount is then distributed as unconditional so-called 
key grants. Key grants show—in different combinations and quantities 
among the states—three basic forms:
• often a part of the key sum is given as lump-sum grants—diverging 
for the types of local authorities—in order to cover the costs of com-
pulsory local tasks;
• some Länder (e.g. Baden-Württemberg and Rhineland-Palatinate) 
secure a minimum fiscal capacity per inhabitant for municipalities by 
top-up grants to a certain percentage of the average fiscal capacity;
• all fiscal equalisation schemes contain key grants covering a certain 
share of the gap between financial needs and fiscal capacity for each 
local government.
The measurement of financial ‘needs’ is based on the size of the popula-
tion (main approach) and other factors representing important cost factors 
(secondary approach). In most states, the number of citizens is evaluated 
by a factor increasing with the size of the municipality. The variety of indi-
cators for the secondary approach is broad and ranges from the number of 
pupils or standardised school costs per pupil, number of long-time 
Table 14.7 Changes in the local shares of the compulsory tax sharing revenue of 
the Länder 2000–2019 (percentage of state tax revenue)
Land BW Bav He LS NW RP Saar SH BB MV Sax
2000 23.0 11.54 22.9 17.59 23.0 20.25 20.00 19.00 26.1 27.36 26.365
2011 23.0 12.20 23.0 15.50 23.0 21.0 20.555 17.74 20.0 23.81 22.09
2019 23.0 12.75 – 15.50 23.0 21.0 20.573 17.83 21.0 26.09 22.135
Source: Fiscal equalisation laws of the Länder
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unemployed, number of employees, number of students and ‘central loca-
tions’ from regional planning categories, to the size of the military person-
nel, mining communities, spas, etc. Each community then has an indicator 
for abstract financial needs without any particular monetary dimension.
Fiscal capacity is accounted as the real revenue from the local shares of 
personal income tax and turnover tax plus standardised revenue from local 
property and local business tax, which is weighted by a uniform multiplier 
in order to avoid inefficient local tax policies. Fees and charges as well as 
minor local taxes are not included in the fiscal capacity.
The rate of equalisation varies between 50 per cent and 90 per cent 
from state to state. The ‘neutral’ indicators of financial needs are multi-
plied by a ‘basic grant’, which is calculated to absorb exactly the whole key 
sum. These local authorities receive key grants, of which the monetised 
financial needs indicator exceeds the fiscal capacity. If the fiscal capacity 
exceeds the financial needs, no key grants are available.
Although German local governments have experienced a long period of 
economic growth as well as growing tax and fiscal equalisation revenue, 
communities in certain states suffer from persistently high amounts of cash 
credits. In particular, the cities and counties in regions undergoing mas-
sive structural economic change ‘accumulated’ cash credits during the 
periods of recession in the late 1990s and 2000s until the financial crisis of 
2008–2010 and have not been able to reduce them in the amount or as 
quickly as required. All states concerned have established programmes for 
local debt relief using transfer payments for interest payments and redemp-
tions or—more recently in Brandenburg and Hesse—assumptions of local 
debt (Stolzenberg 2018). The Federal Minister of Finance has now offered 
to help all remaining over-indebted municipalities (particularly in North 
Rhine-Westphalia, Rhineland-Palatinate and Saarland) by means from the 
federal budget, which then needs to be matched by state financial resources. 
The process of intergovernmental decision-making in this important issue 
is ongoing.
8  lessons learned
Germany experienced increases in public expenditure until the late 1970s 
and later again to cover the immense costs of German reunification in the 
1990s and 2000s, periods when economic growth had slowed down 
because of the recession and the economic and financial crisis and rising 
social insurance contributions. The tax ratio to GDP has remained fairly 
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stable across the economic cycles. Growth in expenditure has been slower 
than that of GDP in recent years, obviously as a result of the consolidation 
efforts to achieve the balanced budgets of the debt brake from 2020. Since 
2012, the sustainable growth of GDP has helped to balance public bud-
gets (Fig. 14.3).
However, tax revenue and social insurance contributions have grown 
faster than GDP since 2013 and 2017. New programmes for climate 
change, expensive payments for additional pensions for childcare (‘mother 
pensions’ for children born before 1992), early retirement and most 
recently for low income contributors, higher transfers for long-term care 
cases, increasing staff for police, schools and early childhood education, 
will enforce the recent trend of increasing rates of public spending as well 
as tax revenue and social insurance contributions to GDP.  The gap of 
infrastructure investment expenditure and additional needs for the policies 
of climate change and new mobility concepts will set further pressure on 
growing public budgets (Bardt et al. 2019). Further reforms will be neces-
sary to find legal and constitutional financial solutions. Germany faces—
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Fig. 14.3 Tax revenue, social contributions and public expenditure in relation to 
GDP 1970–2018. Source: Federal Statistical Office, author’s own calculations and 





1. See BVerfG, Urteil des Zweiten Senats vom 07. Mai 1998–2 BvR 1991/95-, 
Rn. (1–114), http://www.bverfg.de/e/rs19980507_2bvr199195.html.
2. Until 2019, the equalisation scheme included a VAT-pre-equalisation for-
mula and horizontal transfer payments from the rich to the poor Länder.
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CHAPTER 15
Transformation of Public Administration 
in East Germany Following Unification
Hellmut Wollmann
1  TransformaTion of Public adminisTraTion 
in EasT GErmany followinG unificaTion
In analysing the institutional transformation of post-socialist countries, 
East Germany has been interpreted to be a ‘special’ case (Wiesenthal 1995: 
50). This is because in East Germany the collapse of the communist regime 
and the transformation of the existing system coincided with the process 
and dynamics of German unification and the GDR’s integration into the 
‘old’ Federal Republic. Hence, East Germany’s transformation was, from 
the outset, propelled by a triad of exogenous factors, namely:
• ‘institution transfer’ (Lehmbruch 2000: 14) by extending the 
constitutional, legal and institutional order of the ‘old’ Federal 
Republic to East Germany;
• ‘personnel transfer’ as tens of thousands of West German officials 
and experts moved temporarily or permanently to East Germany to 
get involved in the transformation process; and
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• ‘financial transfers’ from West German public budgets and social 
security funds to East Germany.
1.1  Institution Transfer
The institution transfer took off and gained momentum as the politico- 
administrative structure of the ‘old’ Federal Republic’s ‘ready-made state’ 
(Rose and Haerpfer 1997) was extended to East Germany. This secular 
institutional shift set in as early as spring 1990 when on 17 May 1990 (for 
the first time) the democratically elected parliament (Volkskammer) of the 
(then still existing) GDR passed a new Municipal Charter that hinged on 
democratic local self-government. Subsequently, in July 1990, the parlia-
ment decided to re-establish the five regional States (Länder), which the 
communist regime had abolished in the early 1950s.
The most spectacular institution transfer occurred when, on the basis of 
the Unification Treaty signed on 31 August 1990 by the governments of 
the two German states, the GDR was integrated into the ‘old’ Federal 
Republic (and into the European Union) by way of ‘accession’ at mid-
night on 3 October 1990. In that unprecedented historic ‘second’, the 
constitutional and legal order of the ’old’ Federal Republic was extended 
to East Germany, while, at the same moment, the GDR ceased to exist as 
a separate state and its legal world vanished.
Hence, key constitutional parameters were pre-decided during the 
preparation of the German unification (‘exogenously’ orientated towards 
West German requirements). In contrast to Germany, the other ex- 
communist CEE countries had to settle basic constitutional and institu-
tional issues (‘nation building’, intergovernmental setting and accession to 
the EU) in conflicts and compromises between political parties and actors 
in the respective national arena (‘endogenously’).
1.2  Personnel Transfer and ‘Elite Import’ from West to East
The institutional transfer was accompanied and bolstered by a massive 
personnel transfer and ‘elite import’ from west to east as thousands of 
West German officials and specialists moved to East Germany, either tem-
porarily or permanently, to assist the organisational and personnel trans-
formation of Land and local administration. In June 1990, that is prior to 
unification, the ministers of the interior of the West German Länder 
decided to provide ‘administrative aide’ to the upcoming East German 
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Länder (see Goetz 1993: 451). In a similar vein, twinning partnerships 
were arranged between West German and East German municipalities and 
counties (Wollmann 1996b: 60ff.). By 1993, some 15,000 West German 
officials rendered ‘administrative aide’ in Land administration and about 
4000 in local authorities by counselling, training and assisting their East 
German counterparts (Goetz 1993: 452). Moreover, a significant number 
of West German officials and experts moved and stayed permanently in 
East Germany to take up administrative top or meso-level positions. This 
‘elite import’ aimed at filling the ‘political and administrative elite vac-
uum’ (Derlien 1993), which resulted from the resignation or removal 
(‘purging’) of most of the leading political and administrative functionar-
ies of the communist regime. Thus, from the outset, ‘administrative aide’ 
and ‘elite import’ from West to East proved crucial in advancing the trans-
formation of East Germany’s administration, which again differed pro-
foundly from the other ex-communist countries.
1.3  Financial Transfer
Finally, another key factor was the huge financial transfer from West to 
East. Since the early 1990s, this figure has amounted to some US$75 bil-
lion annually. This enormous flow of resources largely supported and pro-
moted East Germany’s transformation, which again has had no parallels in 
other ex-communist CEE countries.
However, the overall assessment that East Germany’s politico- 
administrative transformation was predominantly driven by exogenous 
factors needs to be qualified on a number of scores.
First, there was no single West German model that could have been 
transferred to the East. Instead, the Federal Republic’s political and 
administrative system is at all levels, and in most sectors, characterised by 
a considerable degree of institutional differentiation and variability so that 
the repertoire of institutional solutions on which East Germany’s institu-
tion building could draw was, to begin with, diverse and varied (see Chaps. 
8 and 9). Moreover, the West German officials and experts, who came 
temporarily or permanently to East Germany, carried with them in their 
conceptual and mental ‘luggage’ the diverse institutional and organisa-
tional solutions typical of their ‘native’ Land or local authority (see Goetz 
1993: 452; Derlien 1993: 329; Schimanke 2001: 181).
Second, the newly elected East German Land parliaments and local 
government councils as the relevant political decision-making bodies were 
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occupied entirely by East Germans (Wollmann 1996a, b: 77) who were 
politically poised and ready to take the pertinent political and institutional 
matters into their own hands. Therefore, notwithstanding the significant 
‘exogenous’ influence, East German decision-makers were (‘endoge-
nously’) guided by their specific ‘East German’ preferences, interests 
and goals.
Consequently, institution building in the East German Länder and 
local authorities has unfolded in organisational forms that range from 
(exogenously inspired) blueprint-type institutional imitation to (endoge-
nously driven) adaptation and self-development (‘autochthonomous 
development’, Lehmbruch 2000: 14) and (even) innovation (see 
Wollmann 1996a, b; Kuhlmann 2003: 307ff.). As East Germany’s institu-
tional transformation took place in a spectacular simultaneity of disman-
tling the GDR’s state structure, remoulding existing structures and 
building new politico-administrative institutions, this secular process bore 
traces of what Joseph Schumpeter, alluding to the elementary forces of 
capitalism, called ‘creative destruction’ (‘schöpferische Zerstörung’, 
Schumpeter 1942).
The following account will first address the organisational dimension of 
East Germany’s politico-administrative transformation and subsequently 
its personnel side.
2  orGanisaTional TransformaTion
2.1  Transformation of the GDR’s State Economy: The Activities 
of the Treuhandanstalt, THA (Trust Agency)
Since under the communist regime and doctrine the GDR state essentially 
owned and operated most of the economy sector, the latter’s liquidation 
and restructuring was from the outset a prime goal and task of East 
Germany’s adaptation and integration into the ‘old’ Federal Republic’s 
politico-economic system (see Czada 1996; Seibel 1992, 2011; Wiesenthal 
1995: 58). As early as 1 March 1990, the (reform-communist) GDR gov-
ernment decided to set up a trust agency, Treuhandanstalt (THA), 
designed to revamp the state economy while basically still holding on to 
state ownership. Shortly after, on 17 June 1990, the first democratically 
elected GDR parliament adopted a new Trust Agency Act which marked a 
conspicuous shift in the THA’s mandate to privatise the GDR’s state 
economy. Finally, in August 1990, anticipating imminent unification, the 
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THA was turned into an agency whose centralist organisational structure 
appeared, somewhat ironically, tailored to the GDR’s previous centralised 
economic regime (Seibel 2011: 110). As the THA was accountable to the 
federal government and acted largely independent of the new Länder gov-
ernments, it was called ‘a second East German government’ (Czada 1996: 
99) or even ‘a most powerful second national government’ (as former 
Chancellor Helmut Schmidt put it, quoted by Czada ibid.: 94).
Under West German leadership, initially most prominently under 
Detlev Rohwedder, the former CEO of Hoesch (who was murdered on 
13 April 1991 by the terrorist Red Army Fraction—RAF), the THA’s mis-
sion was defined (in this preferential order) to privatise, restructure or 
liquidate the GDR’s state economy. Consequently, from the outset the 
THA was responsible for more than 8500 state-owned enterprises with 
around 4  million employees, which made the THA the world’s largest 
industrial enterprise (Czada 1996: 93). At the same time, it also took over 
2.4  million hectares of agricultural land and large-scale public hous-
ing assets.
As the federal government decided that the THA was to wind up its 
mandate by the end of 1994, the latter acted under great time pressure. By 
1994, about half of the 6545 enterprises were (entirely or partially) ‘priva-
tised’, often after restructuring them in order to make them ‘fit’ for priva-
tisation, 310 were transferred to local authorities and 3718 enterprises 
were liquidated. In addition, the so-called small privatisation was directed 
at some 25,000 state-owned businesses such as shops, restaurants, hotel, 
pharmacies, bookshops and cinemas. In total, two-thirds of the workforce 
lost their jobs in the process, entailing mass unemployment.
On 1 January 1995, the THA was transformed and organisationally 
restructured into a new political body called the ‘Federal Agency for 
Special Tasks related to Unification’ and into several smaller administrative 
units (see Czada 1996: 114).
The THA and its activities have evoked more discussions and 
controversies than any other field and sector of the GDR’s transformation.
In assessing the role and impact of the THA in the economic 
transformation, a number of opposing views have been put forward (for a 
recent overview see Goschler and Böick 2017). On the one hand, some 
argue that given the unprecedented challenges posed by the collapse of 
the GDR’s state economy, the THA has achieved, by and large, respectable 
results. On the other hand, the high unemployment and de- industrialisation 
that resulted from the activities of the THA and the selling off of GDR 
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assets to West German and foreign investors has provoked harsh criticism, 
including scathing critique of East Germany having been ‘colonised’ 
(Dümcke and Vilmar 1996).
2.2  Transformation of the GDR’s State and Administration
The GDR’s state was typical of the (post-Stalinist) ‘socialist’ state model 
based on the dual structure of the intertwined state and communist party 
apparatus which, by 1990, was made up of around 1000 administrative 
units with about 2.1  million functionaries and employees. This ‘dual’ 
structure and its strict hierarchical control comprised all tiers (central, 
meso and local) of public administration and, under the doctrine of so- 
called democratic centralism, ruled out any degree of autonomy at lower 
levels (Goetz 1993: 448). Fourteen meso-level administrative districts 
(Bezirke) were installed which, modelled on the (regional) ‘oblasti’ in the 
Soviet Union, served as the regional backbone of centralist party and state 
rule. In formally retaining the traditional two-tier local government struc-
ture, the (191) counties (Kreise) and (27) ‘county-free’ cities were turned 
into (centrally directed and controlled) local-level state units, while the 
some 7000 (‘within county’) municipalities played a minimal administra-
tive role.
Following German unification, the historic task of restructuring the 
defunct GDR state consisted of the triple challenge of either liquidating 
part of the ‘inherited’ administrative structures, retaining and remoulding 
them into a new organisational architecture, or creating new ones.
2.2.1  Central Government Level
Under the distribution formula established in the Unification Treaty about 
200 of the 1000 administrative units of the defunct GDR state fell to the 
Federation, in particular most of the GDR’s central administration (min-
istries and central agencies primarily based in Berlin) (Goetz 1993: 451). 
If not ‘liquidated’, institutional and personnel segments came under fed-
eral responsibility. Moreover, in some administrative areas, new federal 
institutions were created in the East German Länder, especially regional 




2.2.2  Länder Level
The five new East German Länder (Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania, 
Brandenburg, Saxony-Anhalt, Saxony and Thuringia) came into existence 
on the date of the election of the new Länder parliaments on October 
14, 1990.
Under the Unification Treaty, about 800 out of 1000 administrative 
units—that is the lion’s share of the GDR’s state administration (with 
some 1.6 million employees)—fell under the responsibility of the five new 
Länder (see Goetz 1993: 451ff.; Wollmann 1996b: 80ff.; König 1997: 
226ff.). So, each Land government, hardly formed in October 1990, was 
confronted with the challenge of setting up its own ministerial offices and 
staff from scratch and creating a new architecture for its entire administra-
tion. Thus, Land ministries, the Prime Minister’s Office, other central- 
level non-ministerial offices as well as the Land Court of Audit, had to be 
created ab ovo in each Land (Goetz 1993: 452). With regard to the lower 
levels of their administration, the new Land governments were faced with 
the decision of whether to liquidate the administrative units ‘inherited’ 
from the GDR state or retain and fit them into a new organisational archi-
tecture. In pursuit of this task, ‘often the ruins of the former administra-
tive structure with its personnel and material equipment became a quarry 
for the new administrative units’ (Ruckriegel 1993; see Wollmann 
1996b: 86).
From the outset, the question of whether the GDR’s meso-level 
administrative districts (Bezirke) should be dissolved or retained and 
transformed into meso-level administrative districts in line with those 
traditionally (albeit increasingly contested) in place in most West German 
Länder, where they are primarily in charge of coordination and supervisory 
functions (see Chap. 8), took centre stage. The controversy surrounding 
this issue was fuelled by widespread recollections of the ominous role the 
districts had played under the communist regime as the regional 
strongholds of its centralist party and state rule. The decision of the 
parliaments in the Länder of Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania and 
Brandenburg to abolish the meso level—thus choosing a two-tiered 
architecture of Land administration made up of the central and the local 
government levels—was also largely due to this fact. By contrast, it was 
decided to retain the GDR’s meso level in the Länder of Saxony and of 
Saxony-Anhalt and turn it into meso administrative districts 
(Regierungsbezirke) in line with their respective West German partner 
Land (see Kuhlmann and Wollmann 2019: 94).
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2.2.3  Local Level
The (191) counties (Kreise) and (about 7500) municipalities (Städte, 
Gemeinden) were the only political and administrative structures that 
institutionally survived the disappearance of the GDR state. Tellingly, 
from early 1990 when the GDR central government was increasingly slid-
ing into agony, until early 1991 when the new Länder governments 
became operational, it was almost solely the local authorities that bore the 
brunt of the secular political, institutional and socio-economic system 
change. In the same vein, from the beginning they were confronted with 
the task of fundamentally remoulding the organisational and personnel 
structure left behind by the GDR’s centralist state.
Manifesting the radical departure from the communist regime’s unitary 
and centralist state model, the democratically elected GDR parliament 
adopted a new Municipal Charter on 13 March 1990, thus essentially 
restoring the concept of local self-government (Kuhlmann and Wollmann 
2019: 96ff.; see Chap. 9). In accordance with the ‘dual task’ model 
entrenched in the German tradition, local authorities are in charge of car-
rying out ‘genuine’ local self-government tasks that basically follow from 
the traditional general competence clause, on the one hand, and ‘dele-
gated’ tasks transferred to them by the state, on the other (see Kuhlmann 
and Wollmann 2019: 161ff.).
Internal Organisation
In restructuring their administrations, the East German local authorities 
drew heavily on organisational designs and the practical experience of the 
‘administrative aides’, their West German counterparts and advisers. A 
crucial role in this was played by the Communal Joint Office for 
Administrative Management (KGSt), a local government-funded non- 
profit consultancy organisation, which has long since acquired a high rep-
utation and considerable influence in the field of administrative 
reorganisation. It should be noted that since the early 1990s, KGSt has 
abandoned its previous advocacy of the ‘Weberian’ administrative model 
and shifted to propagate a New Public Management (NPM)-inspired 
‘managerialist’ New Steering Model (NSM) (see Kuhlmann and Wollmann 
2019: 284 seq.). After 1990, however, when it came to the administrative 
restructuring of the East German local authorities, KGSt conspicuously 
recommended doing this on the basis of the (traditional) ‘Weberian’ legal 
rule-bound hierarchical model. Consequentially, in contrast to their West 
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German counterparts, the East German local authorities initially exhibited 
considerable restraint (Wollmann 1996a: 156; Kuhlmann et al. 2008: 856).
Furthermore, under the Municipal Asset Act of 6 July 1990 and the 
Unification Treaty of 31 August 1990, a myriad of (social, cultural, health, 
etc.) organisations, which until then had operated under the responsibility 
of the GDR state and its state economy, were transferred (‘communalised’) 
to the local authorities. As a result, the number of local government 
employees virtually ‘exploded’ (and, for instance, in county-free cities sky-
rocketed within weeks from 5000 to 50,000). For the range of tasks the 
local authorities had to perform in order to reduce their ‘overstaffed’ per-
sonnel, see below.
In institutional terms, especially in facing this ‘avalanche’ of institutions 
and personnel, the local authorities chose to either organisationally inte-
grate them into their ‘core’ administration or ‘outsource’ them in their 
‘corporatised’ form as organisationally and legally separate municipal 
organisations or companies (usually as limited companies or stock compa-
nies; see Chap. 17).
Territorial Reforms and Functional Reforms
Immediately after the formation of the new Länder in October 1990, their 
governments and parliaments turned to territorially redraw (upscale) the 
counties whose size (averaging 80,000 inhabitants) was considered likely 
to seriously impair their administrative capacity (see Wollmann 2010; 
Kuhlmann and Wollmann 2019: 203ff.; also Chap. 16). Moreover, terri-
torial county reforms aimed at preparing the ground for follow-up ‘func-
tional reforms’, that is transferring (decentralising or deconcentrating) 
further administrative functions from Land administration to local author-
ities (see Kuhlmann and Wollmann 2019, 175; Chap. 16).
3  EmPloymEnT sEcTor
In the GDR’s ‘cadre administration’ (König 1992: 153ff.), following the 
Soviet Union’s model, the executive and administrative leadership posi-
tions were occupied by a ‘nomenklaturist elite’, the members of which 
were directly appointed by and subjected to the communist party. By the 
same token, in the recruitment and staffing of personnel, the loyalty and 
obedience to the party was given priority over professional qualification 
(Goetz 1993), which fostered what was pointedly called ‘politicised 
incompetence’ (Derlien 1993: 324). The GDR’s state sector had some 
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1100 administrative units with a total of around 2.1 million functionaries 
and employees. In addition, the ubiquitous state security service, com-
monly known as the ‘Stasi’, comprised approximately 85,000 official and 
180,000 ‘unofficial’ collaborators (Derlien 1993: 325).
3.1  ‘Elite Change’ and ‘Purging’
The radical transformation of the GDR’s employment sector (see also 
Chap. 13) took place in two ways.
First, a policy was pursued of ridding (‘purging’) the personnel who 
had been involved in the communist regime and particularly in its omi-
nous state security service (the Stasi) and to a degree deemed politically 
unacceptable. According to the Unification Treaty of 31 August 1990, 
public employees could be dismissed for ‘having collaborated’ (in official 
or unofficial capacity) with the Stasi or for having ‘violated principles of 
humanity or rule of law’ (Goetz 1993: 460; Derlien 1993: 326). The 
(federal) Stasi Records Agency (informally dubbed ‘Gauck Agency’ after 
its first director Gauck, who was later elected president of Germany from 
2012 to 2017) was established when the Stasi Records Act came into force 
in December 1991 with the mandate, upon request by federal or Länder 
authorities, to scrutinise public employees and identify those possibly fall-
ing under the ‘purging’ verdict. By mid-1995, the ‘Gauck Agency’ was 
requested to scrutinise some 1.3 million public employees, about 10 per 
cent of whom were identified as ‘purging’-relevant and about 1 per cent 
(i.e. approximately 1300 in total) were finally dismissed (see Derlien 1997: 
277).1 While the final number of ‘sanctioned’ cases appears relatively 
small, the institutionalised scrutiny process proved to be a sword of 
Damocles hanging over the entire process of personnel transformation.
Second, an almost complete elite change in the administrative ranks 
took place as the holders of higher positions of the communist regime 
were almost completely ousted and replaced by ‘elite import’ from the 
West or by the recruitment and appointment of East German personnel.
At the Länder level, the build-up of the new Land ministries and 
central- level agencies was marked by a sizeable ‘elite import’ (Derlien 
1993: 328) from West German partner Länder as a significant number of 
executive and administrative leadership positions in Land administration 
were occupied by West German ‘transferees’. For instance, initially three 
out of five East German prime ministers, all state secretaries, four out of 
five justice ministers, the majority of the ministers of economics and 
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finance as well as up to three-quarters of the department heads and section 
heads in Land ministries were West Germans (Derlien 1993: 328; 
Wollmann 1996b: 79ff.). However, administrative top positions were also 
taken over by East Germans, albeit as a rule in less important ministries 
and often in lower echelons. This applied to administrative ‘newcomers’ 
who had no previous experience in public administration proper, but came 
from (meanwhile ‘liquidated’) economic enterprises or scientific institu-
tions. This also held true for East German administrative ‘old-timers’ who 
were previously employed in technically oriented administrative segments, 
particularly in district- or central-level administration, and resumed new 
positions in qualification equivalent to ministries or agencies (e.g. environ-
ment, health) (Schimanke 2001: 180).
At the local government level, too, on the heels of the (voluntary or 
forced) exodus of the Communist party appointed (‘nomenklaturist’) 
position holders, a new generation of local leaders emerged. Most of them 
were administrative ‘newcomers’ with no previous experience in municipal 
administration and often had a professional and occupational background 
in engineering or natural science, many coming from management and 
technical functions held in (meanwhile dissolved) state economy compa-
nies.2 Some were administrative ‘old-timers’ previously employed in local 
administration and often with a technical background. Interestingly, con-
trary to the Länder level, only a few West Germans have assumed leading 
positions in local administration. The fact that the East German ‘new local 
administrative elite’—whether newcomers or old-timers—have predomi-
nantly an educational and occupational background in engineering or 
other technical trades makes for an intriguing difference between them 
and their West German counterparts, among whom a legal or quasi-legal 
background prevails (Wollmann 2002: 170).3
It is worth noting that the ‘elite import’ (from West to East) and the 
scrutiny (‘purging’) procedure are salient features of East Germany’s 
transformation, which sets it apart from other ex-communist CEE coun-
tries4 and is another aspect of its ‘special case’ profile.
3.2  Reduction in Personnel
As previously mentioned, after 1990 the newly formed five Länder and the 
local authorities were confronted with the challenge of reducing an ‘over-
sized’ workforce ‘inherited’ from the defunct GDR state. Thus, as of 30 
June 1991, the number of employees of the new Länder totalled some 
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634,000, which amounted to a ratio of 39 per 1000 inhabitants compared 
to 29.50 in the West German Länder (Wollmann 1996b: 98). Between 
1991 and 1999, they cut their personnel numbers by 16.24 per cent to 
about 30 employees per 1000 inhabitants and thereby narrowed the gap 
between them and their West German counterparts (see Jann 2001: 114, 
table 1).
As a result of the myriad of institutions and personnel that were 
transferred (‘communalised’) after 1990 to the local authorities, their 
workforce doubled (per capita) compared to their West German 
counterparts (Wollmann 2002: 168, table 5). Since the early 1990s, the 
number of East German local government employees has been drastically 
reduced and, by the end of the 1990s, had almost halved from some 
660,000 in 1990 to about 340,000 in 1999 (see ibid. table, Jann 2001: 
114, table), which in terms of personnel size per capita came close to their 
West German counterparts.
3.3  Vocational Training and Qualification 
of Administrative Personnel
Applying the complex legal system transferred ‘from West to East’, and 
coping with the multiple administrative tasks following unification, posed 
unprecedented challenges to the East German administrative personnel.
In order to prepare and train the administrative staff to master these 
difficulties, a huge campaign of vocational training was launched. Funded 
by the federal government and the West German Länder, crash courses 
were organised and offered to thousands of Land and local government 
employees (see Wollmann 1996b: 130). However, amid the operational 
turmoil and urgency, there was often hardly any time available to regularly 
attend the vocational training courses. Consequently, learning-by-doing 
and on-the-job-training came to prevail.
There are strong indications that East German administrative personnel, 
by and large, have learned remarkably fast to cope with the new legal 
world and task load. For instance, a study on the implementation of fed-
eral building law constituting a particularly complicated piece of legisla-
tion plausibly demonstrated that after an initial period, during which the 
legal provisions appeared in part to have been ‘ignored’ by local practitio-
ners, the practice and standards in their implementation and application 
soon came to largely match those in the West German local authorities 
(see Wollmann 2002: 171; Kuhlmann 2003, 2004).
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A major lever and driver for this fast pace of adaptation and qualification 
plausibly lay in the ‘disciplining’—if not ‘compelling’—effect which the 
newly established administrative courts exerted on the administrative 
personnel and their performance. The administrative courts played a cru-
cial role in ensuring that the administrative practice was guided by the rule 
of law (Rechtsstaat; see Chap. 12), thus sealing the secular break from the 
previous regime in which public administration essentially acted under the 
sway of the Communist Party and which bordered on ‘legal nihilism’. It 
is, moreover, noteworthy that the newly created administrative courts and 
their judges, most of whom were West German ‘transferees’ (see Wollmann 
1996b: 100ff.), assumed an advisory and ‘pedagogic’ function in the 
interaction and exchange with their ‘clients’ (see Kuhlmann 2003: 202ff.).
Additionally, in dealing with the turbulence and intricacies of the 
transformation process, the East German administrative personnel also 
exhibited a disposition to seek ‘pragmatic’ and ad hoc solutions. This 
pragmatism arguably reflects the collective experience which the East 
Germans at large were prone to have under the communist regime when, 
vis-à-vis the endemic bottlenecks, supply gaps and malfunctions of the 
socialist system and economy, they learned to improvise and ‘find ways 
out’, which has, in hindsight, been pointedly called a ‘chaos competence’ 
(Marz 1992 quoted in Wollmann 1996b; 144; see also Schimanke 2001: 
180ff.; Kuhlmann 2003, 2004).
4  concludinG rEmarks
In conclusion, a somewhat ambivalent summary should be proposed.
On the one hand, East Germany’s transformation in Land and local 
administration has proceeded remarkably fast and, after some ten years, 
has attained an institutional format and a performance profile that come, 
by and large, close to their West German counterparts (see Jann 2001: 
105). The essential reason for this ‘fast track’ transformation of East 
Germany’s politico-administrative plausibly lies in the fact that it was 
embedded in the process of German unification and driven by East 
Germany’s integration into the ‘old’ Federal Republic. Thus, basic institu-
tional decisions (e.g. relating to the introduction of the Länder, local self- 
government, rule of law/Rechtsstaat-guided public administration and 
also the inclusion in the European Union) were pre-determined and ‘fore-
gone conclusions’ by the GDR’s spectacular accession to the ‘old’ Federal 
Republic at midnight on 3 October 1990. By contrast, in other 
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ex-communist CEE countries, the basic decisions on the transformation 
of their politico-administration (nation-building, intergovernmental 
architecture, accession to the EU, etc.) were often the result of protracted 
political conflicts and compromises (see Wollmann 2020).
On the other hand, the ‘fast track’ transformation of East Germany has 
had noticeably negative consequences. As it was strongly driven from the 
outset by ‘exogenous’ factors and actors, in particular by the triad of insti-
tution, personnel and financial transfers, East Germany’s transformation 
came to be perceived and criticised as ‘externally determined’ and even as 
‘colonisation’ (Dümcke and Vilmar 1996). Particularly the Treuhandanstalt 
that had the time-limited triple mandate to restructure, liquidate or ‘pri-
vatise’ the GDR’s state economy has been reproached for having inflicted 
lasting political ‘traumata’ on East Germans in the wake of persisting de- 
industrialisation and unemployment.
5  lEssons lEarnEd
Before finally addressing the question of whether or what lessons can be 
drawn from the ‘East German case’ by countries that find themselves in 
political and socio-economic transition or transformation, a note of cau-
tion is needed. The singularity of conditions under which East Germany’s 
transformation took place should be kept in mind in order to forestall 
‘hasty’ conclusions. Keeping this caveat in mind, the following sugges-
tions can arguably be put forward:
• The basic decisions on the organisational (central, meso and local 
level) architecture should be made as early as possible in the transfor-
mation or transition process in order to relieve the decision-making 
process from these basic organisational issues and proceed to tack-
ling and resolving other urgent problems of the ongoing development.
• The building of a competent, effective, efficient and trustworthy 
public administration should be given prime importance as being an 
indispensable (sine qua non) condition for coping with these 
urgent problems.
• For this purpose, the introduction and consolidation of a rule of law- 
bound (‘Weberian’), politically independent and non-partisan public 
administration is absolutely essential as well.
• By the same token, of utmost importance is the establishment of 
independent administrative courts with qualified administrative 
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judges as guardians of judicial review of the public administration 
activities and their compliance with the rule of law (Rechtsstaat).
• The recruitment and employment of professionally qualified and 
politically non-partisan public personnel who are immune to corrup-
tion is equally of crucial importance. In order to ensure high profes-
sional (and ethical) standards of future public personnel, appropriate 
educational and vocational training facilities and programmes need 
to be put in place.
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1. For more data and references see Wollmann (1996b: 97).
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4. With the exception of post-communist Czechoslovakia where, for the 
limited duration of three years, a comparable ‘purging’ procedure (called 
lustration) was put in place.
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CHAPTER 16
Administrative Reforms in the Multilevel 
System: Reshuffling Tasks and Territories
Sabine Kuhlmann and Jörg Bogumil
1  IntroductIon
In German administrative federalism, the Länder take the central role as 
the enforcement level for federal and Land laws (see Chap. 8). Since the 
post-war period, there have been repeated attempts and initiatives to 
change, optimise and improve the efficiency of the traditional administra-
tive structure, but hardly ever with decisive success (cf. Ellwein 1994). 
After German reunification, the East German Länder in particular had to 
adapt their administrative structures to the West German models (see 
Chap. 15). Since the beginning of the twenty-first century, however, all 
Länder governments have intensified their reform efforts with surprising 
success, measured by the extent and intensity of the changes. The reforms 
reached their first climax in Baden-Württemberg and Lower Saxony, and 
then found their way into the majority of German Länder in the form of 
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territorial and functional reforms (see Ebinger et  al. 2018). One major 
reason for the increasing reform activity is to be found in the precarious 
situation of the Länder budgets due to escalating pension burdens, demo-
graphic developments and debt brakes (see Chap. 14). This situation 
opened a window of opportunity for governments to push through 
reforms of their apparatus. Other reasons are ideological or political in 
nature and are related to governments’ ambitions to weaken or dissolve 
administrative units or levels that are regarded as difficult to control, espe-
cially after changes of government.
All Länder are striving to streamline, trim and (partly) concentrate their 
administrations, albeit with different priorities and instruments. 
Approaches include the merging of special-purpose authorities at the state 
government (Länder) level, the dismantling of meso-level state authori-
ties, the decentralisation of state tasks to local governments as well as the 
rescaling of local governments’ territorial boundaries (for a breakdown of 
administrative levels, see Table 16.1). In Germany, these efforts are often 
subsumed under the term ‘administrative structural reforms’ 
(Verwaltungsstrukturreformen) in a broad all-encompassing sense. 
Analytically, however, a distinction must be made between three types of 
reforms: functional reforms, structural reforms and territorial reforms, 
although these three types are closely interconnected. Functional reforms 
relate to the reassignment of tasks and responsibilities between existing 
administrative units and levels (centralisation/decentralisation; concentra-
tion/deconcentration). Structural reforms concern the reorganisation of 
the administrative structures, that is the physical dissolution, merging or 
creation of administrative units. Finally, territorial reforms refer to a rescal-
ing of counties’ and/or municipalities’ territorial boundaries. More 
recently, the latter could only be observed in East Germany, whereas in 
West Germany territorial reforms were carried out in the 1970s (Thieme 
et al. 1981; Bogumil 2016; Kuhlmann and Wollmann 2019: 199ff.). The 
heterogeneity of structural, functional and territorial reforms across the 
German Länder has led to increasing differences in the institutional set-
tings, task portfolios and organisational frameworks within the administra-
tive federalism at Länder and local level. Accordingly, there is also a high 
variance regarding the outcomes and impacts of intergovernmental 
reforms at the subnational level, not only across Länder but also across 
policy sectors (Kuhlmann et al. 2014; for the evaluation of subnational 
reforms, see Kuhlmann and Wollmann 2011).
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2  Structural reformS
The structural reforms in the German Länder related to a reorganisation 
of institutional units of the state (Länder) administration, specifically 
affecting the meso level, but also parts of the upper-and lower-level state 
administration. In Germany, the meso-level state administration has the 
Table 16.1 Structural and functional reforms in the German Länder (sub- 
ministerial level)
Reforms within two-tier 
systems
Reforms within three-tier 
systems
Administrative level Brandenburg, Mecklenburg- 




Württemberg, Hesse, NRW, 
Rhineland- Palatinate, 
Saxony, Saxony- Anhalt, 
Thuringia
State government level (Land administration)
Upper level
(higher state authorities)





Integration of (parts of) 









Integration of upper- and-






Merging of lower state 
authorities; organisational 
concentration; 




Decentralisation to local 
self-government level; 




Local self-government level (counties, county-free cities, municipalities)
Upper tier
(counties and county-free 
cities)
Integration of tasks transferred by state government 
(Länder); partly combined with territorial upscaling;
varying degrees of institutional strengthening
Lower tier
(municipalities)
(Limited) Integration of tasks transferred by state 
government (Länder); partly combined with territorial 
upscaling or increased inter-municipal cooperation;
limited institutional strengthening
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traditionally assigned function to bundle and coordinate the various 
sector- specific administrative activities at sub-state level. The term ‘meso 
level’ refers to administrative units located between the ministerial admin-
istration at Länder level and the local governments. The bundling func-
tion of meso-level state authorities aims at guaranteeing the unity of the 
state (Land) and a horizontal coordination of various territorially relevant 
functions at sub-state level (Ellwein 1994). It is intended to limit the frag-
mentation and dis-connectedness of single-purpose administrative units 
with different or even conflicting policy responsibilities. Within the federal 
system of Germany, this function is however organised in very different 
ways. Some of the German Länder have three-tier systems with a territo-
rial state administration at the meso-level (administrative district authori-
ties), while others—mainly smaller ones—have two-tier systems in which 
this function is assigned to local self-government (counties). In general, 
the institutional variance of territorial administration at the meso level in 
Germany is increasing, in particular as a result of the current structural 
reforms in the Länder (cf. Kuhlmann and Bogumil 2010; see Table 16.1).
The debate surrounding meso-level instances (administrative district 
authorities) is first and foremost a question of whether or not a bundling 
and coordination authority below the ministerial level and above the local 
government level is required in a specific Land. The main points of criti-
cism of the meso-level authorities refer to their deficits in the fulfilment of 
coordination and bundling functions. The reasons for these deficits may 
lie in the fragmentation of the administration—as is evident in the large 
number of single-purpose authorities—or in the internal structures of the 
meso-level authorities. The existence of numerous single-purpose authori-
ties at the meso level prevents comprehensive bundling and coordination 
in administrative district authorities. In addition, this leads to a ‘dual 
administration’ consisting of general and specialised authorities at the 
meso level, such that the same tasks are performed by both a general and 
a specialist authority, resulting in inefficiency. If—despite the complexity 
in the thirteen Länder (excluding city-states)—an attempt is made to typ-
ify the structural reform approaches at the subnational level in Germany, 
two models can be distinguished: (1) reforms within or towards two-tier 
systems; and (2) reforms towards concentrated three-tier systems (see 
Table 16.1).
(1) A two-tier administration without a general meso-level instance can 
be found mainly in the small Länder (under three million inhabitants, the 
exception being Lower Saxony with eight million). Lower Saxony is the 
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only German Land that implemented the ‘system change’ in 2004 from a 
three-level to a two-level model (Bogumil and Kottmann 2006: 63) by 
way of dissolving the four administrative district authorities of Brunswick, 
Hanover, Lüneburg and Weser-Ems and abolishing the administrative dis-
tricts. This involved an extensive deconcentration of the previously terri-
torially and functionally bundled meso-level state administration and 
resulted in a significant upgrading of the sectorwise organised special- 
purpose Land administration. Accordingly, new attempts are being made 
in Lower Saxony and in other Länder with two-tier systems to reduce and 
merge special-purpose Land authorities, integrate them into the higher- 
level Land authorities or shift them to local governments.
(2) In most Länder (especially the larger states with the exception of 
Lower Saxony) a three-tier administration dominates. The lowest level 
constitutes the counties, the highest level the Land ministries and the 
meso-level various forms of coordinating and bundling authorities. 
Institutional bundling of administrative functions as part of a three-level 
system (ministries, meso-level and counties) is the general model found in 
the Länder of Bavaria, Hesse, North Rhine-Westphalia, Baden- 
Württemberg, Saxony, Saxony-Anhalt, Thuringia and Rhineland- 
Palatinate. Among these Länder, three variants of meso-level instances can 
be distinguished and neither their tasks nor their integration into the 
administrative structure are uniform nationwide: a) an administrative unit 
(Landesverwaltungsamt) which assumes coordinating and bundling func-
tions for the whole territory of the Land (Saxony-Anhalt, Thuringia); b) 
functionally specialised directorates which, in some task areas, are respon-
sible only for specific regions and, in other tasks, for the whole territory of 
the Land (Rhineland-Palatinate); c) the traditional form of administrative 
districts which are regionally oriented instances in charge of bundling and 
coordinating subnational public functions for specific regions within the 
Land (Hesse, Baden-Württemberg, Bavaria, Saxony1 and North Rhine- 
Westphalia). In all three models, an attempt is made to achieve a far- 
reaching concentration of state tasks at the meso level, in particular by 
shifting the tasks of the lower state authorities to the meso level. Moreover, 
there has been a general attempt to concentrate these duties by privatising 
existing tasks according to political guidelines or by transferring them to 
the local government level and realigning some of the authorities.
Baden-Württemberg provides a prime example of this process. The 
multi-purpose meso-level state administration (administrative district 
authorities) has been substantially upgraded and functionally 
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strengthened since 2005. In addition, numerous state tasks have been 
transferred to the counties (waiving territorial reforms). The core element 
of the reform was the complete abolition of 350 out of a total of 450 exist-
ing single-purpose state authorities, whose tasks and employees were inte-
grated into the four multi-purpose administrative district authorities and 
into the thirty-five county administrations and nine county-free cities 
(Ebinger and Bogumil 2008). The counties received a large number of 
new responsibilities and emerged from the reform functionally strength-
ened, even though an increasing number of voices can be heard criticising 
the new excessive demands being placed on geographically small-scale 
counties with limited resources (cf. Kuhlmann 2015: 202).
3  functIonal reformS: decentralISatIon 
of State taSkS
Another essential feature of the reforms in the multilevel system are func-
tional reforms related to the decentralisation of state tasks to the local 
governments (also called communalisation). This reform approach aims at 
transferring tasks typically performed by single-function/special-purpose 
units of the Land to local self-government (counties/municipalities). It 
amounts to a strengthening of the multi-purpose organisation at the local 
level (Kuhlmann 2015: 188ff.). The transfer of state tasks to local authori-
ties can be structured in different legal ways. According to the model of 
‘genuine municipalisation’ (see Kuhlmann and Wollmann 2019: 161ff.) 
or ‘political decentralisation’ (Kuhlmann 2015: 187), all functions that are 
assigned to the local governments become ‘real’ (genuine) local self- 
government tasks for which the elected local council is responsible. By 
contrast, under the model of ‘pseudo-’ (in lieu of genuine) communalisa-
tion (cf. Wollmann 2008: 259ff.) or of ‘administrative decentralisation’ 
(Kuhlmann 2015: 187), local governments receive functions that are del-
egated to them by the state. The responsibility for the conduct of such 
delegated functions lies with the local government’s executive (mayor, 
head of county administration—Landrat) and not with the elected local 
council. The transfer of functions in the case of pseudo-communalisation 
or administrative decentralisation has significant consequences for the 
municipalities regarding both the internal relations between the local 
council and local executive and their external relation to the state. First, in 
the internal relationship, the local executive is solely responsible for the 
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implementation of these tasks, while the elected council has, at least for-
mally, no powers. Second, in the external relationship, the local adminis-
tration is subject to a functional and administrative supervision that goes 
beyond the legal oversight and that also addresses the merits and ade-
quateness of the activity concerned. By contrast, in cases of genuine com-
munalisation (political decentralisation), the elected local council is, 
internally, the highest decision-making body, while externally the munici-
pality stands only under the legal oversight of the state authorities. 
Although in both regards the distinction has often become blurred in local 
practice, it remains relevant if and when conflicts arise (cf. Wollmann 
2008: 259; Kuhlmann and Wollmann 2019: 161ff.). The current func-
tional reforms in Germany primarily correspond to the type of administra-
tive decentralisation (pseudo-communalisation). Most often, local councils 
are not granted any rights of political decision-making and control regard-
ing the new tasks transferred to them by state governments.
In Germany, the decentralisation of responsibilities is generally viewed 
positively on the basis of the subsidiarity principle. Indeed, a number of 
positive effects have been shown, but there are also some sobering empiri-
cal findings regarding the outcomes of functional reforms (see Kuhlmann 
et al. 2014; Kuhlmann 2010, 2015). On the one hand, there is a tendency 
for improved horizontal coordination capacities at the subnational level in 
Germany, especially after political decentralisation, but less in the case of 
administrative decentralisation. This seems to prove a general theory in 
administrative sciences according to which the integration of tasks within 
multifunctional, politically accountable local governments can help to 
improve territorial coordination within a given administrative jurisdiction. 
The reforms also demonstrate that the effectiveness of task fulfilment 
tends to be positively influenced by political decentralisation.
On the other hand, the euphoric expectations placed upon decentrali-
sation strategies in general cannot be justified by the German experience. 
Decentralisation often entails considerable additional costs and burdens 
which sometimes overload local governments. In none of the Länder have 
state governments shown much inclination to sufficiently address the bud-
getary problems of local governments by reimbursing costs. Such circum-
stances frequently increase the risk of default on their performance 
obligations, implementation failures or inconsistent applications of law. 
Furthermore, empirical evidence shows that any type of task transfer to 
lower levels of government exacerbates existing performance disparities or 
creates new ones. Thus, irrespective of whether a genuine or a 
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pseudo- communalisation is pursued, task transfer furthers the interlocal 
variation and makes the equity of service delivery shrink. It should be 
emphasised, however, that reform effects are also shaped by other inter-
vening factors, such as the local budgetary and staff situation, policy prop-
erties (e.g. person- related vs. technical tasks), local policy preferences and 
political interests in conjunction with the salience of the tasks transferred.
Against this background, it comes as no surprise that the effects of 
decentralisation vary greatly across individual municipalities, types of 
reform policy and fields of activity. Regulatory and technical tasks, such as 
in the environmental sector as a whole, seem rather unsuitable for decen-
tralisation, while distributive tasks and those heavily reliant on local net-
working, especially in welfare policies, can benefit from the enhanced local 
proximity (Kuhlmann et al. 2014; Kuhlmann 2015). It is worth noting 
that differing or negative reform effects can be seen to result from unre-
solved interface problems across administrative units, limits in local gov-
ernments’ territorial viability and resources, and the politicisation of newly 
transferred tasks.
4  terrItorIal reformS
There is considerable variance across Länder regarding the territorial 
structure of counties and municipalities (see Chap. 9). Of the 295 coun-
ties in Germany, 244 have at least 100,000 inhabitants and more than 100 
counties have at least 200,000 inhabitants. The average is 193,000 inhab-
itants in Western Germany and 162,000  in Eastern Germany. With an 
average of 95,000 inhabitants, the administrative counties in Thuringia 
are the smallest in Germany, with ten counties having fewer than 100,000 
inhabitants. The total number of inhabitants in Thuringia’s counties is 
about 40 per cent below the average for the eastern German Länder. The 
same applies to the number of inhabitants in the county-free cities, which 
are 47 per cent below the average of the eastern Länder and 64 per cent 
below the average of the western Länder (see Table 16.2). Out of a total 
of roughly 11,000 municipalities, there is a wide variance in territorial 
sizes across Länder too. Whereas in North Rhine-Westphalia the average 
size of the 400 municipalities is 45,000 inhabitants, Rhineland-Palatinate 
has about 2300 municipalities with 1700 inhabitants on average (see 
Table 16.3).
Due to the constitutionally entrenched power of the Länder to decide 
their ‘own’ territorial reform policy that reflects the different settlement 
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structures and varying party-political constellations, the reform strategies 
pursued in Germany show a high amount of variance across the Länder. 
In procedural terms, the Länder governments carried out their respective 
reform concepts by inserting a so-called voluntary phase during which 
municipalities were given the opportunity to ‘voluntarily’ adjust them-
selves to the territorial changes proposed. If agreement on the part of the 
(consulted) municipalities could not be reached, the Land parliament 
decided as a last resort by way of (binding) Land legislation.
Table 16.2 Territorial structures of counties in Germany
























































Source: Authors’ own compilation, Federal and Länder Statistical Offices; inhabitants and size as of 
31.12.2016
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In some of the West German Länder, comprehensive territorial reforms 
were adopted in the 1970s (see Bogumil 2016). The most radical 
approaches were pursued in North Rhine-Westphalia and Hesse, which 
are the most heavily urbanised and densely populated Länder in Germany. 
These reforms hinged on the amalgamation of all existing municipalities 
to form new territorially and functionally integrated municipalities. In 
both these Länder, the number of municipalities was drastically reduced 
by over 80 per cent. In North Rhine-Westphalia, this resulted in the estab-
lishment of newly integrated municipalities with an average of 46,000 
inhabitants (see Table 16.3). By contrast, in the majority of Länder, which 
mostly had more rural areas and were less densely populated, a softer 
approach was preferred, either by amalgamating only part of the munici-
palities (e.g. Bavaria) or providing for minimal or practically no 
Table 16.3 Territorial structures of municipalities in Germany
State Number of 
municipalities in total 
(December 2017)
Number of 
inhabitants in 000’s 
(December 2018)
Average number of 
inhabitants of 
municipalities
Baden-Württemberg 1101 11,070 10,054
Bavaria 2056 13,077 6360
Brandenburg 417 2512 6031








Rhineland-Palatinate 2305 4085 1772
Saarland 52 991 19,057
Saxony 422 4078 9663
Saxony-Anhalt 218 2208 10,128
Schleswig-Holstein 1110 2897 2609
Thuringia 849 2143 2524




Länder (excl. West 
Berlin)
8394 66,823 7997
East German Länder 
(excl. East Berlin)
2659 12,551 4720
Source: Authors’ own compilation, Federal and Länder Statistical Offices
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amalgamation (for instance Rhineland-Palatinate). Furthermore, in those 
areas with small-sized municipalities, a new level of inter-municipal forma-
tions was introduced with the aim of supporting the former in carrying 
out their functions. The proportion of municipalities that are members of 
an inter- municipal formation varies between the Länder, reflecting the 
different impetus of amalgamation. While in Rhineland-Palatinate it is 
98.2 per cent, it stands at 47.8 per cent in Bavaria. During the wave of 
territorial reforms that swept across the (West German) Länder during the 
1960s and 1970s, the counties in part went through a radical territorial 
rescaling by way of amalgamation as well. Nationwide, their total number 
was cut from 4254 to 237, which led to an average population size of 
600,000.
The main objectives of the territorial reforms of the 1970s were three-
fold: (1) to improve local government performance; (2) enhance capaci-
ties for fulfilling supra-local objectives, while (3) taking the aspect of 
proximity to citizens into account (Thieme and Prillwitz 1981: 45). 
Greater efficiency and cost reduction measures, pursued in the more 
recent (partly failed) reform attempts (see Kuhlmann et  al. 2018a, b), 
were not regarded as the main goals at the time. As a result of the 1970s 
reforms, local government performance is better today. Above all, their 
capacity to offer services has improved, as confirmed by international 
experience (cf. Kuhlmann et  al. 2018a, b with further references). 
Furthermore, the reforms led to a withdrawal of locally operating admin-
istrative units from the territory to institutional concentration, specialisa-
tion and professionalisation. As a consequence, it also led to a certain loss 
of territorial proximity and local political identity. The specialisation and 
professionalisation positively impacted the quality of service delivery, as it 
was now possible to maintain and expand certain services. However, there 
was a need for an institutional counterbalance to concentration and upscal-
ing. A number of administrative units were thus deconcentrated and local-
ised with the aim of bundling together the locally less specialised tasks and 
services that had direct contact with citizens. The lessons from this reform 
period are an emphasis on greater proximity to citizens, downscaling of 
complex tasks to municipalities and upscaling more specialised functions 
to centralised administrative units supported by efficient ICT (cf. Thieme 
and Prillwitz 1981). These lessons, however, were barely taken into con-
sideration in the more recent (partly failed) reform debates, which focussed 
more on reducing costs and increasing efficiency (Kuhlmann et al. 2018a, 
b) (Table 16.4).
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Since the early 1990s, the East German Länder have witnessed a prolif-
eration of territorial reforms. The need to amalgamate local governments 
in these Länder derives from the fact that after reunification the newly 
established municipalities were organised into small-scale units, which 
could not live up to the demands of the growing portfolio of tasks emerg-
ing at the local level—let alone those tasks to be transferred from state 
administration (see Chap. 15). After the first wave of consolidation in the 
mid-1990s, the already difficult situation of several public budgets intensi-
fied due to structural weaknesses and the debt cap imposed by the EU. This 
situation led to a second wave of territorial reforms in 2007  in Saxony, 
Saxony-Anhalt and Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania. This strong reform 
momentum has since come to a halt with the current reform attempts in 
the Länder of Brandenburg and Thuringia. While the early reforms were 
often carried out by reform coalitions striving for administrative sustain-
ability and competitiveness of their region, the new deliberations alone 
have become the plaything of political confrontation (see also Ebinger 
et al. 2018).
The situation of the Land of Brandenburg is an exemplary case. The 
population will shrink by about 10 per cent by 2030 and the average age 
will rise further, while the population density will develop more and more 
Table 16.4 Territorial reforms in the West German Länder
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Holstein
1378 1132 1110 19
Bavaria 7077 2056 2056 71
Lower Saxony 4231 1030 945 78
Baden- 
Württemberg
3379 1111 1101 67
Hesse 2684 426 426 84




2277 396 396 83
Source: Authors’ own compilation based on Bogumil (2016: 22), updated
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asymmetrically as a function of the distance to Berlin. Consequently, main-
taining infrastructure and services will become a challenge in most parts of 
the country. The cross-party study commission set up in preparation for 
the reform of the administrative structure concluded that a territorial 
reform at county level is indispensable. While the appraisals were similar 
across Eastern Germany, the set of reform ventures vary considerably con-
cerning drivers (big or small coalition), scope (only county level or munic-
ipal—though with time offset), target figures set, actual territorial changes 
achieved as well as related decentralisation processes (see above).
In Saxony-Anhalt, a territorial reform was executed at both the county 
and the municipal level. Following the first county-level territorial reform 
of 1994, the Land Parliament introduced further changes in 2007 under 
the auspices of the Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschlands (CDU) 
and the Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (SPD). The number of 
counties was reduced from twenty-one to eleven with an average of 
153,000 inhabitants (ranging from 86,000 to 223,000 in 2015) and cov-
ering an area between 1400 km2 and 2400 km2. The three county-free 
cities were maintained. At the municipal level, two reforms succeeded in 
2004 and 2011. As a result of amalgamation, the number of municipalities 
decreased by more than 80 per cent, from 1300 (2003) to 218 (2015), 
which have an average of 11,000 inhabitants.
Similarly, Saxony implemented territorial reforms at both the municipal 
and the county level. After the first territorial reform at county level from 
1994 to 1996 and at municipal level in 1998, the CDU and the SPD 
approved another reform in 2008. The remaining twenty-two counties 
were reduced to ten and the seven county-free cities to three. The ten 
counties had between 200,000 and 355,000 inhabitants in 2012. The 
counties cover an area between 1400 km2 and 2400 km2, with the excep-
tion of one covering 950 km2. At the municipal level, the number of units 
decreased by voluntary amalgamation from an original 1626 in 1990 to 
540 in the first territorial reform of 1998, and to 426 as of today, while the 
average number of inhabitants increased to 9500.
Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania introduced the first county-level ter-
ritorial reform in 1994. A further reformative attempt in 2007 was 
thwarted by the Land’s constitutional court (Bogumil and Ebinger 2008). 
However, in 2011 the parliament finally approved a reform with the sup-
port of the CDU and the SPD. The result was a merger of twelve counties 
into six and six county-free cities into two. These new counties cover an 
area between 2100  km2 and 5400  km2, corresponding to the biggest 
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county in the whole of Germany. The population varied between 156,000 
and 264,000 in 2012, with an average of 217,000. Mecklenburg-Western 
Pomerania has not yet carried out any territorial reform at the munici-
pal level.
The Brandenburg Parliament agreed in July 2016 on a blueprint for 
structural reform of the administration in 2019 in the hands of the SPD 
and Die Linke (The Left). The reform envisaged there would be a popula-
tion of at least 175,000 in the counties and 150,000 in the county-free 
cities by 2030. A first proposal with scientific backing that put forward 
merging the fourteen counties to nine and four county-free cities to one 
(Potsdam) met with strong opposition. Against the reservations of the 
parliament’s study commission, the Ministry of the Interior of the Land 
Brandenburg was urged into devising a watered-down solution, reducing 
the number of counties to eleven. However, because of persisting opposi-
tion, the county-level territorial reform was finally discarded in 
November 2017.
In Thuringia, following the first territorial reform at county level in 
1994, the SPD, Die Linke and Die Grünen (the Greens) approved in 2016 
a blueprint and an interim law for administrative, functional and territorial 
reform. The territorial reform envisaged that the number of municipalities 
would decrease from 850 to 200 and the seventeen counties to eight, with 
a minimum population of 130,000 at county level and 6000 at municipal 
level. Of the six county-free cities, only Erfurt and Jena (with more than 
100,000 inhabitants) would maintain their status (Bogumil 2016). 
However, the reformative plans of the Land government met with strong 
resistance from the opposition and the communal arena. Furthermore, the 
ratification of the interim law was declared invalid on formal grounds by 
the Federal Constitutional Court. As a result, the government abandoned 
the project on 30 November 2017 (Table 16.5).
One might wonder why the more recent territorial reforms in East 
Germany (Thuringia and Brandenburg) have failed compared to previous 
reforms in Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania, Saxony, Saxony-Anhalt and 
West Germany (see above). Here, there are various factors to consider. 
First, the political constellations have changed. In both Thuringia and 
Brandenburg, only very narrow parliamentary majorities were in favour of 
these reforms, while large political coalitions had supported them in the 
past. Second, the measures for consultation and active citizen participation 
carried out by the state government in Brandenburg to enhance support 
for the reforms turned out to be rather dysfunctional. Instead of 
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supporting the government’s reform agenda, the local governments, may-
ors and heads of county councils used the direct-democratic participatory 
arena as a public forum for mobilising protest against the reform. 
Moreover, the opposition parties (the CDU; the Freie Demokratische 
Partei, (FDP); and the Alternative für Deutschland (AfD)) allied them-
selves with the mass media and thus fuelled a highly emotionalised debate 
impeding any attempt at objective and evidence-based discourse. Finally, 
the state government overemphasised increases in efficiency as a major 
reform goal, which, based on earlier reform experience, raised doubts 
about the expected reform success and sharply contrasted with the previ-
ous reforms in West Germany. These reforms were much more guided by 
policies that aimed at improving local governments’ performance and 
capacities rather than increasing efficiency and reducing costs.
5  concluSIonS and leSSonS for tranSfer
A good decade after the entry into force of the major reform projects at 
national level, the administrative landscape in some Länder has undergone 
fundamental changes (Kuhlmann 2009). The bundling of responsibilities, 
the dismantling of double administrations, communalisation and territo-
rial reforms are steps in the right direction towards modernising and 
improving the performance of subnational public administration. In order 
for these measures to achieve their goals, however, it is vital to ensure that 
they are used in a prudent and task-oriented manner and not merely as a 
calculated political manoeuvre or to achieve savings targets. The 
Table 16.5 Territorial reforms in the East German Länder














1117 994 753 33
Saxony-Anhalt 1349 1289 218 84
Thuringia 1699 1017 849 50
Brandenburg 1775 422 417 76
Saxony 1623 540 422 74
Source: Authors’ own compilation based on Bogumil (2016: 24), updated
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observation of the current administrative reforms makes it clear that, when 
shifting responsibilities, certain factors must be taken into account (for an 
international overview see Schwab et  al. 2017; Kuhlmann 2010). For 
instance, factors such as the ability of the municipalities to provide services 
that are seldom required but demand a high degree of specialisation, the 
efficiency with which tasks are performed and the uniformity of adminis-
trative execution. The particularly pronounced tension between technical 
and political objectives at this level due to local proximity and the demo-
cratic legitimacy of the decision-maker is also an important factor. There is 
also a close connection between the possibility of functional reforms and 
the existing territorial structures (Kuhlmann et  al. 2018a, b; Ebinger 
et al. 2018).
In practice, the problem is that in the field of administrative structural 
reforms, it is not always possible to combine technical arguments, political 
will and enforceability. It is not surprising that this has never fully been 
achieved. For example, political decisions made in both the administrative 
structural reform in Baden-Württemberg and in Saxony could hardly be 
justified from a technical point of view. However, until 2011 it was possi-
ble, at least in large coalitions, to implement (necessary) territorial reforms. 
In the light of past experience in Thuringia and Brandenburg, there is 
good reason to be more sceptical here. The majorities in each case were 
narrow and this certainly made the reforms more difficult. Even the earlier 
(reform) alliances between the local government associations and the state 
governments, such as in Saxony, were no longer possible as it was only a 
question of power. How to combine the positive modernisation will of the 
state governments with functional and regional reforms and integrating 
the knowledge of the administration into the process is still an open ques-
tion and also dependent on political framework conditions. An important 
lesson to learn from the various waves of (successful and failed) territorial 
reforms in Germany is that they should not be justified mainly by the argu-
ment of increasing efficiency, but of improving local governments’ capaci-
ties and performance instead. The latter effects of territorial upscaling are 
well documented in literature and supported by empirical findings, while 
greater efficiency and cost savings through mergers have not generally 
been recorded as they largely depend on specific context conditions and 
local implementation processes (cf. Kuhlmann et al. 2018a; for the con-
ceptual background see Kuhlmann and Wollmann 2011).
A major strength of the German administrative system is that it pro-
motes territorial and functional variations, which allow for flexible models 
 S. KUHLMANN AND J. BOGUMIL
287
of subnational intergovernmental organisation. This variety of institu-
tional set-up and reform approaches encourages piloting, adjustments and 
learning. However, different models can lead to differences in service pro-
vision, treatment of citizens and varying institutional progress of local 
administration. Furthermore, a balance needs to be found between ‘too 
small’ and ‘too big’ territorial jurisdictions. A continuous monitoring of 
local governments’ service quality and performance seems indispensable 
for identifying new reform requirements in due time and for adjusting 
institutional settings accordingly. Many of the organisational features and 
reform approaches discussed here make perfect sense in the German 
politico- administrative context. They constitute domestic institutional 
responses to context-specific problems agreed upon by state and local 
actors. Given such particularities, any possible transfer of the German 
institutional solutions described in this chapter should be approached with 
caution, and the respective country-specific political, administrative and 
cultural circumstances should be taken into consideration when drawing 
on lessons and translating concepts.
note
1. The three administrative districts were renamed Landesdirektionen in 2008. 
On 1 March 2012, these were formally merged into one regional directorate 
(which continues to have regional branches).
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CHAPTER 17
Institutional Differentiation of Public Service 





Recent decades have seen an increasing transfer of public service1 provi-
sion to institutions outside the core administration. This process of dif-
ferentiation in the performance of public tasks has led to significant 
changes in the institutional landscape. The shift from the model of the 
‘caring welfare state’ towards the model of the ‘enabling and ensuring 
state’ has fundamentally changed the understanding of the state in 
Germany. Public services are no longer exclusively and directly delivered 
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by the core administration of the state and municipalities, but also by 
external (not-for-profit and private) organisations.
The idea behind the model of the ‘enabling and ensuring state’ is the 
division into different levels of responsibility for service provision (guaran-
teeing, providing, financing and serving as a fallback provider; see: 
Schuppert 2005). This kind of division of responsibilities results in a com-
plex network of public and private actors (which can be described as prin-
cipal–agent relationships).
Following the arguments of the Public Choice Theory, the reasons for 
the institutional differentiation in Germany are, on the one hand, criticism 
of the inefficiency and ineffectiveness of public administration as a monop-
olistic service provider. On the other hand, there have been political ten-
dencies to push the state back in favour of the private sector (in conjunction 
with anti-bureaucratic, market-oriented reforms for the remaining state 
and more ‘choice’ for citizens) and to divide monolithic-bureaucratic 
administrations into smaller decentralised units.
Within the framework of the enabling state model, the state has a wide 
range of institutional arrangements to choose from in order to ensure the 
performance of public tasks. Public services can be produced and delivered 
by (cf. Reichard and Röber 2019):2
• different departments and units of the public core administration 
(in-house provision);
• corporatisation, which can be understood as the institutional transfer 
of tasks from administrative units into companies. Corporations 
remain completely or partially in state or municipal ownership. A 
distinction can be made between the following options:
 – partly independent institution without its own legal status and 
with rather limited autonomy (e.g. government-operated/semi- 
autonomous agency/utility) (Eigenbetrieb),
 – public institution and foundation under public law (Anstalt und 
Stiftung des öffentlichen Rechts),
 – local administrative association as single-purpose agency which is 
an association of several local authorities for the joint performance 
of a specific public task (e.g. water supply/sewerage or local public 
transportation) (Zweckverband),
 – legally and organisationally independent institution which, 
although still fully or partly owned by the state or municipality, 
has a minimum degree of managerial autonomy as state- or 
municipal-owned enterprise (formelle Privatisierung). It usually 
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takes place in the private legal form of the limited liability com-
pany (Gesellschaft mit beschränkter Haftung) or joint-stock com-
pany (Aktiengesellschaft),
 – hybrid institution, such as a corporation jointly owned by public 
and private shareholders (also called institutional public-private- 
partnership (PPP));
• outsourcing or contracting out (funktionale Privatisierung) for 
which the public sector withdraws partially or completely from the 
provision of services by transferring a task or part of it to private 
organisations for a fixed period of time, but still retains the responsi-
bility for ensuring these services (e.g. awarding of concessions). A 
special form of outsourcing is contractual PPPs, which means the 
transfer of services or functions to private companies based on con-
tracts for a limited time period. The private organisation will gener-
ally be a commercial private enterprise, but a private not-for-profit 
organisation can also be considered (e.g. provision of social services 
by welfare associations), and
• privatisation as the complete transfer of a public task to private enti-
ties (materielle Privatisierung) in which the state relieves itself of all 
responsibility and has only a minor influence on the scope of tasks in 
the form of regulation (full retreat of the state).3
After decades of privatising public services, several municipalities have 
terminated concession contracts which were formerly awarded to external 
private suppliers or have—in a very few cases—bought back utilities. 
Therefore, we observe a debate about the advantages of publicly provided 
services vis-à-vis privatised ones at the local level. Re-municipalisation—
which is about returning previously (in most cases, functionally) privatised 
public supply and disposal services to local authorities—has been on the 
agenda of local politicians for the last ten years.
If the state or a local authority wants to make a decision about which 
institutional arrangement should be used to perform a public task, the 
criteria of strategic relevance (i.e. the importance of fulfilling a task for 
implementing policy objectives), the specificity of resources (i.e. the extent 
of the exclusivity of public resources which are necessary for the provision 
of services compared to an alternative use of resource) and the cost-effec-
tiveness of task performance by comparing production costs and transac-
tion costs (e.g. for contract initiation, coordination and monitoring) of 
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different institutional arrangements4 should be taken into consideration 
(Warm et al. 2018). Taking these fundamentals of institutional economics 
into account, there is—as mentioned above—a wide range of organisa-
tional options for the provision of public services, namely corporatisation, 
outsourcing, privatisation and re-municipalisation. These four different 
options will be outlined in the next section with regard to their objectives, 
advantages and disadvantages as well as selected empirical findings and 
trends in Germany.
2  ServIce ProvISIon Between corPoratISatIon, 
outSourcIng, PrIvatISatIon and re-munIcIPalISatIon
2.1  Corporatisation
According to the calculations of the German Federal Statistical Office, the 
total number of corporations which are fully or partly owned by public 
authorities at federal, state and local level is round about 15,000.5 The 
majority of these corporations operate at local level (approximately 90 per 
cent). About two-thirds of the federal workforce and about half of the 
municipal employees are employed in these corporations. State-owned 
enterprises are responsible for more than half of the public sector’s invest-
ments. The debt ratio of these enterprises is often even higher than that 
of the core administration. Approximately one-third of these institutions 
are organised under public law in the form of government-operated/
semi- autonomous utilities, public institutions and foundations under 
public law or local administrative associations, which are under public law 
and owned by several local authorities. Almost two-thirds are private-law 
types of corporatisation mostly in the form of a limited liability company 
and a joint- stock company (German Federal Statistical Office 2014; 
German Institute for Economic Research 2017; Hesse et  al. 2017; 
Kuhlmann and Wollmann 2019). The legal form of the limited liability 
company predominates because, unlike a joint-stock company, this form 
enables the public owner to exert more influence on corporate strategies 
and business plans through articles of association (Gesellschaftsvertrag), 
assembly of owners (Gesellschafterversammlung) and owner instruction 
(Gesellschafteranweisung).
The aim of corporatisation, that is the transformation of administrative 
units into companies, is to enable these newly established public enter-
prises to act more flexibly and independently. This should relieve the core 
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administration of purely operational tasks and the provision of services and 
position it more strongly as a strategic control unit. As a corporatisation 
can often focus on a single task (similar to the single-purpose agencies in 
Great Britain), it is expected that their formation will lead to greater pro-
fessionalism and stability in the fulfilment of tasks (Reichard and 
Röber 2019).
Corporatisation can also be a matter of relieving political entities by 
pulling politically controversial issues out of the ‘line of fire’ of everyday 
party politics. Especially in the creation of companies under private law, 
the circumvention of public services and budget law or bureaucratic pro-
curement law is often a motive. Moreover, there is no doubt that hidden 
motives also play a role. On the one hand, corporatisation can be used to 
‘hide’ loans and thereby conceal public debt (‘shadow budgets’). State- 
owned enterprises hold nearly 38 per cent of the state’s total debt. At the 
local level, approximately 60 per cent of all municipal debts relate to their 
municipal-owned enterprises (Schaefer and Friedländer 2019). On the 
other hand, it can be very tempting to provide distinguished party mem-
bers with lucrative and well-paid posts or to use these enterprises for party- 
political manoeuvring (Ennser-Jedenastik 2014; Schröter and Röber 2017).
Although it is difficult to empirically prove that corporatisation has led 
to an increase in efficiency and flexibility, some research results suggest 
that such effects have been produced—but not to the extent initially 
assumed (e.g. Voorn et  al. 2017; Lindlbauer et  al. 2015; Mühlenkamp 
2015). In addition, the necessarily formal communication structures 
between the public owner and its corporation (e.g. in the case of a limited 
liability company through the above-mentioned mechanism) as well as 
new requirements for accountability seem to have increased the transpar-
ency of decision-making processes (Schröter and Röber 2017). Moreover, 
in many cases, a certain cultural change from being less bureaucratic to 
being more entrepreneurial could be observed (Reichard and Röber 2019).
However, corporatisation can also have some negative consequences. 
The process of corporatisation in recent decades has resulted in a frag-
mented organisational landscape. Particularly in large German cities, we 
find highly complex corporate structures with hundreds of municipal 
holdings (e.g. the city of Frankfurt am Main with more than 540 munici-
pal holdings), which are hard to control and steer solely by the traditional 
bureaucratic concepts of hierarchy and planning. In some cases, corpora-
tions and their managers enjoy too much autonomy, leading to increasing 
inconsistencies between local policy objectives and corporate purpose. 
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Centrifugal dynamics can give rise to serious steering and control prob-
lems for local authorities. In addition, experiences at the local level show 
that performance information is insufficiently used for the control of the 
described corporate structures, so that important prerequisites for an 
effective holdings management are often still missing (Friedländer 2019; 
Wollmann 2016; see Sect. 3). Overall, decisions on corporatisation should 
be carefully prepared and weighed up to see whether the benefits of 
enhanced autonomy are appropriate to the loss of steering and control by 
public authorities.
A special type of corporatisation is institutional PPPs, which are under 
private law and in a mixed public-private ownership (Duffield 2010). The 
influence of the two owners on the company’s policy formally depends on 
the size of their capital shares. With a few exceptions, there is a huge lack 
of reliable statistical data available for this type of enterprise. Based on the 
analysis of holdings reports, it is assumed that about two-thirds of compa-
nies at the federal and state level and nearly 40 per cent of all municipal 
corporations are institutional PPPs (Reichard 2016 with further refer-
ences). Due to their mixed ownership, institutional PPPs differ from other 
forms of corporatisation in certain aspects, insofar as the two owner groups 
have different interests, goals, core competencies and organisational cul-
tures. These ‘trade-offs’ between public and private ownership require 
complex modes of coordination, which can lead to extensive negotiation 
processes. Success in coordination efforts very much depends on how well 
both sides are able to tolerate different cultural imprints and competencies 
(e.g. basic understanding of the public interest and political decision- 
making processes, managerial skills or competencies in inter-sectoral coop-
eration) and how they can harmonise these special properties with each 
other (Röber and Schröter 2016).
2.2  Outsourcing
The basic idea behind the outsourcing of public tasks to private actors 
(also referred to as contracting out or functional privatisation) is that pub-
lic administration can concentrate on its politically defined core functions 
and be relieved of the burden of providing services that can be produced 
in a better quality and more cost-effectively by other—private—organisa-
tions (‘principle of subsidiarity’). In the case of ‘outsourcing’, a service 
contract is concluded between the contracting authority and the private 
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contractor. The responsibility for ensuring the service provision remains 
with the state (for the following, see: Röber 2018).
In Germany there is a long tradition—in contrast to unitary welfare 
states—of involving not-for-profit and private institutions in the provision 
of public services, such as in the areas of healthcare and social services 
(Kuhlmann and Wollmann 2019; Grohs 2014). Moreover, numerous ser-
vices (e.g. supply and disposal services), internal administrative services 
and annexe tasks (e.g. cleaning services) have been outsourced to private 
companies since the 1980s.
The main motives for outsourcing public tasks and services to private 
actors—particularly in the light of the challenging budgetary situation of 
many local authorities—are similar to those of corporatisation. It is also 
expected that costs of public services can be reduced by enabling private 
actors to be more productive due to specialisation and higher levels of 
efficiency as well as by lower wage levels. Beyond that, ideological convic-
tions continue to contribute to the existence of preferences for private 
service providers (for more details, see below on privatisation).
Although there are no systematic and comprehensive empirical studies 
on the consequences of outsourcing, some experiences suggest that from 
the citizens’ point of view quality of service provision may decline 
(Dahlström et al. 2018). In addition, comparative studies tend to point to 
similar effects in the case of corporatisation (Pollitt and Talbot 2004)—
including cautious assessments that outsourcing can reduce costs under 
certain conditions, although there is so far insufficient empirical evidence 
for stronger effects on government spending behaviour (Alonso 
et al. 2015).
However, when making estimates of cost reduction it should be noted 
that potential—but often rather short-term—effects must be compared 
with the transaction costs associated with the outsourcing process (i.e. 
cost of awarding, contract design, monitoring and renegotiation). 
Furthermore, public authorities should avoid becoming dependent on 
market-dominating private providers. It is advisable for the public sector 
to maintain a minimum of relevant ‘production know-how’ as this can 
prevent information asymmetries between the public contracting author-
ity and the private service provider. This also creates the possibility of still 
being able to competently assess the services of the private supplier with 
regard to their price-performance ratio (cf. Röber 2018).
After a relatively strong trend of outsourcing over the past twenty years, 
this institutional arrangement is now being regarded with increasing 
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scepticism. In many cases, it was not possible to meet the savings expecta-
tions, so now there is a tendency to return to more public arrangements 
(see below on re-municipalisation). Outsourcing of public services can, 
however, be a reasonable alternative to in-house provision as long as the 
service is suitable (e.g. in terms of low strategic relevance or low specific-
ity), easy to describe and easy to measure. Furthermore, the contract 
design should ensure successful control, and the contracting authority 
should be in a position to constantly monitor the process of service provi-
sion. Finally, it is important that a sufficient degree of competition exists.
These requirements become even more obvious when it comes to con-
tractual PPPs that represent a specific form of outsourcing. Contractual 
PPPs are contractual agreements that allow for the transfer of services or 
functions to private companies typically based on long-term contracts for 
a period of twenty to thirty years (Duffield 2010). In Germany, they are 
most frequently used for physical infrastructure projects in the social sec-
tor, such as schools, hospitals or sports facilities. Based on previous experi-
ences, this form of outsourcing has become controversial. Although 
contractual PPPs are mostly justified with possible efficiency benefits, 
there are, so far, no reliable empirical findings to suggest these efficiency 
gains have been made. As a result, relatively few new PPP projects in 
building and road construction have been launched in Germany since 2012.
Contractual PPPs tend to involve high transaction costs as the often 
very complex and long-term contracts require extensive adjustments and 
renegotiations. The theoretical concept of ‘incomplete contracts’—as the 
key to the economic understanding of contractual PPPs—implies that, 
due to bounded rationalities, not all actions and their consequences can be 
adequately regulated for the future and that the state or a local authority 
runs a high risk of bearing these unregulated consequences (e.g. higher 
costs in the operating phase because of savings or deficiencies in the con-
struction phase). Under these circumstances, the bundling of the different 
phases of a PPP life cycle, that is from planning, construction, operation 
to recovery, can increase efficiency and is therefore recommended for such 
projects. Unfortunately, in most cases, this life cycle approach is not con-
sistently followed in practice.
2.3  Privatisation
Looking at privatisation—as the complete transfer of public tasks and pub-
lic ownership to private entities—from a historical perspective, it can be 
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noted that since the 1970s—not only in Germany but in all OECD coun-
tries—the idea of the welfare state and its institutions has come under 
pressure due to obvious, but sometimes only perceived, inefficiencies of 
public institutions (‘state failure’). The main explanations offered for state 
failure are the selfish behaviour of politicians, the budget-maximising 
behaviour of bureaucrats, the lobbying of powerful interest groups and 
inappropriate pricing for public services. As a consequence of the assumed 
state failure—and in line with changing ideologies towards the lean or 
minimal state—there has been overall stronger support for privatisations 
in society and politics. Nevertheless, as far as privatisation is concerned, 
from an international perspective, Germany was among the OECD coun-
tries that pursued a cautious privatisation policy. Although there have been 
some privatisations of assets such as the federal government’s industrial 
holdings, privatisations have been fairly moderate (Sack 2019). The most 
relevant areas of privatisation are supply and disposal, postal services, tele-
communications and housing. At the municipal level, about one-third of 
municipalities have had experience with rather modest privatisation proj-
ects—especially in the energy and waste sector. In the last two decades, 
however, the policy of the European Commission for further liberalisation 
has increased pressure considerably (Röber 2018).
Similar to outsourcing, considerations on privatisation are primarily 
concerned with financial objectives (cost reduction and budget relief). In 
addition, however, general ideological positions (‘private enterprises basi-
cally make everything better and cheaper’) as well as economic and regula-
tory motives have played a role and fostered the private sector.
The effects of privatisation are still the subject of controversial discus-
sion, not least because empirical studies produce mixed results. These con-
troversies relate to different assessments of cost reductions, deterioration 
in quality, price increases, deterioration in working conditions, the forma-
tion of oligopolies in the markets of public services, externalisation of eco-
nomic, social and ecological risks as well as adverse effects on the democratic 
control.
In principle, privatisation as the complete transfer of public tasks and 
public ownership to private entities means that a task loses its ‘public’ 
character. It can only be influenced to a limited extent by the state through 
regulatory policies such as general legislation and regulatory supervision. 
For this reason, the decisions to privatise have more serious consequences 
than those to outsource public tasks for a limited period of time. An 
important prerequisite for a successful privatisation policy is therefore that 
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the state is not pushed back and undermined in its regulatory functions, 
but is in a position to set rules and—if necessary—to enforce them.
Against the background of current studies on privatisation, it should be 
noted, particularly in the context of public services, that ownership—as a 
regulatory parameter—has lost its importance. Much more important in 
terms of regulatory policy than the question of ownership—and the result-
ing advocacy or rejection of privatisation—is the question of how com-
petitive structures and regulatory regimes can be created in which public 
and private enterprises can operate for the benefit of society and the citi-
zens, without this leading to misallocations, loss of efficiency or abuse of 
power (see Sect. 3).
2.4  Re-municipalisation
More recently, we observe an increasing scepticism about privatisation 
projects. In the last few years, there has been growing citizen resistance to 
planned municipal privatisations, and some municipalities have terminated 
concession contracts which were formerly awarded to external private sup-
pliers or have—in a very few cases—bought back utilities (Bönker 
et al. 2016).
In other words, re-municipalisation is about returning previously (in 
most cases, functionally) privatised public supply and disposal services to 
local authorities. Consequently, it is an issue related to previous privatisa-
tion decisions. Re-municipalisation is a possible result of the revaluation of 
choice options in the light of former experiences with privatisation 
programmes.
Apart from other reasons (e.g. ensuring sufficient control of service 
provision, achieving synergies in municipal corporate structures and socio-
economic reasons, such as contributing to regional employment policies), 
the global financial crisis was, without doubt, a strong driver for such a 
reappraisal as the neoliberal dogma of private sector supremacy has been 
severely damaged. Furthermore, growing doubts persist about the merits 
of privatisation. Potential reasons for the ‘municipalisation- renaissance’ 
are obvious failures of privatisation, anxieties of citizens, stronger self-con-
fidence of local authorities in running their services efficiently and effec-
tively, and increasing fears that the idea of local self- government could be 
hollowed out if more and more services were transferred to private entities 
that cannot be controlled politically (Friedländer and Röber 2016; 
Schaefer and Theuvsen 2012).
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Against the background of this political discourse, a process began in 
Germany about twenty years ago—especially at the municipal level—to 
reverse outsourcing and privatisation, at least partially. As a result of this 
process, an increasing importance of public enterprises can be observed. 
Between 2000 and 2013, the number of public funds, utilities and enter-
prises rose steadily by approximately 25 per cent from roundabout 12,240 
to—as already mentioned—approximately 15,000 (Hesse et al. 2017).
Some evidence on re-municipalisation can mainly be observed in the 
energy sector. Between 2007 and 2012, more than 160 concessions were 
taken over by municipalities or municipal companies. A current study has 
identified seventy-two newly founded municipal energy utilities in the 
period from 2005 (Wagner and Berlo 2015). In the period from 2000 to 
2011, sales revenues of municipal energy utilities rose from €51.9 billion 
to €114.9 billion (179 per cent). Thus, their share of nominal GDP has 
more than doubled (Monopoly Commission 2013).
The concerns of many local authorities that their own utilities could not 
withstand competition from private energy suppliers have been dimin-
ished. Municipalities that privatised large parts of their energy supply in 
the early 1990s are becoming increasingly aware of the lack of influence 
on the supply infrastructure and urban development. The dynamic of re- 
municipalisation was mainly fuelled by two factors: first, the development 
of energy from renewable resources and second, the expiry of existing 
electricity and gas concessions. The share of renewable energy in Germany’s 
total heat and electricity consumption is to increase from 20 per cent in 
2020 to 60 per cent by 2050—accompanied by a 50 per cent improve-
ment in energy efficiency. This implies a tendency towards more decen-
tralisation in power generation with better chances for municipal public 
utilities to enter/re-enter the energy market. Experts assume that the 
trend towards re-established or newly established municipal utilities will 
continue. However, the takeover of distribution networks will tend to 
decline in the coming years due to the decreasing number of expiring 
concessions (Libbe 2013).
The picture in waste management is quite similar. Here we observe an 
increase in municipal provision. The absolute revenues of public waste 
disposal services increased between 2001 and 2011 by about €4.6 billion 
(growth rate of 33.7 per cent) (Monopoly Commission 2013). Empirical 
findings show that in recent years some local authorities (especially smaller 
cities and districts) have opted for in-house provision rather than out-
sourcing (Opphard et  al. 2010). In other municipal service areas, the 
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emphasis on re-municipalisation is rather low. This applies, for instance, in 
the water and sewage industry and in the public transport sector. Most 
service providers in these sectors are still public and the ratio of privatised 
corporations is very low.
Although the sectoral re-municipalisation tendencies go beyond the 
individual projects, no visible general trend towards re-municipalisation 
can be observed in Germany. It remains unclear to what extent these 
developments are of a long-lasting nature, that is whether they will tend to 
spread further or are more likely to decline. This can be said for Germany 
and other European countries where different developments can also be 
observed in the various sectors of public services and where the diversity 
and differentiation of the institutional landscape is also increasing rather 
than decreasing (Friedländer and Röber 2016; Wollmann 2016).
3  leSSonS learned
Each of the above-mentioned institutional arrangements has important 
consequences for steering, governance and management requirements, 
which will continue to increase rather than decrease. Practitioners facing 
these complex issues have to deal with various actors who can differ greatly 
in their goals, risk preferences, logic of action, core competencies and 
organisational cultures. In addition, all these issues involve micropolitics 
that are difficult to influence but are, in many cases, crucial.
Better management in decentralised or external institutions with no 
corresponding capabilities in public authorities and politics will most 
probably widen the skills gap, which can, in turn, lead to an uncontrollable 
autonomy of these institutions and too little influence on public service 
provision. Recent research results show that it is becoming more difficult 
for public authorities to strike a balance between ‘freedom to manage’ 
(e.g. managerial autonomy of corporations) on the one hand, and political 
control (e.g. enforcement of policy objectives) on the other, through dif-
ferent forms of coordination as well as embedded or connected modes, 
including appropriate incentive and sanction mechanisms as well as quality 
standards, which fit exactly to a specific organisational setting (Friedländer 
2019). This requires a system of integrated coordination and manage-
ment, which focusses on the core administration as well as on the various 
forms of decentralised and external institutions or service providers.
Looking in particular at the relationship between municipalities and 
their corporations, municipal codes require that local authorities exert a 
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reasonable influence on these institutions. As a result, most German 
municipalities have a corporate governance or holdings management sys-
tem that includes all the tasks, institutions, actors and administrative units 
involved in enabling a municipality as an owner to take responsibility for 
the control of its enterprises. This system also involves the activities of 
supervisory bodies and representatives of the shareholders within munici-
pal corporations as well as political committees responsible for finance and 
holdings (Ausschüsse für Finanzen und Beteiligungen) (similar regulatory 
mechanisms exist at federal and state level).
Some municipal charters additionally require the establishment of an 
administrative unit for holdings management, which can be arranged very 
differently within or outside the municipal administration. In most cases, 
this unit is either part of the finance department or organised as a separate 
department or located as a staff position directly with the mayor (central 
organisation). Some cities use a decentralised form in which holdings 
management is carried out by the specialised administrative departments 
(e.g. housing, water and energy) or a combination of both, that is a cen-
tralised/decentralised form. In a few cities, holdings management is not 
part of the core administration but is carried out externally by an institu-
tion which is completely in municipal ownership (Schaefer 2004).
Apart from this, the duality of supervisory board and management 
board applies to the majority of municipal-owned enterprises. The German 
corporate law subjects owners of a limited liability company of a certain 
size to the rules that apply to joint stock companies by introducing a dual 
structure of governing boards. Moreover, individual German states require 
local governments to establish supervisory boards—regardless of the size 
of the corporation—if they opt to pursue their economic activities in the 
form of a private-law company. Therefore, the composition of board 
membership, and the selection, recruitment and appointment of individ-
ual board members are highly significant matters in the management and 
control of public enterprises (Schröter and Röber 2017).
In summary, the institutional options for providing public services have 
become highly differentiated and have, of course, their own specific advan-
tages and disadvantages. If the public sector does not opt for in-house 
provision, a key challenge will be exerting an appropriate level of influence 
over the provision of services, which normally diminishes significantly 
when taking the ‘corporatisation’ to ‘privatisation’ option. It is necessary 
to ensure that an institutional arrangement guarantees an accessible, 
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qualitatively appropriate and financially stable fulfilment of tasks. And 
finally, the service must be provided efficiently.
However, valid assessments of the efficiency of the various institutional 
options are difficult to make as such organisational solutions often have a 
time horizon of between twenty and thirty years. For this reason, the 
costs, effects and behaviour of the various actors can only be evaluated 
with a considerable degree of uncertainty. Furthermore, as already men-
tioned, transaction costs associated with the planning, control and moni-
toring of a particular arrangement of service provision play a significant 
role in efficiency assessments. Therefore, these ‘control costs’ should not 
be ignored.
From a more fundamental position, it should be emphasised that the 
debate about public versus private service provision might now be a fairly 
outdated discussion because both options only differ from each other in 
terms of property. Hence, the debate is primarily focussed on ownership 
issues—while questions of appropriate market structures and regulation 
are neglected. This only leads to an exchange of more or less ideological 
convictions. It is most likely that ownership issues are overestimated and 
less relevant for the efficiency and effectiveness of service provision.
An important starting point for correcting these misconceptions would 
be to take a somewhat more functional perspective rather than the tradi-
tional institutional and ownership-based perspective (state-owned versus 
private enterprises). Following this idea, it would be useful to have serious 
debates about private or public service provision regarding public tasks 
and services, and about which institutional arrangements and organisa-
tional structures are the most suitable for performing these tasks and pub-
lic services. The brief overview of opportunities and trends in the provision 
of public services shows that the institutional arrangements for services 
provision vary, each option has its own specific advantages and disadvan-
tages and that there is no one-size-fits-all solution.
Consequently, the public sector will need to evaluate the respective 
strengths and weaknesses on a case-by-case basis. In essence, it is about the 
conscious choice and design of the institutional structure and its steering. 
Decisions about organisational arrangements—which are ultimately policy 
decisions—make it absolutely necessary to use procedures enabling practi-
tioners to systematically analyse current framework conditions and objec-
tives as well as consider all possible institutional options.6
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noteS
1. The German term for these services is Daseinsvorsorge and covers technical 
infrastructure (traffic and transport facilities, gas, water and electricity sup-
ply, refuse collection, sewage disposal, telecommunications) as well as social 
infrastructure, like healthcare, hospitals, childcare, care for the elderly, edu-
cational and cultural institutions.
2. For comparability of the internationally common distinction between differ-
ent agency types, see: van Thiel (2012).
3. We can also distinguish the form of privatisation as asset sale, which refers to 
the sale of enterprises, property assets, land and so on. This form of privati-
sation plays a subordinate role in this chapter.
4. Due to the effort required for coordination and monitoring, transaction 
costs normally increase from ‘in-house provision’ to the 
‘outsourcing-solution’.
5. For details, see Table 17.1. In some documents, the figures vary slightly due 
to the reference year and the methodology used for public finance and pub-
lic service personnel statistics (‘shell concept’) (cf. Schaefer and 
Friedländer 2019)





Joint stock company 11 35 194 240
Limited liability company 181 842 7758 8781
Limited partnership with a limited 
liability company as general partner
7 111 489 607
Other (e.g. associations) 3 9 87 99




5 230 3522 3757
Local administrative associations - - 1102 1102
Institution under public law 9 86 265 360
Foundation under public law 1 36 4 41
Other corporations under public law 2 39 20 61
Total Public Law 17 391 4913 5321
Total 219 1388 13,441 15,048
Source: Authors’ own calculations, based on German Federal Statistical Office 2014, see: Warm 
et al. (2018)
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6. For these decisions, the Local Governments’ Joint Agency for Administrative 
Management—an independent consultancy agency organised by voluntary 
membership of German municipalities, counties, and local authorities with 
more than 10,000 inhabitants—recommends a five-step procedure (see: 
KGSt 2010a, b). This procedure, which was developed in collaboration with 
the author Manfred Röber, is to be understood as a checklist or analytical 
instrument, which can be used for case-by-case decisions about organisa-
tional arrangements.
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Citizens face ‘their’ public administration in different roles: as more or less 
passive ‘subjects’ and ‘customers’, as passive ‘financiers’ (taxpayers), as 
active political ‘principals’ and ‘co-producers’ of public goods. Additionally, 
in some of their interactions with the public sector, citizens act as individu-
als, in others as members (or users) of organisations such as associations, 
citizens’ initiatives and non-profit organisations. On the one hand, the 
German state tradition has long been described as seeing the state as being 
superordinate to society and conceiving citizens primarily as subjects 
(Untertanen) (Dyson 2009). On the other hand, influenced by Catholic 
social ethics, Germany developed early a strong tradition of ‘subsidiarity’ 
with voluntary organisations from the ‘third sector’ (Evers and Laville 
2004) producing public goods alongside public bodies. These voluntary 
organisations were united under umbrella organisations, the so-called wel-
fare associations, which also have a strong role in the formulation and 
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implementation of policies. This dense partnership between the voluntary 
sector and the state has often been labelled ‘neo-corporatism’ (Heinze and 
Strünck 2000; Zimmer 1999).
The ambiguous relationship between state and society has changed 
considerably in recent decades—at both the micro level of individual citi-
zens (Bogumil and Holtkamp 2004) and the meso level of third sector 
organisations (Grohs 2014; Grohs et al. 2017; Zimmer and Evers 2010). 
Since German reunification, ‘participation’ has gained increased attention 
from policymakers. First, citizens claimed their roles as active citizens in 
demanding more participatory rights. With the general increase in levels 
of educational attainment and value shifts towards post-materialistic orien-
tations, the expectations of citizens to participate in public affairs increased 
(Evers 2019). After reunification, every German state (Länder) intro-
duced new forms of direct democracy and many local governments experi-
mented with stronger participatory processes, for example in planning 
decisions and budgeting. Second, established ‘corporatist’ modes of co- 
production have been challenged by new forms of citizen engagement and 
private for-profit actors criticising the old ‘oligopolies’ of welfare produc-
tion. Third, there are functional reasons for actively promoting co- 
production. Fiscal constraints, especially at the local level, and problems 
associated with shrinking rural areas in some parts of Germany pose addi-
tional challenges for the provision of public services. Finally, new chal-
lenges, especially the integration of refugees since 2015, have paved the 
way for new forms of citizen involvement in public affairs.
The new relationship between state and citizens has been categorised 
under different, more or less synonymous, labels: ‘participatory adminis-
tration’, ‘co-production’ and ‘cooperative democracy’. Whereas the latter 
term is more common in the German debate (Holtkamp et al. 2006), the 
term ‘co-production’ is used throughout this article, as it is more familiar 
to an international readership (Bovaird and Loeffler 2012; Brandsen and 
Pestoff 2006). ‘Co-production’ describes different practices of coopera-
tion between individual or organised citizens and the public sector in 
developing and implementing public goods. Apart from the classic distinc-
tion of state and society, co-production means a productive interpenetra-
tion of both spheres, ideally in a symmetric and reciprocal way. Citizens 
are seen as active producers and not as passive recipients of public goods. 
Administrative actors do not react on ‘disturbances’ by citizens claiming 
their rights, but actively develop citizens’ competences and opportunity 
structures to act for a common cause (Bovaird and Loeffler 2012).
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There are several functional and political reasons for the support of the 
public sector for co-production. First of all, the inclusion of additional 
knowledge (especially from those directly affected) fosters an effective 
design and participation in the decision-making processes of policies. 
Second, the activation of additional resources (especially voluntary work 
and the provision of rooms or equipment) reduces (public) costs. Third, 
the involvement of citizens and relevant groups can enhance the accep-
tance of programmes and increase the compliance of target groups. 
Fourth, activating citizens to participate can strengthen solidarity and 
‘social capital’. Finally, the experience of participation can strengthen 
(local) democracy and enlarge the pool of candidates for classic represen-
tative democracy (Bogumil and Holtkamp 2004; Bovaird and Loeffler 
2012). To structure the following assessment on the state of co- production 
in Germany, I will refer to four aspects of co-production according to 
Bovaird and Loeffler (2012):
• co-design: participation in planning and the preparation of 
decision-making;
• co-decision: legislation and other forms of binding 
decision-making;
• co-implementation: co-production of public value through coopera-
tive implementation; and
• co-evaluation: assessment of public performance through public 
consultation and evaluation mechanisms (as this dimension is still 
underdeveloped in Germany, its own section has been omitted in the 
following).
In the following sections, I provide an overview of the major reform 
developments since the beginning of the 1990s and focus first on partici-
patory reforms on the ‘input side’ of the politico-administrative system, 
that is the strengthening of co-design (see Sect. 2 below) and co-decision- 
making (see Sect. 3 below). Second, I survey developments in matters of 
co-implementation (see Sect. 4 below). Each chapter first sketches out the 
status quo ante, then addresses major reforms, which is followed by a dis-
cussion on the experiences and problems of the new ‘participatory state’. 
The concluding paragraph resumes the arguments, discusses future chal-
lenges of participatory public administration in Germany and identifies 
potential for transfer (see Sect. 5 below).
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2  co-desIgn: From expert Knowledge 
to cItIzens’ expertIse?
Surely one of the most common forms of co-production is the participa-
tion of citizens in the design and planning of policies in binding or mostly 
non-binding forms. This form of participation has its roots in formal par-
ticipation in planning procedures. For example, Section 3 of the German 
Building Code (Baugesetzbuch) stipulates that the public should be 
informed early about the aims, purposes, alternatives and impacts of plan-
ning procedures, and is given the opportunity to comment and participate 
in discussions. Similar regulations apply in the context of planning proce-
dures (Planfeststellungsverfahren; Section 73 of the Administrative 
Procedures Act, VwVfG, see Chap. 8) and within the scope of environ-
mental regulations, for example the Federal Nature Conservation Act 
(Grohs and Ullrich 2019). In Bavaria, the municipal code 
(Gemeindeordnung) specifies that a citizens’ assembly to deliberate on all 
local issues is held (at least) once a year.
In addition to these mandatory forms, voluntary non-formal participa-
tion is becoming increasingly important as part of administrative gover-
nance (Bogumil and Holtkamp 2004; Kersting 2016; Vetter et al. 2016). 
In these arrangements, governments and political bodies not only seek 
support and legitimisation for their decisions but also the specific expertise 
of citizens in their own affairs. Today, a plethora of non-formal and volun-
tary forms of participation exists, especially at the local level, but also in 
other public institutions. They vary especially according to the level of citi-
zens’ involvement and deliberation. At one extreme, certain participatory 
formats are merely informational and asymmetric in nature (e.g. citizens’ 
assemblies and other information events that have very little room for 
questions concerning proposals put forward by public institutions). 
Examples of more dialogue-oriented instruments include ‘citizen forums’ 
(e.g. round tables, citizens’ conferences and workshops, etc.), ‘planning 
cells’ (a randomly selected group of people work together to develop pro-
posals in a limited period of time—and often learn from citizens’ exper-
tise) and mediation procedures to address escalating conflicts.
These participatory events typically focus on a specific issue and are 
conducted during a fixed and narrowly defined time period. More general 
and holistic processes are seldom. As an exception, so-called citizens’ bud-
gets have become popular in many local governments (Sintomer et  al. 
2016). They address the cross-cutting issue of budgeting and develop 
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proposals for the prioritising of budget items in a regular time frame. 
Examples of other ongoing participation processes include municipal advi-
sory councils dealing with different issues (e.g. environment or health) 
and boards for specific status groups (e.g. juveniles, immigrants and senior 
citizens). In these councils, interested members of the public have the 
opportunity to provide input throughout the decision-making processes 
of the authorities with a long-term perspective. Some of them are obliga-
tory and anchored in municipal law, others are voluntary.
While citizens’ petitions and referendums, which are discussed in the 
next section, can produce binding decisions, the voluntary forms of par-
ticipation are only consultative for political actors and the administration. 
With their expansion, the politico-administrative system hoped for a stron-
ger input legitimacy, aiming to increase the acceptance of controversial 
projects. Several problems arise from the expansion of such participatory 
processes. On the one hand, supplementing representative democracy 
with elements of dialogue-oriented participatory democracy arouses the 
grievances of councillors and members of parliaments concerning their 
future role as elected representatives. On the other hand, the non-binding 
character of results can lead to frustration among participants if their pro-
posals are not ratified by councils or parliaments. This can subvert the 
legitimacy of decision-making and damage the (local) political culture. 
The legitimacy of the results of these processes is especially challenged by 
an asymmetric mobilisation, that is the selective participation of certain 
citizen groups. The ‘usual suspects’ in all kinds of voluntary participatory 
formats can be divided into two groups: in one group the well-off, well- 
educated citizens with enough spare time (i.e. mostly elderly academics) 
and those directly affected by the disputed measures (i.e. the famous 
NIMBYs) in the other. Whereas the first group tends to reproduce social 
inequalities (middle-class bias), the latter dilutes the common good with 
private concerns. In complex matters, citizens are often overwhelmed by 
the problems at stake (which can be solved by administrative actors having 
a competent moderator).
Some instruments (e.g. planning cells) try to avoid a misrepresentation 
by selecting a more or less representative sample of citizens. Nevertheless, 
these approaches remain isolated and are comparatively expensive. 
Especially at the local level, administrations are meanwhile experimenting 
with digital solutions (e-participation, citizen panels, online fora, etc.) and 
new forms of participation (‘gamification’; Masser and Mory 2018) to 
attract broader groups of citizens and to foster the participation of younger 
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people. Even if these procedures are controversial in terms of representa-
tive democratic theory, they can improve the quality and acceptance of 
decisions and introduce elements of deliberation into decision-making 
processes, insofar as they are supported by democratic majorities. At the 
same time, participation binds administrative resources and, in some cases, 
extensive participation can impede decision-making considerably. 
Therefore, increased participation is not a panacea for modern democracy 
and the pros and cons should be weighed up in each case.
3  co-decIsIon-maKIng: From representatIve 
democracy to a new ‘power-trIangle’?
Since the 1990s, the rights of citizens to participate in binding decisions 
at the local and state level have been strengthened. These reforms, primar-
ily directed towards the municipal level (Bogumil and Holtkamp 2004; 
Vetter et al. 2016), were based on the introduction of elements of direct 
democracy through the introduction of citizens’ petitions and referen-
dums, and the direct election of mayors and heads of counties. With the 
exception of Baden-Württemberg and Bavaria, where both features have a 
long tradition, both elements were introduced by all states between 1990 
and 1997 at both the state and the local level. Nevertheless, state regula-
tion for petitions and referendums differs considerably regarding the range 
of topics allowed and the requirements in terms of quorums (Mehr 
Demokratie 2018). The federal level still denies direct democratic ele-
ments (with the exception of a revision of state territory boundaries 
according to Article 29 of the Basic law).
A referendum can be initiated by citizens (citizens’ referendum: 
Bürgerbegehren) and by the parliament or the local council (council’s ref-
erendum: Ratsreferendum) (see Chap. 6). For a referendum initiated by 
citizens on factual issues to succeed, citizens have to overcome several 
hurdles. First, a defined number of valid signatures are necessary. This 
threshold varies from state to state and depends on the size of the munici-
pality (the larger the municipality, the lower the quorum) and varies 
between 2% to 3% in Hamburg and 10% in Brandenburg. Saarland, one of 
the smaller municipalities, requires 15% of citizens to sign 
(Bürgerbegehrensbericht 2018: 11). Second, if a sufficient number of 
valid signatures are obtained, the council must then decide on the applica-
bility of the referendum. The most important question here is whether the 
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issue of the initiative falls within the legally defined range. Usually, issues 
with direct relevance to the budget are excluded. Some states like Bavaria, 
Berlin and Hamburg allow referendums on a wide range of issues, while 
others are quite restrictive (e.g. Brandenburg, Saarland and Rhineland- 
Palatinate) (for details see Bürgerbegehrensbericht 2018: 11). Finally, to 
be accepted, a referendum must reach a certain quorum of votes to be 
successful. Again, the quorum depends on the size of the municipalities 
and the height of this hurdle differs from state to state. The lowest hurdles 
can be found in Bavaria and Berlin (between 10 and 15%) and Hamburg 
(where no quorum exists at all). The highest quorums can be found, for 
example, in Brandenburg, Saxony and the Saarland between 25 and 30%.
This regulatory divergence is one reason for the varying use of these 
instruments between the states as well as between local governments. 
Generally speaking, the lower the thresholds, the more often referendums 
take place. Of the 7503 referendums held since 1956, over one-third 
(2910) took place in Bavaria. Looking at the shorter period from 2013 to 
2017, the picture remains the same: Bavaria held the largest number of 
referendums per inhabitant, followed by the states of Baden-Württemberg 
and North Rhine-Westphalia. The lowest numbers can be found in 
Saarland and in the East German states (Bürgerbegehrensbericht 2018: 
19). The issues have mostly concerned public facilities, traffic projects and 
other public building projects.
As in the case of dialogue-oriented instruments, the new entitlements 
of citizens to have a say have been critically evaluated by proponents of 
representative democracy as a weakening of the representative elements, 
especially of local democracy. In the case of citizens’ petitions and deci-
sions, parliaments and city councils in particular lose their representative 
monopoly directly (through opposing citizens’ petitions) or indirectly 
(through the mere threat of such a procedure, often a strategy of opposi-
tion parties). However, there are few empirical indications that this instru-
ment is used so frequently that these fears are firmly based. In this respect, 
the indirect effects are more important for the decision-making processes. 
Referendums have also been criticised for their simplistic approach to 
social problems, reducing complex issues to dichotomous questions that 
ask for a Yes/No. In addition, referendums often show a negative bias as 
they mostly try to hinder projects (typically large-scale infrastructure proj-
ects) or defend existing arrangements (typically to prevent closures of 
public facilities such as schools, swimming baths, theatres, etc.). Positive 
approaches and the proposal of realistic alternatives remain in a minority 
of issues.
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4  co-ImplementatIon: From corporatIsm 
to actIvatIon and cIvIc pluralIsm?
In this section, I first discuss co-implementation regarding civic activism 
for public purposes (see Sect. 4.1 below) and then turn to the transforma-
tion of welfare production by civic associations (see Sect. 4.2 below).
4.1  Activating Citizens: The Promotion of Voluntary Activism
A major effort to promote participatory approaches to co-production was 
triggered in 1998 by the first red-green coalition at the federal level with 
its emphasis on the ‘activating state’ (Blanke and Schridde 2001). A par-
liamentary committee of enquiry (Enquête-Kommission) on civic engage-
ment developed a broad agenda on activating citizens for the common 
good. For example, the number of local volunteer agencies 
(Freiwilligenagenturen), where opportunities for volunteering are con-
veyed to citizens, spreads. This movement could rely on a strong latent 
potential for civic co-production, which is monitored on a regular basis by 
the survey on volunteering, commissioned by the federal Ministry for 
Family Affairs, Senior Citizens, Women and Youth (BMFSFJ 2017). 
About 45% of the German population interviewed claim to volunteer in 
one or another area, most of them in sports, education, cultural affairs and 
social purposes (BMFSFJ 2017).1 This has increased over the past few 
decades and varies between regions and social groups. A larger proportion 
of citizens are engaged in volunteering in the west of Germany than in the 
east (BMFSFJ 2017: 22) and in rural areas, engagement is more wide-
spread than in urban areas (BMFSFJ 2017: 25). Those who volunteer are 
usually better educated and better off (BMFSFJ 2017: 16). Besides the 
increase in numbers, the character of voluntary engagement has also 
changed over the past few decades. People spend less time on voluntary 
activities and younger people especially tend to engage more selectively 
and in less formal ways than before. They are more reluctant to take lead-
ership roles in associations and other organisations (BMFSFJ 2017: 28). 
There seems to be a further potential for volunteering as a considerable 
number of people not already involved in volunteering express themselves 
willing to volunteer in the future (BMFSFJ 2017: 28). Some administra-
tions, especially local governments, try to mobilise this latent potential for 
volunteering with local agencies for volunteering and other low threshold 
kinds of volunteering opportunities.
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A large part of these voluntary activities is organised by associations and 
other organisations. About 70% of the German population are members of 
at least one association, but are not always committed in an active way 
(e.g. the largest ‘association’—the German automobile club (ADAC)—is 
merely a service provider, not an arena for voluntary engagement). Among 
these organisations, sports clubs, educational and cultural associations 
organise the largest part. These occupations might seem to be merely ‘pri-
vate’ activities, nevertheless the associations play a significant role in 
organising public goods and forming social solidarity and social capital 
(Zimmer and Evers 2010). Therefore, such associations are supported 
financially and in terms of free access to public facilities, for example, 
sports facilities or rooms in schools and other public buildings by local 
governments. Some local governments, driven by fiscal pressures, have 
gone even further and transferred the operation of public facilities (e.g. 
youth clubs, swimming baths and other sports facilities) to associations 
(e.g. swimming clubs) on condition that the association looks after the 
facilities and guarantees access to the wider public (Bogumil and Holtkamp 
2004). This development can be dangerous if citizens feel they are being 
exploited for buffering budget cuts by public institutions. Participation 
and co-production are scarce resources. Over-use and perceived inefficacy 
are among the perils of all efforts to strengthen the role of citizens. If 
people have the impression that they are purely serving as legitimisers of 
ex-ante decisions, or that the value of their participation is being largely 
ignored, this is as dangerous as when volunteers feel they are being taken 
advantage of doing the same tasks previously performed by paid 
professionals.
These traditional arrangements for volunteering by associations and 
other organisations (e.g. voluntary fire brigades) are being challenged by 
an increasing orientation towards private engagement and more mobile 
biographical patterns. Younger adults especially tend to engage in new, 
more flexible forms and are not being reached by traditional associations. 
As modern biographies include a greater proportion of job-related geo-
graphical mobility, associations are becoming more unstable and experi-
encing difficulty in finding people who are willing to show enduring 
commitment, for example to serve in management and leadership posi-
tions in the associations. In terms of public administration, such unstable 
patterns on the part of associations come with the problems of maintain-
ing reliability and continuity, necessary preconditions for the transfer of 
ambitious tasks.
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4.2  An End of Corporatism? Pluralising 
Welfare Arrangements
Building on a strong tradition of local social care by church parishes, since 
the end of the nineteenth century a mixed system of welfare provision has 
developed where church parishes and local charities run hospitals, homes 
for handicapped people or orphans’ homes. In the early twentieth century, 
accompanied by the expansion of the German welfare state, this arrange-
ment expanded to include other areas such as social care, youth welfare 
and a dense network of counselling institutions. In the 1920s, this scheme 
became regulated by law, when the ‘principle of subsidiarity’ was anchored 
in social law, claiming that the public (municipal) sector is only permitted 
to provide these welfare services if civil society, welfare organisations and 
citizens’ initiatives are not able to do it on their own (Grohs 2014; Heinze 
and Strünck 2000). From this time onwards, the duality of public respon-
sibility (Gewährleistungsverantwortung, see also Chap. 17) and organised 
civic provision has become increasingly institutionalised. A corporatist 
mode of governance has emerged at the local level with a division of labour 
developing between local governments and non-profit organisations uni-
fied in the so-called Wohlfahrtsverbände (welfare associations).2 As a con-
sequence, the third sector as a whole is the largest employer in Germany 
today. Among its organisations, the welfare associations and its member 
organisations represent the bulk of professional occupations. In the past, 
these organisations were able to channel the voluntary commitment of 
individual citizens and at the same time develop professional structures 
with employed staff to guarantee stability.
At the governance level, these non-profit organisations had privileged 
access to both welfare provision and political decision-making bodies, for 
example through functional representation in  local committees, such as 
youth welfare committees (Jugendhilfeausschüsse). Services were subsi-
dised by local governments and social insurances according to the princi-
ple of cost coverage, and the cost-bearing units generally refrained from 
introducing standardised measures of quality control. These arrangements 
were stabilised by close ties between welfare associations and local poli-
tics—often along party lines—as well as between the associations and wel-
fare administrations. Far from being mere substitutes for state activity, 
welfare associations combined a role of advocacy with the mobilisation of 
their memberships and volunteers. In addition to the functional relief of 
public bodies, one of the main motivations behind these arrangements was 
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the incorporation of the specific (and diverse) value orientations of the 
associations and the additional resources provided by their memberships. 
This has often led to a ‘co-evolution’ of public and private bodies, but the 
organisations retained their distinct identities and were also able to adapt 
to changing economic environments (Heinze and Strünck 2000).
These established arrangements came under pressure in the 1990s. The 
reasons were first of all the fiscal pressures, but also the obvious gover-
nance deficits and lack of accountability measures of the organisations 
(Seibel 1996) as well as demands for more ‘pluralism’ or ‘market’. Actors 
from the left and the liberal side of the political spectrum unanimously 
criticised the corporatist oligopoly of the welfare associations and its mem-
bers. From the left, the heirs of the alternative movements and self-help 
activists claimed their share of public financial support; from the liberal 
side, for-profit providers advocated for equal treatment as the welfare asso-
ciations (Evers 2005). One political response to these pressures has been 
the implementation of managerial reform measures and the introduction 
of quasi-market principles, which were often subsumed under the head-
ings of ‘managerialism’ or ‘marketisation’. These reform measures fol-
lowed the international paradigm of New Public Management (Pollitt and 
Bouckaert 2011) and were adapted to the German discussion on the New 
Steering Model (Kuhlmann et al. 2008, see also Chap. 22). These strate-
gies were not primarily targeted at the reduction of services, but rather at 
the more efficient and effective allocation of resources. In this context, the 
activation of competition had an important role, with private for-profit 
actors sometimes acting as competitors to the established system. The 
establishment of competition between providers went hand in hand with 
the replacement of the traditional principle of cost coverage by fixed prices 
as well as the abolishment of the privileges of charities. The abandonment 
of the old corporatist model of welfare production was incorporated into 
all the relevant welfare acts (Grohs 2014).
The discussions on quality and impact measurement in the field of 
social services have been extensive, but the comprehensive implementa-
tion of established and acknowledged standards is still a long way off. In 
some areas, such as care for the elderly, a series of control measures to 
increase transparency in the sector (quality records, care grades) have been 
introduced in recent years. The degree of change differs between the sub-
fields, as can be seen if we compare services in elderly care with youth 
welfare. Whereas in the care sector new actors have gained considerable 
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market shares, in the field of youth welfare established arrangements have 
continued (Grohs et al. 2017, see Table 18.1).
After almost thirty years of quasi-market reforms in the German welfare 
system, no clear-cut conclusions regarding their consequences for the 
character of the organisational field, its governance mechanisms or its con-
stituent organisations can be drawn. Despite tendencies towards privatisa-
tion and marketisation in the care sector, the so-called freigemeinnützigen 
(non-profit) organisations continue to provide the majority of social ser-
vices. The growing market orientation clashes with the welfare associa-
tions’ traditional roles as advocates and promoters of voluntary action.
Summing up, we can identify two competing rationales regarding the 
co-implementation of services in Germany. On the one hand, the tradi-
tional modes of organising voluntary work in the traditional welfare 
organisations are being challenged (primarily by quasi-market mecha-
nisms) and new forms of voluntary work are being promoted on the other. 
One recent development is the support of so-called social entrepreneur-
ship, which will bring more innovation through ‘entrepreneurial action’. 
A concept promising innovative approaches, ‘social entrepreneurship’ 
seeks to develop new forms for civic engagement, which acknowledge 
changes in participatory behaviour and communication technology (Grohs 
et  al. 2017). The focus on single entrepreneurial organisations may, 
Table 18.1 Types of provider (in %) from 1998 to 2016–17
Private sector Non-profit sector Public sector




34.9% 38.1% 42.6% 56.6% 55.1% 52.7% 8.5% 6.7% 4.7%




1998 2006–07 2016 1998 2006–07 2016 1998 2006–07 2016
Youth 
welfare
3.0% 2.1% 8.8% 71.6% 72.8% 68.7% 25.3% 25.2% 22.3%
Child day 
care centres
0.5% 1.0% 2.9% 54.7% 63.2% 64.2% 44.8% 35.8% 32.7%
Note: slight differences in reference periods due to availability of data
Sources: Statistisches Bundesamt, Einrichtungen und tätige Personen in der Jugendhilfe. Jg. 1998, 2006, 
2018; Statistisches Bundesamt, Pflegestatistik, Jg. 2001, 2007, 2019
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however, distract from a far more urgent issue: how to bring about more 
cooperation and networking to address complex problems. Civic and pub-
lic organisations working in parallel need to find new ways to cooperate. 
This may avoid potential losses of momentum and consolidate resources 
with the aim of expanding the local social infrastructure. The role of pub-
lic administration in the participative state is still pivotal as participation 
has to be managed and coordinated more than ever.
5  lessons learned: redIscoverIng the cItIzen: 
about mute euphorIa, some FrIctIons and old 
patterns oF partIcIpatory admInIstratIon
Recent decades have seen a rediscovery of the citizen as a partner (and 
resource) of public administration—on the input side as well as on the 
implementation side of public policies. These developments have been 
driven by the changing demands of citizens, fiscal constraints and the 
declining effectiveness of public administration to tackle ‘wicked’ prob-
lems. The term ‘co-production’ has gained momentum as a promise for a 
new balance between the public sector and civil society actors. This agenda 
is attractive for political actors as it combines a reduced public responsibil-
ity with a potential increase in legitimacy.
Nevertheless, findings from this survey on different aspects of participa-
tory administration in Germany reveal some friction. On the input side of 
co-design and co-decision-making, research shows several hitches and 
asymmetries which have the ability of subverting the potential for increased 
legitimacy and effectiveness. The perceived loss of relevance of representa-
tive democracy is an important issue and one that is voiced by most mem-
bers of parliaments and local councils. This is reflected in the unwillingness 
of politicians to contest the role of professionals and place more trust in 
citizens. In addition, the question of whether citizens are willing to par-
ticipate more intensively is far from clear. Many referendums fail to reach 
the necessary quorum and many deliberative events fail to attract partici-
pants from a broader spectrum of socio-cultural backgrounds. The hope 
for smoother implementation by early participation is often diluted by the 
experience of participation processes in large-scale planning, where plan-
ning periods are substantially prolonged (see Chap. 11) without increas-
ing the acceptance of planning results.
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On the implementation side, a major concern about co-production is 
that it tends to dilute public accountability, blurring the boundaries 
between the public, private and third sectors. The problem increases with 
the sheer numbers of actors involved. In the ‘old’ world of welfare corpo-
ratism, the associations could claim a hybrid mix of professionalism, value 
orientation and embeddedness in societal networks. Today, secularisation 
and individualisation have reduced the willingness of people to volunteer 
in welfare associations. Additionally, the quasi-market reforms of the 
1990s have transformed the organisations themselves. The separation 
between the spheres of service provision and normative and social integra-
tion is wider. This signifies that simple delegation chains hardly contribute 
to the determination of policy results. The resulting tasks of quality assur-
ance and effectiveness, the consolidation of participation in reliable part-
nerships and the intervention in cases of defection and failure by civic 
partners remain core competencies of public administration.
In this context, German public administration needs to assume new 
roles of facilitator and coordinator, but sometimes also as ‘realist brake-
man’. As a result, the public sector has to face new challenges, such as 
qualifying volunteers to deal with demanding tasks (e.g. accompanying 
refugees, tutoring and quality assurance). Activating people with social 
backgrounds typically considered unsuitable for social participation is 
another challenging step towards more legitimate co-production.
But there are also many opportunities. Digital transformation (see 
Chap. 19) can cause patterns in civic participation and co-production to 
change. With open government and freedom of information acts, the 
information base of citizens has become broader. Digital participation for-
mats can result in lower social thresholds and allow for more attractive 
formats (Masser and Mory 2018) as well as help organise voluntary 
engagements (e.g. Uber for Volunteering). On the other hand, digital 
offers come with the risk of low commitment and new inequalities. At a 
time when traditional forms of co-production in infrastructure mainte-
nance (Kehrwoche) and public security (voluntary fire brigades) are strug-
gling to motivate citizens to contribute, it is hard to imagine that digital 
solutions alone can step in and help.
The German experience shows that participatory reforms and co- 
production have to be handled with care and need to be adaptive to local 
circumstances and time frames. A sensible use of civic resources has the 
potential to increase legitimacy and improve results. However, a naïve reli-
ance on civil society can also dilute responsibilities and increase social 
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inequalities. Some of the defining characteristics of the German context, 
such as the prominence of welfare associations, are difficult to transfer to 
other contexts. Other findings, for example the measures adopted to 
soften social selectivity in participation processes aimed at mobilising citi-
zens for voluntary work, or the importance of institutional barriers for 
referendums, may be easier for interested observers to adopt.
notes
1. All data presented in this paragraph stem from the Fourth German Survey 
of Volunteering, a publicly financed survey based on about 28,600 tele-
phone interviews; for methodological details, see BMFSFJ (2017: 11–13).
2. These welfare associations are the catholic Caritas, the protestant 
Diakonisches Werk, the Jewish Zentralwohlfahrtsstelle der Juden in 
Deutschland, the social-democratic Arbeiterwohlfahrt, the German Red 
Cross and the secular Paritätische Wohlfahrtsverband. They are organised 
federally, resembling the basic architecture of the German federal state. 
Together, their subsidiary organisations and institutions represent one of 
the largest employers in Germany with a total of almost two million employ-
ees and more than 100,000 establishments in the fields of social services and 
education (BAGFW 2018).
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1  IntroductIon
The digital transformation of German public administration is an urgent 
matter, given that the public sector is  generally lagging far behind the 
private sector and especially in comparison with digitalisation efforts across 
Europe. As one of the largest economies in the world, Germany has con-
sistently been ranked in the low- to mid-field of digital government rank-
ings (see, DESI 2019). In addition, recent polls have shown that the 
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German public’s use of existing digital services has been steadily declining 
during the past few years even though large-scale investments in IT spend-
ing have been made (Initiative 21 (2018/2019)).
These developments can be traced back to delays in supporting policy 
developments, lacking  investments for necessary modernisation and the 
resulting backlog in IT capacity and failures to update IT legacy systems. 
The multilevel system of Germany’s federal, state and municipal public 
administrations makes the decision and implementation approach  even 
more complicated. Many activities with respect to IT governance and 
implementation are outsourced to external IT service providers, leaving 
public administrations devoid of the skills and competences necessary to 
innovate on their own and relying on external IT expertise for buying and 
implementing digital technology (Dunleavy et al. 2006).
Recently, the German government has embarked on a large-scale 
reform of its public service delivery mode—all 575 public services will be 
digitally transformed by 2022—a reform in scale and scope that no other 
country has yet set out to approach (Mergel 2019). This reform plan 
demands certain coordination tasks across the federal system, which will 
be discussed in this chapter.
The goal of this chapter is to outline the recent development of digital 
transformation of public services in Germany, provide insights into the 
legal framework guiding the digital transformation efforts, its organisa-
tional embeddedness and multi-organisational collaborative governance 
approach, the barriers and challenges imposed by the multilevel institu-
tional context of the German government and the observable outcomes 
to date.
2  current StatuS of dIgItal tranSformatIon 
In germany
Digital innovation in the public sector is slowly progressing in Germany. 
This is mostly due to the independence between administrative levels lead-
ing historically to relatively independent progress across administrative 
levels (see Chaps. 3 and 8). Most recently, Article 91c (1) of the Basic Law 
aimed to heal this disconnect by mandating that federal and state levels 
cooperate in the planning, establishment and operation of the information 
technology systems required to fulfil their tasks. Article 91c (2) stipulates 
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that the federal government and the Länder can define the standards and 
security requirements necessary for communication between their infor-
mation technology systems. What remains undefined and open is how the 
11,000 municipalities are going to adopt the standards set by the federal 
and state government administrations. Based on their self-administration 
right established in accordance with the provisions of Article 28 (2) of the 
Basic Law, municipalities remain independent in their decision making so 
that the use of top-down developed standards, platforms and security 
needs to be reviewed and additional funding needs to be made available 
(see Chap. 9).
Even though Article 91c has initiated a functional reform at the federal 
and state government levels, digitalisation efforts still remain a sore topic 
in Germany. While the majority of German citizens are highly active on 
social media and shop online (ninety-three per cent), only five per cent are 
willing to use digital public services (InitiativeD21 2018/2019). This is a 
phenomenon that needs to be understood in light of the historical circum-
stances of Germany’s political system. Especially since the Third Reich, 
Germans have been very reluctant to hand over data to the government in 
fear of becoming transparent citizens. The power distance felt between 
bureaucrats and citizens is increased by a general feeling that public admin-
istrations are slow, overly bureaucratic, and that access to public services is 
bogged down by excessive administrative burden.
It is only recently, from 2018 to 2019, that the use of digital public 
services has slightly increased (InitiativeD21 2018/2019). However, 
many online public services and administrative apps are not used by citi-
zens because they are inaccessible or require additional hardware to access 
services related to the eID and a personal service account. This is a con-
tinuous trend and comes with accessibility burdens that require a high 
degree of administrative literacy, which many citizens do not encounter in 
their otherwise personal online experiences on websites such as Amazon.
de (Grönlund et al. 2007).
2.1  Legal Framework for the Digital Transformation 
of the German State
The legal framework governing digital transformation in Germany con-
sists of a much larger web of laws that have developed over time. The 
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foundation was laid with Article 91c of the Basic Law which establishes 
that the federal government and the Länder may cooperate in the plan-
ning, construction and operation of the information technology systems 
required for the fulfilment of their tasks. This was further developed into 
an e-government law, which incorporates the access to electronic informa-
tion, online payments through SEPA direct debit, electronic filing, publi-
cation of regulations online, open data, and the replacement of the written 
form by using a government email service (De-Mail) and web access 
through eID (electronic identification). However, many existing adminis-
trative laws are still preventing a fast and unbureaucratic transition from 
analogue to digital government. Examples include the paper form require-
ment, required (hand)written signatures on official administrative forms, 
or the personal and physical handing over of documents (instead of digital 
provision).
The implementation of digital government practices follows the coop-
erative approach outlined in Article 91c of the Basic Law, but the admin-
istrative practice shows that coordination issues remain based on the 
federal approach towards negative coordination and the self-governing 
principle of the municipalities. Solutions are developed at the federal and 
state level, and it is only after the solutions have been consensually agreed 
upon that potentially negative consequences that might impact other 
stakeholders are reviewed. As a result, the Länder are aiming to coordinate 
their efforts among mid-level public managers at so-called expert confer-
ences and are bringing the results of their negotiations to the IT Planning 
Council, which is a committee consisting of the  state-level Chief 
Information Officers (CIOs), the federal government CIO as well as 
selected representatives of interest groups.
With the help of the IT treaty, the IT Planning Council is responsible 
for the planning, construction, operation and advancement of the infor-
mation technology infrastructure. They set IT standards, such as safety 
requirements for data exchange, and coordinate the collaboration across 
the federal and state levels. In its amendment, this collaboration was rec-
ognised for its immense complexity due to the heterogeneity of the exist-
ing structures, processes and legal requirements. To solve this complex 
coordination problem, a new federal public institution for IT cooperation 
(FITKO) was created to support the IT Planning Council in all organisa-
tional issues and provides technical support starting January 2020. The 
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main goal is to coordinate the multilevel coordination and to set up a joint 
digitalisation budget to support the digital transformation of public ser-
vice delivery. This will allow the IT Planning Council to focus on its politi-
cal coordination role among the Länder CIOs and leave technical details 
and implementation issues to FITKO.
Currently, most public services are, however, paper-based, still require 
a handwritten signature and need to be applied for in person. There are 
few instances where forms are already available online in pdf format. These 
forms are most of the time not connected to a database that would auto-
matically transfer the data to the local authority. Instead, citizens print out 
the forms at home, walk them into the agency, watch a public servant type 
in the data and then provide a handwritten signature on a printed paper 
form. At times, it is possible to schedule appointments online or partici-
pate in information-based polls.
With the online access law (Online-Zugangsgesetz—OZG), the German 
government has set out to make analogue public services available by 
transforming them into a new citizen-centric service that will be available 
24/7. Service provision will be facilitated through one federal portal to 
which all sixteen state portals are connected. Each citizen will have his 
own eID and service account, so that services are accessible and data is 
exchangeable between agencies when necessary. Federal, state and local 
government levels are required to offer 575 public services online by 2022.
The implementation is currently divided into two large-scale projects:
• Digitalisation programme: a total of 575 administrative processes 
and public services will be digitised. These services are located at 
various administrative levels. The services are divided into fourteen 
subject areas. One tandem, each from the federal ministry and the 
Länder, has taken the lead for a subject area. In these subject areas, 
public services are prepared for digitisation. After a  detailed analysis, 
concrete digitisation plans are drawn up for each service. Particularly 
important services were prioritised within the thematic areas and are 
developed in so-called digital laboratories. Within these labs, 
 interdisciplinary teams of experts from specialist departments, 
e- government experts and human-centred designers work in cross- 
functional teams on user-centric solutions.
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• National portal network: the portal provides the technical linkages 
to the sixteen Länder administrative portals and their municipalities 
and ensures interoperability between the three administrative levels. 
This is intended to provide uniform access to all digital services 
offered by the administration. User accounts for citizens and compa-
nies are provided in the portal network for the authentication of 
users to access digital public services.
One important implementation challenge remains: the municipalities 
are not explicitly named in the law and it is up to the Länder to include 
them in their efforts. One way to consolidate the communication and 
coordination to the 11,000 municipalities is the inclusion of municipal 
interest organisations that bring in the interests of the municipalities. At 
this stage, it is unclear how the municipalities will be involved beyond the 
initial prototypes. Some Länder have developed their own portals and pro-
vide the digitised services to their municipalities free of charge, while others 
have not yet started to plan how to involve the municipalities in roll-outs 
or in the subsequent use of the functional prototypes already created.
Each new law is reviewed by a federal body, the National Regulatory 
Control Council (Nationaler Normenkontrollrat—NKR; see Chap. 20 for 
a detailed overview of the NKR). The NKR is located in the chancellor’s 
office and serves in an advisory role. Laws are reviewed based on their 
potential to increase subsequent costs, evaluate their potential to lower 
bureaucratic burden and to simplify existing administrative processes. The 
online access law is explicitly designed to lower administrative burden and 
to increase access to public services to those who are willing to conduct 
them online. However, the NKR has repeatedly highlighted in its annual 
reports that the actual implementation is stalling, too complex, not suffi-
ciently coordinated, and given the way in which implementation is organ-
ised, the OZG goals might not be achieved by the deadline.
In summary, the laws governing the digital transformation of the 
German state are listed in Table 19.1.
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Table 19.1 Overview of laws governing the digital transformation of the 
German state
Name of the law Date Content Scope of 
application
Act amending the 
Basic Law 
(Grundgesetz) 
(Articles 91c, 91d, 




Amendment of the Basic Law within 
the framework of the Conference on 
Federalism II with specific focus on 
the cooperation between federal and 
state government with respect to 
standards and security measures
Federal, states
IT State Treaty on 
the establishment 




Establishment and regulation of the 
working methods of the IT Planning 
Council as a steering committee for 
general IT cooperation
Federal, states








Enables the federal, state and local 
governments to offer simpler, more 










The aim is to vertically consolidate 
the federal government’s information 







Act for the 
Improvement of 






By 2022, the federal government, 
the Länder and the municipalities 
should be able to offer all 
administrative services in digital form
Federal, states, 
municipal
Coalition Treaty of 





Within the scope of the coalition 
agreement, several e-government- 
related projects were agreed upon
Federal, states, 
municipal




Advancing the development of IT 
cooperation in public administrations 
by FITKO
Federal, states
Source: Author’s own compilation
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3  ImplementatIon reSponSIbIlItIeS of dIgItal 
tranSformatIon In germany
The responsibilities for different aspects of IT governance are distributed 
not only horizontally across different federal ministries, but also vertically 
throughout the multilevel system across federal, state and municipal gov-
ernment levels.
3.1  Horizontal Distribution of Responsibilities Across 
Federal Ministries
At the federal level, the responsibilities are located in at least five different 
federal ministries or departments.
The Ministry of Transport and Digital Infrastructure (BMVI.de) is 
responsible for the improvement of the Long Term Evolution (LTE) and 
fibre-optic broadband deployment, the promotion of digital innovation 
technologies in the mobility sector as well as automated and networked 
driving. It also develops the Federal Government’s Artificial Intelligence 
Strategy, which was drawn up under the joint leadership of the Federal 
Ministry of Education and Research, the Federal Ministry of Economics 
and Energy and the Federal Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs. Its goal 
is to establish Germany and Europe as a leading AI location and thus con-
tribute to securing Germany’s future competitiveness. The aim is to 
develop and use AI responsibly and in the public interest. AI will also be 
used to automate public service delivery or proactively deliver services to 
citizens.
The Federal Ministry of Economic Affairs and Energy (BMWI.de) is in 
charge of creating a legally secure future framework for digital change and 
a modern net policy. The design of the digital economy (e.g., Sharing 
Economy) includes a strategy for artificial intelligence and blockchain. 
The goal is to create an intelligent interconnectedness between the educa-
tion, energy, health, and transport sectors.
The Federal Ministry of the Interior, Building and Community (BMI.
de) is responsible for the implementation of the Act for the Improvement 
of Online Access to Public Services (OZG) and the coordination of the 
Open Government initiative. It houses the data ethics commission and the 
agency for innovation in cyber security. As part of the implementation of 
the OZG, the BMI is establishing the national portal and the portal net-
work as a technical prerequisite for digitalisation of public services. The 
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work is being carried out in so-called digitisation laboratories and focusses 
on the different life cycles of citizens. It involves steps, such as the register 
modernisation and also the IT consolidation at the federal level. It has 
served as the initiator within the framework of federal cooperation includ-
ing the FITKO and IT Planning Council committees. The BMI has 
increased its responsibilities within the framework of e-government proj-
ects in the execution, coordination and control of the various measures 
initiated. Once completed, the services provided by the BMI will be acces-
sible to all citizens of the state. BMI is also home to the recently estab-
lished project team for the conception and development of a digital 
innovation team and e-government agency (DIT.BUND). DIT is using 
human-centric design and agile approaches and serves as a think-and-do 
tank for the federal government. 
The German Chancellory has recently established its own digital service 
team—Digital Service 4 Germany, which evolved out of the private sector 
initaitive Tech4Germany and Work4Germany, a fellowship program that 
places technology experts in federal ministries to collabroatively work on 
IT projects. The digital service team is an initiative under the patronage 
of head of the Federal Chancellery and is considered a technology task-
force, comparable to the UK’s Government Digital Service or the US’ 
Digital Service.  In addition, the federal CIO has initiated a cross-agency 
workgroup, NExT Netzwerk—a network  that focuses on connecting fed-
eral government employees to develop and implement technology prac-
tices and competencies.  The Federal Administration Office (BVA) is a 
federal agency in the portfolio of the Federal Ministry of the Interior, 
Building and Community. It performs a large number of federal adminis-
trative tasks and is active for some federal ministries and their business 
areas (for more details, see Chap. 5). The tasks include recovery of student 
loans, salaries and allowances of federal employees as well as citizenship 
matters. It also performs a variety of central services for other federal 
authorities, such as the payment of emoluments and allowances, travel 
expense management, time recording and personnel recruitment. The 
BVA has established its own organisational consultancy for other minis-
tries and authorities and has already digitised a large number of tasks and 
processes. The BVA currently has around 120 digitisation and IT pro-
cesses in use or under development. As the central service authority with 
many specialist tasks and customers, the BVA has developed a Digital 
Agenda, ‘BVA.digital 2022’, where all digital measures of the BVA are 
bundled and controlled. It specifically focusses on the development of the 
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digital skills and competences of federal government employees. In addi-
tion, its agenda consists of four application areas:
 1. Beihilfe App/Aid app: this is an app which allows eligible persons to 
quickly and easily apply for the reimbursement of eligible costs.
 2. BVA.digital: in addition, eleven different digitisation principles have 
been developed, which serve as guidelines for the digitisation of tasks, 
business processes and offers.
 3. Digital consulting: Federal Administration Office consultants support 
authorities in mastering this challenge and exploiting the potential of 
digitisation in a targeted manner.
3.2  Vertical Distribution of Responsibilities Across 
Administrative Levels
With respect to the current implementation of the online access law, the 
federal government is responsible for setting up the federal portal by 2022 
and ensuring interoperability with state-level portals. The result will be a 
network of portals (Portalverbund) that electronically offers all public ser-
vices taking accessibility criteria  into consideration. The federal govern-
ment is also responsible for creating user accounts and identification under 
the negotiated security standards. They are responsible for the federal IT 
consolidation. The aim of this consolidation of information technology is 
to ensure information security against the background of increasing com-
plexity, be able to react to innovations and ensure an efficient, economical, 
stable and sustainable operation. Three strands of action lay the ground-
work: (1) consolidation of operations, (2) consolidation of services and 
(3) procurement bundling.
The Länder are responsible for providing their electronic services on 
their own state portal and connecting them to the federal portal. The ser-
vices are connected to the agencies responsible for delivering them. The 
challenge at the state level is that some states started this process long 
before the online access law was established. They have already invested in 
their own portal network, created partnerships with other states, selected 
their service providers and set their own standards. This contradicts in 
many ways the standards set by the law and the agreed-upon shared IT 
components, and new interfaces will likely need to be designed to be able 




The municipalities and their possible distribution of tasks are not explic-
itly mentioned in the law. The website of the IT Planning Council states: 
‘The municipalities are to be involved by the Länder’. However, only a 
handful of selected municipalities are involved in the digital labs to develop 
service prototypes and are, therefore, at the forefront of designing digital 
services in one specific life phase. The majority of municipalities are not 
involved and are dependent on the innovativeness and coordination ability 
of their respective states. Some states take this task very seriously and have 
distributed the tasks of public service design to the municipalities, while 
others have not yet had early discussions with their municipalities.
4  recent developmentS: cItIzen-centrIc dIgItal 
ServIce deSIgn
E-government and digital transformation have become one of the core 
elements of the recently elected nineteenth coalition government. The 
coalition agreement includes the expansion of a high-speed network and 
the creation of a digital portal for citizens and businesses to provide easy, 
secure and mobile access to all administrative services. An additional 
€500 million will be available for the implementation of the online access 
law to improve online access to administrative services. The coalition has 
agreed to establish an e-government agency that will jointly develop stan-
dards and pilot solutions for all federal levels more quickly than before. 
For that purpose, one of the hallmarks of the German public service will 
be reviewed: the (hand)written form requirements. According to the 
coalition agreement, the federal government intends to strengthen the 
role of the federal government’s IT commissioner.
A digital council consisting of German-speaking high-profile interna-
tional academics and practitioners was established to advise the chancel-
lor’s office and bring in new ideas to move the digital transformation of 
the German public sector forward. The honorary council has met a few 
times, but no public announcements were made that provide insights into 
the guidance that the chancellor’s office receives from the council. The 
goal for establishing the council is to receive critical external insights on 
the progress the German government is making with respect to digital 
transformation.
Some progress has been made by establishing e-filing across all levels of 
government. The most prominent example is the tax e-filing system. 
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Using plain language, e-filing through the electronic filing system for tax 
returns, Elektronische Steuererklärung (ELSTER), has been available since 
2019. With My Elster (formerly ElsterOnline-Portal), the tax administra-
tion has made a portal available through which citizens can register their 
own account, use their electronic filing ID to submit their tax declaration 
forms or request tax returns and so on.
New practices of citizen-centric public service design have initially been 
tried out in small pockets of the overall administrative system, originating 
mostly from the municipal government level. Networks such as the ANDI 
group (agile network for digital innovation) have started working with 
designers to bring innovative methods, such as a design thinking or 
human-centred design, to their digital transformation work (see, e.g., 
Ansell and Torfing 2014; Bason 2016; Junginger 2016). These bottom-
 up efforts have subsequently spread to the federal level and are now offi-
cially established as part of the federal digital transformation efforts. 
Especially in the digital labs used to derive the requirement of digital pub-
lic services, interdisciplinary teams of experts from across public adminis-
tration collaborate with content experts to design user-centred public 
services. This new form of co-production is used to design services, not 
from the internal logic of government but from the perspective of those 
who need to use digital services in the future. These users can either be 
internal users (public servants) or external users, such as citizens and other 
stakeholders. The goal is to deliver services that are easier to use, have a 
higher success and acceptance rate and generally make the design process 
more democratic in nature.
What has not been addressed in either the laws or public discussions on 
digital transformation in Germany is the necessary build-up of digital 
competences in the public sector. While Germany has signed off on the 
European Digital Competency 2.0 framework (EU Science Hub n.d.), it 
has not yet started to come up with any form of comprehensive framework 
on how to build digital competences in order to prepare the public sector 
workforce for future challenges. There are initial plans to build a govern-
ment digital academy serving all three levels of government and an eGov-
ernment MOOC to bring digital competencies to civil servants. Results 
from expert interviews show that public managers need to be trained in 
developing a digital mindset. They need to understand what the role of 
new technologies is and build up digital fluency to switch between differ-
ent types of technologies. Middle managers responsible for the implemen-
tation of digital transformation need to learn how to use new project 
management techniques to guide the implementation process. Public 
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servants, and especially frontline workers, need to be able to participate in 
the digital transformation efforts, understand how efficiency gains are cre-
ated, encourage citizens to use the tools and reduce administrative bur-
dens during actual usage. This will help public servants to focus on more 
complex issues that need to be tackled in person and leave other tasks to 
those willing to conduct them online or use automated public service 
delivery. Another important stakeholder group includes the IT service 
providers and consultants who need to understand public service values as 
an achievement of the rule of law, instead of promoting the abandonment 
of federalism. Surprisingly, the experts uniformly highlight that citizens’ 
digital competences are far more formed than those of public servants and 
do not necessarily need to be improved. Instead, public administrations 
need to simplify the design of public service delivery so that no additional 
skills need to be developed in the future and administrative burdens are 
reduced.
4.1  Digital Transformation of Citizen Offices
One recent advancement can be observed in the digitalisation of local 
one-stop shops. These are local government initiatives to advance 
e- government service provision bundled on one website, so that those 
digitally literate citizens have an opportunity to access information about 
the agency and its services 24/7.
According to Schwab et al. (2019), the focus is on two advancements. 
One can be described as the interactive process through which appoint-
ments are made with the agency, for example, to register a car or apply for 
a driver’s licence. The other is accessing information about services offered 
online, including information about office hours or the general process, 
and to provide some of the necessary administrative forms online. These 
two services can be mostly observed in cities with more than 100,000 
citizens.
Among the top cities in this area is Freiburg in Baden-Württemberg 
(see Digital.Freiburg.de) that uses idea labs to integrate citizen needs into 
the deliberate design of online public services. Other cities, for example 
the city-state Hamburg, are providing interactive options such as the chat-
bot ‘Frag-den-Michel’. The chatbot is AI-supported and provides help to 
find services, locations and office hours.
However, face-to-face interactions between civil servants and citizens 
are still the norm. While citizens can prepare for some of these interactions 
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using the documents and forms available online, citizen interactions are of 
a complex nature and need to be dealt with in an analogue discursive man-
ner, potentially including several different agencies and not just 
through one frontline worker.
4.2  Digital Transformation of the Federal Agency 
for Migration and Refugees
Another prominent success story of a digitalised agency is the Federal 
Agency for Migration and Refugees (BAMF). Since the migration crisis of 
2015, the BAMF has increased the number of clients it serves on a regular 
basis from 40,000 refugees per year to around 800,000–1,000,000 refu-
gees per year. This massive increase in scale needed to be reflected in the 
internal processes and distribution of responsibilities in order to effectively 
coordinate and trace refugees across all levels of government (Bogumil 
et al. 2018). The BAMF has set up an internal IT Lab that introduces new 
project management tools, such as Scrum to develop software together 
with the process owner, product owners and users. Scrum is an iterative 
project management practice that introduces the development of small 
project steps in so-called sprints. The project team is allowed to revisit 
previous project steps and adjusts the directions and requirements as they 
go along. The result is a minimal viable product that can be used to pro-
totype the expected final product, and additional adjustments can be made 
when users are invited to test the prototype. The goal is to develop tools 
faster with fewer errors that are immediately usable for the users. The pro-
cess is more democratic in nature than the standard waterfall technique 
that has  led to large-scale IT failures  in the past. The IT lab is a rather 
unique organisational setup, comparable to digital service teams in the UK 
or the US or innovation labs in Denmark. It is located in rooms with graf-
fiti and artwork that are not usually found in a German bureaucracy, has 
large windows for transparency and demonstration purposes. As part of 
their mission, the agency’s inhouse IT lab staff also provides administra-
tive assistance to other agencies with responsibilities related to the immi-
gration service, such as customs, border and local police, to share their 
knowledge and practices.
As a starting point, BAMF has used the refugee crisis to rethink its own 
IT management. It has developed a series of new tools in a relatively short 
amount of time that help to automate tasks related to refugee processing 
and handle the coordination efforts with other agencies, such as the 
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municipal and state immigration office, first admissions by the states, fed-
eral agency for employment, police, customs, federal intelligence services 
and others. For this purpose, tools such as the migration tracker were cre-
ated according to the Dublin procedure. For each refugee case, the proce-
dure reviews which European country is responsible for accepting the 
refugee. The tool is used to coordinate arrivals at the initial reception 
facilities, register arrivals and provide proof of arrival. All immigration 
offices are now connected to the migration tracker and the data can be 
transferred to the police and especially to the courts. All documents are 
scanned, electronically distributed, and are made available to the con-
nected agencies through the MARIS system, a workflow and document 
management system to process all asylum-related procedures. According 
to those responsible for the digitalisation of the BAMF processes, the digi-
talisation efforts themselves were not necessarily difficult. It was much 
more difficult to train public servants in applying new project manage-
ment practices and work on cross-functional teams together with design-
ers and software developers and help them move towards a digital mindset 
to establish and accept these new practices.
The BAMF is also the initiator of the NExT network which was founded 
in 2018 in collaboration with the federal chief information officer (CIO) 
(see https://www.next-netz.de/ for more information). NExT is an 
interdepartmental network of digital pioneers. These are experts in differ-
ent federal ministries whose common goal is to significantly shape and 
advance the digital transformation of German public administration. The 
network is divided into six working groups that focus on: how digital proj-
ects can be developed; how digital skills can be increased; what new tech-
nologies public servants need to pay attention to; how organisational 
practices need to be adapted; what kind of cooperation is necessary and 
how the results can be communicated and distributed to public sector 
actors. This interorganisational network has the opportunity to distribute 
insights from different angles of the administrative system and share 
insights without reinventing the wheel over and over again.
5  leSSonS learned and practIcal ImplIcatIonS
The developments and insights gained from the digital transformation 
experiences in Germany lend themselves to other countries—with simi-
larly advanced bureaucracies and IT legacy systems that have been built up 
over many years. In countries with a comparable institutional context, 
19 DIGITAL TRANSFORMATION OF THE GERMAN STATE 
346
where authority for policymaking and implementation is delegated to dif-
ferent types of actors across levels of government and jurisdictions, 
Germany may be a model to emulate and adapt to other local contexts. 
The all-encompassing reform that tackles publicly facing administrative 
service is a holistic approach to get up to speed in contexts in which policy 
and implementation of digital services have been slow to develop.
Those who are aiming to introduce a similar approach, however, can 
learn from the coordination mechanisms used by Germany. The focus on 
co-creation together with actors at all levels of government and with exter-
nal stakeholders is unique in that it includes not only all levels of govern-
ment but also citizens and related interest groups. However, the 
administrative practice shows that there is currently an over-reliance on 
external consultants and government-owned IT service providers. As soon 
as they pull out, contracts expire or projects end, there is a need to find 
another approach to sustain the development and implementation of digi-
tal services. The German government will need to focus on continuous 
service provision and scaling up to the 11,000 municipalities where most 
citizens access public services.
Digital transformation of the public sector is at its core a cultural change 
process that needs to be carefully guided with the input of public manag-
ers and cannot be driven bottom-up by frontline workers (Mergel et al. 
2019). Public servants need to be included each step of the way to provide 
their feedback, experience the potential changes coming their way as well 
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When considering political and administrative actions over the past 
decades, a general trend towards more openness can be observed (Meijer 
et al. 2014: 103–104). Internet portals, where large quantities of adminis-
trative data are available to be used freely by the general public, are exam-
ples of this trend, which is generally supported by technological advances 
(von Lucke 2017: 155ff.). Alongside the different motivations for these 
changes, different terms are used to describe this development. However, 
the term open government is becoming increasingly common—also in 
Germany—to refer to actions generally increasing the openness of the 
political-administrative system.
According to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD), open government can be defined as ‘a culture of 
governance based on innovative and sustainable public policies and prac-
tices inspired by the principals of transparency, accountability and partici-
pation that fosters democracy and inclusive growth’ (OECD 2016: 3–4). 
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The principles of transparency and participation are also part of Barack 
Obama’s Open Government Directive of 2009. Instead of accountability, 
he included collaboration as the third element of open government 
(Executive Office of the President 2009: 1). Going back to the differences 
in the conceptual understanding of open government, the term is used in 
the context of a wide variety of policy measures in practice.
The possible advantages of open government are closely related to its 
principles. Civil society, the economy as well as the administration itself 
can benefit from increased openness of policy decisions and administrative 
actions, which may also strengthen the relationships between these actors. 
In addition, the involvement of citizens and their ideas can help to make 
administrative processes more citizen-friendly. Disadvantages, on the 
other hand, may arise in terms of extensions of policy and planning pro-
cesses due to the involvement of more external actors as well as the pos-
sible demotivation of participants whose ideas or proposals cannot always 
be taken into consideration.
Criticism of open government further points out a possible lack of 
democratic legitimacy (Wewer and Wewer 2019: 11). While the under-
standing of the types of measures which are part of open government dif-
fers, the problems of legitimacy are not apparent for most types of 
initiatives. This also applies, for example, to the advisory roles of external 
actors in political-administrative processes, which have a long tradition in 
many countries and do not replace the decisions taken by elected 
representatives.
The Open Government Partnership was founded in 2011 as an interna-
tional initiative to promote open government. So far, more than seventy 
countries are part of the initiative. Germany joined the partnership in 
2016. The member states are obliged to develop national action plans in 
cooperation with civil society. The action plans comprise specific commit-
ments in areas such as open data and citizen participation (Federal 
Chancellery 2019; Federal Ministry of the Interior 2017).
Germany’s current national action plan for the years 2019–2021, for 
example, includes commitments to the establishment of an e-government 
agency as a digital innovation team of the federal administration, the fur-
ther development and promotion of the open data environment and bet-
ter regulation through participation and testing. The nine commitments 
by the federal government are complemented by further commitments by 
some state governments (Federal Chancellery 2019).
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While initiatives in the context of open government can be found in 
various policy areas and at different levels of government, the following 
sections will focus on three sub-fields, namely open government data 
(Sect. App. 2), open innovation (Sect. App. 3) and open budget (Sect. 
App. 4), where a comparatively large number of activities has been identi-
fied. Each section addresses the current state of affairs at the federal level 
in Germany from a legal and practical perspective. The insights gained and 
existing potentials for further open government activities are then sum-
marised (Sect. App. 4).
App. 2. Open Government Data
Open government data is one of the most well-known sub-fields of open 
government focussing on the free availability of administrative data for 
further use (Ubaldi 2013: 6). While the publication of administrative data 
enhances transparency, private companies and administration itself can 
also benefit from the exchange and further use of data. For some types of 
governmental data, such as geographical data, the provision implies con-
siderable business opportunities for the private sector.
Since 2017, section 12a of the E-government Act (EGovG) obliges 
direct federal authorities to provide unprocessed data, which they collect or 
receive in the context of the fulfilment of their tasks, via public networks. 
Furthermore, Germany is legally bound by the European Directive 
2013/37/EU amending Directive 2003/98/EC on the re-use of public 
sector information (the PSI Directive) obliging the member states to make 
public sector information accessible and reusable. In Germany, the directive 
was transposed into national law through the First Amendment of the 
Re-Use of Information Act (IWG). In 2019 the European Directive (EU) 
2019/1024 on open data and the re-use of public sector information passed 
which encourages member states of the EU to extend the provision of gov-
ernment data for further usage, especially for economic purposes. The 
member states shall implement the directive into national law until July 2021.
Based on an administrative arrangement of 2014 between the federal 
government and several federal states, the data portal GovData1 was estab-
lished in order to collectively provide data from various public authorities 
on the Internet. Two types of data licences, one requiring source specifica-
tions and one without any restrictions or conditions, were developed to 
enable the legal reuse of the data. The decision on the licence used is taken 
by the provider of a dataset. Today, a wide range of data relating to various 
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policy areas is available on the platform. In addition, open government 
data are available on other platforms operated by federal, state and munici-
pal governments.
App. 3. Open Innovation
According to Henry W. Chesbrough, the economist who coined the term, 
‘Open Innovation means that valuable ideas can come from inside or out-
side the company and can go to market from inside or outside the com-
pany as well’ (Chesbrough 2003: 43). By enabling inclusion of the ideas 
of external actors, opening up the innovation processes can generate a 
number of advantages, for example optimised workflows, for any type of 
organisation. Public authorities can also benefit from this approach.
In the context of open government, open innovation is also a possible 
tool for strengthening the connection between administration and the 
general public. Government officials can add to their knowledge, espe-
cially about citizens’ needs, by allowing input from outside the public 
sector. Citizens, on the other hand, can participate more directly in public 
matters and increase their influence on governmental decision-making.
In Germany, section 19 of the Regulation on the Award of Public 
Contracts (VgV) further allows public authorities to establish innovation 
partnerships with private companies with the intention of creating innova-
tive products or services, which are not yet available on the market. 
However, the use of this procurement procedure has remained limited so 
far. Also, the civil dialogue ‘Wellbeing in Germany’, which was conducted 
between 2015 and 2016 and included discussions between federal politi-
cians and citizens about the living conditions and quality of life in Germany 
(Federal Government 2020), can be considered as an activity in the con-
text of open innovation.
App. 4. Open Budget
Open budget refers to the opening of the budget as well as the budgetary 
cycle of public authorities with the objective of providing information and 
enabling the free reuse of budgetary data. In some cases, a consultative 
participation of citizens and private businesses in budgetary affairs is also 
intended. Comparable to many other areas of open government activities, 
open budget fosters transparency and participation in particular. Open 
budget data and open contracting can be considered as sub-areas of open 
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budget. While the former focusses on budget data for analytical and 
research purposes, the latter addresses the disclosure of public authority 
contracts with all their contractual clauses.
In Germany, the disclosure of the budgets is required by law. According 
to Article 110 of the Basic Law, all federal revenues and expenditures need 
to be included in a budget plan, which can be part of the draft of a budget 
law. The draft law needs to be approved by the Bundestag, while the 
Bundesrat can deliver its opinion. On the grounds that the Bundestag 
generally debates publicly (Article 42 of the Basic Law), the federal budget 
is publicly available. Further provisions covering the federal budget are 
regulated by the Federal Budget Code (BHO).
In addition to the publication as part of the federal budget law, the 
federal budget is interactively and freely accessible on a website2 operated 
by the Federal Ministry of Finance. The website enables a detailed explo-
ration of the budget, including graphical illustrations of the allocations of 
the individual budget items, year-on-year comparisons and a key-
word search.
App. 5. Lessons Learned
The German government and public authorities have become more open 
in recent years. Changes in political convictions and priorities coupled 
with the commitments in the context of the participation in the Open 
Government Partnership have led to a broad range of initiatives generally 
aiming to improve transparency, accountability and participation.
However, for some types of information and data, such as legislative 
texts and budget plans, it is important to note that public availability has 
existed in Germany for many decades, even centuries. The changes in the 
context of open government mainly affect the types and convenience of 
availability. While, for example, access to printed legal gazettes and explor-
ing content requires substantial efforts, the full-text search of legal docu-
ments readily available on the Internet can be considered as a significant 
relief and, therefore, progress in terms of openness.
Although the German federal government has implemented various 
open government initiatives, the user groups and utilisation processes of 
the initiatives have not been fully evaluated yet. Further efforts could 
focus on gaining a better understanding of the user side of open govern-
ment. If necessary, measures could be taken to reach broader groups of 
users, for example by developing more tailored offers and more widely 
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promoting existing activities. New measures to promote open govern-
ment by emphasising its potentials could also be addressed to the admin-
istration itself. Additional steps to improve and further develop current 
open government initiatives, for example by expanding data visualisations 
and search options, could also be considered.
Further attention should also be given to the interrelations between the 
various initiatives as well as the sub-fields of open government. The mea-
sures related to open innovation, for example, can largely benefit from 
open government data. A focus on interrelations could also support the 
development of a more uniform understanding of open government in 
general.
Besides the federal government, the state governments and many local 
governments have also implemented measures in the area of open govern-
ment in Germany in recent years. Some larger cities, for example, operate 
their own open data and/or open budget portals. Furthermore, the proj-
ect ‘model municipality open government’ by the Federal Ministry of the 
Interior, Building and Community and the municipal umbrella organisa-
tions have supported open government initiatives in selected municipali-
ties with the general aim of promoting open government at the sub-national 
level (Federal Ministry of the Interior, Building and Community 2019). 
Stimulating increased collaboration and the exchange of ideas between 
public authorities across all levels of government could be a promising 
approach to further exploit the potential of open government in Germany.
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CHAPTER 20
The Federal Ministerial Bureaucracy, 
the Legislative Process and Better Regulation
Sabine Kuhlmann and Sylvia Veit
1  IntroductIon
Since the end of the 1990s, against the backdrop of increasing interna-
tional competition, growing regulatory density and demands on the out-
put legitimacy of legislative action, there has been a debate around the 
concept of ‘Better Regulation’ in Germany and Europe. Better Regulation 
reforms are directed at anchoring institutional mechanisms to ensure 
lower costs, enhanced effectiveness and better executability of regulations 
as well as improving the legislative process. First, these reforms attempt to 
stem the growing flood of legal norms and overregulation with the objec-
tive of the state to enhance its scope of action. Second, they are meant to 
reduce red tape and the compliance costs of new legislation for businesses, 
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citizens and public administration. Third, Better Regulation reforms are 
directed at increasing the effectiveness of political interventions and at 
systemically considering the non-intended side effects of regulations in 
order to revise and improve them. While the fundamental debate sur-
rounding reducing red tape, Regulatory Impact Assessment (RIA) and 
evaluation is by no means new, some facets of the more recent discourse 
are indeed innovative. This concerns, on the one hand, the influence of 
the European Union (EU) on national legislation and the bureaucratic 
burdens caused by adopting EU law. On the other hand, new methods for 
RIA have been developed, such as the Standard Cost Model (SCM) for 
estimating bureaucratic costs. Additionally, innovative forms of RIA insti-
tutionalisation have evolved, for instance by way of establishing indepen-
dent advisory bodies by law, such as the National Regulatory Control 
Council (Nationaler Normenkontrollrat—NKR) in Germany, which 
brings a new quality to the discourse and practice of Better Regulation. 
This chapter addresses these developments and specifically outlines the 
role and functions of the NKR in this context.
2  Better regulatIon as reform concept
Since the second half of the 1990s, Better Regulation1 has been estab-
lished as an international reform wave focussing on the improvement of 
the production, design, selection and implementation of regulations. The 
main aim of Better Regulation reforms is to countervail the inherent defi-
cits of regulatory regimes such as the extensive administrative burdens on 
businesses, a biased inclusion of societal interests or insufficient use of 
scientific evidence (Lodge and Wegrich 2012). Thus, governments adopt 
Better Regulation reforms to increase the effectiveness of their regulations 
and policies but also to strengthen their (democratic) legitimacy (e.g. 
Radaelli et al. 2013). The concept of Better Regulation is not limited to 
specific policy areas as it aims ‘to improve policy-making and regulation by 
adopting standards and procedures that govern regulatory decision- 
making across different public policy areas’ (Bunea and Ibenskas 2017: 
591).2 Hence, Better Regulation can be classified as institutional policy 
(Kuhlmann and Wollmann 2019; Kuhlmann and Wayenberg 2016) or 
meta-regulation (Radaelli and Meuwese 2009).
Better Regulation is an umbrella term for various tools and instruments 
to raise the quality of both the process and output of legislation. Typical 
elements in the ‘toolbox’ of Better Regulation are Regulatory Impact 
 S. KUHLMANN AND S. VEIT
359
Assessments (RIAs) and its sub-forms, sunset clauses (sunset regulation), 
consultations, ex post evaluations of policies/laws, approaches to regula-
tory simplification and tools for risk-based or smart regulation. More 
recently, digitalisation has influenced this reform area and triggered a 
debate on the use of electronic forecasting tools and algorithms in policy-
making. As RIAs are not only the most widespread tool of Better 
Regulation but also an instrument with many facets and sub-forms, some 
further explanations on this instrument are necessary.
RIAs involve a systematic assessment of the impacts of legislative pro-
posals and other policies before they are enacted. RIAs are no new ‘inven-
tion’ of the more recent Better Regulation debate but have a rather long 
history. In Germany, a list of ten questions to be answered by the lead 
ministry focussing on the quality and impact of legislative proposals (the 
so-called Blaue Prüffragen) was established as early as 1984 by the federal 
government. The practical relevance of this list, however, remained low.
Since the end of the 1990s, increased political efforts to improve poli-
cies by systematically integrating RIAs into the legislative process have 
been observed in many countries. Two core elements of this reform wave 
can be identified. Firstly, RIAs are explicitly designed as meta-regulation 
(Radaelli 2010). Hence, the objective is to improve governmental legisla-
tive proposals by defining additional ‘rules of the game’ within the core 
executive. Secondly, compliance with RIA requirements is regularly sup-
ported by the creation of RIA boards or (regulatory) control bodies in 
charge of quality assurance and control tasks (such as the NKR in 
Germany). These measures have increased the practical relevance of RIAs 
and fostered policy learning (Fritsch et al. 2017).
The growing significance of RIAs over the last two decades has been 
accompanied by a process of functional differentiation, in which various 
sub-types of RIAs—such as Bureaucracy Cost Assessment with the 
Standard Cost Model (SCM) or Gender Impact Assessment—have been 
established in different countries. In addition, different types of ‘generic’ 
RIAs exist—the most famous being the Sustainability Impact Assessment 
(SIA). SIAs focus on a well-balanced appraisal of social, environmental 
and economic impacts, and on the coupling of sustainability policy (e.g. 
sustainability indicators) and impact assessment (Russel and Turnpenny 
2009). In recent years, ICT development has created new opportunities 
for analyses and triggered the development and use of electronic RIA 
tools. The federal government in Germany has introduced an electronic 
tool as part of the SIA called eNAP (see www.enap.bund.de).
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The OECD has played a crucial role as an important reform promoter 
in the international diffusion of Better Regulation reforms (DeFrancesco 
2012). In Europe, the European Commission has also established itself as 
a reform promoter by pushing agendas in the field of Better Regulation 
under different labels. The implementation of Better Regulation mea-
sures, as well as the impact of the tools promoted by reform advocates, has 
become a controversial topic in academic discourse. While some scholars 
have underlined the potential of these reform tools to improve policies 
(e.g. Rissi and Sager 2013), others have criticised the reforms for being 
mainly rhetorical and symbolic with limited impact in practice (e.g. 
Coglianese 2008). With regard to RIA, empirical studies point to a mainly 
formal adoption in many countries and considerable implementation defi-
cits and cross-country variation (e.g. Dunlop 2012).
3  Better regulatIon and the federal 
mInIsterIal Bureaucracy
In Germany, as in most other parliamentary democracies, the coordina-
tion and formulation of new regulations and draft laws is one of the main 
functions of the federal ministerial bureaucracy (see Chaps. 5 and 10). 
Almost 90 per cent of all federal laws passed by the parliament go back to 
initiatives of the federal government (Regierungsvorlagen) (Deutscher 
Bundestag 2019). The remaining ten per cent are mostly initiated by one 
of the two chambers of federal parliament, the Bundestag or the Bundesrat. 
There are at least three reasons for this dominant role of the federal 
bureaucracy in the policymaking process. First, despite the notion of a 
separation of powers between the legislative and the executive branch, in 
practice there is no clear dividing line. The head of government 
(Chancellor) is elected by a majority in the legislature. Majority fractions 
in parliament and the government are intertwined. Therefore, in many 
cases, successful legislative initiatives introduced by the Bundestag can 
actually also be traced back to the executive branch and have been written 
by ministerial staff. For the most part, strategic considerations or time 
restrictions are the reason for the decision to formally initiate these laws by 
the majority fractions in the Bundestag. Secondly, MPs and parliamentary 
fractions in the Bundestag have far fewer personnel and financial resources 
at their disposal to develop policy solutions than the government. The 
government has about 19,000 civil servants working in federal ministries 
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and the chancellery (Bundeshaushaltsplan 2019), and more than four times 
as many civil servants in federal agencies, including governmental research 
agencies. In addition, a huge number of advisory bodies of the federal 
government have been established to provide expert policy advice on dif-
ferent topics (see Chap. 5). Finally, the government has substantial finan-
cial resources for commissioned research. Compared to the federal 
government, the parliamentary resources are rather limited: altogether, 
the Bundestag has about 6000 employees, of whom 3000 belong to the 
Bundestag administration, about 1150 work for the (currently six) parlia-
mentary fractions (Deutscher Bundestag 2019) and the remaining approx-
imate 1850 are employed as personal staff for the current 709 MPs in the 
Bundestag. A third reason for the executive dominance in policy formula-
tion lies in the ability to draw on its vast amount of knowledge and policy 
expertise, which is located in the federal ministries and especially in their 
basic units (divisions/Referate).
Due to the constitutional principle of minister responsibility 
(Ministerverantwortlichkeit), federal ministries in Germany are charac-
terised by a strict hierarchy and linear organisation. Each ministry is 
headed by a single minister. The number of ministers and their policy 
portfolio is defined by the federal chancellor (there are usually between 
14 and 16 ministers). Despite the fact that all legislation and important 
policy programmes need a cabinet majority (cabinet principle) and, as 
stated in the federal constitution, the federal chancellor determines and 
is responsible for general policy guidelines (Richtlinienkompetenz), min-
isters in Germany have a relatively strong position compared to ministers 
in many other countries. Every minister conducts his ministry and policy 
domain independently (departmental principle/Ressortprinzip). Thus, 
ministers are not subordinate to the head of government and he/she 
cannot instruct them on how to handle specific issues within their min-
istries’ affairs. In the development of legislative proposals within the 
executive branch, the strong position of single ministers leads to a domi-
nance of ‘negative coordination’. Because of the departmental principle, 
the lead ministry has considerable autonomy in procedural decision-
making and consulting interest groups. In policymaking processes, the 
chancellery exerts influence on the departments by specifying deadlines 
for consultation. It also has responsibility for releasing departmental leg-
islative proposals (Referentenentwürfe) for interdepartmental coordina-
tion and later in the processes leading up to cabinet decision. The 
chancellery’s capacity for fostering policy integration and enforcing its 
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own policies is however limited, and even conflict resolution usually 
takes place among single ministries in the process of interdepartmental 
coordination (Ressortabstimmung), rather than hierarchically by the 
chancellery (see Chap. 5). If a conflict cannot be resolved in the 
Ressortabstimmung, the coalition parties try to negotiate a solution.
The formal policymaking process within the federal government from 
the first draft of a new regulation to the final cabinet decision is regulated 
by the Federal Ministries’ Joint Rules of Procedure (Gemeinsame 
Geschäftsordnung—GGO). Besides some of the organisational aspects, the 
Joint Rules of Procedure stipulate who has to be involved in the law- 
making process and at what point in time. Whenever a new draft law is 
presented, there is an obligation to consult other federal departments, 
Länder governments, the local level and interest organisations relevant to 
that particular policy. The GGO also defines the necessary formal parts of 
each legislative proposal, notably (a) a summary cover sheet with an over-
view of the expected impacts in different areas (e.g. compliance costs), (b) 
the draft law text itself and (c) a detailed explanation of the reasons leading 
to the respective draft law (explanatory memorandum).
The first attempts at systematising ex ante evaluation of legislation in 
Germany at federal level date back to the 1970s (Veit 2010). However, it 
was not before the year 2000 that federal ministries committed themselves 
to conducting a comprehensive RIA by regulating RIA procedures and 
competencies in the GGO.  It was then, according to the provisions of 
Section 43 (5) GGO, that the ‘consequences of a law’ had to be presented 
in the explanatory memorandum of each legislative proposal. Section 44 
(1) GGO further stipulates: ‘The consequences of a law are defined as the 
main impacts of a law: this covers its intended effects and unintended side 
effects’. The following paragraphs of the GGO list some specific RIA 
requirements—with an emphasis on cost consequences (e.g. consequences 
for small- and medium-sized enterprises and implementation costs).
According to the GGO, RIAs have to be conducted by the lead minis-
try. Since there are no evaluation units within the different federal minis-
tries, RIAs are usually conducted by the same division that has key 
responsibility for developing the draft law. Before 2006, there was no 
oversight body within the federal executive with responsibility for evaluat-
ing RIA implementation and quality. The Federal Ministry of the Interior 
was assigned responsibility for supporting the other ministries in their RIA 
activities, for example by publishing impact assessment guidelines. The 
quality of RIAs, however, was expected to be discussed by the various 
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ministries when coordinating a draft law. Hence, policy coordination and 
political compromise on the one hand, and neutral analysis of proposed 
policy impacts based on appropriate methods on the other, were supposed 
to be realised simultaneously—within the same formal procedures and by 
the same actors (Veit 2010). To what extent this pattern of institutionali-
sation changed when the NKR was established in 2006 is elaborated in the 
following section.
4  the natIonal regulatory control councIl
The National Regulatory Control Council (Nationaler 
Normenkontrollrat—NKR), which was established on a statutory basis3 
in Germany in 2006, constitutes a new form of institutionalisation of 
Better Regulation in organisational, procedural and methodological 
terms. The NKR is an advisory and control council of ten members that 
assists the German federal government with Better Regulation and 
reducing red tape. Its core task is the assessment of all legislative initia-
tives of the federal government with regard to the presentation of com-
pliance costs and other cost impacts. The aspired political goals and 
purposes of regulations are thereby not subject to examination accord-
ing to the NKR law (NKRG). In the following, an overview of the insti-
tutionalisation of the NKR as an independent body, its missions and 
tasks, operating principles and the outcomes of the work of the NKR 
is given.
4.1  Institutionalisation of the NKR as an Independent 
Advisory and Supervisory Body
The NKR commenced its work in September 2006 after the ‘Act on the 
Establishment of a National Regulatory Control Council’ (NKRG) was 
passed in the previous month. The establishment of the NKR in Germany 
is to be understood in light of two developments. On the one hand, the 
federal government drew on the positive response received by the Dutch 
government’s programme ‘Bureaucracy Reduction and Better Regulation’. 
In the Netherlands, where the SCM was developed, an independent expert 
and advisory body (ACTAL) had already been established in 2000. On the 
other hand, experience with regulatory impact assessments in Germany 
had shown that impact assessments were difficult to implement without an 
assertive authority monitoring their implementation (Veit 2010). One of 
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the main arguments for establishing the NKR was, therefore, to set up an 
independent advisory and supervisory body to systematically monitor and 
demand that departments assess bureaucracy costs in accordance with 
their obligations. The NKR is located in the German federal chancellery; 
however, the NKR is neither supervised by nor subordinate to the federal 
chancellery or any other authority (Section 1 (1) NKRG). The autonomy 
and independence of the NKR is also emphasised through its legal anchor-
ing. Contrary to most other advisory bodies of the federal government, 
disbanding the NKR requires a parliamentary majority.
The NKR consists of ten (eight until 2011) members who work ad 
honorem. They are nominated by the federal chancellor and appointed by 
the federal president. In Section 3 (2) NKRG, the profile for members of 
the council should meet the following requirements: ‘The members 
should have experience in legislative matters within state or social institu-
tions as well as knowledge of economic matters.’ The NKR is supported 
by a professional secretariat with currently 11 employees who are also not 
subject to any directives issued by the federal chancellery or any depart-
ment. They are only accountable to the NKR. The secretariat offers civil 
servants in the departments drafting legislative proposals assistance in 
implementing the assessments of compliance costs in terms of methodol-
ogy, while the Federal Statistical Office administers and updates the data-
bank of the assessment exercise. The centrepiece of the formal 
institutionalisation of the NKR is its obligatory involvement in the inner 
legislative procedure in the executive. The federal ministries in Germany 
are obliged to involve the NKR in every regulatory initiative at an early 
stage. In the phase of interdepartmental coordination, the NKR, thus, has 
the same rights as other affected departments (Section 45 (1) GGO). The 
statements of the NKR on legislative proposals—although non-binding 
for the government—are part of the cabinet draft and are published at the 
time of introducing the draft to the Federal Parliament (Bundestag) or the 
Federal Council (Bundesrat) as an appendix to the respective legislative 
draft (Section 6 (1) NKRG). If there is dissent between the NKR and the 
government regarding specific issues, the federal government can define 
this dissenting opinion as the statement of the NKR. The federal govern-
ment’s response is then considered in the further advisory process as an 
appendix to the legislative draft.
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4.2  Mission and Mandate
According to Section 4 (2) NKRG, the main task of the NKR is to assess 
legislative and regulatory drafts before their presentation to the federal 
cabinet with regard to compliance with the principles of a standardised 
assessment of bureaucracy costs and by means of the so-called Standard 
Cost Model (SCM).4 Bureaucracy costs are here to be understood as costs 
‘incurred by natural or legal persons in fulfilling their duties to provide 
information. Duties to provide information are obligations deriving from 
an act, ordinance, bylaw or administrative regulation to procure, make 
available or transmit data and other information to authorities or third 
parties’ (Section 2 (2) NKRG). Typical examples of information obliga-
tions include completing forms and providing statistics, or reporting. In 
order to calculate bureaucracy costs arising from these obligations, the 
time and cost expenditure needed to comply with the public information 
obligations are estimated. Based on a common methodology, the data are 
multiplied by a tariff, frequency of activity and the number of cases. The 
result gives information in monetary terms about the bureaucracy costs 
that entail a legal provision, a legal area or a certain occurrence (e.g. busi-
ness creation). This procedure can be applied to other target groups (citi-
zens or public administration) in a similar manner. In December 2006, 
shortly after the establishment of the NKR, the provisions for regulatory 
impact assessments of the Federal Ministries’ Joint Rules of Procedure 
(GGO) were extended by the obligation to ensure transparency about 
information obligations and bureaucracy costs for companies, citizens and 
public administration in the draft proposal and as part of the justification 
for the law.
In assessing the impacts of Better Regulation policies, critics argue, 
however, that the bureaucracy reduction measures are not sufficiently per-
ceptible and tangible from the perspective of businesses and citizens. 
These shortcomings were a crucial reason for extending the NKR man-
date in 2011 to foster a more realistic and true-to-life picture of regulatory 
cost assessments. Initially, the measurement of information obligations for 
businesses had covered only a minor (and less important) part of the regu-
latory costs, whereas the weightier and more perceivable part of compli-
ance costs as well as the burdens incurred by citizens and administrations 
had been ignored. As a result of the extended NKR mandate, the federal 
ministries not only have to display details of the bureaucracy costs of leg-
islative and regulatory drafts, but also quantify the total compliance costs 
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incurred by citizens, businesses and administration at all governmental 
levels (federal, Länder and local). ‘The term compliance costs include the 
total measurable time expenditure and the costs incurred by citizens, busi-
ness and public authorities in order to comply with federal legislation’ 
(NKR 2018: p. 11; Section 2 (1) NKRG). In addition to the bureaucracy 
costs (see above), the measurement of the compliance costs thus includes 
all direct costs incurred by citizens, businesses and all three levels of public 
administration (federal, Länder, local levels) by a new federal regulation. 
Both annual recurrent and one-off burdens—or reliefs—must be pre-
sented. The presentation of compliance costs serves two purposes. First, it 
ensures transparency of the cost implications of a regulatory initiative. 
Second, it stimulates decision-makers to think about less bureaucratic 
alternatives and thus minimise compliance costs in general. Without dis-
closing the compliance costs, a legislative draft cannot proceed to the fed-
eral cabinet—it is a binding obligation of the lead ministry that cannot be 
circumvented.
4.3  Activities and Results of Regulatory Scrutiny5
Since the establishment of the NKR in September 2006, a total of 4683 
regulatory initiatives have been scrutinised, of which 330 regulatory initia-
tives were allocated to the period from 1 July 2018 to 30 June 2019 (NKR 
2019). As mentioned earlier, the amendment to the NKRG in 2011 com-
prised a widening of its audit mandate from ‘pure bureaucracy costs’ 
(reporting and statistical obligations) to total compliance costs (time and 
money expenditures that the economy, citizens and administrations at all 
levels incur by following federal legal provisions) of legislative proposals. 
Consequently, the scope of the NKR’s audit activity and the amount of 
regulatory initiatives with relevant impacts have increased significantly. 
Thus, of the 330 proposals examined between July 2018 and June 2019, 
127 projects (38 per cent) had a significant impact on one-off and/or 
annual compliance costs, whereas 203 (62 per cent) incurred only minor 
or no compliance costs. Compared to the old mandate, which only 
included the examination of bureaucracy costs, the number of regulatory 
initiatives with relevant impact in the context of the NKR mandate has 
virtually tripled. Furthermore, it should be noted that the number of reg-
ulatory initiatives with annual burdensome impacts (82 in the reporting 
period) is much higher than the number of burden reducing regulatory 
initiatives (26). This can also be explained by the fact that a substantial 
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part of the burdensome regulations stems from the implementation of EU 
directives6 and that—for numerous reasons—there is still growth in regu-
latory activity and a tendency in politics to initiate new legislative projects. 
This has been confirmed by the increase in annual compliance costs since 
2011 (first year of assessment), on balance by a total of €6.6 billion, of 
which €4.9 billion (74 per cent of the increase) is allocated to businesses, 
€1.5 billion (22 per cent) to administration and €221 million (3 per cent) 
to citizens. Between 2018 and 2019, the annual compliance costs increased 
on balance by a total of approximately €831  million (15 per cent; see 
NKR 2019).
The percentage distribution of the calculated compliance costs among 
different federal departments indicates where highly regulated intensive 
policy fields and strong regulatory activity can be found. Here it becomes 
apparent that the increase in the annual compliance costs can largely be 
traced back to the regulatory initiatives of the Federal Ministry of Finance 
with €672 million. Almost half of the initiatives scrutinised by the NKR in 
the reporting period were attributed to three ministries (Federal Ministry 
of Finance: 55, Federal Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs: 47, Federal 
Ministry of Transport and Digital Infrastructure: 46). On balance, only 
three federal ministries recorded a substantial annual relief in compliance 
costs: the Federal Ministry of the Environment with €156 million, the 
Federal Ministry of Transport and Digital Infrastructure with €65 million 
and the Federal Ministry of Food and Agriculture with €12 million.
5  future outlook and lessons for transfer
Thanks to the ex ante assessments of compliance costs for each federal 
legislative regulatory initiative, decision-makers in government and parlia-
ment today know with greater accuracy than in the past (and with greater 
accuracy than in most other European countries), which legislative pro-
posals impose costs on citizens, the economy and the administration. This 
increased cost transparency has many times resulted in a reduction of 
bureaucracy costs7 and, following the critical NKR reviews, enabled an 
improvement in legislative drafts by virtue of reduced compliance costs. In 
addition, the (hardly quantifiable) positive influence of the NKR’s audit 
activities on the entire legislative process has to be considered. This is 
especially the case when a potentially critical NKR statement is anticipated 
by the departments drafting the law and before the proposal can proceed 
to the federal cabinet. Thus, the NKR activity has contributed to a higher 
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institutional sensitivity for the subsequent costs of legislative action today. 
The NKR has become a widely accepted ‘watchdog’ and promoter of 
Better Regulation within the federal legislative process, giving permanent 
voice to the issues of regulatory burdens and impacts, compliance costs 
and red tape in Germany. Additionally, it is increasingly taking advantage 
of its reputation to set the agenda for other fields of administrative reform, 
such as digital government, modernising public registries and speeding up 
procedures for large infrastructure projects (see Chap. 19).
A perspective on the future of Better Regulation as a reform doctrine in 
public administration foresees several developments. First, the federal gov-
ernment could/should focus more sharply on reducing bureaucratic bur-
dens in a more perceptible and everyday life-oriented way, thereby taking 
a more systematic approach to measuring stakeholders’ perceptions. The 
low perceptibility of cost reliefs is mainly due to the broader notion of 
compliance costs from the citizens’ and businesses’ perspective, which 
involves, inter alia, EU legislation, Länder and local regulations, adminis-
trative procedures, customer-business relations, technical standards and so 
on (IfM—Institut für Mittelstandsforschung Bonn 2019). Thus, the citi-
zens’ and businesses’ regulatory reality is shaped by a multitude of provi-
sions and rules stemming from various sources and levels, whereas the 
NKR focuses solely on compliance cost reductions at the federal level. 
Against this background, there is a trend in Germany towards extending 
compliance cost measurements beyond the federal level by, for example, 
establishing regulatory control councils at the Länder level. In Baden- 
Württemberg and Saxony, for instance, the Länder regulatory control 
councils are responsible for assessing compliance costs resulting from reg-
ulations and administrative directives enacted by the respective Länder 
governments. In general, the multilevel perspective is a major challenge 
for regulatory reform policies in federal countries. The separation of the 
legislative function (predominantly federal level) and the administrative 
function (predominantly Länder/local levels) makes compliance cost 
assessments particularly wicked, but all the more important and necessary 
to ensure better informed, more robust evidence-based policymaking in 
the multilevel system. However, there is still a lack of well-functioning and 
generally accepted procedures in Germany that would enable Länder and 
local governments to be sufficiently involved in federal compliance cost 
assessments. Further improvement in Better Regulation policies could be 
achieved by extending the so-called one-in, one-out-rule (OIOO), which 
was introduced to EU legislation in 2015 on the initiative of the NKR. The 
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OIOO rule implies that for new legislative initiatives that incur annual 
compliance costs to businesses (‘in’), a corresponding amount of relief 
(‘out’) must be generated by the end of a legislative term at the latest—
within either the draft legislation itself or elsewhere. In the 2018/2019 
reporting period, the additional costs to businesses (‘in’) of €120 million 
was outweighed by a relief (‘out’) of €262 million, which corresponded to 
a net relief for businesses of €142 million. As a result, since its introduc-
tion in 2015, the OIOO balance sheet has shown an ‘out’ of about €2 bil-
lion net relief for businesses. Nevertheless, this positive OIOO rule does 
not often tally with reality as perceived by businesses. This is because since 
2015 an additional annual ‘in’ of €435 million resulting from the imple-
mentation of European legislation has been excluded from the OIOO 
rule.8 Consequently, the NKR maintains that this is precisely why European 
burdens and reliefs must also be covered by the application of the OIOO 
rule, since it is of complete irrelevance to companies whether costs are 
incurred as a result of European or national legislation.
Finally, following a joint decision of the federal secretaries of state in 
2013, ex post evaluations of legislative acts (in addition to ex ante cost 
assessments) must be carried out by the departments in a more systematic 
and methodologically rigorous manner, thus upholding an existing bind-
ing decision of the federal secretaries of state responsible for the reduction 
of bureaucracy. According to this decision, ex post evaluations of impacts 
and outcomes of new regulations (e.g. regarding political goal attainment, 
effectiveness, acceptance by stakeholders, unintended effects, etc.) must 
be conducted for all legislative acts entailing a threshold of (ex ante mea-
sured) compliance costs of more than a €1  million per  annum. So far, 
however, the departments have adopted this general rule in a rather reluc-
tant and unsystematic manner, which suggests that further adjustments 
and a possible standardisation are required. The implementation failure of 
systematic ex post evaluations of legislative acts illustrates the extreme 
importance of having not only an independent quality control mechanism 
for the evaluative process but also an institutionalised, competent and 
powerful watchdog. The German example shows that Better Regulation 
as cross-cutting reform measures and meta-regulation needs an advocate 
within government administration who cannot be circumvented by the 
departmental policy specialists (Jann and Wegrich 2019) because of its 
legal foundation and procedural integration in the pre-parliamentarian 
legislative process. The reduction of bureaucracy costs and—with some 
restrictions—compliance costs has been working well since the 
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establishment of the NKR. However, related topics such as ex post evalu-
ation and sustainability impact assessment (which have both been obliga-
tory in the GGO for some years now), have not been successfully 
implemented so far due to a lack of organisational institutionalisation and 
procedural integration.
In order to further promote Better Regulation as an approach to the 
modernisation of state and administration, it would be desirable if other 
countries decided to install (independent) bodies for the review of impact 
assessments too. This applies to members of the European Union in par-
ticular, but to other nations as well. To this end, the NKR maintains a 
close liaison with six other independent bodies in Europe tasked by their 
government or their parliament with reviewing impact assessments and 
together with the NKR have formed the network ‘RegWatchEurope’. 
Besides the German NKR, the network consists of the Adviescollege 
Toetsing Regeldruk (ATR) from the Netherlands, the Regulatory Policy 
Committee (RPC) from the United Kingdom, the Swedish Regelradet 
(SBRC) and the Norwegian Regelradet (NBRC) as well as the Regulatory 
Impact Assessment Board (RIAB) from the Czech Republic and the 
Finnish Council of Regulatory Impact Analysis (FCRIA). The purpose of 
the network is to enable the exchange of experience and knowledge among 
its members and the representation of common interests at the EU level, 
specifically vis-à-vis the Regulatory Scrutiny Board (RSB) of the EU 
Commission and, in an international context, the Regulatory Policy 
Committee of the OECD. These multilateral, European-scale and inter-
national exchanges offer the opportunity to share different national expe-
riences in impact assessments with representatives from other OECD 
member states and thus promote the model of independent regulatory 
scrutiny on a European scale and in the international context.
notes
1. In practice, Better Regulation reforms are known by different names. 
Common labels include smart regulation (often used by the European 
Commission), high-quality regulation and regulatory reform.
2. As efforts in the area of Better Regulation often include the (increasing) use 
of scientific evidence and expertise to improve policy decisions and regula-
tions, the concept is closely related to another reform concept: evidence- 
based policymaking (EBPM). At the core of EBPM lies the idea of a 
‘rationalisation’ of political decision-making by systematically integrating 
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scientific evidence and expertise in policymaking processes and by strength-
ening ‘positive coordination’ within the politico-administrative system.
3. Gesetz zur Einsetzung eines Nationalen Normenkontrollrates vom 14.8.2006 
(Act on the Establishment of a National Regulatory Control 
Council—NKRG).
4. The assessment of bureaucracy costs by means of the SCM was developed in 
the 1990s in the Netherlands. Subsequently, this instrument spread 
across Europe.
5. The following summary of  essential fields of  activity and  audit results 
of the NKR refers to the reporting period from 1 July 2018 to 30 June 2019 
(NKR 2019).
6. A considerable proportion of the legal provisions prevailing in Germany and 
approximately half of the compliance costs in the reporting period stem 
from EU law. However, up to now, only EU directives that are to be trans-
posed into national legislation (not EU regulations) that constitutes imme-
diately applicable law in Germany are systematically recorded by the NKR 
audit in which a ‘transparency gap’ can be detected.
7. The ‘pure’ bureaucracy costs, which by definition exclusively comprise 
information and statistical obligations for the economy, were reduced 
between 2006 and 2011 by 22.3 per cent NKR (2013, p. 28).
8. This exception was carved out by a joint decision of the federal administra-
tive state secretaries in January 2016.
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Public administration—not only in Germany—requires a sufficient num-
ber of qualified and motivated staff to produce services, provide infrastruc-
tures and implement policies efficiently, effectively, professionally and 
reliably. Managing the workforce is, therefore, one of the most crucial 
functions in public administration. In this chapter, we take a closer—but 
given the complexity of the topic—unavoidably selective look at human 
resource management (HRM) in general, and at related issues in particu-
lar, such as pay for performance and public service motivation (for general 
aspects regarding civil service systems and the institutional framework for 
HRM, see Chap. 13).
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Our main argument is, paradoxically, that HRM reform has not been 
the focus of attention despite its obvious relevance for effective policy 
implementation. As opposed to the general trend worldwide towards con-
vergence between public and private HRM strategies and practices, the 
workforce in German public administration is still managed in rather tra-
ditional and bureaucratic ways despite major challenges, such as digital 
transformation, demographic changes and attractiveness issues.
2  Fundamentals oF Human resource management 
In german PublIc admInIstratIon
A qualified and motivated resource base is key for any public sector organ-
isation. This applies especially to German public administration with its 
particularly high expectations in terms of reliability, compliance and fair-
ness that are typical of a traditional, bureaucratic, continental European 
administrative system.
Human resource management is quite simply concerned with making 
sure that for every task there are sufficient numbers of qualified and moti-
vated people available when and where they are needed with the necessary 
equipment. What may sound simple is, in fact, an extremely complex task 
if we consider that roughly 4.6 million individuals work in German public 
administration. Hence, it is not a straightforward exercise to describe 
HRM in public administration, particularly given that it comprises differ-
ent groups, such as police officers and teachers, as well as organisations at 
all levels of government with varying staff sizes (from 20 to more than 
100,000), different professions, cultures and traditions.
Traditionally, HRM in the German public sector has been highly insti-
tutionalised in three major respects:
• The civil service and HRM are heavily regulated and thus relatively 
inflexible. Compliance and equality have become dominant criteria 
in HR processes. In addition to relevant laws and labour agreements, 
legal decisions made by the administrative and constitutional courts 
contribute to the very complex regulatory framework.
• Values associated with traditional public bureaucracy represent the 
dominant perceptions and criteria of HRM. The function of the civil 
service is to provide stability and reliability, neutrality and 
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 professionality. Service orientation, competitiveness, mobility and 
flexibility, for example, play a much less important role.
• Education and training focus predominantly on the legal framework 
and traditional values and tend to mutually reinforce each other. 
Programmes in public administration and law (many key players in 
the public sector HRM are lawyers) overemphasise the importance 
of these principles, whereas managerial aspects (e.g. strategic plan-
ning, leadership, managing costs and enhancing motivation) play a 
rather marginal role. Lawyers as legal professionals usually have no 
training at all in HRM, except for learning on the job or through 
(selective) continuing education.
In that sense, the institutional basis in regulative, cultural-cognitive and 
normative terms is relatively consistent. For example, HRM is strongly 
influenced by the ‘traditional principles of civil service’ and ‘selection of 
the best’, placing emphasis on formal qualifications, aptitude and merit, as 
well as seniority, experience and the privileged status of civil servants. 
Obviously, these values and principles are not only in line with Max 
Weber’s concept of bureaucracy, but also form the basis for regulations 
and decision-making in HRM. Furthermore, divergent strategies such as 
abolishing the traditional civil servant status or, at least, harmonising 
HRM practices in the public and private sectors have never been seriously 
considered.
Looking at the institutional basis of public sector HRM, there are also 
some problematic aspects to be considered. First, the significant differ-
ences between HRM in the public sector and in the private sector (both 
for-profit and not-for-profit organisations) are considered normal and are 
rarely challenged. Second, the public sector HRM community of practice 
is not well organised and, thus, does barely allow for a systematic and 
regular exchange of experience and ideas that are essential to innovation. 
Further, there are neither journals on public sector HRM nor any specific 
regular conferences that give support for knowledge exchange and net-
working. Third, there is little opportunity to discuss the challenges, prac-
tices, norms or changes in managing the people working in public sector 
organisations. Fourth, there has been surprisingly little political attention 
paid to HRM (apart from occasional law making and downsizing initia-
tives), despite its obvious relevance for effective policy implementation. 
Rather, it seems that political actors take a functioning HRM in public 
administration for granted. Fifth, this impression correlates with the lack 
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of interest shown by the general public and the media in these issues. This 
has changed only slightly and recently in the wake of the occasional per-
formance failure in service provision (e.g. in the city of Berlin) and corrup-
tion scandals (e.g. in military procurement). Sixth, HRM is highly 
decentralised and fragmented.
Today, HRM in German public administration, and particularly the 
‘maintaining’ stance on reform, faces serious challenges:
• The demographic situation and changes play an increasingly impor-
tant role in staff shortages and create an even greater need for change 
to enhance the attractiveness of public administration organisations 
as employers. The downsizing efforts of previous years have contrib-
uted to an imbalanced age pyramid. At a time when a large part of 
the staff is retiring, labour markets are becoming less and less capable 
of providing the much-needed workforce.
• In the situation where staff become an increasingly scarce resource, 
capacity is further reduced due to high levels of part-time employ-
ment and absenteeism. For example, persistently high numbers of 
staff on sick leave increases awareness about the quality of work, 
motivation and leadership.
• The shift in the social, ethical and cultural composition of German 
society in general, and in metropolitan areas in particular, raises the 
question of representative bureaucracy. Migration in recent years has 
reinforced this trend. The general shift in the values of society also 
increases pressure on public employers to be more diverse in sev-
eral regards.
• The digital transformation of government also has major implica-
tions for HRM, basically for all its functions, from capacity planning, 
recruiting and training to knowledge management, motivating peo-
ple and innovation. In this context, deficiencies in HRM become 
clearly visible, such as lower employer attractiveness and insufficient 
flexibility in hiring IT experts, or inadequate internal qualification 
systems to develop the necessary competencies for an e-government.
• The public sector in Germany is also under constant pressure to 
reduce the number of ‘precarious’ forms of employment, particularly 
the extensive use of time-limited contracts. Furthermore, the increas-
ing shadow workforce of external consultants and service providers 
draws attention to alternative forms of employment that are not usu-
ally considered part of HRM.
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Even though most of these challenges also apply to other governments, 
HRM in German public administration is facing a considerable gap 
between its traditionalist, ‘maintaining’ stance on the one hand, and prob-
lematic outcomes and increasing pressure to modernise on the other. This 
strategic tension will characterise the context in which HRM develops.
In recent years, the main focus of the (limited) reform activities taking 
place in HRM has been on flexibilisation, particularly regarding work days 
and work hours, opportunities to work from home, slightly increasing 
mobility between sectors and within the administration, access to employ-
ment and, more recently, part-time leadership. However, overall, these 
efforts have resulted in no substantial changes in general HRM practices—
with the noticeable exception that approximately one-third of staff cur-
rently work part-time. Apart from the extraordinary job security for those 
with civil servant status or permanent employment contracts, flexible 
working hours and part-time employment significantly contribute to the 
attractiveness of public administration as an employer.
3  selected FunctIonal and reForm toPIcs
Given that HRM is a complex phenomenon, particularly in a federal state 
with local self-government, our considerations can only take a selection of 
functions and reform topics into account. Therefore, we will focus on:
• HR strategy and planning;
• HR marketing, selection and training; and
• leadership
and complement these descriptions with considerations on related topics 
that have drawn particular attention in the international academic com-
munity and in recent German HRM debates, namely
• public service motivation;
• performance-related pay; and
• diversity management.
Consequently, many other aspects that are indeed of some importance 
have to be neglected. Generally, we point out that the empirical basis for 
this chapter is very weak because only few empirical evidence or data is 
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available. Therefore, we also have to acknowledge that some statements 
we make remain merely hypothetical or preliminary.
3.1  HR Strategy and Planning
Theoretically, every public sector organisation should formulate an explicit 
HR strategy based on the respective government’s personnel and employ-
ment policies. At the very least, it should be aware of the fundamental 
principles and guidelines as orientation towards HR decision-making, be 
able to formulate responses to major challenges facing its workforce and 
reflect upon emergent strategies as part of the organisational learning pro-
cess. This managerialist and prescriptive stance is confronted with the real-
ity that can basically be described as the absence of sound HR strategy in 
German public administration.
Even though evidence is sparse, it can nevertheless be assumed that 
most authorities have not formulated an explicit HR strategy or systemati-
cally evaluated their implicit ones. HRM is usually carried out operation-
ally and reactively. Substantial analysis of HR-related strategic issues and 
the formulation and implementation of adequate deliberate strategies are 
relatively uncommon. Furthermore, few organisations use explicit guide-
lines or goals for strategic direction.
Instead of strategy, the key instrument used in HR planning is still the 
‘job positions plan’ as part of the budget. Normally, it defines the number 
of positions the organisation is allowed to fill, differentiating between pay 
grades and status groups (employees and civil servants). However, exactly 
what the necessary or appropriate number of positions is in order to fulfil 
the organisation’s mandate is disputable and, in fact, disputed within the 
respective administrations and in the budgetary process, during which 
changes—usually incremental—must be confirmed. Whereas the 
Department of Finance is typically reluctant to accept calls for an increase 
in the number of positions, the rest of the administration generally argues 
for more capacity. This bargaining process happens independent of actual 
staff requirements, which are difficult to rationally assess. Even though the 
Federal Ministry of the Interior has issued a sophisticated handbook on 
how to calculate the required workforce capacity analytically based on 
tasks and workloads, this way of identifying the ‘right’ capacity is hardly 
used in practice. The handbook is perceived to be too demanding in terms 
of information needs and the costs of the assessment process. Projects are 
implemented selectively, supported by external consultants, mostly in 
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areas where a number of people perform similar jobs, for example in the 
job centres or in tax administration. In other areas like education, calcula-
tions are based on general ratios (e.g. student–teacher) and often on com-
parisons within the particular community of practice (e.g. comparing 
across the states the size of police force per capita). If downsizing efforts 
have been undertaken for budgetary reasons, across-the-board, top-down 
specifications are typical and implementation predominantly depends on 
actual fluctuation, unsurprisingly leading to patchy results in staff capacity. 
Furthermore, some government functions have better lobbying support 
(like education or policing) than others (like general administration), 
which exacerbates the imbalance. In addition, decisions take a long time 
to implement and show effects.
However, several more or less obvious strategic issues need to be 
addressed in addition to the ones mentioned above. Particularly for Länder 
governments, HR expenses and liabilities (especially for pensions) are a 
ticking time bomb. For example, in the (relatively wealthy) city-state of 
Hamburg, pension liabilities alone accounted for €33 billion in the bal-
ance sheet for 2018, whereas total assets amounted to €46 billion. In the 
budget, more than a third of personnel expenses go to pensioners!
Since these (and other) strategic issues have consequences, regardless of 
whether or not an organisation is dealing with them systematically, the 
tendency to ignore problems until their effects become obvious (and it is 
often too late to respond appropriately) can be difficult to bear. Publicly 
debated examples of HR planning incapacity illustrate this observation 
well with the example of teachers, who—surprise!—mostly belong to the 
baby-boomer generation entering retirement age, but very little attention 
has been given to workforce planning in light of the capacity (and experi-
ence) drain that has been foreseeable for decades, resulting in actual ser-
vice provision and performance problems across Germany.
3.2  HR Marketing, Selection and Training
HR marketing was not systematically institutionalised in German public 
administration until a few years ago. If there was a position to be filled, 
usually an internal offering would be published first, and if unsuccessful, 
published in the official bulletin or a newspaper, on the website or in 
online job markets. As long as there were ample sufficiently qualified 
applicants, this approach was considered to be useful—or at least ‘good 
enough’.
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However, at a time when the public sector has an increasing number of 
jobs to fill mainly due to demographic change, the overall labour force is 
potentially stagnating or even in decline, and the gap between labour sup-
ply and demand is widening, sometimes dramatically. For example, in 
2017, thirty-eight per cent of Berlin’s district government staff were at 
least 55 years old. Between 2018 and 2026 in the city-state of Hamburg, 
approximately thirty per cent of staff in the police, health-related occupa-
tions and firefighting will retire. Whereas this generally applies to more 
than a quarter of Hamburg’s city government workforce, almost forty per 
cent of prison staff will retire. The situation looks similar in most other 
administrations in Germany. At the same time, the regional labour markets 
are basically empty as the respective target segments have full employment.
The strategy up to now has come to seem increasingly inappropriate. 
This is why many organisations in German public administration have 
recently developed marketing strategies using several instruments like 
social media campaigns, creating employer brands and reflecting on their 
competitive positioning in the relevant labour market segments. Strategies 
focus less on job security (being the dominant factor explaining job or 
career decisions for the public sector) than diversity aspects, local patrio-
tism and, increasingly, public service motivation (see below) as arguments. 
However, because most public sector organisations are late movers (with 
a few exceptions, like the military) and invest relatively few resources in 
the related efforts, the overall effects are limited. Being related to some-
one who works in the public sector is still an important factor that influ-
ences why young people consider working there (thus, de facto 
discriminating against migrants, for example).
Recruiting processes have traditionally focussed on fairness and ‘selec-
tion of the best’, even though no concours system has been established (for 
details on general recruitment, see Chap. 13). Hiring decisions (allegedly) 
follow objective, legally enforceable criteria based on position (employees) 
or career track (civil servants). The diagnostic instruments used are similar 
to those used in the private sector with a certain focus on criteria that 
relate to logical skills, general education, and civic engagement and (writ-
ten) psychological tests, job interviews and assessment centres as methods. 
These methods are routinely applied with a degree of formality and usually 
with the participation of employee representatives. Recently, the optimisa-
tion of the recruiting process has been criticised as the long period of time 
it takes is a competitive disadvantage.
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As in other countries, recruiting practices and the reasons why people 
decide to work for the public sector in Germany are prone to certain 
biases, in part with problematic consequences. People working in public 
administration tend to be more security-oriented and risk-averse, and thus 
relatively immobile, inflexible and reluctant to change (Tepe and Prokop 
2018). These tendencies are often exacerbated during the bureaucratic 
socialisation process by dysfunctional incentives. This raises a serious 
dilemma if it is assumed that governmental organisations—particularly in 
Germany—will become more innovative and responsive to dynamic and 
increasingly demanding stakeholder expectations.
3.3  Leadership
In German public administration, as in many other countries, nowadays 
leadership is considered a crucial factor in the successful management of 
public organisations. NPM-like reforms have emphasised the role of lead-
ers, even though managerialism has not been as influential as in other 
contexts. However, widened managerial accountability that results from 
(intra-organisational) decentralisation and the role of leadership in manag-
ing organisational change has replaced the classic bureaucratic assumption 
that leadership is largely irrelevant if the rules and structures work properly.
It can be assumed that the authoritarian or patriarchal leadership styles 
are exceptions rather than the norm, whereas delegation, coordination by 
means of mutual consultation and sometimes autonomy characterise lead-
ership behaviour. Leadership practices and effectiveness largely depend on 
the context, and there seems to be a general consensus that there is no 
‘one best way’ of approaching leadership in public administration. Instead, 
it should ‘fit’ the circumstances, particularly the kinds of tasks, work and 
followers, and so on. Given the obvious relevance of leadership, it is sur-
prising to see that there has been little empirical research on the public 
sector—and only a few normative and prescriptive publications.
As a noteworthy exception, Vogel (2016) scrutinised the leadership 
behaviour and its antecedents in three organisations in Länder and local 
governments. He found that six orientations explain leadership behaviour: 
task, relations, change, external, ethical and administrative processing. 
These dimensions of leadership behaviour are correlated and almost evenly 
distributed, with the notable (and hardly surprising) exception of the sig-
nificantly less perceived orientation around change. Based on his findings, 
Vogel doubts the common assumption that leadership is a weak point in 
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German public administration, even though he finds room for improve-
ment (ibid., pp. 234).
Looking at the factors explaining leadership behaviour, the study shows 
the influence of a ‘non-calculating’ motivation and particularly a distinct 
management orientation of leaders related to the perceived intensity and 
effectiveness of leadership across all six dimensions. Furthermore, the 
work characteristics (in terms of task complexity) of followers, as well as 
goal and performance orientation, have a positive influence on leadership 
behaviour. However, Vogel points out that the effects often vary between 
intended and perceived leadership (leaders’ vs. followers’ perspectives).
3.4  Public Service Motivation
The concept of public service motivation (PSM) has enjoyed a lot of atten-
tion in the academic debate since its emergence in the 1990s, whereas 
resonance (and relevance?) in terms of practice is rather limited, at least in 
Germany. However, empirical research on public service motivation allows 
for some observations that could be relevant for public HRM, particularly 
for comparative analysis.
PSM is a theoretical construct originally developed and later operation-
alised by Perry (1996) consisting of four major categories: attraction to 
policymaking, commitment to the public interest, compassion and self- 
sacrifice. PSM can be used as a set/index of dependent or independent 
variables in the sense that factors explaining or influencing PSM can be 
scrutinised as well as the impact of PSM, for example on employment 
choices, job satisfaction or performance. The PSM concept has also occa-
sionally been applied to German public administration with ambiguous 
results.
In a recent study based on a survey among students of public adminis-
tration, Keune et  al. (2018) compared their findings on the PSM of 
(young) civil servants with previous empirical studies in the German con-
text. Several results should be highlighted.
First, PSM only plays a minor role compared to other motivating fac-
tors. A secure job, the compatibility of work and private life, an interesting 
occupation and the perceived opportunity to work relatively autono-
mously are more important motivating factors than PSM-related explana-
tions. Second, among the PSM categories, working for/in the public 
interest (in German, the quasi-mythical term Gemeinwohl is used for oper-
ationalisation) is the most important, followed by compassion and the 
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wish to help others, self-sacrifice and political motivation. Third, among 
the PSM elements, correlations can be observed between compassion and 
both political motivation and working in the public interest, and there 
seem to be strong links between self-sacrifice/altruism and both public 
interest and compassion.
However, there is little reliable evidence regarding the antecedents and 
effects of PSM, or patterns of change, for example during a career in the 
public sector. Empirical studies based on a socio-economic panel (Vogel 
and Kroll 2016; Breitsohl and Ruhle 2016) with considerable limitations 
in operationalising PSM found that social and political involvement, as 
well as interest in politics by people working in the public sector, are posi-
tively influenced by age and that the interest in politics is negatively 
affected by organisational tenure. However, longitudinal observation 
reveals very little variation in PSM over time. Furthermore, PSM (which 
generally ranks low on the list of decision criteria) for some seems to 
explain the sector choice of members of the ‘millennial’ generation.
As for the impact of PSM, Gross et al. (2019) recently scrutinised the 
direct and indirect effects of PSM on (self-perceived) work engagement 
and employee performance. They found empirical support for the hypoth-
esis that PSM positively affects work engagement and employee perfor-
mance, the ambiguous links between PSM and presenteeism and 
absenteeism, although no support for hypotheses assuming moderating 
effects of PSM on the relationships between job resources and work 
engagement. In explaining job performance, work engagement matters 
most, whereas PSM plays a far lesser role—even stress is a better explanation.
Considering the German case, the relatively high attention paid to PSM 
by academics seems to be somewhat disproportionate. Drawing conclu-
sions from the results is difficult, since the empirical basis is limited. 
Obviously, it would make sense, for example, to appeal to the public inter-
est in the recruitment process.
3.5  Performance-Related Pay
The traditional incentive and remuneration system in German public 
administration did not comprise substantial elements of pay for perfor-
mance (PRP). Nowadays, even though there are differences between the 
levels of government and across the sixteen Länder, the remuneration sys-
tems in German public administration are still relatively similar. However, 
in some instances, the differences in the level of remuneration have proven 
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challenging for some authorities. For example, the city-state of Berlin has 
lost personnel (e.g. in the police) to the federal government due to sub-
stantial disparities in the pay scheme. Another problem in this context is 
that in general the salary for a particular job is the same regardless of 
whether a person lives and works in a metropolitan area like Hamburg or 
Munich, or in a rural region where the costs of living are much lower. This 
has prompted some big city governments to introduce extra pay, but for 
all members of staff. As a third exception from the rule of equal pay, extra 
pay for specific jobs such as IT experts has recently been introduced.
Nonetheless, the rule is still that in order to earn a higher salary one 
must be a seasoned employee, more experienced or promoted to a job in 
a higher pay grade (where ‘jumps’ rarely occur). One major difference in 
salary is due to the distinction between the two status groups of civil ser-
vants and public employees (see Chap. 13, Kuhlmann and Röber 2006). 
The specific and systematic particularities between the two groups lead to 
significant differences in public workforce pay, but none of these differ-
ences are related to job performance.
Performance-related pay (PRP) has been on the reform agenda for 
more than twenty years now. In 1997, civil service laws were changed to 
create the option of bonuses based on performance. Today, the guidelines 
allow for bonus eligibility limited to maximum fifteen per cent of civil 
servants employed in the organisation, an individual bonus not higher 
than seven per cent of the annual salary, and total bonus payments of an 
organisational entity must not exceed 0.3 per cent (!) of the overall per-
sonnel expenses.
Pay for performance elements for public employees were introduced as 
part of a major overhaul of the labour agreements, becoming effective ten 
years later in 2007. The capacity for financial incentives should—poten-
tially—have been increased to eight per cent of the personnel expenses, 
but was actually set at a much lower rate (e.g. two per cent in federal and 
local government from 2010 onwards). However, these incentives came 
with strings attached: pay for performance was intended to be based on 
clear and ‘objective’ evaluation criteria, performance agreements and 
reviews. Furthermore, the system was to be developed, adopted and 
implemented by each organisation independently. Thus, while imposing a 
very high standard but leaving attention to details to the organisations, 
HR managers and employee representatives were left dealing with the 
practical and fundamental challenges of implementing the system. 
Consequently, the outcomes from PRP were mixed and partly 
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disillusioning. In an empirical study considering the practices of local gov-
ernments in the (largest) state of North Rhine-Westphalia, Schmidt et al. 
(2011) and Schmidt and Müller (2013) found that even though perfor-
mance-related pay had been introduced in most entities, conventional 
evaluation was predominantly being used for review and bonuses tended 
to be distributed equally, but often not on the basis of actual performance. 
The system lacked acceptance among the employees, had almost no effect 
on motivation and incentivisation was limited.
Meier (2013) surveyed twenty-one German counties and cities to anal-
yse whether the introduction of PRP in the public service caused any 
crowding-out effects on intrinsic motivation and PSM. The design of the 
performance appraisal schemes proved to be the dominant factor influenc-
ing the perception of PRP, in particular the perceived fairness and trans-
parency of the PRP concept. The study suggests that more than ninety per 
cent of employees receive at least some performance pay and that the per-
centage of those who receive the best performance ratings is very high 
(further results also in Wenzel et al. 2019).
PRP has opened much discussion and led to a number of problems in 
the German public sector. Some of the problems stem from the differen-
tiation between public employees and civil servants because different reg-
ulations concerning PRP apply. In 2009, PRP was practically abolished at 
the federal level. Since 2014, there has no longer been any obligation to 
apply PRP at the Länder level. The unions argue that PRP does not achieve 
its purpose and all too often creates discord and arouses envy.
3.6  Diversity Management
In recent years, diversity management has increasingly been the focus of 
attention, partly due to legal changes (e.g. in anti-discrimination law) and 
partly because of difficulties public employers face in filling vacant posi-
tions. Furthermore, many public employers have signed the German 
Charta der Vielfalt (the Diversity Charter), a cross-sectoral agreement 
highlighting the commitment to diversity in the workforce in terms of 
age, gender, sexual orientation, handicap, ethnic and cultural background. 
Even though public administration has long been at the forefront in the 
fight against discrimination, in particular ensuring the rights of women 
and people with disabilities, women are still underrepresented in manage-
ment positions (Schimeta 2012).
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Diversity management in the broader sense is an innovation to HRM in 
German public administration. This might explain why there is still little 
research on the impacts of implemented strategies or the effects of an 
increasingly diverse workforce.
One of the most crucial strategic changes in diversity-related aspects of 
HRM is what is called ‘intercultural opening’ or ‘receptiveness’. Many 
public employers are increasingly promoting the cultural and ethnic diver-
sity policy, particularly in recruiting and training. Several city governments 
(like Berlin, Hamburg, Munich and the Ruhr area) have committed them-
selves to the goal that at least twenty per cent of all junior staff recruited 
should have a ‘migration background’ or otherwise demonstrate intercul-
tural competences; in some states, corresponding legal obligations exist. 
These commitments are aligned with efforts in advertising, employer 
branding, revisions in selection criteria and communication. Some employ-
ers, such as the city-state of Hamburg, have been relatively successful in 
achieving this goal. However, in most metropolitan areas, half of the 
younger generation grow up in migrant families and therefore these goals 
do not tackle underrepresentation effectively. Another key component of 
these strategies is to provide training in intercultural competence for staff, 
such as improving foreign language skills and cultural sensitivity (among 
clients or colleagues) and so on. Changes in HR strategies and integration 
policy go hand in hand.
4  lessons learned
This chapter covers some general and functional aspects of human resource 
management in German public administration. To conclude, our initial 
proposition that the traditionalist or ‘maintaining’ stance on HRM and its 
reform is increasingly challenged by internal weaknesses and external 
threats, can be complemented by pointing out a few major paradoxes and 
dilemmas:
First, the highly formalised institutional framework which corresponds 
with bureaucratic criteria such as equality, compliance, professionalism 
and qualification—ultimately aimed at stability, predictability and reliabil-
ity—seem problematic in an increasingly dynamic environment demand-
ing mobility, flexibility and innovation.
Second, this could be reflected in intensifying conflict between employ-
ers and employees. Recognising that demographic trends and labour mar-
ket conditions strengthen their position, employees can exert pressure on 
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their organisations, HR departments and leaders, heightening the need 
for HRM to respond to their expectations. If the institutional framework 
is not flexible enough, public sector employment will become unattract-
ive, thereby limiting the public administration’s ability to recruit qualified 
and motivated staff, which it needs more than ever.
Third, the digital transformation of government could prove to be a 
catalyst for these dilemmas and their negative consequences, potentially 
resulting in the dramatic growth of a shadow workforce of consultants and 
external service providers, undermining not only administrative capacity 
(and, thus, legitimacy and attractiveness) but also further weakening pub-
lic administration’s competitive position in the ‘war for talents’.
Finally, the greatest paradox is the low priority given to personnel on 
the administrative reform agenda over the past decades and the factual 
relevance of personnel in general, and HRM in particular, in dealing with 
the growing pressure and inconsistent demands from key stakeholders. 
Deficiencies in organisational and institutional changes or why public 
administration is lagging behind in digital transformation can be explained 
to some extent by the low level of reform activity and the lack of attention 
(and appreciation) paid to people working in German public administra-
tion. The situation is exacerbated by the fact that omissions of HRM 
reform cannot be reversed quickly as changes take years if not decades for 
their effects to be felt.
Regardless of our rather sceptical account of HRM in German public 
administration, it is worth noting that there are some examples of excel-
lence that are comparable to practices in other sectors, for example in the 
military, in some federal agencies (e.g. the Federal Employment Agency), 
states (e.g. the city-state of Hamburg) and local governments (e.g. the city 
of Munich and the district office of Berlin-Neukölln). These and other 
cases demonstrate the opportunities of professionally managing the public 
workforce despite the various restrictions and the traditional bureaucratic 
stance. HRM can be expected to be a major focus of reform in the years 
to come due to the challenges described in this chapter. Last but not least, 
one should not forget that Germany is often envied for its reliable, profes-
sional and effective public administration, which is essentially based on its 
qualified workforce.
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CHAPTER 22
Public Management Reforms in Germany: 




German public administration has often been characterised as an ideal 
example of a bureaucratic Rechtsstaat (see Chap. 2), with its functioning 
described along the lines of legal programming and application of law, 
along with its strong orientation to professional and legal accountability 
and compliance. According to the global trend, also in Germany, the call 
for a stronger results orientation and managerial culture and control 
emerged in the early 1990s and resulted in corresponding management 
reforms. In the past thirty years, two reform models have dominated the 
reform debate and trajectories in Germany moving towards a more 
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management- oriented mode of control and steering in public administra-
tion: the New Steering Model during the 1990s, and the New Municipal 
Financial Management—particularly after their enactment by legislation—
as of the mid-2000s. This chapter presents the core elements and claims of 
both reform models and presents evidence on their implementation and 
impact in practice. Following a description of each reform model, evi-
dence regarding the impacts on control behaviour and mechanisms in 
German public administration is discussed. The chapter concludes with 
lessons learned from the German public management reforms for the 
international public management reform debate.
2  the new SteerIng Model: the Advent 
of MAnAgeMent orIentAtIon In gerMAn 
PublIc AdMInIStrAtIon
2.1  The Reform Model
The ‘New Steering Model’ (NSM) is the starting point and reference 
model for management-oriented reforms in Germany. It was developed 
and advocated by an influential association of local administrators and a 
think-tank, the Local Government’s Joint Agency for Administrative 
Management, often only referred to and known by its German acronym 
KGSt, in the early 1990s as a reform model for local government. The 
NSM was the title of a seminal report published in 1993, which presented 
a general ‘managerialist’ concept for local government reform (KGSt 
1993). Starting from there, the model was refined and expanded in the 
years that followed. Although the NSM has its background in the munici-
pal area and is a relatively clearly outlined reform model, it eventually 
became a term (or label) for administrative modernisation and reforms in 
general, which included partial reforms and reforms at other levels of 
government.
In terms of content, the NSM basically represents the German variant 
of New Public Management (NPM). For almost a decade, the reform 
debate in Germany was dominated by the terminology and concepts of 
the NSM. Its core elements include typical NPM elements such as con-
tract management, the decentralisation of responsibility for resources, per-
formance measurement and customer orientation.
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The most crucial difference for the international discussion lies in the 
justifications and motives for reform. Less than in other countries, the 
New Steering Model was driven as a reform to reduce an excessive public 
sector. Paired with a deeply rooted self-confidence about the general qual-
ity of its administrative apparatus, which has been mainly based on the 
criteria of legality and robustness, the NSM was legitimised as an alterna-
tive strategy to strengthen the capacities and competitiveness of local gov-
ernments and their administrations via-à-vis the private sector. Contrary 
to examples in the US or the UK, where NPM reforms were positioned 
(or labelled) as a neoliberal reform agenda, the NSM was not directed 
towards ideas of dismantling and cutting back the state. As a consequence, 
the reform model of the NSM emphasised internal reforms of the admin-
istrative organisations (‘modernising’) over ‘marketizing’ or ‘minimizing’ 
(Pollitt and Bouckaert 2017) reform elements, like privatisation or con-
tracting out.
The central reform elements to advance the internal modernisation of 
local public administrations included the following:
• Output orientation should be introduced by focussing the control of 
administration on output objectives and indicators as opposed to the 
traditional, bureaucratic input controls. This shift in focus was driven 
by the claim that local governments should become more entrepre-
neurial, particularly as regards service and customer orientation.
• Decentralisation: responsibility for managing resources should be 
devolved to line units in order to integrate responsibilities for results 
and resources into the same organisational unit. The introduction of 
lump sum budgets for product groups (relatively broad output cat-
egories) would weaken the dominant role of resource departments. 
At the same time, responsibility for the results of line units would be 
strengthened.
• Performance agreements: performance agreements or ‘contracts’ 
should be concluded as additional formal control instruments in 
order to include output-oriented control variables and objectives for 
various hierarchical levels throughout the organisation.
In the beginning, the reform focus had been on raising cost awareness 
and customer orientation by increasing room to manoeuvre and the 
autonomy of line units in exchange for greater transparency on costs and 
output results according to the central idea of the NPM, that is 
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exchanging ‘freedom to manage’ for ‘accountability for results’. In the late 
1990s, reforms and debates became more extensive—or blurred—and 
included other aspects, such as quality management (customer surveys), 
human resource management concepts and instruments, and benchmark-
ing (Reichard 2003: 353–354). As a result, the use and interpretation of 
the term ‘NSM’ also emancipated itself from the original model and 1993 
report, later becoming a general umbrella term for the use and transfer of 
(private sector-inspired) management techniques and instruments in pub-
lic administration.
2.2  Implementation and Results
The NSM has shown its greatest effects at the local government level, 
while the federal and Länder governments have been reluctant to under-
take major reforms following the ideas of NSM (Reichard 2001: 551).
In the mid-2000s, about ten years after NSM swept across Germany’s 
local level, an evaluation study on the implementation and effects of NSM 
on local governments was published. The quantitative results of this evalu-
ation were based on a survey, which included cities with populations over 
10,000 and counties (Kuhlmann et al. 2008). The attention that NSM 
brought to administrative reform sparked unprecedented reform activism 
in German local government during the 1990s. As the results from the 
evaluation study revealed, administrative reform was no longer the exclu-
sive business of larger communities, but embraced virtually all of the com-
munities. Since the beginning of the 1990s, 92 per cent of local 
governments in cities and counties with more than 10,000 inhabitants 
have pursued administrative reforms. However, not all of these reforms 
were NSM reforms and a closer look reveals the selective reform strategies 
of the German local governments. Even though the KGSt emphasised 
interdependencies among the different elements of the reform model and 
the importance of comprehensive reform implementation, the actual 
reform practices indicated a different pattern of use by local governments. 
NSM was mostly used as a toolbox and list of instruments rather than a 
holistic reform agenda. The larger ‘West German’ cities tended to follow 
the holistic approach more often than the smaller cities and those located 
in the former ‘East German’ territories. Only 16 per cent of local govern-
ments used NSM as a comprehensive reform model aiming to implement 
all its various elements. A large majority (66 per cent) of local govern-
ments had never aimed for a comprehensive redesign of their control 
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mechanisms and began by simply picking out individual instruments and 
elements from the NSM ‘toolbox’ based on their perceptions of their 
organisation’s problems (Kuhlmann and Wollmann 2019).
The results concerning the most and least adopted reform elements are 
displayed in Table 22.1 and are indicative of the actual reform trajectories. 
First, the dispersed dissemination and implementation rates of NSM ele-
ments corroborate the use of NSM as a toolbox. Focussing on the cleav-
age between the implementation rates of elements for the entire 
administration versus only partial implementation not only illustrates the 
selective use of individual NSM elements, but also the selective adaptation 
strategies in various departments and throughout the organisational parts 
of the administration.
Table 22.1 Implementation of NSM elements (n = 870 mayors/CEOs of counties)




(Total of) entirely or 
partially implemented 
(%)






One-stop agencies 57.5 * 57.6







Internal service centres 23.9 24.7 48.6
Strategic steering units 35.9 12.4 48.3
Cost and activity 
accounting
12.7 33.0 45.7
Reporting 22.1 20.7 42.8
Output analysis (definition 
of ‘products’)
29.0 9.9 38.9
Contracts between top 
management and services
24.3 * 24.3
Contracts between politics 
and administration
14.8 * 14.8





Source: based on Kuhlmann et al. 2008, p. 854
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Second, among the most widely implemented elements, two (groups 
of) elements appear at the top of the list. The elements in the first group 
show different kinds of changes in the organisational structure emerging 
as some of the most widely implemented measures. These include the 
establishment of one-stop shops designed to improve customer orienta-
tion. But more importantly, the changes also include the restructuring of 
line departments into larger entities to flatten hierarchies and decentralise 
control.
The second-most widely implemented NSM element was the introduc-
tion of a new budgeting system, in particular lump sum budgeting. 
However, the lump sum budgets introduced in Germany are not perfor-
mance budgets as known in the UK or Switzerland, since performance 
data are only loosely coupled and have no systematic link to resource allo-
cation. The evaluation study therefore concluded that its popularity as a 
control mechanism might have stemmed more from its potential as an 
expense management and savings programme (by setting expense ceil-
ings) rather than from its incentives to improve on performance or 
efficiency.
Third, concerning the ‘core’ NSM elements, which directly targeted a 
new and more performance-oriented control mode, a discrepancy arises 
between proclaimed reform objectives and actual measures implemented. 
Most obviously, the idea of contract management, for example control via 
performance agreements, never gained much ground in practice. Contract 
management between politics and administration was hardly ever imple-
mented, while performance agreements between top management and 
departments were used in one out of four municipalities after all.
In sum, the actual implementation patterns displayed a clear preference 
for customer-oriented and structural reform elements at the expense of 
results-oriented approaches.
Some Länder launched reform projects along the lines of NSM, but 
these were often eclectic and limited in terms of the selection and scope 
of instruments. The ‘NSI’ reforms (New Steering Instruments), which 
started in Baden-Württemberg in 1999, aimed at improving the efficiency 
and effectiveness of the administration and results orientation in planning 
and control. The NSI reforms focussed on a technically widely automated 
budget management system, but also including decentralised budget 
responsibility, cost and performance accounting, and greater emphasis on 
executive training (see Chap. 21). The project gained unwanted publicity 
after a report was released by the audit court concluding that the project 
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had shown little effects thus far, but had incurred €220 million in project 
costs plus annual running costs, while producing only minimal efficiency 
gains. Another Land which started an ambitious reform project was the 
city-state of Berlin (the other two city-states, Bremen and Hamburg, also 
undertook NSM reforms). In Berlin, the reform had previously been 
enacted by an administrative reform framework law passed in 1999. The 
Berlin reform foresaw the introduction of decentralised budgeting, per-
formance contracts, cost accounting, quality management, and personnel 
and leadership development. The reform eventually led to the introduc-
tion of a (comparative) cost accounting system, the introduction of per-
formance agreements and decentralised budgeting for the twelve district 
offices (but not the Senate administration). In sum, the effects of the 
NSM at the Länder level have been significantly weaker than at the 
local level.
As a noteworthy example of policy-field related reforms at the Länder 
level, the use of performance-oriented control instruments in the control 
of universities should be mentioned. In the federal distribution of compe-
tencies, universities fall within the jurisdiction and responsibility of the 
Länder. Roughly 90 per cent of public universities in Germany have per-
formance agreements in place with the state ministry. They receive their 
funding from the state based on a performance-oriented allocation mecha-
nism, and they also apply similar mechanisms internally to allocate 
resources across the various departments (Heinze et al. 2011: 132). The 
employment schemes for most professors also foresee that part of their 
salary consists of a performance component. However, such elements have 
not altered the dominant governance culture to become more results-
oriented or managerial. Therefore, many of the objectives and perfor-
mance indicators used (e.g. third-party funding, numbers of exams or 
students, development of junior research staff; Heinze et al. 2011: 133) 
refer to unambitious levels of (actual) performance, are somewhat static 
and not systematically linked to strategic priorities. Additionally, the tradi-
tional financial and personnel control mechanisms, combined with the 
constitutionally enshrined autonomy of universities, faculties and aca-
demic staff with regard to the content of research and teaching, dominate 
and determine the control and management culture effectively.
After some delay, the NSM discourse also spilt over to the federal level. 
In 1997, the then conservative federal government established the ‘lean 
state committee’, which published a comprehensive list of reform propos-
als more or less in line with the NPM doctrine. The following 
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social- democratic government turned the discourse to the concept of the 
‘activating state’, emphasising the enabling and regulating role of govern-
ment (Jann 2003). However, it was only in exceptional cases that all these 
reform proposals translated into concrete reform measures, such as the 
introduction of performance-related pay (see Chap. 21) and shared ser-
vice centres. Apart from this, the federal government started several new 
initiatives to downsize administrative entities and privatise various publicly 
owned corporations. The most recent study on reform trajectories at the 
federal level confirmed the conception of the German federal government 
as being a highly legalistic administrative system, and showed that 
management- oriented tools are less frequently used than in most other 
European countries (Hammerschmid and Oprisor 2016: 69).
However, there are also a number of notable exceptions to this rule. 
The Federal Employment Agency (FEA) has come to epitomise 
performance- oriented control in Germany and has been undergoing a 
massive overhaul and reorientation of its control mechanisms since the 
early 2000’s. With around 100,000 employees, the FEA is the largest 
administrative authority of the German federal government. The FEA has 
introduced a comprehensive performance management system that 
includes an indicator-based performance agreement between the Ministry 
and the agency, but has spawned performance agreements throughout all 
hierarchical levels of the agency. The agency has oriented its control and 
management process around a rather strict and detailed system of perfor-
mance management and controlling (reporting systems to monitor the 
achievement of goals), and has aligned its other management processes 
(such as parts of the financial allocations, team performance and manage-
ment appraisals and the definition of task priorities) with this as well (Vogel 
et al. 2014). The largest federal authority has, therefore, also undergone a 
massive radical shift in control culture and is characterised today as a 
performance- oriented and management-oriented agency. Even though it 
is the largest federal authority, there have been few ‘spillover effects’ of the 
FEA and, in general, the FEA’s management and control culture contrasts 
sharply to that of the federal government.
2.3  Impacts
Regarding the overall effects on local governments, increased customer 
and service orientation and cost awareness of local public administrations 
are the visible and unambiguous results of the NSM debate. With regard 
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to cost and efficiency improvements, results also point to the positive 
impact of NSM reforms. However, the extent of this impact is contested 
as the cost-benefit ratio of NSM reforms and the causality of NSM versus 
a traditional savings policy on savings remains ambiguous. The question of 
whether NSM has achieved a change in the culture and control mode 
within public administration, thus contributing to improved political- 
democratic accountability or strategic management capacities, is by no 
means uncontentious.
The overall assessment of the NSM has sparked polarised debate in 
Germany. On the one hand, critics have interpreted the results in relation 
to the self-proclaimed goals (of the NSM model and, e.g., how they were 
stated by the KGSt) and have come to a rather sobering conclusion. They 
argue that the NSM model has a conceptual flaw, namely the division of 
roles between politics and administration, and the corresponding contract 
management that becomes conceptually problematic and practically inap-
propriate. Furthermore, this school of thought claims that the NSM has 
also failed to deliver—presumably intended—the promised efficiency gains 
and savings. A paradigm shift from the traditional bureaucratic model to a 
New Public Management, however, has not taken place.
On the other hand, the proponents of the NSM argue that reforms 
in local government are a necessary part of an (ongoing) process of change 
and learning. The fact that the local management, leadership and control 
practices have changed during the past twenty years, and that NSM has 
provided a crucial impetus and conceptual framework for this transforma-
tion is not questioned, not even by critics. Its proponents also argue that 
any assessment of the effects must take the specific goals, strategies and 
context of NSM-style reform in the adopting organisations into account, 
with the concept being voluntary, a suggestion and an integrated toolbox. 
The approaches to reform have varied significantly across local govern-
ments, as have the available resources, problem perceptions and support. 
Therefore, heterogeneity—and more importantly—‘deviation’ from the 
model is neither surprising nor problematic, but should be expected and 
considered legitimate.
3  fInAncIAl MAnAgeMent reforMS
A second phase of administrative reforms emerged around 2003 with 
amendments to the regulatory framework for local financial management. 
A major difference between the financial management reforms and the 
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NSM reforms was that the former reforms were now prescribed by law 
and therefore no longer voluntary.
3.1  New Municipal Financial Management
The reforms in public budgeting and accounting systems for local govern-
ments are referred to as ‘new municipal financial management’ (NMFM). 
Their start ran in parallel with the NSM debates and the initial pilot proj-
ects began in 1994. In 2003, the conference held by the ministers of the 
interior of all the Länder was unanimous in its support of the decision to 
adapt the framework legislation for local government budgeting and 
financial accounting, and to push and allow for fundamental changes in 
the system. The first two core principles were a shift in the accounting 
method from cash-based to accrual-based accounting using double-entry 
bookkeeping and a change in the structure of the budget to output- 
oriented categories. Programmatically, this type of budget is referred to as 
a ‘product budget’. The concept has given broad discretion to the Länder 
governments in deciding how they handle conceptual and implementation 
details. Consequently, there is no homogenous model or standard but—
de facto—sixteen more or less different Länder models. Despite this het-
erogeneity, some common core features of the new municipal financial 
management reforms in the various Länder can be synthesised as follows:
• The budget consists of two components: a cash-based finance plan 
and an accrual-based results plan. The financial reporting includes 
three documents: a balance sheet to account for the change in equity 
during a fiscal year, the financial report and the results reporting.
• The budget includes a three- to five-year medium-term plan, which 
is mainly informational in character and serves as a financial forecast 
instead of a strategic planning tool.
• The results and financial plans are structured into subdivisions along 
the lines of product areas, product groups and products as the most 
detailed level.
• The budget is conceptualised as a lump sum budget on the level of 
product groups.
• The budget is performance-oriented in that it provides performance 
information regarding the product groups.
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With these characteristics, the NMFM is mostly in line with interna-
tional standards and trends.
3.2  Implementation and Results
Since the seminal decision in 2003, the governments of the thirteen ter-
ritorial Länder have legislated on the introduction of accrual accounting 
and performance budgeting for local government. While nine Länder 
have prescribed by law a shift to accrual accounting, four Länder have 
given local governments the opportunity to choose whether they want to 
change to accruals or keep a (modified) cash-based system. However, it 
would not be German federalism if the various Länder had not each opted 
for different modes of implementation and different standards for accrual 
accounting. An overview of the status, standard and time frame of the 
implementation of accrual accounting in German local governments is 
shown in Table 22.2.
In 2017, around 7000 local governments, corresponding to about 60 
per cent of all local governments, changed to accrual accounting and have 
at least prepared their first opening balance sheet. The different accrual 
reform options are not restricted to a change in accounting method, but 
also comprise performance budgets in the form of ‘product budgets’, per-
formance objectives and indicators (some as a recommendation, some 
mandatory), and lump sum budgeting.
Since 2009 and based on new legislation, the federal level and the 
Länder have also had the option to use the accrual accounting method. To 
date, only two out of thirteen territorial Länder—Hesse, and more 
recently North Rhine-Westphalia—have opted to shift to accrual account-
ing in budgeting and reporting and to performance-oriented budgeting. 
The remaining eleven territorial Länder are continuing to operate on a 
(modified) cash-based accounting system. Regarding the three city-states, 
Hamburg operates on a full accrual accounting system and Bremen on a 
partial accrual accounting system with accrual-based reporting, but cash- 
based budgeting. The city-state of Berlin uses a modified cash-based 
accounting system.
The federal level government still uses a cash-based accounting system. 
A shift to accrual accounting has never been an issue. In the late 2000s, a 
project for a modified accounting system was launched at the federal level, 
which—while remaining basically cash-based—aimed at the disclosure of 
assets and liabilities in a simplified balance sheet. However, the project was 
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eventually turned down by the budget committee of the federal parlia-
ment, ending the debate over accounting reforms at the federal level 
(Reichard and Küchler-Stahn 2019: 103). To date, the German federal 
government has exhibited a reluctance to change to accruals. However, 
some innovations (top-down budgeting framework decisions, text explica-
tions about results, realignment of the structure of the budget and the 
introduction of spending reviews; Reichard and Küchler-Stahn 2019: 
103) have been introduced to the federal budgeting process. This approach 
Table 22.2 Implementation of accrual accounting in German Länder and local 
governments
Federal state Reform option for 
local governments 










Reform option for the 
Länder 
administration (year 




Accrual (2020) 1136 197 Cash
Bavaria Choice 2127 95 Cash
Berlin Cash 1 0 Cash
Brandenburg Accrual (2011) 432 432 Cash
Bremen Accrual (2010) 2 2 Accrual (2010)
Hamburg Accrual (2006) 1 1 Accrual (2006)
Hesse Accrual (2015) 447 447 Accrual (2009)








Accrual (2009) 427 427 Accrual (2018)
Rhineland 
Palatinate
Accrual (2009) 2239 2239 Cash
Saarland Accrual (2010) 58 58 Cash
Saxony Accrual (2013) 441 441 Cash
Saxony-Anhalt Accrual (2013) 233 233 Cash
Schleswig 
Holstein
Choice (2007) 1121 502 Cash
Thuringia Choice (2007) 866 42 Cash
Total (2017) 11,325 6911
Source: Hilgers et al. (2018: 14)
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differs from the product budgets and the performance information per 
product group as used by the Länder and local governments. However, it 
can euphemistically be seen as a modest move towards a more results- 
oriented federal budget.
3.3  Impacts
The NMFM reforms have been one of the core reform projects over the 
past twenty years. The mandatory NMFM reforms have combined and 
underpinned two reform ambitions. First, the accounting concept should 
be changed to accruals in order to provide more realistic and transparent 
financial information based on resource consumption and not only on 
expenditures. Second, output-oriented control of public administration 
should be strengthened by product budgets with performance objectives 
and indicators. The debate on accounting reforms and the shift from cash- 
based to accrual accounting started in parallel with the NSM debate in the 
1990s. It was also strongly led by the KGSt, but was not initially part of 
the NSM agenda. The link between the NMFM and the NSM debates 
only arose out of the seminal 2003 framework decision of the conference 
held by the ministers of the interior of the Länder, according to which 
core elements of the NSM model (product budgets, performance man-
agement) were made an integral part of the NMFM reforms.
As expected, formal adoption of the new accounting method was com-
pleted within the set time frames, at least in the Länder where this transi-
tion was mandatory. The impact of the reforms on management and 
control behaviour is less visible. A recent survey study, which included the 
local governments of the three Länder, Lower Saxony, North Rhine- 
Westphalia and Saxony-Anhalt (Weiss and Schubert 2020), found that 
slightly more than half of the surveyed local governments perceive the 
reforms as allowing for a more realistic overview of the financial situation 
and consider the reforms useful. The conviction that accrual accounting 
provides more realistic information about the financial situation is no lon-
ger contested. Nevertheless, the cost-benefit relation of the reforms has 
attracted criticism and the general relevance of cost and equity-related 
financial information for decision-making (as opposed to its informational 
appeal) is still controversial in the German debate (Bogumil 2017: 25).
Regarding the use of performance information and more results- 
oriented management, several studies substantiate the claim that control, 
or deliberation over performance objectives and indicators is still of 
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negligible relevance in the budgeting decision and control mechanisms. 
Performance indicators in German product budgets usually only refer to 
quantitative (often not transparently) selected aspects of single products 
within a product group. They are therefore by no means comprehensive 
or designed to satisfy an organisational control ambition and are purely 
informational in character. Accordingly, empirical studies conclude that 
performance information has only been partially provided and then hardly 
used for control and decision-making—either within the administration or 
for political decision-making (Weiss and Schubert 2020: 16–18; Bogumil 
2017: 25–27; Burth and Hilgers 2014; Kroll and Proeller 2012). 
According to Weiß and Schubert (2020: 17), only 5 per cent of local gov-
ernments reported the use of performance information for the manage-
ment of expenses and services at the operational level, and even less for 
political decision-making (3 per cent). In a different study, it was found 
that more than 60 per cent of members of local councils claimed that they 
had not perceived any changes in the budgeting process except for the 
accounting method (Bogumil 2017: 25).
Exploring to what extent the reform ambition of strengthening the 
strategic orientation of political and administrative control has been 
accomplished, Weiss (2017) concludes that no more than fifteen to 20 per 
cent of local governments make use of a minimum of medium-term, 
objective-oriented information and analysis in their product budgets that 
would eventually allow them to follow a strategic management approach. 
Similar results were found for the ‘strategicness’ of political and adminis-
trative control, with 19.6 per cent of local governments reporting to make 
use of strategic objectives and only 7.1 per cent of local governments 
using these for political control (Weiss and Schubert 2020: 17). In gen-
eral, results show that although some cities have defined strategic objec-
tives setting out priorities and guidelines, there are no mechanisms in 
place linking these strategic objectives to resource allocation at the prod-
uct (group) level. Needless to say, while strategic objectives may exist, 
their impact as well as their inclusion in further control mechanisms, and 
particularly in resource allocation, is not (yet) readily apparent. In this 
vein, it is also important to note that an outcome orientation in the sense 
of using and including outcomes as a core variable or dimension in inte-
grated planning—such as the integrated task and financial planning in 
Switzerland, and now also in Austria—has never been an element of debate 
in Germany. However, there are also some noteworthy exceptions to this 
rule where local governments have initiated a deliberate process of 
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establishing strategic processes (e.g. the city of Potsdam, the county of 
Potsdam-Mittelmark and the city of Mannheim; Proeller 2015) with 
which to pursue a strengthening of the outcome focus as a crucial dimen-
sion for strategic control (e.g. the cities of Mannheim and Cologne).
In sum, recent financial management reforms in Germany have not had 
any significant effect on changing the mode or culture of political or 
administrative management. The product budgets used in German local 
governments are of a largely informational character and do not include a 
systemic link between performance information and the financial appro-
priations. This also applies to the performance budgets found at the 
Länder level. Further, the logic of financial control is still focussed on 
expenditures and appropriations (as opposed to results or lump sums).
4  leSSonS leArned
Over the past decades, German public administration has been exposed to 
a number of large-scale management reforms. Conceptually, the reform 
models have been ambitious and in line with the international trends of 
those years in terms of strengthening the focus of public administration on 
results, strategy and management orientation. Empirically, however, 
reform practices have focussed rather more on the technical and structural 
aspects of the reform models, such as the customer orientation and cost 
awareness elements of the NSM and the technical accounting methods of 
the NMFM reforms.
As a result, the reforms of the thirty years since German reunification 
have not altered the basic bureaucratic and legalistic characteristics of 
German public administration. Control and accountability mechanisms in 
Germany are still primarily based on inputs and due process, and there has 
been no substantial increase in the capacities for strategic management. 
We should note, however, that it is questionable to what extent a stronger 
results orientation and strategic alignment would actually match the prob-
lem perception of political and administrative actors in the German public 
sector. For one thing, an unambiguous conclusion of the reform is that its 
elements aimed at redefining the role and control mechanisms for the 
political level have had no discernible effect. Instead, there continues to be 
a rather self-confident stance towards the functioning and control mecha-
nisms of the bureaucratic system in Germany. Less emphasis has been 
given to the development of effective mechanisms for medium-term 
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planning, strategic management and alignment or accountability for 
results compared to other countries.
The German pattern of accommodating management-oriented reforms 
into the prevailing legalistic administrative structure and culture has been 
referred to as ‘neo-Weberian’ (Pollitt and Bouckaert 2017), even though 
‘neo-bureaucratic’ would be the more appropriate term. It is used to refer 
to the modest application of selected NPM ideas without giving up the 
traditional public administration model. In the German case, this can be 
seen in the form of an opening up to external demands through improved 
quality and service orientation, the introduction and expansion of partici-
patory decision-making processes, and the provision of performance 
information as an add-on in financial control procedures (Kuhlmann and 
Bogumil 2019).
German public management reform trajectories show an enormous 
degree of heterogeneity. Germany’s federalist structure grants consider-
able autonomy to Länder as well as to local governments. Moreover—and 
also related to the centrifugal forces created by federalism—coherence in 
the transformation process has never been a goal and cannot therefore 
lead to overarching reform visions or coordinated strategies. As a conse-
quence, management reforms in Germany have been used to accommo-
dating local preferences and priorities. By the same token, this grassroots 
approach to reform has come at the expense of comparability, coherence 
and compatibility—which is an increasing challenge to the digital transfor-
mation of government (e.g. see Chap. 19).
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The glossary is based on Introduction to Comparative Public Administration: 
Administrative Systems and Reforms in Europe, 2nd Edition (Kuhlmann & 
Wollmann 2019) with further additions by the editors and with the assistance of the 
Language Service of the Federal Ministry of the Interior, Building and Community.
Deutsch (German) English
Abgabenordnung (German) Fiscal Code
Abteilung Directorate (-General) (ministry) or division 
(general usage) or department (communal)
Allgemeine Verwaltung General administration
Allzuständigkeit (-svermutung) (Presumption of) general competence
Amtsfrei/amtsangehörig Self-governing municipality/municipality 
belonging to a municipal association
Angestellter Public employee
Anstalt Institution
Äquivalenzprinzip Principle of equivalence
Aufgabenverteilungsprinzip Principle of task distribution/allocation
Aufsicht Supervision (oversight)
Bauleitplanung (Urban) land-use planning














Decision of the Committee of State Secretaries (for 
Bureaucracy Reduction)
Beurteilungsspielraum Margin of discretion/scope for appreciation
Bezirksregierung, 
Regierungspräsidium
Regional government, Regional Commissioner’s 
Office
Bezirk/Stadtbezirk District (of a bigger city)
Bund Federation/federal level/federal government
(Bundes-/Landes-) Mittelbehörde Intermediate (federal/Land) authority
Bundes-/Landesrechnungshof Bundesrechnungshof (Germany’s Supreme Audit 
Institution)/Land Audit Office
Bundesagentur für Arbeit (BA) Federal Employment Agency
Bundesamt für Migration und 
Flüchtlinge (BAMF)
Federal Office for Migration and Refugees
Bundesamt für Soziale Sicherung Federal Social Insurance Office
Bundesbank Deutsche Bundesbank (Federal Central Bank)
Bundesgerichtshof Federal Court of Justice
Bundeskanzleramt Federal Chancellery
Bundesländer/Bundesland Länder/Land or federal state/s
Bundesministerium für Arbeit und 
Soziales (BMAS)
Federal Ministry for Employment and Social Affairs
Bundesrat Bundesrat (Federal Council)
Bundesregierung Federal Government
Bundestag German Bundestag (Federal Diet/federal parliament)
Bundesverfassungsgericht (BVerfG) Federal Constitutional Court
Bundesverwaltungsamt Federal Office of Administration
Bundeszwang (Art. 37 GG) Federal enforcement
Bürgeramt Bürgeramt (municipal office rendering 
administrative services for the public)
Bürgerbegehren Citizens’ initiative
Bürgerentscheid Referendum/plebiscite
BVerfGE Decisions of the Federal Constitutional Court 
(published in volumes)
CDU/CSU Christian Democratic Union (of Germany)/
Christian Social Union (in Bavaria)
Demokratieprinzip Principle of democracy
Deutscher Landkreistag Association of German Counties
Deutscher Städtetag Association of German Cities
Dezernent Head of department (municipality)
Dienstaufsicht Administrative supervision









Eigenbetrieb Owner-operated municipal enterprise









Lead ministry (division etc.)
Finanzausgleich Fiscal equalisation (scheme)
Finanzautonomie Financial autonomy
Flächennutzungsplan Land-use plan
Flächenstaat Territorial state (in contrast to city state)
Funktionale Politisierung Functional politicisation
Funktionalreform, Gebietsreform, 
Strukturreform
Reform of administrative functions, territorial 
reform/local government reorganisation, structural 
reform
Gebietsgrenze Territorial boundary
Gebietskörperschaft Territorial community (of self-government/
self-administration)





Gemeindeverband (z.B. Kreis) Association of municipalities (e.g. a county)
Gemeinsame Geschäftsordnung der 
Bundesministerien (GGO)
Joint Rules of Procedure of the Federal Ministries
Geschäftsordnung der 
Bundesregierung (GOBReg)
Rules of Procedure of the Federal Government




(Principle of) own responsibility/self-government
Hauptverwaltungsbeamter/ 
Landrat
Chief executive officer/district commissioner
Haushaltsgrundsätzgesetz – HGrG Budgetary Principles Act
Hessische Gemeindeordnung (HGO) Local government law of Hesse
Höherer Kommunalverband Higher municipal association
Höherer Dienst Higher service
Informationsfreiheitsgesetz (IFG) Freedom of Information Act





juristische Person des öffentlichen 
Rechts
Legal person under public law/ public entity
Kabinettsprinzip Principle of joint Cabinet decision-making
Kameralistik Cash-based accounting
Kanzlerprinzip Principle of Chancellor policy guidelines
Kommunaler Betrieb Municipal undertaking
Kommunale Gemeinschaftsstelle für 
Verwaltungsmanagement (KGSt)
Municipal Association for Administration 
Management
Kommunale Selbstverwaltung Local self-government
Kommunalverfassung Local government constitution
Kommunalverfassungsrecht Local government constitutional law
Kommunalverwaltung Local government
Kommune / Gemeinde Municipality
Konnexitätsprinzip Principle of concomitant financing (one meaning: 
obligation of a state level to provide financial 
compensation when transferring tasks to another 
level).
Körperschaft Corporate body, corporation




Kreisfreie Stadt Town constituting a county in its own right
Kreisgebiet County area/area of the county
Kreispräsident President of the county council
Landesbetrieb State/Land undertaking
Landesoberbehörde higher Land authority/higher federal state 
authority
Landesverwaltungsamt Land Administration Office/Federal State 
Administration Office (Landesverwaltungsamt: 
assumes coordinating and bundling functions for 
the whole territory of the Land)
Landkreis Rural county
Landrat County commissioner
Landratsamt County commissioner’s office
Leistungskatalog der öffentlichen 
Verwaltung (LeiKa)
Public administration service catalogue
Landesorganisationsgesetz (LOG) State Organisation Act
Mittlerer Dienst Intermediate service
Nationaler Normenkontrollrat 
(NKR)
National Regulatory Control Council







Obere (Bundes-/Landes) Behörde Higher federal authority; higher Land/state 
authority
Öffentlicher Dienst Public service
Online-Zugangsgesetz (OZG) Online Access Act
Ortsamt Urban district office
Organisationserlass (des 
Bundeskanzlers, Art. 65 GG)
Federal Chancellor’s organizational decree
Örtlich/ überörtlich Local/regional
Parlamentarischer Rat (1948/49) Parliamentary Council (West German constituent 
assembly in Bonn, 1948–1949)
Politikverflechtung Policy integration (interwovenness between levels 
in a federal system)
Politischer Beamter Political civil servant
Raumordnung/Raumplanung Regional/ spatial planning; physical planning
Rechtsaufsicht Legal supervision
Referat Division or section
Regierungsbezirk Administrative district (Government region)
Reichsverfassung 1871 Constitution of the German Empire 1871
Ressortprinzip Principle of ministerial autonomy




Social Democratic Party (of Germany) (SPD)
Spiegelreferat Shadowing division (‘mirror’; e.g.: a financial 
division shadowing a particular department and 
supervising its budget)
Staatskanzlei State Chancellery









Träger der Sozialversicherung Social insurance agencies
Treuhandanstalt (THA) Treuhandanstalt (agency responsible for privatising 
formerly state-owned industry in the GDR); ‘Trust 
Agency’
Unterabteilung Directorate or sub-division
Untere (Bundes-/Landes-) Behörde Lower federal/Land authority







Vermittlungsausschuss Mediation Committee (joint committee of 
Bundestag and Bundesrat to solve conflicts at the 
final stage of the process of law making in the 
Federation)






Code of Administrative Court Procedure





Volkskammer Volkskammer (People’s Chamber—GDR)
Wahlbeamter Elected representative (high-ranking local authority 
official elected for a specific term of office)
Weimarer Republik (1918-1933) Weimar Republic
 zwei-/dreistufiges System; 
einstufiges System
Two-tier system, three-tier system; unitary system
(continued)
